Uttarakhand Forest Development Corporation And Others @APPELLANT@Hash Bhupal Singh Jalal

Ramesh Ranganathan, CJ

The delay of 170 days in preferring this Special Appeal is not opposed and is, therefore, condoned. Delay condonation application is allowed.

This appeal is preferred by the Uttarakhand Forest Development Corporation (hereinafter referred as the “Corporationâ€) against the order

passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 636 of 2013 dated 06.04.2018, setting aside the order of punishment of censure and

stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect imposed upon the respondent-writ petitioner by order dated 11.12.2012, on the ground that the

second inquiry was an ex parte inquiry, without associating the petitioner with the same. Recording the submission of the respondent-writ petitioner,

that he was harassed by the authorities of the Corporation for his acts of highlighting corruption in the Corporation, the learned Single Judge allowed

the writ petition with costs and quashed the impugned order dated 11.12.2012.

A brief reference to the facts of the case is necessary in order to adjudicate the lis. On certain charges, a disciplinary inquiry was initiated against

the respondent- writ petitioner and the Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 10.09.2009 holding the respondent- writ petitioner guilty of the charges.

The disciplinary authority however, by its order dated 18.09.2010, directed the Inquiry Officer to further inquire into certain aspects pointed out in its

order dated 18.09.2010. While the Inquiry Officer appears to have conducted another inquiry, and to have submitted his report on 14.10.2010, neither

was the respondent-writ petitioner associated with any such inquiry, nor were witnesses permitted to be examined on behalf of the respondent-writ

petitioner or for evidence to be adduced in his defense. The respondent-writ petitioner was also not given an opportunity of oral hearing by the Inquiry

Officer.

While the Inquiry Officer cannot compel attendance of witnesses (Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. The Workmen [AIR 1965 SC 155], )and it is for the

Corporation to adduce evidence during the course of disciplinary inquiry and examine such witnesses as it chooses to examine in support of the

charges levelled against the delinquent employee, the charged employee is, undoubtedly, entitled to adduce evidence in his defense, and in case

witnesses are examined on behalf of the Corporation to cross-examine them. He is also entitled for an opportunity of oral hearing after evidence is

adduced on both sides. Without complying with any of these requirements, the Inquiry Officer prepared the report dated 14.10.2010; and, on the basis

of the said Inquiry Report, the respondent-writ petitioner was again imposed an order of punishment on 11.12.2012 of censure and withholding of an

increment with cumulative effect.

Yet another anomaly is that a copy of the Inquiry Report was forwarded to the delinquent employee not by the disciplinary authority but by the

Inquiry Officer himself. It is settled law (Union of India Vs. H.C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364 ]t)hat the Inquiry Officer is a delegate of the disciplinary

authority. While the disciplinary authority can conduct an inquiry itself, it can also have an inquiry conducted by another officer. In cases where inquiry

is conducted by an Officer other than the disciplinary authority, the Inquiry Officer is required to submit its report to the disciplinary authority who, on

examination of the Inquiry Report, is either entitled to agree or disagree therewith. Before doing so, however, the disciplinary authority is required to

furnish the delinquent employee a copy of the Inquiry Report, and to give him an opportunity of submitting his objections thereto. (Managing Director,

ECIL, Hyderabad etc. Vs. B. Karunakar, etc. [AIR 1994 SC 1074.] )In the present case, this procedure has not been complied with by the

disciplinary authority.

While the order under appeal is no doubt cryptic, we are satisfied that the learned Single Judge was justified in quashing the order of punishment, as

the said order was passed on the basis of an Inquiry Report which does not accord with principles of natural justice. We are, however, of the view

that the learned Single Judge was not justified in imposing costs of Rs, 25,000/-, merely recording the statement of the respondent-writ petitioner that

he was being harassed by officials of the Corporation. We say so for two reasons. The allegation of harassment made in the writ petition does not

refer to the individuals who, according to the respondent-writ petitioner, had harassed him. None of those individuals have been arrayed as party

respondents to the writ petition eo nomine (by name) (State of Bihar and another Vs. Shri P.P. Sharma and another [AIR 1991 SC 1260].) Further, in

the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge has not assigned any reasons for his conclusion that the respondent-writ petitioner was being

harassed by officials of the respondent-Corporation.

While we see no reason to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge, to the extent the impugned order dated 11.12.2012 was quashed, we

are of the view that costs of Rs. 25,000/- could not have been imposed by merely accepting the statement of the respondent-writ petitioner that he

was subjected to harassment. The order under appeal, to the extent costs were imposed, is set aside. Suffice it to make it clear that the order now

passed by us shall not disable the Corporation from having an inquiry caused in terms of the order of the disciplinary authority dated 18.09.2010, and in

compliance with principles of natural justice.

The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. No costs.