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Judgment
Ratnam, J.—An interesting question in the realm of industrial jurisprudence arises for our consideration and decision in this appeal. To lay
bare that question and to highlight the controversy, the factual backdrop may be briefly noticed. One Thiru Veeranan was a senior clerk in the
Madurai District Co-operative Supply and Marketing Society Ltd. He was placed in charge of Srinivasa Mills for a brief period during which a
shortage in the stock of grains and pulses was detected in the godown in respect whereof Veeranan was also charge-sheeted. A domestic enquiry
followed his explanation and as a result of the findings arrived at, Veeranan was dismissed from service. This led to a reference by the Government
u/s 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to the Labour Court, Madurai, in I.D. No. 65 of 1970 in the
following terms :
Whether the non-employment of Thiru C. Veeranan (Godown clerk) is justified, if not, to what relief he would be entitled ?
To compute the relief, if any, awarded, in terms of money, if it can be so computed.
Pending adjudication of this reference, Veeranan died on 26th January, 1973. The appellant prayed in I.A. 102 of 1973 that he being the only son
and heir of deceased Veeranan, should be brought on record and that in the event of an award being passed with back wages, the heirs of
deceased Veeranan will be entitled to get those benefits. The respondent opposed this on the ground that the Act being a special and self-
contained one and there being no provisions in the Act or in the Rules to implead the legal representatives of a deceased workman concerned in an
industrial dispute, the general provisions of the C.P. Code will not apply. Apart from disputing the claim of the appellant as the sole heir of the
deceased, the objection that the appellant was not a workman and had therefore no locus standi to prosecute the case further and that the relief
asked for by deceased Veeranan was personal to him and would not survive was also raised.
The Labour Court, Madurai, found that there is no provision in the Act or in the Rules framed thereunder for impleading the legal representatives
of a deceased workman, that the provisions of the C.P. Code would apply to certain specified matters only and not to all and therefore, on the
death of a workman pending adjudication of an industrial dispute, no legal representatives can be brought on record. Dealing with the contention
raised by the appellant that the relief prayed for was not personal to the deceased and therefore the legal representative could be brought on
record, the Labour Court concluded that the question in each case depended upon the nature as well as the character of the dispute and that in the
present case, the dispute referred to the Labour Court for adjudication was purely personal to the deceased workman and on his demise, his legal
representative cannot, therefore, be permitted to come on record or further prosecute the proceedings in the place of the deceased worker.
Ultimately, the petition was held to be not maintainable and dismissed. Consequent to the dismissal of I.A. 102 of 1973, an award was passed in
I.D. 65 of 1970 dismissing the reference.
Thereupon, in W.P. No. 6555 of 1973, the appellant prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order in I.A. 102 of 1973 and to
restore I.D. 65 of 1970 for disposal according to law. Therein, the appellant stated that Section 18(3) of the Act empowers the Labour Court to
implead the legal representative of a deceased workman. A further point was raised that the relief of back wages till retirement could be given to
the workman, though dead, that a benefit belonging to the estate of the deceased workman, could be secured by his legal representative and
therefore, that would enable him or her, as a person interested, to come on record. The principle of action personalis moritur cum persona, was
inapplicable to industrial adjudications, according to the appellant. Referring to Section 33C(1) of the Act, it was contended that if, in the case of
proceedings in the nature of execution, the legal representative could participate therein it was anomalous that it was unavailable at the time of the
passing of such orders.
The respondent disputed the claim of the appellant on the ground that the subject matter of the reference u/s 10(1) of the Act related to the non-
employment of deceased Veeranan and that the relief or benefit, if any, to which he might have become entitled, was purely personal to him and
not having been quantified, it could not mature into an estate so as to enable his legal representatives to claim the benefits thereof. The claim by the
appellant, a non-workman, cannot either be recognised or adjudicated upon by the Labour Court, functioning under the Act, according to the
respondent, as on the death of the workman, there was no live industrial dispute as envisaged under the provisions of the Act. A further objections
was also raised that the provisions of the Act do not at all contemplate the adjudication of a claim to the estate of a deceased workman at the
instance of his heirs. The respondent characterised the claim of the legal representative of the deceased workman on behalf of the estate as one of
a civil nature outside the scope of adjudicatory powers of the Labour Court under the Act. The nature and scope of an adjudication u/s 33C(1)
and (2) of the Act were entirely different and the claim of a legal representative of a deceased workman to continue the proceedings cannot,
according to the stand of the respondent, be rested on such basis.
Before the learned Judge, who heard the writ petition, it was admitted that there is no provision either in the Act or in the Rules framed
thereunder (Central or Tamil Nadu) to implead the legal representative of a deceased workman as a party to pending proceedings. The learned
Judge took the view that the existence of the employee or workman is essential to keep alive a dispute for the purpose of adjudication and that on
the death of a workman pending a reference, nothing remained to be adjudicated upon, as the dispute ceased to exist as an industrial dispute.
