Uttarbanga Veneer and Plywood Merchants'' Association and Another vs Chief Conservator of Forests and Others

Suhas Chandra Sen, J.—This is yet another case where nobody has appeared to oppose the application on behalf of the State of the Divisional Forest Officers, Jalpaiguri Division and Buxa Division, inspite of several notices served upon the Respondents individually and the Government Pleader. The matter appeared for hearing on 31st January, 1986, 21st March 1986 and 2nd April, 1986. Nobody appeared to oppose the writ petition. On 21st March, 1986 an affidavit of service was filed. The petitioners were directed to serve notice once again upon the Government pleader and to inform him that if nobody appeared to oppose this writ petition on the next hearing date, the matter would be disposed of ex-parte. This notice has also gone unheeded. When the matter was taken up for hearing on 2.4.1986, nobody appeared on behalf of the State. The case is, therefore, disposed of ex-parte. It is difficult to fathom why so many applications are not opposed by the State inspite of repeated notices served upon the Respondents directly as well as upon the Government Pleader and Legal Remembrancer. Possibly the State officials want the applications to succeed. Whatever may be the motive behind this strategy, the result is that the hearing of the cases are unnecessarily delayed. It also imposed an extra burden on the Court assessing the merits of the case of the petitioners.

This writ petition has raised a short but interesting question of law. The petitioner No. 1 is an Association of Veneer and Ply Wood Merchants carrying on their business in North Bengal. The members of the Association as well as the petitioner No. 2 purchase soft and fire wood from local dealers and prepare veneer with the help of Peeling Machines. Very thin pieces of wood are prepared from wooden logs with the help of the Peeling Machines which are thereafter placed in Glue Spreader Machines for the purpose of pasting together three pieces of veneer to make plywood.

The veneer manufactured by the petitioners are dispatched to Calcutta, usually, by trucks. The case of the petitioners is that veneer and plywood and other wood based articles produced by the petitioners cannot be regarded as "forest produce or timber". Therefore, the products manufactured by the petitioners do not come within the mischief of the Indian Forest Act. The Transit Rule, 1959 which requires a transit pass for movement of "timber" or other "forest produce" cannot be made applicable to the movement of the goods manufactured by the petitioners.

Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 has defined "forest produce" to mean:

2(4) ''forest produce'' includes-

(a) the following whether found in, or brought from, a forest or not, that is to say:

Timber, charcoal, caoutchouc, catechu wood oil, resin, natural varnish, bark, lac, mahua flowers, mahua seeds, kuth and myrobvalans; and

(b) the following when found in, or brought from, a forest, that is to say:-

(i) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits, and all other parts of produce, not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees,

(ii) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and moss), and all parts or produce of such plants,

(iii) wild animals and skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk, cocoons, honey, and wax, and all other parts of produce of animals, and

(iv) pest, surface soil, rock and minerals (including limestone, laterite, mineral oils and all products of mines or quarries).

Section 2(6) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 has defined ''timber'' to mean:

2(6) Timber includes trees when they have fallen or have been felled, and all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not.

It is to be noted that the definitions are inclusive definitions. Moreover, it has been specifically stated in section 2(6) that timber will include all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose. The word ''fashioned'' is an expression of very wide amplitude. According to Webster New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, the word ''fashioned'' used as a verb means inter alia:

To give shape or figure; to form, mould.

To make; to construct.

To bring about by devising; to contrive.

On behalf of the petitioners, it has been urged that the goods manufactured by the petitioners are based on ''forest produce'' but cannot be regarded as ''forest produce''. It has been urged that section 41 of the Act enables the State Government to make rules to regulate transit of forest produce. But that section cannot be utilised to regulate transit of goods manufactured out of forest produce.

Chapter VII of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 deals with control of timber and other forest produce in transit. Section 41 provides that the control of all rivers and their banks as regards the floating of timber as well as the control of all timber and other forest produce in transit by land or water, is vested in the State Government and it may make rules to regulate the transit of all timber and other forest produce.

The West Bengal Forest Produce Transit Rules, 1959 has been framed in exercise of powers conferred by Sections 41, 42 and 76 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. In the Rules, ''forest produce'' has been given the same meaning as in the Indian Forest Act, 1927. The relevant portion of Rule 4(1) and Rule 4(2) is as follows:

(1) Within the limits of the areas specified in rule 3, no person shall conceal any timber.

(2) No timber or other forest-produce shall be moved into, from or within the districts referred to in rule 3, except under cover of a transit pass in the form prescribed in Appendix I hereto annexed from an officer of the Forest Directorate not below the rank of a Forester duly authorised by the Divisional Forest Office to issue the same or otherwise than in accordance with the considerations of such pass.

These rules have been framed to prevent unlawful felling of trees and also for the purpose of collecting revenue for the State. Rule 9 has provided that any person dealing in ''timber fashioned or unfashioned'' shall reqister with the Divisional Forest Officer. Therefore, timber when it is cut up or shaped or fashioned into veneer or plywood will clearly come within the mischief of the Act and the Rules. Merely because timber has been cut into strips and then pressed together by machine to be sold in the market, the and product will not cease to be timber. If the timber is simply cut or shaped into some other form and then transported, the Act and the Rules will clearly apply. If the argument of the petitioners is to be accepted, then all that a dealer has to do to avoid the mischief of the Act and the Rules is to press the cut strips of timber together by machine into a block. If that is done, neither will the Forest Act apply nor will the Rules be enforceable against movement of such goods. The goods will cease to be either forest produce or timber.

