V. Chandraprakasa Nadar and Co. and P. Velayuda Nadar and Sons vs Commissioner of Income Tax

Janarthanam, J.—In these actions, the parties are distinct and different. But none the less, the question arising for consideration in these

actions are so inter linked in such a way as is not possible to decide the one without the other. Desirable it is, in this view of the matter, to dispose

of them by a common order.

The factual matrix relevant for arriving at a decision in relation to the question under reference in the tax case may now be briefly stated :

The assessee, V. Chandraprakasa Nadar and Company, Trichy, is a registered firm and the assessment year involved is 1975-76 for which the

accounting year ended on December 4, 1973, being the date on which the firm was dissolved. The firm dealt with hardware, paints, cement and

building materials on retail basis. The closing stock as per books on December 4, 1973, amounted to Rs, 9,27,459.66.

The assessee filed an original return admitting income of Rs. 91,890 followed by a second revised return admitting an income of Rs. 2,78,235

inclusive of an addition of Rs. 1,78,075 towards valuation of closing stock.

Originally, the assessee valued the closing stock at cost as hitherto been done, but in the light of the decision of this court in the case of A.L.A.

Firm Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, , the closing stock was valued at the market rate, which resulted in an addition of Rs. 1,78,075 towards

the closing stock in the revised return filed.

The Income Tax Officer accepted the valuation of the closing stock as per the revised return filed by the assessee.

On appeal, the Commissioner (Appeals) was of the view that the valuation adopted by the Income Tax Officer was not correct and he, in fact,

determined the value of the closing stock by adding five per cent. to the cost price in order to arrive at the market value on the date of dissolution.

On appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal vacated the valuation made by the Commissioner (Appeals) and restored the addition made by the

Income Tax Officer to the closing stock.

On these facts, the Tribunal at the instance of the assessee u/s 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short ""the Act""), referred the question

as below, for the opinion of this court :

Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the closing stock on dissolution of the firm, which was distributed between the parties

should be valued with reference to retail market price and not wholesale market price in order to determine the market value of the stock ?

The question as framed above, we rather feel, did not bring out the real dispute between the parties, in the sense arising from the order of the

Tribunal and, therefore, the said question requires to be refrained. The reframed question reads as under :

Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in valuing the closing stock of the firm at market value on

December 4, 1973, the date of dissolution of the firm ?

The juridical facts giving rise to the writ proceedings may now be briefly referred to.

The firm styled V. Chandraprakasa Nadar and Co. was dissolved on December 4, 1973. On dissolution of the firm, the stock on hand was

distributed among the partners.

Some five partners of the dissolved firm, viz., Chandraprakasa Nadar and Co., constituted a new firm, P. Velayudha Nadar and Sons, having their

place of business at 28, Pala Kharai Road, Trichy-8 on December 9, 1973. The said five partners brought the stock distributed to them in the

process of dissolution of the old firm (Chandraprakasa Nadar and Co.) to the newly constituted firm (P. Velayudha Nadar and Sons) on the same

value as was adopted in the dissolution accounts of the old dissolved firm for adjustment and determination of mutual accounts and rights among its

partners.

In the assessment to Income Tax of the old dissolved firm made on March 14, 1977, the stock-on-hand on December 4, 1973, which was

distributed to its partners was revalued by the Income Tax Officer at market price.

In the meantime, however, the assessment of the newly constituted firm for the relevant year had already been completed on March 23, 1976.

In its assessment, the opening stock had been valued at the same value as was adopted in the dissolution of accounts of the old dissolved firm.

The newly constituted firm filed a revision petition u/s 264 of the Act before the Commissioner of Income Tax, Madurai, seeking"" alteration of

the value of the opening"" stock by adoption of the market price, the price as adopted by the old dissolved firm, relatable to its closing stock.

The Commissioner, by his order dated October 15, 1982, however, dismissed the revision petition.

The newly constituted firm resorted to the writ proceedings, challenging the order of the Commissioner in refusing to rectify the value of the

opening stock of its firm at the level of the closing stock of the old dissolved firm.

In the light of the facts as stated above, the question that arises for consideration in the writ proceedings is as to whether the stock brought in

by the five partners of the old dissolved firm, who are members of the newly constituted firm, should be valued at the same value, as was adopted

in the dissolution of accounts of the old dissolved firm in the adjustment and determination of mutual accounts and rights among its partners or at

the market rate, as had been determined by the Income Tax Officer in framing the final assessment on dissolution of the old firm on December 4,

1973 ?

We shall now enter into the arena of discussion in rather a bid to find out an answer to the reframed question in the tax case. Our endeavour in

solving the tangle so posed in the reframed question may not present any problem at all inasmuch as such a question arose for consideration before

superior courts of jurisdiction--High Court and the Supreme Court, in the decision of this court in G. R. Ramachari and Co. Vs. Commissioner of

Income Tax, Madras, and in the decision of the apex court in the case of A.L.A. Firm Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, .