Section 18(3)(b) of the Act, according to the learned Judge, did not confer any power on the Labour Court to implead the legal representative of a
deceased workman. The learned Judge was further of the view that Section 33C(1) of the Act and other related provisions are not intended to
enable the legal representative of a deceased workman to continue the dispute. Applying the principle of actio personalis moritur cum persona, the
learned Judge finally dismissed the writ petition, the correctness of which is challenged in this appeal.
To begin with, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Labour Court, in dealing with a reference u/s 10(1), has powers u/s 18(3)
(b) of the Act to implead other parties to the proceedings before it. Reliance in this connection was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in
Hochtief Gammon Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneshwar, Orissa and Others, . On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent
contended that neither in the Act nor in the Rules framed thereunder, any provision for impleading the legal representative of a deceased workman
has been made and that the power conferred u/s 18(3)(b) of the Act, being a limited power, would not extend to or cover cases of addition of
legal representative of a deceased workman. The power u/s 18(3)(b) of the Act, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, would be
available only to implead other parties to the proceedings, if such parties are to be added, while the party to the reference is alive.
Section 11(3) of the Act enumerates the powers of the Labour Court for purposes of facilitating an enquiry into an industrial dispute. Such
powers are described to be the same as vested in a Civil Court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, while trying a suit and limited
to the following matters :
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) compelling the production of documents and material objects;
(c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and
(d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed.
The power to bring on record the legal representative of a deceased workman in a pending industrial dispute is not one of powers conferred u/s
11(3) of the Act. It is also common ground that there is no rule enabling the impleading or bringing on record of the legal representative of a
deceased workman. In this state of the provisions of the Act and the Rules, there is no power in the Labour Court to bring on record the legal
representative of a deceased workman. Only on account of the absence of such specific power, the learned counsel for the appellant had to fall
back on Section 18(3)(b) of the Act to infer such an implied power. Section 18(3)(b) of the Act declares that a settlement or award of the Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be binding on all the parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the
Labour Court or Tribunal records an opinion that they were summoned without cause. All that is contemplated by S. 18(3)(b) of the Act is that
having regard to the terms of the reference, the Labour Court or Tribunal, if it feels necessary, may summon persons, who have not been joined in
the reference, so that the Labour Curt or Tribunal may pass orders, which could be effective and binding on them as well. Such a power can be
exercised by the Labour Court only with a view to effectively adjudicate upon the dispute as raised and referred and not with a view to otherwise
expand or enlarge its scope, as the very jurisdiction of the Tribunal or Labour Court to deal with an industrial dispute, stems from the order of
reference passed by the appropriate Government u/s 10(1) of the Act. If the power u/s 18(3)(b) to summon parties is to be construed as being
wide enough to implead the heir and legal representative of a deceased workman, the Labour Court or Tribunal, by the exercise of that power, will
be altering, changing and enlarging the reference made u/s 10(1) of the Act. The terms of the reference in any particular case determine the
amplitude of the jurisdiction as well as the scope of powers exercisable in such a case. Viewed in this light, the power of the Tribunal to summon
parties is narrow and limited and is confined to cases where the summoning of the party is necessary to make the adjudication of the dispute as
referred effective and enforceable. To read into Section 18(3)(b) of the Act a wider power in the Labour Court to summon or even implead the
heirs or the legal representatives of a deceased workman and to entertain their claim on behalf of the estate of the deceased workman, will result in
a wholesale substitution of an industrial dispute as referred by another dispute between the heirs of the deceased workman and the employer,
which is not contemplated by the provisions of the Act and would be outside it. The aforesaid limitations have been pointed out by the Supreme
Court in the decision in Hochtief Gammon v. Industrial Tribunal, Bhuvaneshwar, Orissa (supra). In relation to a dispute referred to a Labour Court
or Tribunal for adjudication, if the Tribunal or Labour Court is of the view that a party named in the order of reference does not completely or
adequately represent the interest of either the employer or the employee, then it may direct that other persons also should be summoned to
represent such interest and that would only be in the nature of addition of a party in the presence of others, who are already parties. Such a power
cannot be used to enlarge the scope of the reference with a view to secure an adjudication of a claim which would not fall within the purview of the
Act at all. Besides, Section 18(3)(b) of the Act, while declaring the binding nature of the award or settlement, envisages only workmen employed
in the establishment or part of the establishment on the establishment or part of the establishment on the date of the dispute or who become
subsequently employed therein. The legal representative or heir of a deceased workman is not contemplated at all as a person bound by the award
and a power to implead the legal representative or heir of a deceased workman cannot be inferred. We therefore reject the contention of the
learned counsel for the appellant that u/s 18(3)(b) of the Act, the Labour Court has such an implied power.
