High CourtsDivision Bench

Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Lucknow vs Naim and Others

Allahabad High Court · Decided on 16 December 2015 · Citation: (2015) 12 AHC CK 0021

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.S. Chauhan and Anant Kumar, JJ.
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 39 Rule 1, Order 39 Rule 2, 35-A · Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 115, 65 · Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Section 17 · Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 — Section 28, 32, 38, 38(3) · Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 — Section 117
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
First Appeal No. 3 of 2007
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Judgment

21 paragraphs · 5,581 words
1.

This appeal has been filed challenging the judgement and decree dated 12.10.2006 passed by the trial court by means of which the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant for permanent injunction and declaration was dismissed.

2.

The facts, in nut shell, are that initially the appellant-Parishad filed suit for permanent injunction against the respondents No. 1 and 2 alleging therein that the dispute relates to a portion of land of khasra plot numbers 261 and 258 situated at Village Bastauli, Pargana and Tehsil and District Lucknow, which comes under the Indira Nagar Yozna, Lucknow of the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (for short ''the Parishad'') as the possession of the aforesaid plots was delivered to the appellant-Parishad vide letters dated 7.3.1973 and 7.9.1973 respectively and through land acquisition proceedings, the appellant-Parishad acquired the said land for the aforementioned Yojna vide notification published under Section 28 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (for short ''the Adhiniyam'') in the U.P. Gazette dated 20.12.1969 and the notice under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam was published in the U.P. Gazette dated 26.6.1972 and after conducting other proceedings as contemplated under law, the award was made and the possession of the acquired land of the scheme was delivered to the appellant-Parishad by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in accordance with law, consequent to which the appellant-Parishad became the owner of the said land. It was alleged that a part of land khasra plot No. 261 measuring 0-19-10 was recorded as Talab, though it was a deep pit on the spot and the same was filled up by the appellant-Parishad on which a huge amount was spent and a part of the land of khasra No. 258 measuring 1-7-2 was recorded in the name of Gram Samaj in the revenue records, but since the said land lies within the area of the Yojna, the same also vest into the appellant-Parishad as provided under section 38 of the Adhiniyam after giving the notice to the Gram Samaj as the appellant-Parishad was in actual and physical possession over it. In pursuance to the said notice, Gram Vikas Samiti, Bastauli, Tehsil and District Lucknow filed a suit for permanent injunction for the land of khasra No. 261 measuring 19 biswa, 10 biswansi bearing Regular Suit No. 283/1988, Gram Vikas Samiti v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, in which an ad-interim injunction was granted. It was alleged that on 11.10.1995 respondent No. 1, who poses himself to be the Secretary of one New Azad Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited, without any authority, interest or title, started interfering in the peaceful possession of the appellant-Parishad with the help of antisocial elements by trying to raise thatched cottage, regarding which an FIR was lodged by the appellant-Parishad on 11.10.1995 in the police Station Gazipur, Lucknow, but in spite of that nothing happened. During the pendency of the suit, respondents No. 1 and 2 filed an objection/counter affidavit against the application and the affidavit filed by the appellant-Parishad under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC stating therein that a lease deed was executed by the respondent No. 3-Nagar Nigam in their favour in respect of the property in suit, therefore, they are the owners of the said property and it was necessary for the appellant-Parishad to challenge the said ownership of the respondent No. 3-Nagar Nigam by impleading it as a party in the suit. Thereafter, Nagar Nigam was impleaded as a party in the suit and an additional prayer was made for declaration along with permanent injunction. It was alleged that respondent No. 3-Nagar Nigam has no right, title or interest in the property in suit as the same was acquired by the appellant-Parishad under a housing scheme known as "Bastauli-Gazipur Bhumi Vikas Evam Grih Sthan Yojna" on Faizabad-Lucknow Road in accordance with the provisions of Section 28 of the Adhiniyam and the same was also published in the Gazette on 20.12.1969, as a consequence thereof the State Government sanctioned the housing scheme by means of notification published in the official gazette on 8.7.1972 in accordance with the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 32 of the Adhiniyam and ultimately vide Government Gazette notification dated 12.10.1972, the State Government authorised the Collector to take possession of the acquired land by invoking the provisions of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act in pursuance to the said notification, the possession of the acquired land of Village Bastauli, including the property, in suit was taken over, pursuant to which the appellant-Parishad fulfilled all the formalities under Section 38 of the Adhiniyam in respect of the property related to the Gram Samaj of the said village. Therefore, it was alleged that after the aforesaid acquisition of the property in suit, the Gram Samaj, Bastauli has no right, title and interest and consequently, respondent No. 3-Nagar Nigam had also no right, title and interest over the said property and for illegal means and motive, respondent No. 3-Nagar Nigam executed the lease deed dated 25.3.1995 in respect of the property in suit in favour of respondents No. 1 and 2 and, therefore, the said lease deed is a void document and do not confer any right or title on all the respondents nor the respondent No. 3-Nagar Nigam was in possession over the property in suit at any point of time. It was also alleged that the property in suit was vested in Village Bastauli, Pargana Tehsil and District Lucknow and no notification or Government Order has been passed in respect to vesting the property in suit from Gram Samaj, Bastauli to the Nagar Nigam under Section 117 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, therefore, the Nagar Nigam had no right, title or interest over the property in dispute and the appellant-Parishad through a valid acquisition proceedings, acquired the said property.

