V. Panchavarnam vs K. Balasubramanian and Others

K. Ravichandra Baabu, J.—The challenge in this writ petition is against the order passed by the third respondent, dated 26.9.2003 and

consequently, for a direction to second respondent to promote the petitioner as B. Ed. Grade Headmaster. The case of the petitioner is that he

was appointed as Physical Education Teacher at the second respondent school on 16.10.1973. Thereafter, the petitioner passed B.A. degree in

the year 1992, M.A. degree in the year 1993 and B.Ed degree in the year 1995. Thus, the petitioner was fully qualified for the post of Headmaster

of middle school. The petitioner was having 29 years of experience and he was the senior most teacher in the second respondent school. On

31.3.2003, the Headmaster post at the second respondent school became vacant, due to the retirement of one A. Manickam. Even before such

vacancy arose, the petitioner made a representation to the second respondent on 24.1.2003 for promoting him to the post of Headmaster. The

Educational Authorities had also granted promotion to the second respondent school to fill up the said vacancy. Instead of promoting the petitioner

by following the Rule 15(4) of the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private School (Regulation) Rules, 1974, the second respondent school resorted to fill

up the said post by direct recruitment. An intimation was sent to the petitioner by the second respondent on 23.4.2003, calling upon him to

participate in the interview. Both oral and written test were conducted. The first respondent also participated in the interview along with the

petitioner and others. The petitioner on the very same day gave further representation to the second and third respondent requesting them to

promote him as Headmaster. However, without considering the petitioner''s representation and in violation of the said Rule 15(4), the second

respondent appointed the first respondent as Headmaster on 24.4.2003. Thereafter, the appointment of the first respondent also was approved by

the third respondent on 26.9.2003. Aggrieved against the said order of approval, the present writ petition is filed.

The second respondent filed a counter-affidavit and stated that a vacancy arose to the post of Headmaster on 1.3.2003. Since the post of

Headmaster is a sensitive one requiring merit and ability including administrative experience, the management decided to fill up the said post on

direct recruitment as there were no suitable candidates available in the school. The third respondent granted permission to fill up the said post

through his proceedings, dated 1.4.2003. A selection committee comprising of two educationalists was formed and the school requested the

District Employment Officer to sponsor suitable candidate. Parallely the school also advertised in the notice board. Consequently, four candidates

including the petitioner and the first respondent participated in the selection process. The petitioner got total 32 marks and the first respondent got

total 96 marks. Since, the first respondent scored highest marks among the candidates who participated and since he was already working as a

Headmaster of another private school, which produced 100% result consecutively in public examination, the selection committee recommended his

name for appointment to the post of Headmaster. Accordingly, the school committee deliberated the issue and consequently decided to appoint

the first respondent as Headmaster. Thereafter, by an order, dated 23.4.2003, the first respondent was appointed to the said post.

It is further stated in the counter-affidavit that the selection was made purely based on merit and ability without any prejudice or favour and it

was done purely on the recommendation of the selection committee. The first respondent was more meritorious than the petitioner. It is further

stated in the counter-affidavit that the petitioner had indulged in various misconducts, for which, he was subjected to disciplinary proceedings.

When he attained the age of superannuation on 31.10.2006 he was denied re-employment on the ground that his conduct was not good.

Aggrieved against such denial of the re-employment, the petitioner filed another writ petition before this Court and the Hon''ble Division Bench of

this Court was pleased to hold that the decision of the management was right. The petitioner was also placed under suspension and in the

meanwhile as he attained the age of superannuation, the management took a lenient view and allowed him to retire and he also got his accounts

settled. The petitioner was not considered to the post of Headmaster only because he lacked merit, ability and good conduct. Further the petitioner

had not challenged the appointment of the first respondent and there is no violation of Rule 15(4) as contended by him. On the other hand, the Rule

15(4) was duly followed.

Mr. G.R. Swaminathan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that when the petitioner is fully qualified to the post of

Headmaster, the management ought to have first considered him by following the said Rule 15(4) before resorting to direct recruitment.

In support of such contention, the learned counsel relied on an unreported decision of this Court made in W.P. (MD) No. 810 of 2007, dated

8.8.2011, W.P. (MD) No. 11092 of 2011, dated 8.12.2011, W.P. (MD) No. 10248 of 2008, dated 12.8.2011. He also relied on a decision

reported in S. Pandara Vadivu Vs. The Director of Elementary Education, The District Elementary Educational Officer and The Secretary and

Correspondent Mr. K.S. Senthilnayagam, for the said preposition.