The clear wording of the Statute does not support the construction suggested by Mr. Roy. The definition of ''forest produce'' in Section 2(4) is an inclusive definition. In clause (a) of that definition, it has been clarified that the articles mentioned therein will be regarded as ''forest produce'' whether ''found in, or brought from, a forest or not.'' The language of this clause will have to be contrasted with the language of clause (b) of Section 2(4) which is limited to ''the following when found in, or brought from, a forest''. Therefore, two categories of things are being treated as ''forest produce'' by this definition. The first category comprises of goods that may or may not be found in or brought from a forest. The second category comprises of goods which are found in or brought from a forest.

The articles mentioned in clause (a) go to show the extent of the definition of the term ''forest produce''. Charcoal, catechu, resin etc. have to go through a manufacturing process. These articles cannot be regarded as things collected from the forest in their natural -state. ''Timber'' has been included in this category of goods in clause (a). Therefore, ''timber'' will not cease to be forest produce merely because it goes through some processing.

It will, therefore, be seen that what is being regarded as ''forest produce'' is not only things that are found in or brought from a forest in their natural state but also things which have been extracted from forest produce, like catechu, wood* oil, resin and things that are made of forest produce by some process like charcoal. Therefore, the argument that veneer is not a forest produce but ''an article based on forest produce'' is without any substance.

In this connection, it will be important to bear in mind that all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose will come within the definition ''timber''. Veneer or plywood produced by the petitioners may not have been brought directly from forest. But because of that, it cannot be excluded from ''forest produce''. That some processing or manufacturing activity was needed to produce plywood or veneer will not take it out of the definition of ''forest produce''

It is true that whatever is made out of forest produce cannot be regarded as ''forest produce''. It is a question of fact and degree. Section 51A of the Act has laid down the requirement of taking a licence or permit for saw mills and factories engaged in manufacure of certain articles mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) cannot be regarded as ''forest produce''. The expression ''other articles based on forest produce'' in clause (v) does not mean that the articles that are based on forest produce cannot be regarded as ''forest produce'' at all. If such an interpretation is given, then charcoal, catechu, wood oil etc. can never be regarded as ''forest produce''. It will also make the expression ''whether found in, or brought from a forest or not'' in section 2(4)(a) meaningless.

Mr. Roy, appearing for the petitioners, also very fairly drew my attention to the Indian Forest (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1981 in which Section 51A has been inserted for the purpose of regulating manufacture and preparation of articles ''based on forest produce''. Mr. Roy has argued that the Act has clearly- recognised the distinction between ''forest produce'' and ''articles based on forest produce''.

Section 51A of the Act enabled (1) the State Government to make rules -

(a) to provide for the establishment and regulation by licence, permit or otherwise (and the payment of fees therefor), of saw mills and other units including factories engaged in the manufacture or preparation of the following articles:

(i) Katha-(Catechin) or Cutch out of Khair wood;

ii) plywood, veneer and wood-panel products;

iii) preparation of match-boxes and match splints;

(iv) boxes including packing cases made out of wood;

(v) such other articles based on forest-produce as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette from time to time, specify.

Section 51A enables the State Government to make rules for the purpose of regulating manufacture and preparation of certain articles. Saw mills and various other units manufacturing articles mentioned in clause (i) to clause (iv) of that section have been brought within the ambit of the regulatory power of the State Government.

Section 51A does not specifically describe plywood, veneer and wood-panel produces as ''articles based on forest produce''. The section confers upon the State Government power to frame rules in respect of saw mills and other units engaged ''in the manufacture or preparation of the following articles''. The ''articles'' have been specifically mentioned in clauses (i) to (iv) of the section. In clause (i) Katha (Catechin) or Cutch out of Khair wood has been included. This does not appear to be something different from Catechu. According to Websters'' New International Dictionary, Second Edition, ''Cutch means ''Black Catechu prepared from the hard wood of Acasia Catechu''. Catechu and Kuth have been specifically included in the definition of ''forest produce'' in section 2(4) of the Act.

Moreover, it is to be noted that the section specifically enables the State Government to make regulations in regard to saw mills. A saw is used for cutting wood. It may be used to cut logs or timber into boards or planks. A ''saw mill'' according to Websters'' New International Dictionary, Second Edition, is ''an establishment having power driven machinery for sawing up logs''. The products of a saw mill will clearly come within the definition of ''timber'' in section 2(6) by which all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose has been brought within the ambit of the definition of ''timber''.

In my judgment, the articles mentioned in section 51A are not to be understood in contradistinction to ''forest produce''. The articles mentioned in section 51A may also come within the definition of ''forest produce''. Many things mentioned in the definition of ''forest produce'' in section 2(4) are really ''articles based on forest produce''.

''Forest Produce'' has been defined to include ''timber'' in section 2(4). The expression ''all timber or other forest produce'' used in Chapter VII cannot be used in any restricted sense. In fact, the use of the expression ''all timber'' indicates that all varieties of timber which might not otherwise come within the definition of ''forest produce'' are being brought in within the scope of Chapter VIII. Having regard to the object of the Act, there is no reason to give the expression ''all timber or other forest produce'' a restricted meaning so as to exclude all articles based on forest produce.

It cannot be disputed that if the timber is cut into or sawed into planks, rafters etc., the end products will not cease to be timber or forest produce merely on the ground that planks and rafters are articles based on forest produce. I fail to see any plywood or venner which is made of thin layers of wood glued together will cease to be timber or forest produce on the ground of being articles based on forest produce. The question is, in any event, put beyond doubt by the wide definition of ''timber''.

In that view of the matter, this writ petition must fail and is dismissed. The Rule is discharged.

There will be no order as to costs. After the hearing was concluded on 2/4/1986, Judgment was reserved. The matter has appeared in the day''s list to-day for judgment. A prayer was made on behalf of the State Government to re-hear the matter. In the facts of this case, I did not think it fit to allow anybody to appear for the State at this stage and the prayer was refused.