3.

Written statement was filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2 denying the allegations made in the suit and it was said that the court fee paid is insufficient as the valuation of the property in suit has wrongly been fixed and the present cost of the property in suit is very high, therefore, on this score alone, the suit is liable to be dismissed.

4.

In the additional pleas, it was stated that they are the authorised occupants of the land in dispute as the said land was given to them by the Nagar Nigam through a registered lease deed dated 25.3.1995 and subsequently possession was also given to them and since then they are in possession over the property in suit and it is wrong to say that the appellant-Parishad was ever in possession over the property in suit having constructions over it. It is also wrong to say that the lease deed executed by the Nagar Nigam in their favour is void and without any authority. Moreover, the appellant-Parishad has not impleaded the Nagar Nigam as a party in the suit and the objections filed against the Nagar Nigam are misconceived, wrong and baseless. It is also wrong to say that New Azad Sahkari Avas Samiti is not a valid society as the same is duly constituted and is a registered society and the respondent No. 1 is the Secretary of the said society. The dates of cause of action as given by the appellant-Parishad as 11.10.1995 and 16.10.1995 are false and fictitious and have been given only for making out false case. Apart from it, the suit is not maintainable as the valuation and prayer paras have neither been numbered nor verified. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed with special costs in view of the provisions contained in Section 35-A of CPC.

5.

Additional written statement was also filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2 vide Paper No. A-120 reiterating the fact that the suit is not maintainable as insufficient court fee has been paid and the valuation of the suit has wrongly been fixed. In the additional pleas, it was said that the suit filed by the appellant-Parishad is not legally maintainable in view of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, as such no relief for cancellation of instrument can be granted to the appellant-Parishad as the suit is defective and the same is liable to be dismissed with special cost. Respondents No. 1 and 2 are the actual owner in possession of the property in suit i.e. khasra plot No. 258 measuring 1 bigha, 7 biswa, 2 biswansi and the land of khasra plot No. 261 measuring 19 biswa, 10 biswansi, situated in Village Bastauli, Tehsil, Pargana and District Lucknow after purchasing the same from its actual owner i.e. the Nagar Nigam through a registered lease deed dated 25.3.1995 which was duly registered in the office of the Chief Sub-Registrar in Book No. 1 Part 715 at pages 271 to 282, Serial No. 3774 dated 12.7.1995. It was also said that since the respondent No. 3-Nagar Nigam is the actual owner of the property in dispute, therefore, it has every right, title and authority to execute the lease deed in favour of respondents No. 1 and 2. The appellant-Parishad has neither acquired the land as per provisions of either the Land Acquisition Act or under the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam and mere sending notice under Section 38 of the Adhiniyam does not mean that the property in suit has been acquired by it and if so, then burden lies upon the appellant-Parishad to prove as to how and when the notice was served and to whom the compensation was paid and as to how the land came into its possession. The appellant-Parishad has miserably failed to mention the basic requirement of the acquisition and has only mentioned the flimsy grounds in respect of the alleged acquisition of the property in suit. It is the burden of the appellant-Parishad to prove the entire proceedings of the alleged acquisition of the property in suit as well as the mode of payment of compensation and only thereafter it can claim its right over the property in suit. Since the appellant-Parishad has miserably failed to fulfill the basic requirements of Sections 28 and 38 of the Adhiniyam, therefore, it can not claim its right over the property in suit. It was also said that immediately after taking over the property in suit into the Nagar Nigam, the property vested under the ownership of the Nagar Nigam and after acquiring right of ownership, the Nagar Nigam has executed the registered lease deed dated 25.3.1995 in favour of the respondents No. 1 and 2, consequent to which the Deputy Commissioner issued a ''No Objection Certificate'' to this effect on 11.9.1995 to the respondent No. 2 informing him that the property in suit is neither under the possession of the appellant-Parishad nor any award was made in its favour. Therefore, in these circumstances, the appellant-Parishad is now estopped from re-agitating the matter before this Court as per the provisions of Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act and the lease deed dated 25.3.1995 executed by the Nagar Nigam in their favour is very much effective as the same has been executed by the actual owner of the property in suit and the same has already been acted upon, therefore, the question of its effect by saying that it is illegal and inoperative, does not arise. The aforesaid lease deed is valid as the same has been executed by the actual owner of the property in suit in their favour and now they are the owner of the said property and are in possession, therefore, it is wrong to say that the said document is void. Lastly, it was said that by way of relief of declaration, the lease deed dated 25.3.1995 can not be declared as a void document and further that since the respondents No. 1 and 2 are under settled possession of property in suit, the relief of permanent injunction can also not be granted to the appellant-Parishad as per provisions of the Specific Relief Act. The appellant-Parishad also filed replication reiterating the averments made in the suit.