He further contended that there are no other eligible persons within the school other than the petitioner and therefore, only the petitioner ought to

have been considered to the post of Headmaster. Merely because, the petitioner had participated in the selection process, he cannot be denied the

benefit under Rule 15(4) as there is no estoppal against the statute. In support of such contention, the learned counsel relied on a decision of the

Hon''ble Apex Court reported in Rishabh Kumar and Sons Vs. State of U.P. and Others,

He further contended that the misconducts alleged against the petitioner were all subsequent developments and the same cannot be put against

the petitioner to deny his claim. Therefore, he contended that the impugned action should stand on its own reason and not to be improved by the

later or subsequent developments. He further submitted that as the petitioner had already retired, only a notional promotion is sought for so as to

enable him to get the pensionery benefits accordingly.

Per contra, the learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that there was no violation of Rule 15(4) while filling up the post of

Headmaster at the second respondent school. He further contended that Rule 15(4) is not applicable to the post of Headmaster, since appointment

of the said post has to be made by selection considering the merit, ability and suitability of the candidates to the said post. The school management

considered the suitability of the petitioner as well as other candidates, who participated in the selection process. The petitioner having participated

in the selection process, cannot question the selection, thereafter. The petitioner was not having good conduct. As the post of Headmaster is

sensitive and more responsible post, the school committee is fully empowered to appoint a suitable person to the said post and the said selection

having been made strictly in accordance with rules, the petitioner cannot question the same. The first respondent is working in the said school for

the past nine years.

The learned counsel for the petitioner while replying to the said submission of the learned counsel for the second respondent, contended that

Rule (2)(c) defines (teacher) includes Headmaster and therefore, Rule 15(4) is applicable to the post of Headmaster also.

The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent submitted that the first respondent was appointed to the post of Headmaster as early as

on 24.4.2003, by following the proper procedure and he is working in the said school all these years. His name was, in fact, sponsored by the

Employment Exchange.

I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as learned counsels appearing for the respondents.

The only grievance of the petitioner is that he was not considered to the Headmaster post even though he was the senior most teacher in the

second respondent school with 29 years of experience and with the requisite educational qualification. Thus, by relying on Rule 15(4) of the said

Rules, the petitioner contends that the school should have appointed him to the said post.

A reading of the said Rule 15(4) shows that appointments to various categories of the teachers have to be made first by making promotion

among the qualified teachers in that school and if no qualified and suitable teachers are available, then to make appointment of other persons

employed in that school, provided, they are fully qualified to hold the post of teachers; appointment of teachers from any other school; by direct

recruitment. Therefore, no doubt, the school has to first resort to promote from among the qualified teachers within the school. Only when no

suitable qualified teachers are available, the school can resort to other methods. The said Rule also contemplates that if the school is intending to

appointment from any other school or by direct recruitment, the school committee has to obtain prior permission of the District Educational Officer

in respect of pre-primary, primary and middle school. Keeping in mind the said provision let me consider the facts of the present case to find out as

to whether the said rule was in fact violated or not. The school committee by passing a resolution dated 1.3.2003 had decided to conduct an

interview from among the teachers who are qualified and working in the said school as well as by calling for list of candidates from the Employment

Exchange. Accordingly, the petitioner was called upon to attend the interview along with the other candidates. The followings are the marks given

by the selection committee to the candidates, who have participated in the selection process:--

(See Table below)

From the above said facts, it is clear that the petitioner was not denied of his right or opportunity for being considered to the post of

Headmaster.

At this Juncture, it is pertinent to note further that even according to the petitioner, he was the only qualified person available within the school

and therefore, he ought to have been considered by following Rule 15(4). The object behind Rule 15(4) is only to see that qualified persons within

the school are not denied of their opportunity for considering to the said post. If such opportunity is given, then there cannot be any complaint that

there was violation of Rule 15(4). In this case, it is not disputed that the petitioner was called upon to participate in the selection process, of

course, with other candidates. Thus, the conduct of the school in inviting the petitioner to participate in the selection process along with other

candidates cannot be construed as violation of Rule 15(4), especially under the circumstances, as admitted by the petitioner himself, that he was

the only qualified person within the school. No doubt, the school management invited both the petitioner and outsiders at the same time to

