Uttam Gaikwad vs The State of Maharashtra

A.M. Thipsay, J.—This Appeal is directed against the judgment and order, delivered by the learned Sessions Judge, Jalna, convicting the appellant, who was the sole accused in Session Case No. 57 of 2009, of an offence punishable u/s 376 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/-,in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three months. The prosecution case, was as follows:

� The victim who is of 35 years of age is a mentally retarded unmarried daughter of Laxmibai (P.W.2), a resident of village Ashti. The victim used to wander in the village. The victim often used to go to the house of one Parwatibai (P.W.3), who resides nearby. That, on 17.12.2008, the victim, who had gone out, returned to her house at about 8.00 p.m. She was weeping. Her mother Laxmibai(P.W.2), therefore, enquired with her as to what had happened, when the victim told her that Uttam i.e. appellant - a resident of the same village - had sat on her person, pressed her breasts and had committed rape on her. Laxmibai (P.W.2) examined the body of the victim and found swelling on her private part. Some blood and gummy liquid was also coming out from the private part of the victim. The victim did not sleep during the night, and all the time she was complaining about burning sensation in the private part.

� That, on the next day, Laxmibai (P.W.2) along with Parvatibai(P.W.3) went to the house of the appellant - Uttam, and made enquiries with him. The appellant told them that he had not done anything; and that if they would approach the Police, he would commit suicide. Laxmibai (P.W.2) then took the advise of one Mr. Kadpe Anna (P.W. 5), waited for her two sons, who were out of station, to come back, and ultimately on 19.12.2008, went to the Police Station, Ashti along with Parwatibai (P.W.3) and lodged a report, which was recorded by API Suresh Naiknaware (P.W. 9), who was on duty, at that time. The said report (Exhibit-31) was treated as the First Information Report, on the basis of which, a case of an offence punishable u/s 376 of the Indian Penal Code, came to be registered against the appellant.

� API Naiknaware(P.W.9) carried out the investigation into the matter. He arrested the appellant under a panchnama (Exhibit-52). He also got the appellant and the victim medically examined.

� On 20.12.2008, API Suresh Naiknaware(P.W.9) visited the scene of offence along with panchas and drew a spot panchnama (Exhibit-36). He also recorded a statement of the victim with the help of her mother Laxmibai(P.W.2) and neighbour Parwatibai(P.W.3). API Suresh Naiknaware(P.W.9) also seized the clothes on the person of the appellant under a panchnama (Exhibit-41) and also seized the clothes of the victim under another panchnama (Exhibit-42). The samples of blood, pubic hair and sperm of the appellant were collected and taken charge on under a panchnama (Exhibit-39). Similarly, pubic hair of the victim, sample of her blood and vaginal swab were also collected under another panchnama (Exhibit-40).The seized articles and samples were sent to the Chemical Analyzer, Aurangabad, for analysis and opinion.

� Further investigation was carried out by API Sawant, who collected reports received from the Chemical Analyzer and filed a report as contemplated u/s 173 (2) (i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Hereinafter referred to as "the Code" for short), pursuant to which the appellant was prosecuted and convicted as aforesaid.

The prosecution examined nine witnesses during the trial. The appellant did not examine himself as a witness or adduced any evidence in defence. His defence, as appearing from his examination u/s 313 of the Code and cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, is that he has been falsely implicated at the instance of Mr. Ashruba Kadpe (P.W.5), with whom the appellant had some civil disputes.

I have heard Mr. V.B. Deshmukh, the learned Advocate for the appellant. I have heard Mr. T. S. Lodhe, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State. I have gone through the impugned judgment and other relevant record.

A significant feature of this case is that the victim was not examined as a witness. It was stated that she being mentally retarded, was not capable of understanding the questions, that would be put to her in her examination as a witness, or of giving rational answers to such questions.