6.

The trial court after considering the averments made by both the parties, framed six issues and after considering the entire material and the evidence adduced by the parties, dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal.

7.

Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that Section 32 of the Adhiniyam is the conclusive proof of acquisition and the same could not have been ignored by the trial court on the ground that the same was not brought on record. The acquisition was made by means of notification dated 20.12.1969 and notices were also issued under Section 38 of the Adhiniyam, as such the legal requirement was complete in regard to giving information as contemplated under Section 38 of the Adhiniyam. He has further submitted that in case there was a dispute between the Nagar Nigam and the Parishad, then as contemplated under Section 38(3) of the Adhiniyam, the matter should have been referred to the State Government and the private person does not come into picture as it was a dispute between two local authorities. It has further been submitted that photostat copy of ''No Objection Certificate'' was filed and, therefore, the same could not have been taken into consideration for the purposes of the present case. In this regard, counsel for the appellant has referred to Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act and proceeded to rely upon the decision rendered by the apex Court in the case of H. Siddiqui (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. A. Ramalingam, and on that basis it has been submitted that admission of signature in the photostat copy of the document does not amount to admitting the contents of the document. The land in question stood acquired by means of notification dated 20.12.1969 and if any payment was made to the Nagar Nigam, it was made on account of various properties vested in the Nagar Nigam, which were acquired by the appellant. Submission is that the trial court while passing the judgment has committed illegality in ignoring the relevant facts, therefore, the same cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.

8.

Learned counsel for the respondents countering the augments of learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the land initially belonged to the Gram Sabha and as contemplated under Section 117 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act the property stood vested in the Nagar Nigam after its creation and after vesting of the property in the Nagar Nigam in the year 1989-91, a lease deed was executed in favour of respondents No. 1 and 2 on 25.3.1995 and the said lease deed was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar on 27.3.1995. The Assistant Housing Commissioner has given the ''No Objection Certificate'' indicating therein that the land in question has neither been acquired nor it is in the possession of the Parishad. He has further submitted that a case was set up that the said No Objection Certificate was cancelled on 10.2.1998, but the said cancellation certificate was not brought on record at any point of time and so in absence of any document being brought on record cancelling the No Objection Certificate, the trial court has committed no illegality in accepting the No Objection Certificate granted by the Assistant Housing Commissioner in favour of the respondents. The question of conclusive evidence in respect of the land in dispute, can arise only when the notice to the concerned land owners has been issued and compensation has been determined and paid to the recorded tenure holders, but in the case in hand, the land belonged to the Gram Sabha and it was subsequently vested in the Nagar Nigam which title was never denied by the appellant and thereafter the lease deed was executed in favour of the respondents No. 1 and 2, therefore, it was incumbent upon the appellant to have proved their case in respect of the acquisition of the Gram Sabha land or Talab land which stood vested in the Nagar Nigam. The appellant can not succeed on the weaknesses of the title of the respondents, but the appellant has to prove their own case which they have failed to do so. He, therefore, submits that the trial court has not committed any illegality in passing the impugned judgment.