participate in the selection process. But, such technical flaw itself will not vitiate the entire process of selection, when the fact of the case discloses

that there is a substantial compliance of Rule 15(4). Therefore, in my considered view, the petitioner cannot have any grievance under the

circumstances where his candidature was also considered by the selection committee. When technicality and substantial justice pitted against each

other, it is needless to say that the substantial justice alone should prevail. Therefore, when the petitioner''s right to be considered for promotion

was not denied, he cannot complain against the school, that his claim was not considered. It is well settled principle that right of promotion is not a

fundamental right, whereas, the right to be considered is. When admittedly, the petitioner''s right to be considered for promotion was not denied

and he was called upon to participate in the selection process, the petitioner''s contention of violation of Rule 15(4) has to be rejected. At this

juncture, the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in S.B. Bhattacharjee Vs. S.D. Majumdar and Others, is relevant to be quoted.

Although a person has no fundamental right of promotion in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution of India, he has a fundamental right to be

considered therefor. An effective and meaningful consideration is postulated thereby. The terms and conditions of service of an employee including

his right to be considered for promotion indisputably are governed by the rules framed under the proviso appended to Article 309 of the

Constitution of India.

Apart from the above said legal position, the petitioner''s own conduct will also disentitle him any relief. Admittedly, the petitioner, had

participated in the selection process and became unsuccessful. The petitioner having participated in the selection process, is not entitled to

challenge the same subsequently moreso when his candidature was also considered by the selection committee, based on merits, ability and

suitability.

At this juncture, in support of my above view, following decision is relevant to be quoted R. Rajanarayanan Vs. Joint Director of School

Education, (Secondary Education), District Educational Officer, The Secretary and Correspondent, K.S.O. High School and V. Shyamala, which

read as follows:--

The 4th respondent, who has taken part in the selection for the post of Headmaster by appearing in the written test as well as in oral test and

having taken a chance without any demur, whether can challenge the procedures adopted by the Selection Committee and the mode of the

selection on the ground of estoppel, came up for consideration in the following decisions:

(i) In the decision reported in I.L. Honnegouda Vs. The State of Karnataka and Others, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held thus.

In view of our judgment in Appeal Nos. 883 and 898 to 905 of 1975 (Reported in D. Nagaraj and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others,

which has just been delivered and the fact that the appellant acquiesced to the 1970 Rules by applying for the post of the Village Accountant,

appearing before the Recruitment Committee for interview in 1972 and 1974 and taking a chance of being selected, the present appeal which

questions the constitutionality of Rules 4 and 5 of the 1970 Rules cannot be allowed. It is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.

(ii) In Om Prakash Shukla Vs. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and Others, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held thus,

Moreover, this is a case where the petitioner in the writ petition should not have been granted any relief. He had appeared for the examination

without protest. He filed the petition only after he had perhaps realised that he would not succeed in the examination. The High Court itself has

observed that the setting aside of the results of examinations held in the other districts would cause hardship to the candidates who had appeared

there. The same yardstick should have been applied to the candidates in the district of Kanpur also. They were not responsible for the conduct of

the examination.

(iii) In Madan Lal and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, it is held thus,

...The petitioners also appeared at the oral interview conducted by the Members concerned of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners

as well as the contesting respondents concerned. Thus the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Only

because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview,

they have filed this petition. It is now well settled that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only because the

result of the interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the

Selection Committee was not properly constituted. In the case of Om Prakash Shukla Vs. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and Others, it has been clearly

laid down by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court that when the petitioner appeared at the examination without protest and when he

found that he would not succeed in examination he filed a petition challenging the said examination, the High Court should not have granted any

relief to such a petitioner.

(iv) The above said decisions of the Supreme Court were followed by the Full Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Dr. R. Murali Vs.

Dr. R. Kamalakkannan and three others, and in paragraph 55, question No. 2 was answered thus,

Question No. 2: We hold that writ petitioners are not entitled to challenge the selection after having participated in the written examination on the

principle of estoppel.

The above referred judgments are followed in a recent decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Indian Airlines Limited (Southern Region)

Vs. K. Narayanan, M. Abdullah, V. Masana Muthu and A. Logan, wherein the contention of the management therein that person participated in

selection in terms of the notification are estopped from challenging the mode of selection or the conditions contained in the instructions/rules was

upheld.

