High CourtsSingle Bench(2010) 04 MAD CK 0275

V. Srinivasan vs The Commissioner of Municipal Admn. and The Vellore Municipality

Madras High Court · Decided on 29 April 2010

HON’BLE JUDGES
T. Raja, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 13582 of 2005

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Judgment

39 paragraphs · 792 words

T. Raja, J.—The present writ petition is directed against the impugned order passed by the 2nd respondent imposing the major penalty of

dismissal of the petitioner from service.

2.

The petitioner, while serving as Office Assistant in the office of the 2nd respondent, gave rise to issue of an order of suspension and also

issuance of charge memo by the respondent. After receipt of the charge memo, the petitioner submitted his detailed explanation and being not

satisfied with the explanation offered by the petitioner, domestic enquiry was ordered. Accordingly, the enquiry officer, who was appointed to

conduct domestic enquiry, after affording opportunity to the parties, submitted his enquiry report holding the petitioner guilty of the charges. The

disciplinary authority, after issuing a second show cause notice and on receipt of explanation, having not satisfied with the second explanation

offered by the petitioner, passed the order of dismissal of the petitioner from the service of the respondent.

3.

Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the 2nd respondent, while passing the order of dismissal from service, has not

mentioned any single independent reason as to why the petitioner has been dismissed from the service of the 2nd respondent. Therefore, when the

petitioner preferred an appeal to the 1st respondent against the order passed by the 2nd respondent, the 1st respondent has passed a cryptic and

non-speaking order. Secondly, the Appellate Authority, namely, the 1st respondent, who is the appellate authority as per Rule 15 and 16 of Tamil

Nadu Municipal Service Rules, without following the procedure contemplated under Rule 15 and 16, has simply rejected the appeal in a few line

order, which is also a non-speaking order. The right of appeal, which is under Rule 11 r/w 15 and 16, was completely misplaced by the Appellate

Authority. On that basis, prayed for setting aside the impugned order by allowing the present writ petition.

4.

Heard the learned Counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials available on record.

5.

A perusal of the order passed by the 2nd respondent clearly indicates that the order passed by the Original Authority, namely, the 2nd

respondent, has not whispered anywhere, as to on what reason the order of dismissal was warranted. The Original Authority, while passing the

order of punishment, should have properly considered the case of the petitioner on the basis of the explanation offered by the petitioner and the

findings of the enquiry officer. But, a mere reading of the impugned order passed by the 2nd respondent, does not indicate, whether the 2nd

respondent has applied his mind before passing the order of dismissal against the petitioner. That apart, a cursory look at the order passed by the

Appellate Authority, also equally indicates that the appellate authority has also not given any single reason nor has applied his mind to the appeal

filed by the petitioner. It is the duty of the Appellate Authority to deal with each ground raised by the petitioner in the appeal, but, nothing has been

mentioned in the order, which indicates that the Appellate Authority also has merely confirmed, by a cryptic impugned order, the order passed by

the Original Authority.

6.

A long line of cases speak clearly that even an administrative order, which involves Civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of

natural justice. Natural justice has been variously defined by different judges. In Drew v. Drew and Lebura 1855 (2) macg. 1.8, Lord Cranworth

defined it as ''Universal Justice''.

In Ridge v. Baldwin 1963 (1) WB 569, 578, Harman LJ in the Court of Appeal defined natural justice with ''fair-play in action'' a phrase favoured

by Bhagwati J. in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, .

In Re R.N (An Infant) 1967 (2) B 617, 530, Lord Parker, CJ preferred to describe natural justice as ''a duty to act fairly''. As per the judgment of

the Apex Court in M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , the ''useless formality theory'' is a dangerous one and however

inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. But in the present case, both the original authority as well as the Appellate Authority heavily failed to

record any reasons by applying their mind to the lis in hand. Since both original as well as Appellate Authority failed to record any reason, the

same ipso facto amounts to failure of natural justice.

7.

In that view of this matter, the impugned order passed by the respondents, is liable to be set aside and accordingly, the same is set aside. The

matter is remanded back to the 2nd respondent for fresh disposal by passing a reasoned order after affording reasonable opportunities to the

petitioner.

In result, the writ petition is allowed. No Costs.