In both these decisions, the question that arose for consideration was as to what was the basis to be adopted for valuation of the closing stock

on dissolution of a firm. The view expressed by this court as well as the apex court in the decisions referred to above reflects in pith and substance

as below (headnote of 41 ITR 142) :

The privilege of valuing the opening and closing stocks in a consistent manner is available only to a continuing business and it cannot be adopted

where a business has come to an end and the stock on hand has to be disposed of in order to determine the exact position of the business on the

date of the closure.

Where a partnership, which has been valuing its opening and closing stocks at cost price when its business was continuing, dissolves and one of the

partners takes over the stock-on-hand in order to arrive at the correct picture of the trading results of the partnership on the date when it ceases to

function, the valuation of the stock-on-hand should be made on the basis of the prevailing market price. Therefore, that the partner, who takes

over the stock on hand values them at cost price is of no effect.

In the face of the decision in the cases of G. R. Ramachari and Co. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, and A.L.A. Firm Vs.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, , it goes without saying that the answer to the reframed question cannot be any one other than the one that

the Tribunal was justified in valuing the closing stock, which was distributed to its partners on dissolution at the market price on the date on which

the firm was dissolved. This question is answered accordingly.

We shall now proceed to answer the question posed as above in the writ proceedings. Neither the decision in the case of G. R. Ramachari and

Co. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, nor the decision in the case of A.L.A. Firm Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, had the

occasion to decide the question as to what is the value that should be adopted, for the opening stock of the successor firm, which happened to

acquire such stock from the predecessor-firm on its dissolution. We have to recapitulate here that in order to arrive at the trading results of the old

dissolved firm, the closing stock of the said firm had been valued at market price. The opening stock of the newly constituted firm, which was

constituted five days later, consisted of the acquisition of closing stock of the old dissolved firm. To put it otherwise, some of the disposed stock of

the old dissolved firm became the opening stock of the newly constituted firm. To bring about the correct trading results of the newly constituted

firm, therefore, there can be no other way, except to value the opening stock of the newly constituted firm at the market price. The reason is rather

very obvious. If the newly constituted firm acquired such stock in the open market to trade in such stocks, the newly constituted firm has to

necessarily part with the market price for the acquisition of such stocks. Therefore, the fact that such stocks had been acquired by the newly

constituted firm from the old dissolved firm at the time of its dissolution does not make any difference at all. This apart, the newly constituted firm

and the old dissolved firm are distinct and different entities and the trading results of each of these entities are capable of being arrived at only if

such valuation, i.e. to say, market price is adopted, either for the purpose of valuing the opening stock of the newly constituted firm as well as for

the purpose of valuing the closing stock of the old dissolved firm.

It is perhaps to arrive at the trading results, the newly constituted firm filed an application u/s 264 of the Act before the Commissioner of

Income Tax for the modification of the cost value of the opening stock, into one of the market value.

To say that the case of the assessee on hand does not fall within the parameters prescribed by Section 264 of the Act cannot be expected to

commend acceptance at our hands. Of course, the power in hearing in favour of the Commissioner under the section is capable of being exercised

subject to other provisions of this Act. The Commissioner of Income Tax, it appears, had confounding confusions in his mind that the opening

stock acquired by the newly constituted firm is a depreciable asset and if the same is valued at the market price, which is higher than the cost price,

the possibility of the assessee raising a contention that it is entitled to depreciation at a certain percentage allowable under the Act beyond the

written down value pursuant to the salient provisions adumbrated under Explanation 1 to Section 43(6) of the Act cannot be ruled out of

consideration. The closing stock, in the instant case, such as hardware and paints cannot at all be stated to be a depreciable asset. Section 2(14)

which defines ""capital asset"" also excludes in its definition any stock-in-trade, consumable stores or raw materials held for the purposes of business

or profession. So to the rationale so projected by the Commissioner, we are unable to affix our seal of approval. We are clearly of the view that it

is a fit case, in which the Commissioner ought to have exercised his powers of revision u/s 264 in allowing the assessee newly constituted firm, to

revalue the opening stock at market price in order to arrive at the correct trading results.

In this view or the matter, we set inside the impugned order of the Commissioner of Income Tax and direct the Income Tax Officer to reframe

the assessment of the newly constituted firm for the assessment year 1975-76 after valuing the opening stock at market price. The point is

answered accordingly.

The tax case and the writ petition are thus disposed of. There shall, how ever, be no order as to costs, on the facts and in the circumstances of

the case. After the dictation of the order in the open court was completed. Mr. S. V. Subramaniam, learned senior counsel, representing the

Revenue, made an oral application under Article 134 of the Constitution of India, praying for a certificate to be, issued for appeal to the Supreme

Court that the question involved in the writ petition is a substantial question of law of gene ral importance and we also feel that such a question

needs to be decided by the Supreme Court by way of an authoritative pronouncement and in this view of the matter, the certificate prayed for by

the said learned senior counsel is granted.