I have also considered similar issue in W.P. (MD) Nos. 9694 and 9695 of 2007 and dismissed the writ petitions by order dated 22.11.2007,

holding that the rules of selection are binding on the candidates, who participate in the selection without demur. The writ appeals preferred against

the said order in W.A. (MD) Nos. 90 and 91 of 2008 were also dismissed by Division Bench by judgment dated 5.2.2008.

In the decision reported in Dhananjay Malik and Others Vs. State of Uttaranchal and Others, in paragraphs 7 to 11 (Paras 7 to 10 of AIR) (in

SCC), the Hon''ble Supreme Court held thus,

It is not disputed that the respondent-writ petitioners herein participated in the process of selection knowing fully well that the educational

qualification was clearly indicated in the advertisement itself as BPE or graduate with diploma in Physical Education. Having unsuccessfully

participated in the process of selection without any demur they are estopped from challenging the selection criterion inter alia that the advertisement

and selection with regard to requisite educational qualifications were contrary to the Rules.

In Madan Lal v. State of J&K (AIR 1995 SC 1088) this Court pointed out that when the petitioners appeared at the oral interview conducted

by the members concerned of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the contesting respondents concerned, the petitioners

took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Therefore, only because they did not find themselves to have emerged

successful as a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview, they have filed writ petitions. This Court further pointed

out that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him,

he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee was not properly constituted.

In the present case, as already pointed out, the respondent-writ petitioners herein participated in the selection process without any demur; they

are estopped from complaining that the selection process was not in accordance with the Rules. If they think that the advertisement and selection

process were not in accordance with the Rules they could have challenged the advertisement and selection process without participating in the

selection process. This has not been done.

In a recent judgment in Marripati Nagaraja v. Govt. of A.P., SCR at p. 516, this Court has succinctly held that the appellants had appeared at

the examination without any demur. They did not question the validity of fixing the said date before the appropriate authority. They are, therefore,

estopped and precluded from questioning the selection process.

We are of the view that the Division Bench of me High Court could have dismissed the appeal on this score alone as has been done by the

learned single Judge.

In the light of the above settled legal position, I hold mat the procedure adopted by the third respondent in selecting the petitioner as

Headmaster of the third respondent School is legal and valid and the 4th respondent is not entitled to challenge the same in the appeal filed before

the first respondent.

18-19. No doubt, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Hon''ble Apex Court reported in Rishabh Kumar and Sons Vs.

State of U.P. and Others, to contend that mere is no estoppal against the statute. There is no quarrel about me said preposition. But at the same

time, the facts and circumstances of the each case has to be looked into for applying the said principles. When facts and circumstances of this case

are taken into consideration, in my view, the learned counsel''s reliance on the said decision is not justifiable. Admittedly, in this case, the school

committee, after considering the petitioner''s merit, ability and suitability, rejected his claim and appointed the first respondent to the said post, by

taking note of his merit, ability and suitability. The marks scored by the petitioner was 32, whereas, the first respondent scored 96 marks.

The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following decisions in support of his contention mat there is a violation of Rule 15(4):--

(1) Unreported decision in W.P. (MD) No. 10248 of 2008, dated 12.8.2011.

(2) Unreported decision made in W.P. (MD) No. 11092, dated 8.12.2011.

(3) Unreported decision made in W.P. (MD) No. 810 of 2007, dated 8.8.2011.

(4) S. Pandara Vadivu Vs. The Director of Elementary Education, The District Elementary Educational Officer and The Secretary and

Correspondent Mr. K.S. Senthilnayagam,

I have considered all the above decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

In the order made in W.P. (MD) No. 10248 of 2008, the learned Judge has found that the fifth respondent therein was not having requisite

qualification to the post of Headmaster of Elementary School and mat teachers working in the very same school including the petitioner therein

were not considered by the management before making such appointment of me fifth respondent. It was also found by the learned Judge that no

prior permission from the Educational Authority was taken by the school before filling up the post by direct recruitment. Only under those

circumstances, the learned Judge has found that there was a violation of Rule 15(4) and consequently appointment of the fifth respondent therein

was set aside. The facts of that case are totally different and distinguishable with the facts on hand. Admittedly, in this case, the qualification of the

second respondent to hold the post of Headmaster is not questioned by the petitioner. Likewise, the fact remains that the prior permission from the

Educational Authority was also obtained by the school management before filling up the said post. It is also an admitted fact that the petitioner was

also invited to participate in the selection process. Thus, the petitioner cannot rely on the said decision. The other decision made in W.P. (MD)

No. 11092 of 2011 is also on different set of facts and circumstances. In the said case, the learned Judge upheld the appointment of the petitioner

therein, by holding that he was relieved from the fourth respondent school and thereafter, was appointed in the fifth respondent school as Post

Graduate Teacher. Thus, the learned Judge found that once the petitioner was relived from the fourth respondent school and thereafter, appointed

at the fifth respondent school there was a compliance of Rule 15(4)(2)(b). Here the facts are totally different and as such the said decision relied on

by the petitioner is also not applicable to the present case.