9.

We have heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.

10.

The dispute arose in respect of certain portion of the land of khasra numbering 258 and 261 measuring 1-7-2 and 0-19-10 respectively. When the dispute arose, then the Gram Sabha instituted Suit No. 283 of 1988 titled as Gram Vikas Samiti v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and the said suit is still pending. Another suit was filed bearing No. 393 of 1995 and the respondents have also filed a suit numbering 4 of 1998 against the Nagar Nigam in which an injunction has been granted in favour of the respondents. An application for injunction (C-6) was moved to which reply (C-7) was filed supported by an affidavit and in the said reply, it was indicated that the land in question has been allotted to the respondents by the Nagar Nigam and so the necessity arose to implead the Nagar Nigam as one of the defendants. After the impleadment of Nagar Nigam as party, a relief was further claimed for cancellation of the lease deed executed by the Nagar Nigam, but the Nagar Nigam did not come forward to contest the proceedings and neither any written statement was filed on behalf of the Nagar Nigam for proving its case. The appellant produced Sri Harish Chandra Srivastava as P.W.-1, who was working as Surveyor at the relevant time and he has stated that whichever land has been acquired, the same is in his knowledge regarding which information has given to him from time to time by the office. He carried out measurement of the acquired land. He was also looking after the land in dispute as he has done measurement of the same. The disputed land is in respect of a portion of Khasra Nos. 258 and 261 of Village Bistauli falling under the Indira Nagar Yozna. The acquisition was made under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam regarding which notification was issued and thereafter the notification was made under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam. The information regarding the said acquisition of the Gram Sabha land was given to the District Magistrate though he admitted that the disputed land at the relevant time was belonging to the Lucknow Nagar Nigam. He also admitted that part land of Khasra No. 258 measuring 1-7-2 was entered as barren land.

11.

So far the argument in respect of compliance of Section 38 of the Adhiniyam is concerned, it is to be noted that notice was given to the Gram Sabha, Bistauli regarding acquisition and as soon as notice was given to the Gram Sabha, a suit was filed by it numbering 283 of 1988 in which an injunction was granted. The injunction was operating against the appellant. The appellant has failed to indicate any document from the record which may go to indicate that any notice was given to Nagar Nigam though the property by passage of time has vested in the Nagar Nigam as contemplated under Section 117 of the U.P. Z.A.L.R. & L.R. Act and after the acquisition compensation has been paid in respect of the land acquired which vested in the Nagar Nigam. The witness has stated that the Nagar Nigam has demanded compensation in lump-sum in respect of the entire land to the tune of Rs. 23 crores, but the appellant has paid only Rs. 50 lacs to the Nagar Nigam and regarding the rest of the payment, the correspondence was going on and on some portion of the disputed land, the appellant has also made some construction. The aforesaid statement made by P.W.-1 itself goes to prove that the land belongs to the Nagar Nigam and the ownership of the Nagar Nigam was admitted as in lieu of the aforesaid ownership, Rs. 50 lacs was paid to the Nagar Nigam as compensation. This witness also stated that the Assistant Housing Commissioner has also given the No Objection Certificate indicating therein that the land in question has not been acquired, but he has also stated that the said No Objection Certificate was subsequently cancelled, but the cancellation order has not been placed on record and only a letter has been placed on record in which reference has been made about the cancellation. Paper No. C-147/5 shown to the witness to which he said that on the basis of the aforesaid letter the lease deed was cancelled by the Nagar Nigam, but the contents of the said letter go to indicate that a letter was written to the Nagar Nigam making a reference that in case the lease deed has been cancelled, then the possession may be given to the appellant. This letter dated 10.2.1998 is itself ample proof of the fact that the appellant-Parishad was not in possession over the land in dispute for which the suit was filed in the year 1995 claiming injunction. In absence of any document in respect of cancellation of No Objection Certificate being placed on record, the trial court has rightly come to the conclusion that there was no cancellation order on record and in absence of any cancellation order, the plaintiffs have failed to prove their case regarding the cancellation of the lease deed and once the No Objection Certificate remained on record, it has to be presumed that the land was not acquired and it remained out of acquisition. The negotiations with the Nagar Nigam are also indicative of the fact that the appellant was fully aware of the fact that the land in question stood vested in the Nagar Nigam under Section 117 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and, therefore, the matter has to be dealt with and settled by the Nagar Nigam. There is no evidence on record to indicate that any settlement has been arrived at between the Nagar Nigam and the appellant-Parishad.