The record shows that prosecution closed its case, without examining the victim, and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor in-charge of the prosecution, claimed that the victim was of unsound mind and unable to give rational answers, and that, therefore, the prosecution did not want her to be examined as a witness. The learned Sessions Judge observed that the Investigating Officer Naiknaware (P.W.9) had claimed in his evidence that, he had recorded the statement of the victim, with the help of her mother Laxmibai (P.W.2) and neighbour Parwatibai (P.W.3), and that while the recording was going on, the victim sometimes spoke and sometimes she conveyed, what she wanted to state, by making signs, which were interpreted by Laxmibai (P.W.2) and Parwatibai (P.W.3). The learned Sessions Judge thought it proper to summon the victim to find out whether she was competent to testify. When the victim appeared before the learned Sessions Judge, he attempted to ascertain her competency as a witness and concluded that she was unable to understand the questions put to her and was not at all capable of giving rational answers to those questions. Ultimately, therefore, the victim was not examined as a witness.

Indeed, non examination of the victim, as a witness, means non-availability of any direct evidence in respect of the alleged offence. It is nobody''s case that apart from the victim, there were any others, who had witnessed the offence, while it was taking place. There is also no other evidence, such as, any confession of the offence made by the appellant. It would be interesting, therefore, to see how the case of the prosecution is sought to be proved, for which reference to the entire evidence adduced, would be necessary.

The first witness examined by the prosecution is Dr. Govind Narwane. He is the one, who had examined the victim, on 20.12.2008 at about 4.15 p.m., in the woman''s Hospital at Jalna. The history of the incident was given to him, not by the victim, but by the victim''s relatives and it was to the effect that there was sexual assault on the victim on 17.12.2008 in the afternoon. On medical examination, he found abrasion on the right side of the abdomen, 5 X 05.cm. He opined that age of the said injury as ''7 to 12'' hours.'' According to him, the injury was simple in nature, and could be caused by hard and blunt object. He also found the presence of bruises and abrasion on genital region. As regards the condition of vagina, he found presence of bruises, labia minora found inflamed. Hymen was found to be ruptured within seven days. On examination of vagina, it was found that, it was difficult to pass one finger. He opined that the victim was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse. Interestingly, in the examination-in-chief itself, he said that, initially, he had kept opinion reserved till receipt of the chemical analysis report, but still on the same day, in response to the queries made by the Investigating Agency, he expressed an opinion that the victim was subjected to intercourse, and that she was not habituated to intercourse. Thus, it reveals that though he was of the opinion that the opinion should not be expressed till receipt of chemical analysis report, actually without waiting for the chemical analysis report, he gave his opinion to the aforesaid effect.

In the cross-examination, Dr. Govind(P.W.1) stated that the victim was unable to tell anything to him, as she was mentally retarded. According to him, she could not express herself, because of her mental condition. He admitted that even after taking bath, the spermatozoa in vaginal smear remain alive for 72 hours, and for seven days in dead condition. He denied the suggestion that he had given the opinion without receipt of chemical analysis report, though initially he had reserved it for want of such report. He claimed that chemical analysis report was only for confirmation. He, however, admitted that the chemical analysis report did not support his opinion that the victim was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse.

According to Laxmibai (P.W.2), the incident had taken place on 17.12.2008 and that at about 8.00 p.m. on that day, her daughter-victim - came to the house, and was weeping. It is because of that, Laxmibai(P.W.2) enquired with her, when the victim told her that the appellant had sat on her person, had pressed her breasts and had performed sexual intercourse with her. That, on examination of the victim''s body, she found swelling on her private part and blood and gummy liquid coming out therefrom. That, the victim could not sleep in the night, and that all time she was complaining about a burning sensation in her private part. That, on the next day, Parwatibai (P.W.3) came to the house of Laximibai(P.W.2) and they both, along with the victim, went to the house of appellant. Laxmibai(P.W.2) had narrated the entire incident to Parwatibai(P.W.3). That, when they made inquiries with appellant, the appellant said that he had not done anything, and if they would approach the police station, he would commit suicide.