While coming to the other decision made in W.P. (MD) No. 810 of 2007, the said decision in fact supports the case of the management in this

writ petition, instead of supporting the case of the petitioner. In that case, the petitioner was appointed as Tamil Teacher without prior permission

and when the management sought for approval of such appointment, the same was rejected on the ground that the same was made without prior

permission. The said order was challenged in the above writ petition on the ground that the appointment was made by the management within the

sanctioned strength and it was only after finding out the availability of persons, as per the Rule 15(4) and calling for the list from the Employment

Exchange and by conducting the interview by following the selection process, the petitioner was appointed therein. The learned Judge after finding

that the third respondent management had appointed the petitioner therein only after finding out as to whether other candidates who are having

preferential rights are available and ultimately in the absence of such persons, the third respondent management approached the Employment

Exchange and thereafter, appointed the petitioner therein, after conducting the interview. The learned Judge further found mat though the school

management sought for prior permission, the Educational Authority had neither denied the request nor granted the permission. Therefore, the

learned Judge had found that the respondent school therein cannot be found fault with in appointing the petitioner, merely because, the statutory

authority has failed to perform his duty as per law. In this case, as already stated supra, the facts are totally different. The Educational Authority

had granted permission and thereafter, the school authority had conducted the selection process. Thus, the said decision is also not supporting the

case of the petitioner.

While coming to the other decision reported in S. Pandara Vadivu Vs. The Director of Elementary Education, The District Elementary

Educational Officer and The Secretary and Correspondent Mr. K.S. Senthilnayagam, , the learned Judge had dismissed the said writ petition,

which challenged the order rejecting the grant of approval of the petitioner''s appointment therein as Headmistress, only by giving a specific finding

that the said school did not obtain prior permission from the Educational Authority before filling up the said post. As the facts of this case clearly

disclose that the school management had obtained prior permission, I find that the said decision is also not applicable to the petitioner herein.

Further one more vital aspect has to be noted in this case. The petitioner, after attaining the age of superannuation, approached the school

management for re-employment till the end of the academic year. But the same was rejected on the ground that the petitioner was not having good

conduct. When the same was challenged before this Court in writ petition in W.P. (MD) No. 10181 of 2006, the learned single Judge allowed the

writ petition. However, the management took it on appeal in W.A. (MD) No. 169 of 2007. The Hon''ble Division Bench, after considering various

aspects, has observed at paragraphs 13 and 14 as follows:--

According to the condition No. 1, the character and the conduct of the teacher should be satisfactory for granting extension on re-employment

basis beyond the date of attaining the age of superannuation. The said condition no doubt incorporates in itself a discretion, of course, a guided

discretion conferred on the Management to grant extension or not to grant extension on the basis of the character and conduct of the teacher

concerned. Admittedly, disciplinary proceedings were initiated and a charge memo was issued against the writ petitioner on 5.4.2005 and pending

enquiry, he was also placed under suspension with effect from 25.4.2005. At the conclusion of enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted a report

holding that four, out of five charges, stood proved. It is also not in dispute that based on the said enquiry report, a second show-cause notice was

issued to the writ petitioner. But, ultimately, as the writ petitioner was due to retire on superannuation shortly, the Management thought it fit to drop

all further proceedings and allow him to retire on superannuation.

The fact that the petitioner was not awarded any punishment and the disciplinary proceedings were closed will not be enough to hold that the

character and conduct of the writ petitioner was without any blur or blemish. The very fact that he had to face a disciplinary enquiry in which the

charges levelled against him were found to be proved, is a valid ground to take his conduct and character not satisfactory for the purpose of

granting extension on re-employment basis. Therefore, the refusal on the part of the Management to extend the service of the writ petitioner on

reemployment basis beyond the age of superannuation, according to the considered view of this Court, is justifiable. While deciding a case, the

subsequent events should also be taken into consideration in order to render complete justice to the parties.

