V. Ramalingam vs The Government of Tamilnadu

K. Chandru, J.—The petitioner was employed as a Junior Assistant in a Town Panchayat. According to the petitioner, he joined the service

on 2.4.1962 in Anthiyoor Panchayat Union. During 1967, he was promoted as a Head Clerk. Subsequently, he was reverted as a Junior

Assistant. From 12.11.1974 onwards, he was posted as an Executive Officer, Grade-II. Under the relevant Service Rules, a Junior Assistant with

five years of service and who had also passed the departmental tests, is entitled for promotion as an Executive Officer, Grade-I. According to the

petitioner, he had completed the five year period on 2.4.1967, and had also passed the required test on 30.11.1969. In that view of the matter, he

was eligible to get posted as Executive Officer. The petitioner did not make any claim for such a posting either immediately after the passing of the

test or within a reasonable time thereafter. He waited for one Chandrasekaran who was similarly placed, to move the Government for an

appropriate order, and even that Chandrasekaran by orders of the Government in G.O.Ms. No. 298, Rural Development, dated 9.3.1982, got

promotion as Executive Officer, Grade-I, with effect from the date of passing the order. The petitioner also did not make a claim immediately

thereafter, and just two years before his retirement, he filed O.A. No. 3089/97 seeking for a re-fixation of his seniority by grant of posting as

Executive Officer with effect from 30.11.1969 on the basis of a similarly placed person.

The Tribunal without reference to Section 21, admitted the O.A. and issued notice to the respondents. On the abolition of the Tribunal, the

matter stood transferred to this Court and was renumbered as W.P. No. 30158 of 2006.

Mr. Diwakar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was well within time, and he is only seeking a parity

with the other similarly placed employees, and therefore, his claim can be entertained. He also submitted that his representation dated 8.2.1996,

was not considered, and therefore, he has approached the Tribunal for a relief.

In this context, it is necessary to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology & Mining and Anr. reported in

2008 AIR SCW 7233. Paragraphs 6 to 8 read as follows:

Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the termination. But nearly two

decades later, say in the year 2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold

on the ground of delay (if the application is made before Tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ petition is filed before a High

Court). Therefore, instead of challenging the termination, he gives a representation requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally,

there will be considerable delay in replying such representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage of this position, the ex-employee files an

application/writ petition before the Tribunal/High Court seeking a direction to the employer to consider and dispose of his representation. The

Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to the other side), without

examining the matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose of the representation. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that

every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does

not involve any ''decision'' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to ''consider''. If the

representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason

of the direction to ''consider''. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference

to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made

for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain

such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this

manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.

Every representation to the government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or

barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the

department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the department or to inform the appropriate department.

Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a

fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim.

When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the

matter on merits, being under the impression that failure to do may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the

claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some

kind of ''acknowledgment of a jural relationship'' to give rise to a fresh cause of action.

The petitioner cannot move the Tribunal to revive a cause of action which took place 27 years ago and still claim that he was well within time in

terms of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act. Even though this Court is not trapped by such a provision and the jurisdiction under Article

226 is much wider, yet a stale claim cannot be entertained even by this Court as directed by the Supreme Court in C. Jacob''s case that only a

vigilant person will get relief from the Court, and such a cause of action cannot be revived by sending repeated representations.

In the light of the above, the writ petition is misconceived, and accordingly, it stands dismissed. No costs.