Laxmibai(P.W.2) and Parwatibai(P.W.3) then returned to home. Laxmibai (P.W.2), initially, said that on the way they met Mr. Kadpe Anna (P.W. 5), but later on corrected herself by saying that Mr. Kadpe Anna met them on the next day i.e. on 19.12.2008, on the village road. Laxmibai(P.W.2) told to Mr. Kadpe anna (P.W.5) that the appellant had committed rape on the victim. On the day of the incident, her sons were not present in the village and that one of them returned at about 2.00 a.m. on 18.12.2008. That, the other came to the house about 2/3 days thereafter. It is thereafter, that the matter was reported to the Police. Laxmibai (P.W.2) categorically stated that she narrated the entire incident to the police, which narration was reduced into writing by the Police. She admitted the contents of the FIR (Exhibit-31) as true and correct.

In the cross-examination, Laxmibai(P.W.3) admitted that there is one Public Health Centre at village Ashti, but that she had not taken the victim either to the Public Health Centre or to any private dispensary in the village. She was sought to be contradicted by confronting her with some part of the First Information Report, but it is not significant in my opinion. Laxmibai(P.W.2) also said that clothes of the victim were stained with blood and gummy liquid, and thereafter, voluntarily added that ''on the next day, in the morning, she washed the said clothes and had also given bath to the victim.'' According to Laxmibai (P.W.2), the victim had shown the place of incident to the police, and that Laxmibai (P.W.2) was accompanying her at that time.

The evidence of Parwatibai(P.W.3) shows that on 17.12.2008, she had been to some other village for her personal work, but in the evening, her husband telephoned her and told that the victim was saying that the appellant had committed rape on her. That, on the next day, at about 8.00 a. m., she returned to home and then went to the house of the victim. According to her, the victim told her about the rape committed by the appellant on her. In the cross-examination, she said that her husband told her on phone about the incident of rape. She denied that the victim narrated the entire incident to her. She denied that when she and Laxmibai(P.W.2) enquired with the appellant about the incident, he told them that he would commit suicide, if they would approach the police. This is contradictory to the version of Laxmibai (P.W.2), who does speak about such threat of suicide given by the appellant, should they approach the Police.

The fourth witness Madan Khade(p.W.4), is the husband of Parwatibai(P.W.3). According to him, on 17.12.2008 at about 12.30 p.m., when he was in the house, situated in the field, the victim and the appellant came there. The appellant lit a " " and there was a casual talk between this witness and the appellant. That, the appellant told this witness that he had given " " of two rupees to the victim. Madan(P.W.4) then went towards water canal in his field; and the victim and the appellant left his house. That, he returned to his house, after about one hour, and about two hours thereafter, the victim came to his house, alone. According to this witness, the victim told him that he should accompany her, as she wanted to beat Uttam i.e. the appellant. The witness asked the victim, what appellant had done with her, when she said that ''the appellant had sat on her body and pressed her breasts''. The witness then told her to go to her house. He made a telephone call to Parwatibai (P.W.3) and told what victim had told her. In the cross- examination, he claimed that he asked the victim about other details of the incident, but that the victim told him that ''she would disclose the same to his wife''. This is remarkable, because such an answer, which reflects ability to contemplate and discriminate, would not be expected from a person who is found not competent to testify, because of mental incapacity.

The evidence of Ashruba Kadpe (P.W.5) shows that he met Laxmibai (P.W.2) and victim on 19.12.2008, on village road, and that Laxmibai (P.W.) told him that, the appellant had committed rape on the victim. That, he advised her to take advise of her son and approach police station, if needed. This witness is not a resident of village Ashti, but a resident of Raigavan. He has a cloth shop and grocery shop in the village Ashti, and he daily comes to Ashti from his village.

In the cross-examination, he admitted, inter alia, that he had purchased land ad-measuring 3 Acres 15 R from the appellant, about 10 years back, and that the land of the appellant ad- measuring about 4 acres is adjacent to the said purchased land. He also admitted that the appellant was working as a driver with him. The witness, however, denied that he was insisting that the appellant should sell his land to him, and that, that is why the appellant had left the job. It is revealed in his cross-examination that though his shop is situated just opposite the house of Laxmibai (P.W.2), and though he was present in his shop on 17.12.2008 and 18.12.2008 also, Laxmibai(P.W.2) did not tell him of the incident, but mentioned it only on 19.12.2008, that too not by going to his shop, but when they accidentally met on the road.