12.

This witness has further stated in his cross-examination that he was working on the post of Surveyor w.e.f. 25.8.1980 and continued and he was also looking after this area, but he failed to tell as to when the notice under Section 28 of the Act was made. He told that notice under Section 32 of the Act was made on 26.6.1972, but failed to tell the date of possession. He admitted that Pond (Talab), barren (banjar and usar) and threshing ground (khalihan) vest in the Nagar Nigam, but the disputed land was not in the Nagar Nigam at the time of acquisition. The disputed land was talab and the same was filled up by the appellant-Parishad for which 10-12 years have passed, but he failed to tell that any copy of the notification was issued or not. He also stated that compensation has not been paid to the Nagar Nigam up till now. The information was given to the District Magistrate regarding the acquisition, but he failed to indicate as to whether any notice has been filed which was given to the Gram Pradhan or the District Magistrate and has stated that for the same the Advocate is responsible. The compensation was made in the year 2001, but no compensation was paid to the Gram Sabha because it did not demand any compensation. After looking into the document C-48, he stated that the said document does not contain the number of disputed land as it is a document of payment of Rs. 40 lacs to the Nagar Nigam. Later on, he said that for the land which has been acquired, amount has been deposited and the disputed numbers were also included in the same. He also admitted that notice was given to the Gram Pradhan, but he did not respond, but failed to indicate that a suit was filed by the Gram Sabha, Bistauli. He also admitted that erroneously No Objection Certificate was issued and the same was cancelled on 10.2.1998, but it is to noted that the said cancellation was never placed on record and neither any information regarding the cancellation was given to the defendants and it must be lying in his department. Application No. C-147/5 is a letter written by the Assistant Housing Commissioner to the Nagar Nigam asking for the information of cancellation, but the cancellation order has not been placed on record to prove the factum of cancellation of lease deed. The witness failed to tell as to what is the spot position of khasra Nos. 258 and 261. He admitted that the talab, banjar, khalihan and pathway vest in the Gram Sabha and after creation of the Nagar Nigam, they vest in the Nagar Nigam. The witness has stated that entire land of khasra No. 258 comprising of 13-7-0 was recorded in the names of Mulai and Shahid and khasra No. 261 was recorded in the name of Nasir Ali. Certain portion of khasra No. 258 was recorded in the name of Mulai, whereas 1-10-2 land of the said plot vested in the Gram Sabha, then in what manner khasra No. 258 was recorded as barren, he stated that it is a matter of enquiry. The trial court has opined that certain enquiries are needed in this matter and in respect of plot No. 258, the appellant was claiming that it has been acquired and the compensation has been paid to their owner Mulai and Shahid but the appellant also failed to clarify that how the land measuring 0-10-0 in khasra No. 261 was recorded in the name of Nasir Ali.

13.

Pawan Kumar Srivastava, who was produced as P.W.-2 also stated in his cross-examination that he was posted in the Parishad Construction Division since 1988 and the acquisition has not been made before him, but he has seen the papers in respect of acquisition and at the time when the acquisition was made, the disputed land was recorded as usar, banjar and talab. Some portion of the disputed land was usar and banjar and some portion was pond. In the disputed land, an area of 1-7-2 in khasra No. 258 was usar and banjar whereas in khasra No. 261 an area of 0-19-0 was talab, but he failed to tell the entire area of the disputed land and said that it must be recorded in the documents.

14.