The learned counsel for the appellant next submitted that the death of a workman pending adjudication of an industrial dispute referred to the
Labour Court cannot terminate the proceedings, but that the reference must be dealt with and disposed of by the Labour Court resulting in an
award in accordance with the provisions of the Act, leaving the parties to work out their rights in accordance with Section 33C(1) of the Act.
Elaborating this argument, the learned counsel for the appellant said that an industrial dispute with reference to the non-employment of a workman
had wider ramifications and concerned the interest of the entire community of workmen and touched upon industrial peace as well and cannot
therefore be regarded as being confined personally to the particular workman. Reference was made also to Section 33C(2) of the Act to say that
even a heir or legal representative can make an application thereunder. The principle that even the closure of an industry would not render the
dispute already referred any the less an industrial dispute was also pressed into service by the learned counsel for the appellant. A number of
decisions referred to later in the course of this judgment, were also relied on in this connection.
Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that on the death of a workman who had occasioned an industrial dispute and a
reference, the whole proceeding will come to an end, as there is no workman at all, much less any subsisting dispute between the workman and the
employer and therefore the Labour Court cannot proceed to adjudicate upon anything else, except to dispose of the reference rejecting the claim
of the workman and that such an order would also be in the nature of an award within the meaning of the Act. It was also further pointed out that
on the facts of the present case, there was no question of the community of the workmen acquiring an interest in the dispute raised or any matter
relating to industrial peace, but that it was purely the personal claim of the deceased workman against the respondent, which would not survive on
his demise. The analogy of the effect of the closure of an industry on a pending industrial dispute or consideration which would be applicable to
proceedings u/s 33C(1) and (2) of the Act, has no relevance and application in the present case, according to the learned counsel for the
respondent.
Before proceeding to consider these submissions, it is necessary to bear in mind a few of the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2(b) of the
Act defines in ''award'' as an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court,
Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made u/s 10A. Section 2(g) defines an ''employer''. What is
meant by an ''industry'' is stated in Section 2(j) of the Act. Section 2(k) defines ''industrial dispute'' thus :
''industrial dispute'' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between
workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour
of any person.
u/s 2(s) of the Act ''workman'' is defined as any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled
manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of
any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in
connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include
any such person -
(i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950, or the Air Force Act, 1960 or the Navy (Discipline) Act 1934; or
(ii) who is employed in the police services or as an officer or other employee of prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of
the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.
Section 2A of the Act deems any dispute or difference arising between a workman and the employer connected with or arising out of the
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of the services of an individual workman also as an industrial dispute, notwithstanding that no
other workman or any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. Section 10 provides for reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals.
Under that provision, the appropriate Government, if it is of the opinion that an industrial dispute either exists or is apprehended, may refer the
dispute for adjudication. Section 11 deals with the procedure and powers of an arbitrator, Board, Court, Labour Court etc., Section 11(3)
(already noticed) catalogues the procedure and powers of a Labour Court etc. for purposes of enquiry into an industrial dispute referred to it.
Such powers are described to be the same as vested in a Civil Court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, while trying a suit but
limited to certain specified matters. Section 15 enjoins upon a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to which an industrial dispute has been
referred for adjudication to expeditiously hold its proceedings and submit an award to the Government. Section 18 of the Act declares the binding
nature of a settlement, arbitration award, award of Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, which has become enforceable, on all the parties
to a dispute and all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute unless the Labour Court or Tribunal is of opinion
that they were summoned without proper cause. Section 18(3)(c) specifically provides that where the party to an industrial dispute is an employer
or where the party summoned to appear in the proceedings is an employer, then the agreement or award would be binding upon the heirs,
successors or assigns of the employer in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates. However, Section 18(d) of the Act states that
where a party to an industrial despite or those summoned to appear before the Labour Court in the proceedings as parties to the dispute are
workmen, then all persons employed in the establishment to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently
become employed in the establishment or part thereof, would be bound by the award. It is unnecessary to refer to the other provisions of the Act,
excepting Section 33C which will be dealt with later.