The sixth witness Shivram Satpute is a panch in respect of spot panchnama, drawn on 20.12.2008. According to him, the spot was pointed out by the victim. According to him, at that time, there was standing crop of Jawar and the standing crop of Jawar was found destroyed at that spot.

The seventh witness is one Raju Shete, who runs a grocery shop on the main road of village Ashti. Through him it was sought to be established that the appellant had purchased " " from his shop, had given it to the victim. This witness, however, did not support the case of the prosecution and was declared as hostile. There is nothing in his evidence, which would advance the case of the prosecution.

The eighth witness Ramesh Sonwane, Assistant Police Inspector, is the one, who had recorded a statement of witness Raju (P.W.7), and through him, contradictory version of the said witness, advanced by him, before the police, was brought on record. His evidence is not significant.

The ninth witness Suresh Haribhai Naiknavare, it may be recalled, is the Investigating Officer. In his cross-examination, he stated that the police party went to the scene of offence, as per direction given by the victim herself. He also admitted that place of incident was at a distance of about 2 k.m. from Ashti Police Station. Perhaps by realizing, that this would be inconsistent with the theory of the victim being mentally retarded and unable to answer the questions put to her, the witness added that ''some times the victim was talking, and some times she expressed herself through signs to her mother, and that the mother had taken the police party to the spot.'' According to him, the victim narrated the actual incident of rape by signs. That, victim actually showed to the police party the position and the acts committed during the commission of rape. Interestingly, he denied the suggestion that the statement of the victim was recorded by him, as per the incident narrated by her mother and claimed that statement of the victim had been recorded, as he had found her mentally sound.

The evidence has been discussed above in some details, so as to make it clear that there is no direct evidence with respect to the alleged incident. It is clear that none of the witness have any personal knowledge of the alleged incident. Their knowledge of the incident, is only on the basis of what the victim had allegedly told them. It is elementary that the evidence of these witnesses as regards incident would be merely hear-say. Section 60 of the Evidence Act, mandates that oral evidence must be direct and the evidence of none of the witnesses, in this case is ''direct'' as regards the incident of rape. The victim, who had experienced the incident, has not been examined as a witness, and none of the other witnesses have witnessed the incident or any part thereof. The position that the evidence of Laxmibai (P.W.2) and Parwatibai (P.W.3) or of Madan(P.W.4) cannot be treated as direct evidence to prove that the incident of rape had indeed taken place, being elementary, need not to be discussed any further, and the learned Sessions Judge has also accepted this position. However, the learned Sessions Judge was of the opinion that there was circumstantial evidence to prove the commission of the offence by the appellant. The learned Sessions Judge concluded that from those circumstances, the inference about the guilt of the appellant was ''irresistible.'' It would be proper, therefore, to examine the circumstances, which, according the learned Sessions Judge, were satisfactorily proved, and which, in his opinion, led to an irresistible inference, that the appellant had committed the offence in question.

The first circumstance, held to be proved and relevant by the learned Sessions Judge is that-

''the victim is mentally retarded unmarried girl and her mother Laxmibai(P.W.2) and neighbour Parwatibai(P.W.3) and husband of Parwatibai, MadanKhade can understand the signs and expressions of victim''

� It was held that "this is important chain in the circumstantial evidence against the appellant".(Para No.16 of the impugned Judgment.)

The second circumstance, which was relevant and proved, according the learned Sessions Judge, was that ''the victim told Madan(P.W.4) to accompany her, as she wanted to beat the appellant.'' According the learned Sessions Judge, this shows that the appellant had done something with the victim, for which she wanted to beat him. (Para No.17 of the impugned Judgment.)

The third circumstance recorded by the learned Sessions Judge is that thereafter, Madan (P.W.4) telephoned to his wife Parwatibai, who had gone to some other village and asked her to return as early as possible.

The Fourth circumstance relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge is that on the next day i.e. on 18.12.2008 the appellant, on his own, came to the house of Madan(P.W.4) and told him that he had not done anything, and that he would commit suicide in the water canal. The learned Sessions Judge considered these two circumstances together and was of the view that they indicated, firstly, that Madan(P.W.4) thought that the matter to be serious and called his wife and secondly that the reason for the appellant having gone to the house of Madan(P.W.4) and having explained him that he had not done anything, shows ''indication of the guilty mind of the appellant.''

