V. Palanivel vs State

G. Rajasuria, J.—Animadverting upon the order dated 31.07.2006 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Tirukoilur in C.C. No. 85 of

2002, this criminal revision is focussed.

A summation and summarisation of the relevant facts which are absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this revision petition would

run thus:

(a) The police laid the police report in terms of Section 173 Cr.P.C. as against two accused, namely, Seviappan and Pandu for the offences under

Sections 294, 324, 506(2) IPC on the main ground that owing to previous enmity, A1 and A2 in furtherance of their common intention, on

10.01.2001 at about 21.00 hrs in front of one Selvaraj Nadar grocery shop, Thirukovilur to Lalapettai road, Meyyur village, abused Palanivelu

and his wife in filthy language and also attacked them, so to say, A1 attacked Palanivelu with a bill hook and A2 attacked the same Palanivelu with

iron road and also intimidated him with dire consequences.

(b) Inasmuch as the accused pleaded not guilty, the trial was conducted and during trial, on the prosecution side, P.Ws.1 to 8 were examined and

Exs.P1 to P6 were marked. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced on the side of the accused. Ultimately, the trial Court acquitted the

accused.

Animadverting upon such acquittal, this revision has been focussed by the injured Palanivelu on various grounds, the warp and woof of them

would run thus:

The trial Court took serious note of certain minor contradictions and simply held that the prosecution case was not proved, ignoring even the

medical evidence. The learned Magistrate was not right in referring to the deposition of P.W.1, as in his judgment he misconstrued P.W.1 as the

injured witness, but it was only P.W.4 who was the injured witness. Accordingly, he prayed for setting aside the judgment of acquittal and to pass

necessary orders.

Despite printing the names of the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner and R2 and R3/accused, none appeared.

Heard the learned Government Advocate (crl.side), who would submit that the State has not preferred any appeal.

The point for consideration is as to whether there is any perversity of non- application of law in analysing the evidence in rendering the judgment

of acquittal in acquitting the accused.

A plain reading of the judgment of the lower Court coupled with the evidence available on record would exemplify and demonstrate, expatiate

and display that the trial Court took into consideration the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 the alleged eye witnesses to the occurrence. PW.1, Uttharan in

his deposition would state simply as though the accused attacked Palanivelu by using bill hook and iron rod. But he did not state anything about the

alleged intimidation held out by the accused as against P.W.2 Ramakrishnan. P.W.1 also has not narrated as to which accused used which weapon

and how the injuries were inflicted. It is not a case where a group of people attacked another group, so that the eye witnesses might not be able to

give a descriptive picture or narration about the facts. But in this case, only two accused are involved and P.W.1 could not fully narrate the incident

and it is quite obvious from a plain reading of his deposition. P.W.2, Ramakrishnan was cross examined by the learned Public Prosecutor as he

pleaded ignorance about the occurrence. P.W.3, Selvaraj also was cross examined by the learned Public Prosecutor. P.W.4, Palanivelu the

injured witness in his deposition, as correctly pointed out by the learned Magistrate narrated as though A2 attacked him with bill hook and A1

attacked him with iron rod. This narration is quite antithetical to the prosecution description as according to the prosecution, it was A1 who used

the bill hook and A2 used iron rod. As such, the learned Magistrate considering that there is no satisfactory evidence to drive home the guilt of the

accused had chosen to acquit the accused. Even though medical evidence was available, that medical evidence alone cannot be the sole basis for

recording conviction and it is quite obvious and axiomatic. However, P.W.7, the Doctor with reference to Ex.P3, the accident register would state

that P.W.4, the injured narrated to her that he was attacked by known persons with iron rod and bill hook. But a perusal of Ex.P.3 would show

that none of the injuries were inflicted by using sharp edged weapon like a bill hook. Had really the bill hook was used as narrated by the

prosecution case, certainly there must have been cut injuries.

At this juncture, my mind is redolent and reminiscent of the following decisions of the Hon''ble Apex Court:

(i) Bindeshwari Prasad Singh @ B.P. Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and Another, ; an excerpt from it would run thus:

The instant case is not one where any such illegality was committed by the trial court. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the

procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has

repeatedly been held that the High Court should not reappreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial court. In the absence of

manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted.

We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction

at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that

of the trial court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction u/s 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against a

judgment of acquittal. We cannot say that the judgment of the trial court in the instant case was perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed

out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial

vitiating the trial itself.

(ii) 2005 Scc (cri) 276 - Sathyajit Banerjee and Ors. v. State of W.B. and Ors., an excerpt from it would run thus:

The cases cited by the learned Counsel show the settled legal position that the revisional jurisdiction, at the instance of the complainant, has to

be exercised by the High Court only in very exceptional cases where the High Court finds defect of procedure or manifest error of law resulting in

flagrant miscarriage of justice.

A bare perusal of the said precedents would demonstrate and display that the revisional court is not expected to interfere with the findings given by

both the courts below and if there is any perversity or non-application of law on the part of both the courts below, the question of revisional court

interfering with the findings would arise.

The trial Court being the first Court of facts had the opportunity of seeing the demeanour of the witness and arriving at a conclusion. I would like

to refrain from interfering with the finding of the lower Court in view of the decisions of the Hon''ble Apex Court cited supra. Simply because in the

judgment, there is a typographical error that instead of referring at one point of time P.W.4 as the injured person, P.W.1 was referred to, the entire

judgment would not get vitiated as the Magistrate au fait with law and au courant with facts correctly decided the matter warranting no interference

by this Court.

In the result, this criminal revision case is dismissed.