We now proceed to consider in the light of the above provisions of the Act the nature of an industrial dispute and the effect of the death of the
workman on such a dispute pending adjudication on a reference u/s 10(1) of the Act. We have already noticed that neither under the provisions of
the Act nor under the Industrial Disputes Rules (Central and Tamil Nadu Industrial Disputes Rules) is there any power in the authorities functioning
under the Act by the exercise of which the heir or the legal representative of a deceased workman can be impleaded as a party to the proceedings
in order to enable such a person to further prosecute the matter referred to for adjudication. The provisions of the Act and the rules do not
postulate that the legal representative or heir of a deceased workman was in the contemplation of the Act (except to the limited extent u/s 33C(1)
of the Act) or the Rules as a person who could be subjected to the provisions of the Act for purposes of adjudication or enabled to take
advantage of or be benefited with reference to matters dealt with by the Act. The very definition of an ''industrial dispute'' u/s 2(k) of the Act
speaks of disputes or difference connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour
of any person and arising between the employers and employees, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen. The
definition of ''workman'' u/s 2(s) of the Act now includes a dismissed workman, but does not, as yet, take in the heir or the legal representative of a
deceased workman. Thus the legal representative of a deceased workman is not within the definition of ''workman'' in the Act. In this case, the
industrial dispute arose out of the non-employment of the father of the appellant by the respondent. Section 10 of the Act empowers the
Government to make a reference only if a dispute or difference either exists or is apprehended between the employer and the workmen. The
existence or apprehension of the dispute is the occasion for reference u/s 10(1) of the Act and the reference cannot outlive the dispute. On the
death of the workman, in this case, the dispute relating to his non-employment ceased and no dispute capable of either a settlement or adjudication
resulting in the giving of relief by one party to the other would thereafter remain. Besides, the person regarding whom a dispute is raised must be
one in whose employment or non-employment or conditions of labour, the parties to the dispute should have a direct or a subsisting interest. In the
case of a dead workman, there is no such interest and there is no scope for giving relief to a dead workman. The terms of reference set out earlier
concerned itself with dismissal of the deceased workman only. The dispute was raised and referred to redress the wrong done to an individual. It
did not touch upon or affect the rights of the other workmen or impinge upon the conditions of labour generally. We are not impressed by the
argument that the proceedings have to be continued by the heir or legal representative of the deceased workman on the basis that an industrial
adjudication is in the nature of collective bargaining aimed at securing industrial peace. If the wrong is done to an individual, as in this case and
collective bargaining as normally understood is directed towards securing something objective, then, we do not see how there can be any attempt
at such collective bargaining with reference to something that does not really exist. No useful purpose after the death of the workman will be served
by a revival of the cold and dead members of the dispute. Even accepting the contention of the appellant, under the provisions of the Act, as they
now stand, there can at best be an award in favour of a dead workman. But there is no provision under the Act which enables the heir or legal
representative to realise the fruits of such an award. Apart from the definition of workman already noticed which excluded from its scope, the legal
representative or heir of a deceased workman, Section 18 of the Act would also indicate that an award may not be binding upon the legal
representative of a deceased workman. In declaring u/s 18(3)(a) and (b), the binding nature of a settlement or an award on the parties to the
industrial dispute and also on other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties Section 18(3)(c) specifically provides that in cases
provided for u/s 18(3)(a) and (b) not only the employer but his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute
relates would also be bound by the settlement or the award. However, while referring to the binding on nature of such an award on workman
under S. 18(3)(d), it is not declared to be binding on the heirs or the legal representatives of the workman but only on such persons who are
employed in the establishment or part of the establishment to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and also other persons who
subsequently became employed in that establishment. The enumeration of different classes of persons on whom the award would be binding and
the clear exclusion in Section 18(3)(d) of the heirs and legal representatives of a deceased workman are significant. This clearly brings out that it
was never in the contemplation of the Act that the heir or legal representative should be bound by the settlement or the award. It is difficult and
indeed illogical to conceive of rights in favour of heir or legal representative of a deceased workman without the award or settlement having been
declared to binding on him. This would also establish that the heir or legal representative of a deceased workman is outside the scheme of the Act.
That this is so is made further clear by Parliamentary resuscitation attempted by breathing fresh air as it were into a dead dispute by the
introduction of an amendment to Section 10 of the principal Act by Section 8 of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act 1982 (Bill No. 47 of
1982). A new sub-section u/s 10(8) has been provided to the following effect :
No proceeding pending before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal in relation to an industrial dispute shall lapse merely by reason of the
death of any of the parties to the dispute being a workman and such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall complete such proceeding
and submit its award to the appropriate Government.
The need for making such a provision is obvious. According to the provisions of the Act as they now stand, on the death of a workman, the
proceedings cannot be continued by the heir or the legal representative of the deceased workman. This situation has been attempted to be
remedied by legislation. It has to be remembered that the reference of a dispute for adjudication is very different from entertaining and adjudicating
upon the claims by the legal representatives of a deceased workman. Avowedly, the Act is intended to resolve disputes between the employers
and the workmen and the existence or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is the sine qua non for a reference by the appropriate Government.