The Fifth circumstance relied upon by the learned Sessions is that the ''conduct of the victim narrating incident by giving demonstration.'' This is what, the learned Sessions Judge observed:

But according to P.W. Parwatibai, victim"S" narrated the incident by giving demo. Victim "S" actually slept before them and shown them what accused Uttam has done with her. I do not think that the conduct on the part of victim "S" by giving the demo to P.W. Parwatibai and P.W. Laxmibai cannot (sic) be treated as hear-say evidence and is admissible as a relevant fact.

The learned Sessions Judge was clearly in error. The so called demonstration given by the victim was not before the Court and it was said to have been given before the witnesses. The demonstration, if any, was therefore as much hit by rule against hear-say, as an oral statement made by the victim would be. There was no basis for holding that oral statement made by the Victim to the witnesses, if stated by the witnesses in the Court would be hear-say for the purpose of conveying truth of that statement; but if such statement is made by signs or other physical actions it would not be hear-say. At the cost of repetition, it must be understood that the victim had not given demonstration before the Court. For that matter, even witnesses had not shown what was the demonstration and what were the signs and actions, and therefore, this material was even worse than hear-say.

The sixth circumstance mentioned by the learned Sessions Judge is that the appellant wanted to pressurize Laxmibai (P.W.3) and Parwatibai(P.W.3) by saying that that he would commit suicide, ''in the event, if certain course of action was chosen.'' According to Laxmibai(P.W. 2), this ''course of action'' was reporting the matter to the Police making allegations of rape against the appellant, but the learned Sessions Judge has kept some vagueness about ''course of action'' of which the appellant was apprehensive.

The seventh circumstance was that Laxmibai(P.W.2) had found swelling on the private part of the victim and that blood and gummy liquid was coming out there from. That, the victim made complaint to Laxmibai(P.W.2) that there was burning sensation in her private part.

The learned Sessions Judge next discussed the evidence of Dr. Govind Narwane(P.W.1) and the circumstance that hymen was found ruptured within seven days. That, on examination of vagina, it revealed that it was difficult to pass one finger. That vagina was inflamed and that there was an abrasion on abdomen of the victim. ''The learned Sessions Judge observed that analysis report did not support the opinion of this witness, he stuck up to his opinion that the considered this as a sign of reliability of evidence of this witness. In other words, according the learned Sessions Judge, though opinion of this witness was not supported by other scientific opinion, that he still persisted in holding his opinion, was a guarantee of such opinion being correct. This line of reasoning is rather strange and cannot be accepted as correct.

In para No. 25 of the impugned judgment, the learned Sessions Judge concluded that ''The cumulative effect of all these circumstances un- mistakenly point out the involvement of the accused in the crime and none else.''

It is not possible to accept either the correctness of the appreciation of the evidence, as done by the learned Sessions Judge, or the correctness of the inference drawn by him, from such evidence. It is also not possible to accept his conclusion that these circumstances indicated that offence had infact being committed and further that it had been committed by none else, but the appellant.

The circumstances relied upon by the learned Sessions, may now be commented upon.

The circumstance No.1 is not relevant in establishing the offence, and all that it would indicate that Laxmibai(P.W.2), Parwatibai(P.W.3) and Madan(P.W.4) could understand the signs and expressions of the victim, which position was not disputed by any one. To call this circumstance, as ''an important chain in the circumstantial evidence against the accused'' as has been done by the Sessions Judge, is quite strange.