(Emphasis supplied)

From the reading of the said order of the Hon''ble Division Bench, it is crystal clear that the conduct of the petitioner was taken into

consideration even for making a re-employment and the Division Bench had found that his conduct and character was not satisfactory for the

purpose of granting re-employment. The Division Bench also pointed out that while deciding a case, the subsequent events also should be taken

into consideration in order to render complete justice to the parties.

Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that all those misconducts alleged against the petitioner are subsequent

developments and therefore, the same cannot be relied, has to be rejected more so in the light of the specific finding given by the Division Bench in

his own case.

At this juncture, it is also to be seen that the post of Headmaster is a highly sensitive and responsible post and therefore, the school committee,

which is competent authority, is having every right to select and appoint a suitable person in the said post. The conduct of such person, who claims

for appointment to the said post should be clean and without any cloud. Such conduct whether it is referable prior to the impugned appointment or

after the same does not make any difference while considering his claim. This Court, therefore, is bound to take note of his subsequent conduct

also, while considering his claim to the post of Headmaster.

At this juncture, it is useful to refer the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in N. Ammad Vs. The Manager, Emjay High School

and Others,

Selection and appointment of Headmaster in a school (or Principal of a college) are of prime importance in administration of that educational

institution. The Headmaster is the key post in the running of the school. He is the hub on which all the spokes of the school are set around whom

they rotate to generate result. A school is personified through its Headmaster and he is the focal point on which outsiders look at the school. A bad

Headmaster can spoil the entire institution, an efficient and honest Headmaster can improve it by leaps and bounds. The functional efficacy of a

school very much depends upon the efficiency and dedication of its Headmaster. This pristine precept remains unchanged despite many changes

taking place in the structural patterns of education over the years.

How important is the post of Headmaster of a school has been pithily stated by a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Aldo Maria Patroni

and Another Vs. E.C. Kesavan and Others, Chief Justice M.S. Menon has, in a style which is inimitable, stated thus:

The post of the headmaster is of pivotal importance in the life of a school. Around him wheels the tone and temper of the institution; on him

depends the continuity of its traditions, the maintenance of discipline and the efficiency of its teaching. The right to choose the headmaster is

perhaps the most important facet of the right to administer a school, and we must hold that the imposition of any trammel thereon except to the

extent of prescribing the requisite qualifications and experience cannot but be considered as a violation of the right guaranteed by Article 30(1) of

the Constitution. To hold otherwise will be to make the right ''a teasing illusion, a promise of unreality''.

If management of the school is not given very wide freedom to choose the personnel for holding such a key post, subject of course to the

restrictions regarding qualifications to be prescribed by the State, the right to administer the school would get much diminished.

The additional typed set of papers filed by the school further shows that there were disciplinary proceedings initiated as early as in the year

1999 followed by another proceedings in the year 2003 and thereafter, in the year 2005. Therefore, from the materials placed before this Court, it

is clear that disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner as early as in the year 1999 as well as in the year 2003. Thus, the conduct

of the petitioner prior to the impugned appointment was also taken into consideration by the management.

Another vital aspect of the matter is that the petitioner had challenged only the order of the third respondent granting approval of the

appointment of the first respondent as Headmaster. Admittedly, the said basic order of appointment has not been challenged so far. The order

impugned in this writ petition is only granting approval on such appointment and therefore, it is only a consequential order. Therefore, without

challenging the basic order, namely, the order of appointment, the present writ petition filed against the consequential order, namely, the approval

of such appointment, is not maintainable. At this juncture, it is relevant to quote the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in Edukanti

Kistamma (Dead) thr. Lrs. and Others Vs. S. Venkatareddy (Dead) thr. Lrs. and Others, .

It is a settled legal proposition that challenge to consequential order without challenging the basic order/statutory provision on the basis of

which the order has been passed cannot be entertained. Therefore, it is a legal obligation on the part of the party to challenge the basic order and

only if the same is found to be wrong, consequential order may be examined (Vide P. Chitharanja Menon and Others Vs. A. Balakrishnan and

Others, V H.V. Pardasani and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, ; and Government of Maharashtra and Others Vs. Deokar''s

Distillery,

Thus, by considering all the facts and circumstances, I am of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for in this writ petition.

Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.