In other words, the existence of apprehension of a difference or dispute between the employer and workman affords the cause of action for a
reference u/s 10 of the Act, while the death of a workman furnishes the cause of action for the heir or legal representative, who, as seen earlier, has
no place in the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, to represent the estate of the workman. The foundation of the claim of the workman is very
different from that of his heir or legal representative. While, an industrial dispute in respect of the resolution of which provisions have been made in
the Act presupposes the existence of the employer, the workmen and also a dispute, the claim of the heir or legal representative does not depend
upon either relationship of the employer and employee or the existence of the dispute, but arises solely on account of and as a consequence of the
demise of the workman. Such claims are outside the pale of the Act and it is because of this, there is no machinery provided enabling the
authorities under the Act to adjudicate upon such claims. The Act is a self-contained Act designed to make provision for the investigation and
settlement of industrial disputes. Within the framework of such an Act, there is no scope whatever for the continuation of a reference after the
death of the workman by the heir or legal representative of a deceased workman or the adjudication of a claim on behalf of a person who is not a
workman against the employer. Besides, the right of representation of the worker by the union contemplated u/s 36 of the Act postulates the
continued existence of the workman as well as the dispute, as the death of a workman snaps the relationship of principal and agent and the union
cannot represent the deceased workman any longer. Nor can there be representation of the legal representatives by the union after the death of the
workman. Prima facie, therefore, no the basis of the provisions of the Act, the Labour Court or the Tribunal cannot recognise the heir or legal
representative of a deceased workman or a claim at his or her instance on behalf of the estate of the deceased workman and permit the further
prosecution of the proceedings. To read into the provisions of the Act a power in the Labour Court to recognise the heir or legal representative
and also to adjudicate upon their claims would be to depart from the plain provisions of the Act. We would then be not construing or interpreting
the Act as it is, but substantially rep-enacting it by adding to or varying the words in it.
Earlier, it has been pointed out how the heir or the legal representative of the deceased workman has no place at all in the scheme of the Act or
under its provisions. In this case, there was only the dispute relating to the non-employment of the deceased father of the appellant, which formed
the subject matter of reference by the Government u/s 10(1) of the Act. The non-employment of the father of the appellant did not concern the
interest or the conditions of labour of the other workmen generally. We do not see how in such a case the interest of the other workmen was either
at stake or they had otherwise acquired an interest in the dispute. Though in form an industrial dispute was raised and referred, the other workmen
were neither interested in the adjudication nor had acquired such an interest over the subject matter of the dispute referred so as to claim that the
proceedings must go on despite the death of the worker in the larger interests of the workmen. The dispute, in this case, in its origin, was only an
individual dispute in that it related exclusively to the dismissal of the father of the appellant, but was deemed an industrial dispute by reason of
Section 2A of the Act. That would not however make any difference with reference to the effect of the death of the workman on the industrial
dispute. The scope of the adjudication could not have had wider repercussions and affected the conditions of service of the other workmen as
well. Under these circumstances, the question whether the principle of actio personalis moritur cum persona would apply has to be considered.
Though subjected to the criticism as being obscure in origin, inaccurate in expression, uncertain in application and resulting in grave injustice as
well, the doctrine has nevertheless been applied by courts to personal actions. In the filed of industrial adjudication governed by specific statutory
provisions, there is no scope for the adjudication of a claim by the heir or the legal representative of a deceased workman against the employer and
therefore where the dispute referred affects an individual as in this case, the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona is in-applicable. We
therefore reject this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant as well.
An attempt was made to argue that in matters like this, the Tribunal must necessarily proceed to give its award irrespective of the death of the
workmen in accordance with the provisions of the Act. We have earlier pointed out that there is no question of either recognising the heir or the
legal representative of a deceased workman or entertaining any claim at his or her instance on behalf of the deceased workman and if that be so,
there is nothing further to be adjudicated upon with the result that necessarily the proceedings have to come to a close and the reference will have
to stand either rejected or dismissed as in this case and that would also be determination of an industrial dispute so as to be termed an award
within the meaning of the Act.