Regarding the second and third circumstances, indeed, the inference that something must have happened between the victim and the appellant, as she wanted to beat the appellant would be correct. However, while relying on these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge overlooked a serious infirmity in the case of the prosecution. It is that, the evidence shows that this complaint about the appellant was made by the victim to Madan (P.W.4), some time at about 3.30 to 4.30 p.m. Madan''s evidence clearly shows at about 12.30 p.m. the appellant and the victim were together and they went out. That, Madan(P.W.4) also went out and came back to his house after about one hour. That, the victim came to Madan(P.W.4)''s house alone, about two hours thereafter. This would indicate that to have been done by the appellant to the victim, and which the learned Sessions Judge believed to be the act of rape, had taken place, in any case, before 4.30 p.m. The victim was not weeping at that time. She was then asked to go to her home, and according to Madan(P.W.4), she went away. As against this, version of Laxmibai(P.W.2) is that the victim came to the house at about 8.00 p.m. and that at that time she was weeping. That, it is at that time, she narrated the incident to Laxmibai(P.W.2). This evidence does not match with what had been stated by Madan(P.W.4) The learned Sessions Judge failed to apply his mind as to when the incident of rape had taken place, as per the evidence. If it is presumed that the incident had already taken place before 4.30 p. m., weeping of the victim at 8.00 p.m. after going to her house (and not weeping at 4.30 p.m.) is not consistent with that theory. If, on the other hand, something had happened after 4.30 p.m., then, clearly, it was not related to the complaint allegedly made by the victim to Madan (P.W.4) against the appellant, which was before 4.30 p.m.

The circumstance that the appellant threatened that, he would commit suicide, has been wrongly held by the Sessions Judge to be indicative of guilt of the appellant. The evidence is clear that the witnesses had accused the appellant - on the basis of inference drawn by them from what the victim had told them - that he had committed rape on the victim, and that the appellant had clearly told them that he had not done anything. It was natural for the appellant to be apprehensive that Laxmibai(P.W.2) might report the matter to the police and then he would subjected to arrest and further un-pleasant actions by the Investigating Agency. The logic-that only guilty person would try to avoid the accusation of having committed an offence, and an innocent would not be bothered, even if he is threatened that an allegation of his having committed an offence would be made to the police, as is implicit in the reasoning of the Session Judge - is difficult to understand.

As regards the fifth circumstance, it has already been observed that, the observation that that ''the demonstration allegedly given by the victim to Parwatibai (P.W.3) and Laxmibai (P.W.2) as spoken to about by Parwatibai (P.W.3) and Laxmibai (P.W.2) in Court was not hear-say,'' is absolutely incorrect. Moreover, the learned Sessions Judge came to such a conclusion without requiring the witnesses to show in the Court during their evidence, as to what was the demonstration. This finding of the learned Judge, is not only incorrect, but is rather perverse.

The circumstance that Laxmibai(P.W.2) found swelling on the private part of the victim and blood and gummy liquid came out from there, would, at best indicate that the victim had sexually assaulted by some one, but would not show that, that same one was the appellant. This is apart from the fact that Laxmibai(P.W.2) does not seem to be a wholly reliable witness. She claimed to have washed clothes of the victim, though she was thinking of reporting the matter to the police, which conduct is some what un-natural. Moreover, she volunteered to make that statement during her evidence, which shows that she is shrewd enough to understand that there was no corroborative evidence on that aspect; and that she would have to explain this non-availability of evidence.

The learned Sessions Judge also did not appreciate the medical evidence properly. It was clear that the Medical Officer had not given his opinion as to whether the victim was subjected to forcible intercourse - or even to intercourse, for that matter - and had rightly kept his opinion reserved till receipt of chemical analysis report. The evidence also indicates that, on the pressure of the Investigating Agency, he gave an opinion without waiting for chemical analysis report that the victim was subjected to forcible sure of his opinion, is not clear. Moreover, chemical analysis report, need of which for assurance to his opinion was felt, by him, himself had thought it unsafe to give any opinion about rape, without the availability of the chemical analysis report, and when chemical analysis report did not support the theory of rape, that he should still think it safe to give a positive opinion, speaks for itself. This shows that no reliance could be placed on such medical opinion. The obstinacy of this witness, is considered as his reliability, by the learned Sessions Judge, and this is rather perverse.

In any case, the medical opinion, even if assumed as correct just for the sake of argument, would not show that it was the appellant, who had committed sexual intercourse with the victim.