The trial court appreciated the evidence of P.Ws.-1 and 2 and came to the conclusion that there was major contradiction between the statements of P.Ws.1 and 2 as P.W.-1 has stated that plot No. 258 was recorded in the names of Mulai and Shahid and plot No. 261 was recorded in the name of Nasir Ali to the extent of 0-10-0, but he failed to tell as to when the possession of the disputed land was taken and when the land was acquired. The said proceedings must have been undertaken at the time of acquisition, but he admitted that talab, banjar and usar are the property of the Gram Sabha. The possession of the acquired land was taken, but he failed to tell as to when the possession was taken. The aforesaid finding recorded by the trial court itself is indicative of the fact that P.W.-1 has stated that the land in question was recorded in the name of Mulai and Shahid, whereas P.W.-2 has stated that the land in question was recorded in the name of Gram Sabha and talab. He also stated that the compensation was paid to the Nagar Nigam only 2-3 years back and the usar, banjar and talab land came under the possession of Parishad automatically. The possession was taken through the District Magistrate. The disputed land belongs to the Gram Samaj and thereafter it was vested in the Nagar Nigam.

15.

The defendants adduced Mohd. Naim as D.W.-1 and he proved their case in accordance with law and nothing came out from his evidence which may go to indicate otherwise or which may help the appellant. D.W.-2 N.P. Verma was also examined. He proved the registered lease deed dated 25.3.1995 and he was also cross-examined, but nothing came out in favour of the appellant from his cross-examination. Apart from it, D.W.-3 Brijnath was also examined, who was working on the post of Lekhpal in the Nagar Nigam and he was looking after the property of the Nagar Nigam in the department. He also stated that the patta was executed by the Nagar Nigam. In his cross-examination he stated that the land in question falls in Village Bistauli and the disputed land is relating to khasra Nos. 258 and 261. He also stated that it was not within his knowledge that khasra Nos. 258 and 261 were acquired. The aforesaid evidence itself goes to indicate that the property belongs to the Nagar Nigam and it has executed the patta in favour of the respondents No. 1 and 2 on 25.3.1995, which was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar on 27.3.1995.

16.

The question of compliance of Section 38 of the Act as indicated herein above, has not been there in its letter and spirit. The evidence on record goes to indicate that notice was issued to the Gram Sabha and the Gram Sabha instituted a suit bearing No. 283 of 1988 in which an injunction was also granted in favour of the Gram Sabha, meaning thereby that the Gram Sabha did not accept the ownership of the appellant-Parishad and contested the matter. The defendants also filed suit bearing No. 4 of 1998 in which also an injunction was granted.

17.

The next point which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, is that photostat copy of the No Objection Certificate issued by the Assistant Housing Commissioner dated 11.9.1997 could not be taken into consideration in view of the law laid down by the apex Court in the case of H. Siddiqui (supra). He has drawn the attention of the Court towards para 12 of the aforesaid judgement and has emphasised that Section 65 of the Evidence Act requires that a party can adduce secondary evidence subject to a large number of limitations. In case the original documents are not produced at any time, nor has any factual foundation been laid for giving secondary evidence, it is not permissible for the court to allow a party to adduce secondary evidence. Thus, secondary evidence relating to the contents of a document is inadmissible, until the non-production of the original is accounted for, so as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the section. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof.

18.

Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in the following cases:--

"(a) when the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power -- of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of any person legally bound to produce it."

19.

In the case in hand, the custodian of the original document is the appellant-Parishad and it has never denied that No Objection Certificate was ever issued. The appellant has set up a case that the No Objection certificate issued to the defendants was later on cancelled by the same officer on 10.2.1998. The secondary evidence, therefore, as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant does not come to his rescue in view of the fact that there was no denial on the part of the appellant in respect of issuance of the No Objection Certificate and the witnesses of the appellant i.e. P.W.-1 has also admitted the issuance of the No Objection Certificate. The original record was in the possession of the appellant and the appellant could have produced the cancellation order, but they failed to produce any cancellation order and rather they produced a letter dated 11.9.1997 in which the Assistant Commissioner has written a letter to the Nagar Nigam demanding for the cancellation of the lease deed executed by the Nagar Nigam and requested that a copy of the cancellation order may also be supplied to the appellant-Parishad. Once the cancellation order was not on record and the issuance of the document was not denied, then the benefit of the said argument can not be given to the appellant that the photostat copy can not be taken into consideration and if the execution is admitted, the contents can not be denied. The appellant has not set up a case that the No Objection Certificate was ever issued or that it was a document which was never issued by the office of the appellant, but a counter case was set up in respect of cancellation of the No Objection Certificate as it has failed to place on record any cancellation order. Therefore, the argument of counsel for the appellant does not come to his rescue and is accordingly rejected.

20.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.