We now revert to consideration arising under S. 33C of the Act, upon which considerable reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the
appellant. It may be recalled that in this case, we are concerned only with the effect of the death of a workman on a reference made which is
pending adjudication at the time of his death. The entitlement of the workman either to reinstatement or back wages in lieu thereof, had not in this
case been admitted or adjudicated upon S. 33C(1) and (2) of the Act are special provisions conferring a power and effective remedy on the
workman to enforce or execute adjudicated rights and to realise the benefits of the existing rights. That may involve not only the enforcement or
execution of admitted or adjudicated or even established rights, but also an enquiry or investigation into disputed rights and enforcement of such
rights as well. S. 33C(1) of the Act speaks of recovery of any money due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or
under the provisions of Chapter V A or V B. This enabling provision assists the workman or other persons authorised by him in writing or in the
case of the death of a workman, his assignees or heirs, to make an application for the recovery of money due to the workman and if the
Government is satisfied that any amount of money is due, then it shall issue a certificate for that amount which shall be recovered as an arrear of
land revenue. S. 33C(1) of the Act thus proceeds on the basis of an antecedent adjudication of the right of the workman as well as the liability of
the employer and provides the machinery for execution. S. 33C(1) also provides for a case where the right of the workman and the liability of the
employer had been earlier adjudicated upon and the workman does not live to realise the fruits of the adjudication. In such an event, the heir or the
legal representative of a dead workman can claim those benefits. The recognition of the heir or the legal representative of a deceased workman by
the Act is only to this limited extent and purpose and no more. This is yet another indication in the Act to show that in cases where the reference is
pending adjudication, the heirs or the legal representatives of a deceased workman have no place under the scheme of the Act. S. 33C(2) of the
Act, on the other hand, contemplates only a workman entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit, which is capable of being
computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or the amount at which such benefit should be computed,
then the question may be decided by the Labour Court. The distinction between S. 33C(1) and (2) is obvious. While S. 33C(1) confers the right
of the recovery of money on the basis of an adjudicated claim on the workman and his heirs or legal representatives, S. 33C(2) enables the
workman alone to seek a computation. The legal representative or heir of a deceased workman is farthest from the contemplation of S. 33C(2),
for the definition of ''workman'' under S. 2(s) of the Act, when read into S. 33C(2), does not include the heir or legal representative of a deceased
workman. Besides, a claim under S. 33C(2) may even take in an enquiry into the existence of the right as incidental to the main determination of
the entitlement of the worker provided for under S. 33C(2) and the computation thereof. Thus, the object and scope of S. 33C(1) and (2) are
very different from S. 10 under which the reference has been made in this case and those provisions cannot be therefore relied upon to enable a
legal representative to continue the proceedings. Indeed, the Supreme Court in The Central Bank of India Ltd. Vs. P.S. Rajagopalan etc., has
pointed out that S. 33C(2) of the Act takes within its purview cases of workmen, who claim that the benefit to which they are entitled should be
computed in terms of money, even though the right or benefit on which the claim is based is disputed by their employers. Advertising to the
legislative history of S. 33C of the Act, the Supreme Court held that the construction of S. 33C should not be so broad as to bring within itself
cases which would fall under S. 10(1) of the Act and that industrial disputes arising between the employee and the employer must be adjudicated
upon in the manner prescribed by the Act. The Supreme Court cautioned that though in determining the scope of S. 33C, cases which legitimately
fall within its purview are not to be excluded, yet, it must be borne in mind that cases which fall under S. 10(1) of the Act cannot also be brought
within the scope of S. 33C. In view of this and also the non-applicability of S. 33C(1) and (2) of the Act, we do not think it is necessary to dwell
further on this aspect or to make a detailed reference to some of the decisions rendered under the provisions of S. 33C(1) or (2) of the Act.
We now proceed to refer briefly to a few of the decisions directly touching upon the main point for consideration which had been dealt with in
the foregoing paragraphs.
In Management of Tocklai Experimental Station, Cinnamara v. State of Assam. (AIR 1960 Assam 132) a drunk driver was charge-sheeted
and suspended and the management terminated his services after giving a month''s salary in lieu of notice. This was on 12th December, 1957. The
driver died on 20th May, 1958. The appropriate State Government made a reference under S. 10(1)(c) of the Act on 25th June, 1958. Before the
Labour Court, a contention was raised that the reference had become void on the death of the driver and that there was no industrial dispute at all
within the meaning of S. 2(k) of the Act. Two preliminary issues were raised on the question relating to the void nature of the reference and also
the substitution of the legal representative of the deceased workman for the further conduct of the proceedings before the Labour Court. Both the
preliminary issues were answered against the management which filed writs to quash the notification and also for restraining the Tribunal from
dealing with the matter. Malhotra J., held that a dispute ceased to be an individual dispute when taken up by the workman and therefore, the death
of the workman does not put an end to the dispute or make the dispute cease to exist as an industrial dispute and that it was a fallacy to assume
that the workman whose non-employment was the subject matter of the dispute is a party to the dispute. Sarjoo Prosad C.J., took a different view
on the question of the survival of the dispute on the death of a workman and stated that that would depend upon whether the individual alone was
affected or whether all workmen or a class of them were affected and that in the case of a dispute leading to a reference on the basis of a wrong
done to an individual worker, there is no question of any collective bargaining after the death of the workman. The learned Chief Justice
emphasised upon the futility in raking up the cold and dead embers of the dispute after the death of the workman, as collective bargaining could be
only for something objective and not in respect of that which does not exist and pointed out that the dispute itself would not survive, especially
when there was no provision for the substitution of the heirs or the legal representatives for award of compensation in their favour. It was also
further pointed out that even if an award could be passed in favour of the legal representatives, there was no provision enabling them to realise the
fruits of the award. Ultimately, the learned Judge stated that the incompetency of the Labour Court, in that regard would just be the same
irrespective of whether reinstatement or compensation was the relief. On these divergent views, the matter was referred to the opinion of Deka J.,
who was of the opinion that a real dispute capable of settlement or adjudication by which one party to the dispute is given relief by the other as a
result of adjudication must exist and that the person regarding whom the dispute had been raised must be one in whose employment or non-
employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour, the parties to the dispute must have a direct or substantial interest as well. According to
the learned Judge, the workers in that case did not have either a direct or substantial interest in the employment or non-enjoyment of one who died
and that there was no community of interest of a class as a whole, which was the nexus between the dispute and the parties to the dispute and that
therefore, the dispute could not be continued by the heir or the legal representative of the deceased workman. The majority of the Judges were of
the opinion that on the death of a workman pending a reference under S. 10(1) of the Act, nothing, further survived for adjudication by the Labour
Court. In Bihar Working Journalists'' Union Vs. H.K. Chaudhuri and Another, , the Patna High Court dealt with a case of reference made
regarding the pay and emoluments of three chief sub-editors, one of whom died pending adjudication. The Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction
to adjudicate upon the claim put forth on behalf of the deceased person. The Bihar Working Journalists'' Union contended that the order of
Tribunal was erroneous as the Union was the real contesting party, that the Tribunal cannot refuse to give its award on the merits of the industrial
dispute and that the Tribunal should have further proceeded with the adjudication of the dispute after bringing on record the legal representatives.