Thus, there was no direct evidence to show the commission of the alleged offence by the appellant. The ''hear-say,''which was not admissible as evidence, was tacitly used by taking it into consideration as ''circumstantial evidence'', in an apparent anxiety, to see that some material is found against the appellant. The so-called ''circumstances'' were neither properly established, nor did they point out firstly, that any offence had, infact, been committed, and secondly, that such an offence had been committed by none else, but the appellant only.

The learned Sessions Judge failed to appreciate the evidence properly. He did not grasp the difference in the timings of the complaint of the victim against the appellant as reflected in the evidence of Laxmibai(P.W.2) and the evidence of Madan (P.W.4). He failed to realize that there was no evidence as to when the incident had happened, whether it was before 4.30 p.m. or after that. If it was before 4.30 p.m, the weeping of the victim at about 8.00 p.m. when she was not weeping at 4.30 p.m., could not possibly relate to that incident. On the other hand, if the incident is to be believed to have taken place after 4.30 p.m., then the complaint made by the victim to Madan(P.W.4) at or about 4.30 p.m., could not be related to the incident of rape.

Another significant aspect of the matter was that the victim was not found capable of giving the evidence. Note made by the learned Sessions Judge at Exhibit 64, clearly indicates that, the learned Sessions Judge could not understand even one word spoken by the victim and felt that not even one question could be understood by the victim. If that was the case, it is impossible to believe that the victim would be able to tell her tale to the Police, as has been claimed by the Investigating Officer.

That, the victim pointed out the place of the incident and led the police party there at about two days after the incident, is also difficult to believe on the estimate of the abilities of the victim as revealed from the record. It may be accepted that Laxmibai (P.W.2) and Parwatibai(P.W.3) and even Madan (P.W.4) would be in a position to understand what the victim would say or otherwise convey by signs, because of their long acquaintance with her, but the question that arises is :- why the help of Laxmibai(P.W.2) was not taken for examining the victim in the Court. If these witnesses could convey to the police what the victim stated, they could - at least Laxmibai(P.W. 2) could - have conveyed the same to the Court. Interestingly, the note made by the learned Sessions on Exhibit 64 shows that, ''the victim was unable to understand the question and was not capable to give rational answers.'' The record does not show that the Court was unable to understand what she conveyed. This note made by the learned Sessions Judge must be accepted and this indicates that, that was the reason why no attempt to record the evidence of the victim was made, even with the assistance of her mother. It would be one thing, if the witness is unable to convey to the Court what she has to say because of some physical infirmity, but it would be quite another, if the witness is not capable of understanding at all, as to what is being asked and consequently is not capable on giving any rational answers, because of intellectual deficiency.

It is, therefore, clear that whole case was based on what Laxmibai(P.W.2) conveyed to the Investigating Agency and what she claimed to have understood from the victim. Laxmibai (P.W.2)''s satisfaction about the truth of what the victim (allegedly) stated, could not be substituted for satisfaction of the Court. Thus, once the victim''s evidence was not available, there was no other evidence, which would show the commission of alleged offence by the appellant. It is clear that it is on the basis of inference drawn by the witnesses, from what was reportedly, learnt from the victim, accusation was preferred against the appellant. There was no way of judging whether the inference drawn by the witnesses was proper. There was delay in reporting the matter. There was no evidence as to the time, when the alleged incident had taken place, and the evidence as to when the victim first stated about any such incident, was also conflicting. There was no medical evidence to support the theory of rape. It was, therefore, totally unsafe to hold the appellant guilty of the alleged offence.

The learned Sessions Judge failed to appreciate the evidence dispassionately and objectively. He did not appreciate the evidence in a normal way and was perhaps, carried away by a feeling ''that due to the unavailability of the victims evidence the supposed offender should not escape''. He stretched himself to somehow search for ''circumstantial evidence'', apparently in the belief that the appellant was guilty. The learned Sessions Judge did not realize, that apart from the lack of evidence, there were factors, which indicated that a possibility of false or mistaken implication of the appellant, could not be ruled out. The impugned judgment and order is not proper or legal. The same, is therefore, liable to be set aside.

� The appeal is allowed.

� The impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jalna is set aside.

� The appellant is acquitted.

� He be set at liberty forthwith, unless required to be detained in connection with some other case.

� Fine, if paid, be refunded to the appellant.