V. Prakash vs State

K.B.K. Vasuki, J.—The accused in C.C. No. 172 of 2012 is the petitioner before this Court. He was charged for the offences under

Sections 279, 337, 338 and 504(A) IPC in respect of the occurrence that had allegedly taken place on 17.06.2009. The criminal law was set in

motion against the accused by receiving the complaint on 18.06.2009. Investigation was commenced and was completed and final report was filed

on 22.11.2012 and the case was taken cognizance on the same day and process was issued to the accused to face trial for the offences as above

referred to. On his appearance, the accused filed discharge petition mainly on the ground that final report is filed and the case is taken cognizance

against the accused beyond the period of limitation specified u/s 468 Cr.P.C. and without expressly disclosing in the order taking cognizance about

the condonation of the period of limitation in the manner as contemplated u/s 473 Cr.P.C. It is the case of the petitioner/accused in the discharge

petition that the offences charged against the accused are punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years and the trial Court

ought to have taken cognizance of the same within three months from the date of the offence and as the same was admittedly taken cognizance

with the delay of above 155 days, the criminal prosecution launched against the petitioner is bad in law and is liable to be terminated and the

accused is liable to be discharged from the charges.

In the counter filed by the respondent police, the delay in filing the final report and taking cognizance is not denied, but sought to be explained as

due to collection of materials, particularly, medical records.

The trial Court dismissed the petition on the ground that as the offences to be tried are summary in nature the ground raised herein is not legally

acceptable. The trial Court has also while doing so, did not apply the ratio laid down in the following judgments cited on the petitioner''s side:-

(i) State of Punjab Vs. Sarwan Singh,

(ii) 2009-2-L.W. (Crl.) 1099 : (2009) 4 MLJ Crl. 1169 (Vivekanandan vs. Inspector of Police)

(iii) (2011) 1 MLJ (Cri.) 332 (V.N. Subramaniam vs. State represented by Inspector of Police TIW)

The trial Court was of the view that the limitation is prescribed only to prevent inordinate delay in filing the cases, so that material evidence may

disappear and also to prevent abuse of process of law and the principle laid down in the above judgments cited are not applicable to the present

case.

This Court is not inclined to accept the ground on which the petition is dismissed. The learned counsel for the petitioner has produced the

authorities cited before the trial Court wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that the entire proceedings instituted after the

period of limitation was barred by limitation u/s 468(2)(c) and 469(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code and the entire proceedings as

well as the conviction of sentence, which is the culmination of the same become non est in law. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has, while reiterating

the object of the Code of Criminal Procedure in putting bar of limitation on prosecution, categorically observed that it is clearly to prevent the

parties from filing the cases after a long time, as a result of which the material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of process of the

Court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of offence. The Hon''ble Supreme Court having observed so ended its

judgment with note of caution that it is of utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or the private complainant must abide by

the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation.

The same view is applied by the learned Brother Judge of our High Court (the Hon''ble CTSJ) in his judgment reported in 2011 (1) MLJ (Crl.)

332 cited supra. In the case decided by our Brother Judge, the occurrence took place on 02.06.2004 and the First Information Report was

launched on the same day and the First Information Report was closed on 08.10.2007 as barred by limitation, but subsequently final report was

filed on 21.04.2008, without filing any application for extension of period of limitation as required u/s 473 of Cr.P.C. The Magistrate neither

passed any order before taking cognizance nor observed satisfaction on the facts and circumstances for delay. The learned Brother Judge has by

following the earlier judgment of our High Court reported in 2009-2-L.W. (Crl.) 1099 : (2009) 4 MLJ (Crl.) 1169 in ""Vivekanandan vs. Inspector

of Police, CCB, Egmore, Chennai"" is pleased to hold that taking cognizance of the case beyond the period of limitation is illegal and before taking

cognizance of the complaint, the learned Magistrate ought to have applied his mind and ought to have satisfied of the facts and circumstances of the

case that the delay has been properly explained and the learned Magistrate ought to have observed that it was necessary to take cognizance of the

offence in the interests of justice. It is clearly observed by our High Court that in the absence of any of the order being passed by the learned

Magistrate for extending the period of limitation as provided u/s 473 of Cr.P.C. the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate is illegal. In the

same judgment, our High Court has extracted paragraph 10, 11 and 12 of the judgment reported in 2009-2-L.W. (Crl.) 1099 : (2009) 4 MLJ

(Crl.) 1169, wherein our High Court has made reference to 1981 L.W. (Crl.) 293 : (1981) 1 MLJ (Crl.) 394 (SC) in ""State of Punjab vs. Sarwan

Singh"". As in the present case, the prosecution itself admitted in the case dealt with by our High Court that the cognizance taken without invoking

the provision u/s 473 of Cr.P.C. is barred by limitation and as there was no condonation of delay preceded taking of cognizance of the offence, the

cognizance taken is illegal and the proceeding taking cognizance on the basis of such cognizance is non est in law. By observing so, the accused

was discharged from the case.

Applying the same principle laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court followed by the learned Brother Judge of our High Court to the present

case, which is identically the same, this Court is inclined to set aside the impugned order and discharge the accused from the charges levelled

against him. In the result, the Criminal Revision stands allowed and the accused is discharged from the charges. Consequently, connected

Miscellaneous Petition is closed.