Dealing with the question of the survival of the dispute on the death of a workman, it was held that that would depend upon the nature and
character of the dispute and that there was no erroneous assumption on the part of the Tribunal that the dispute raised and referred was entirely a
personal dispute as the successors-in-office of the deceased workman were no less interested in the adjudication of that dispute. In the course of
the judgment, it was pointed out that the representation by others of the cause of one workman can be taken up and continued only so long as the
worker is alive and that would cease on his death and the union cannot act on behalf of the legal representatives of the deceased worker. The
Bench also expressed the view that the union can really have no concern over the monetary claim of the heirs or the legal representatives of the
deceased workman as they can always pursue their remedies in a court of law and that S. 18(3)(c) and (d) make it clear that there was no
intention whatever to provide for the adjudication of an industrial dispute at the instance of the heir or the legal representative. The circumstance
that there cannot be any reinstatement, if the workman dies, was also relied upon to hold that the proceedings would terminate. However, it was
pointed out that if a dispute touched upon the statue of a successor workman as well, it might still survive. Ultimately, the order of the Tribunal was
upheld. In our view, having regard to the statutory framework within which the adjudication of an industrial dispute referred to Labour Court has to
be done, there is really no scope for contending particularly on the facts of this case, that the dispute would survive. We have already indicated our
reasons earlier. Reliance however was placed on the case reported in Gwalior Rayons Vs. Labour Court and Others, was of the view that the
scope of the adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act was wider than determination of legal rights of the parties involved or redressing the
grievances of a workman, that the maintenance of peaceful relationship between the parties is essential as otherwise the entire community of
workers and their interest would be affected an that an industrial dispute cannot be equated to a personal action in torts. In this view, the learned
Judge held that the death of the workman would not in any manner affect the further course of the proceedings and that any benefit that could have
been made available to the deceased employee can also be realised on behalf of his estate by the heirs of the deceased under S. 33C(2) of the
Act. Bank of Baroda Vs. Workmen, had to consider the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal to the effect that despite the death of the
workman, the industrial dispute survived, as the remaining workmen employed by the Bank were interested in the adjudication of the dispute and
all workmen employed by the Bank were concerned. This conclusion of the Tribunal was upheld by the Court on the ground that even in the case
of the death of a workman in an industrial dispute the heir or legal representative can agitate the question and that S. 306 of the Succession Act
also would enable the heir or the legal representative of the deceased workman to prosecute the proceedings before the Tribunal. Reliance was
also placed on the decision in The U.P. Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. Vs. The Workmen and Others, . The question that arose in that decision was
whether the closure of an industry would preclude the adjudication of a claim for past bonus on the basis of past services rendered. It was in that
context the Supreme Court pointed out that such a claim is not wiped out by the subsequent closure, as the dispute was an alive one, when it was
referred for adjudication and that the closure cannot even annul the adjudication. In that case, the U.P. Electricity Supply Co. Ltd., which had been
carrying on business in generation and distribution of electricity was compulsorily acquired by the U.P. Electricity Board and the award was given
after the compulsory acquisition. In dealing with the contention raised by the U.P. Electricity Supply Co. Ltd., to the effect that its industry had
ceased to exist and any adjudication in respect of a dispute which had occurred prior to the acquisition would become ineffective, the Supreme
Court pointed out that if the dispute related to past working of the industry and in particular where the claim of the workmen was for benefits which
had accrued to them in the past, it cannot be said that the adjudication was without any purpose. In the instant case, the claim of the deceased
workman was not with reference to any past services rendered by him and therefore the decision of the Supreme Court cannot be applied in the
instant case. The judgment of Gokulakrishnan J., in A. Ramaswami Thevar v. Madurai Mills Ltd. Co. S.A. No. 1311 of 1974, dated 4th March
1975, was relied on. The question that was dealt with by the learned Judge was whether the civil court had jurisdiction to grant a declaration with
reference to the date of birth and also an injunction restraining the management from compulsorily retiring him. The objection raised by the
management was that the matter squarely fell under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and under the guise of getting a declaration as to
the correct date of birth, the workman cannot be permitted to circumvent the provisions of the Act.
Gokulakrishnan J., was of the view that the dispute in effect was between the employer and the employee falling within the scope of the Industrial
Disputes Act within the meaning of S. 2(k) of the Act, and therefore, the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. That decision has no
application on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case. V. Bhaskaran and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, to which
our attention was drawn had to consider whether a writ petition challenging the order of dismissal for misconduct can be prosecuted by the legal
representatives of the deceased workman. George Vadakkel J., was of the view that though there are no provisions either in the Act or in the
Rules framed thereunder, the legal representative of a deceased workman, can prosecute the proceedings and that S. 2A is intended to confer on a
workman a right to agitate his grievance and that right can be agitated by his legal representative as well.
With reference to the case referred to earlier where the view has been expressed that the legal representatives can also be permitted to
prosecute the proceedings in the place of the deceased workman, it has to be remembered that the provisions of the Act, as they stand now, do
not provide for such a situation at all. The adjudication of an industrial dispute has to be made only in accordance with the provisions of the Act
and the Rules thereunder and if the Act or the Rules do not permit the legal representative or the heir of the deceased workman to further
prosecute the proceedings, be it a reference or other proceeding, then it is not for the courts to step in and say that despite the absence of the
provisions to that effect, they can do so. The courts will not be interpreting the provisions of the Act as they stand, but probably be indulging in
legislation. Again, it has to be noticed that there is an underlying erroneous assumption in all these cases that the legal representatives of a deceased
workman could also be subjected to the provisions of the Act, that they are also workmen, their interest is also identical with that of the deceased
workman and that such interest can be continued to be represented by others or the Union. The nature of the dispute and its impact on the
workman concerned and the rest of the workmen will have a material bearing on the question of the survival of the dispute after the death of the
workman. In view of the above considerations, the cases relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot assist him as the different
aspects pointed out earlier have not been borne in mind.
There is yet another fanciful and erroneous assumption on which some of the decisions have proceeded and that relates to the scope of an
industrial adjudication which is stated to be wider than the determination of the legal rights or redressing grievances. Whatever may be the label
given to the process or mode of adjudication or determination, ultimately, it is only a question of considering and upholding legal rights stemming
from statute and redressal in accordance with the Act of all injuries or grievances by the Labour Court or the Tribunal in relation to a workman. In
that sense, the scope of an industrial adjudication cannot be enlarged or considered to be wider than what it actually is or what has been provided
for in the statute. An understanding regarding the nature of an industrial dispute and the scope of adjudication has to be secured only from the
reference and the provisions of the Act and not de hors that. It is not permissible to look beyond the Act to sustain a procedure not warranted by it
in determination of industrial disputes and justify it on consideration of wider implications of an industrial dispute, community of interest and
securing and maintenance of industrial peace etc. For the reasons which we have set out in extenso earlier based on the provisions of the Act and
the related aspects arising therefrom, we are of the view that the legal representative or heir of a deceased workman cannot seek to come on
record and continue further proceedings. The reliance placed upon the provisions of the Legal Representatives Suits Act 1855, will not also avail,
as the right of action is with reference to the pecuniary loss to the estate owing to the wrong committed in the lifetime of a person in respect of
which the deceased himself might have maintained an action. Similarly, a right of action is also provided in respect of a wrong done by the
deceased in his lifetime for which he could have been subjected to an action within one year proper to his death. The damages shall in the first case
form part of the estate of the deceased and be payable as a debt in the latter event. S. 2 provided that any action commenced under the provisions
of that Act shall not abate by reason of the death of either party. These provisions do not apply to the case of an industrial dispute properly
referred for an adjudication under S. 10 of the Act. S. 306 of the Indian Succession Act cannot also be pressed into service as it had been earlier
found that the basis of the industrial dispute in this case was the non-employment of the father of the appellant, which was personal to the deceased
workman. In addition, the granting of the relief of either reinstatement or award of compensation in lieu thereof, could not be enjoyed by the
deceased workman and would be nugatory as well.
For the foregoing reasons, the Labour Court was quite correct in having rejected the application of the appellant to be brought on record as
the legal representative of the deceased workman and in dismissing the reference. We therefore confirm the order of the learned Judge and dismiss
the appeal with costs of the respondent.