V. Venugopal and Others vs State

Arunachalam, J.—The Petitioners in Crl. M.P. No. 8889 of 1989 are accused 4, 6, 8, 20 and 21 in C.C. No. 64 of 1989, pending on the

file of the Judicial Magistrate, Chengam,. The Petitioners in Crl.M.P. No. 13281 of 1989 is the 9th accused in the same calendar case. They are

being prosecuted by the Inspector of Police, DCB, Vellore for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468,

471 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 109 I.P.C. The prosecution case is that between 1968 and 1971, during faslis 1377 to

1380, loans and advances were granted by the Government through agencies to the ryots of Panaiolaipadi Village, under the Intensive Manuring

Scheme and Groundnut Export Orientation Programme. Loans were granted in the form of chemical fertilisers on permits on the specific

undertaking that the value of the same would have to be repaid in lumpsum at the time of harvest of the crops for which loans were sanctioned and

obtained. The procedure for sanction of loan was as hereunder:

On receipt of the loan applications, the Gramasevak had to prepare loan order proposal on the spot. The officials must also verify the correctness

of the information contained in the application, like the extent of land owned and crops raised, with reference to the particular found in the chitta

and adangal. In addition, they had to obtain attestation from the Village Karnam, to identify the signature of the loan applicant. The Extension

Officer, in the case of Intensive Manuring Scheme, and Special District Agricultural Officer in the case of groundnut Export Orient Programme,

had to scrutinise the applications and then recommend the loan proposals. The applicant will have to be present at the time of disbursement of loan.

Identification by Village Officers and Gramasevaks, was necessary.

At the relevant time, Accused 1 to 3 who are not the Petitioners herein, were Village Officers, while Accused 4 to 7 were working as

Gramasevaks. A-20 and 21 were working as Assistant Agricultural Officers Grade I. Accused 8 and 9 were working as Special Officers (Deputy

Tahsildar) Loans. Accused 10 and 11 were working as Block Development Officers. A-12 and 13 were Special Agricultural Demonstrators. A-

14 and 15 were working as Special District Agricultural Officers. The other accused, out of the total of 21, were private individuals. The

Government is stated to have been cheated to the extent of about Rs. 16,340/- by false declarations.

In this petition filed u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure to call for the records and quash the pending prosecution as not maintainable and an

abuse of Court, the only ground urged by Mr. V. Surcshham, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, is that there had been a long

and unexplained delay in the investigation and the filing of the final report and that alone would violate the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution

of India. He further contended, that due to long delay, prejudice to the case of the Petitioners was patent.

I have heard Mr. B. Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor, representing the Respondent, on these contentions.

A perusal, of the records, show that the alleged offences were committed between 1968 and 1971. The First Information Report was preferred

only on 20.9.1975. The charge sheet was laid on 23.2.1989, nearly 14 years after the registration of the crime. No explanation has been offered

for the long delay in the preferring of the complaint and the ultimate laying of the charge sheet, on competition of investigation. It was represented

by Mr. V. Suresham, that the main accused. viz., A-1 to 3, are dead. He also point out that A-5, 14 and 16 are also now dead. Many of the

accused have retired from service.

S.A. Khader, J. in Devarajan D.R. v. State 1985 L.W. Crl. 77 had occasion to consider a similar question, on delay, learned Judge observed

as hereunder:

The charges in this case relate to the period between 1968 and 1972 in respect of loans and advances granted to several ryots on the basis of false

declarations, false particulars and false certificates and also by impersonation. More than 12 years have passed since then and it is impossible for

any one, at this distance of time, to remember what happened before 1972, identify the witnesses, cross-examine them and put forth their case

effectively. Though it cannot be said that there was any delay in the filing of the first information report the subsequent delay in investigation, which

has taken nearly nine years and two months, is a matter of grave concern in the administration of justice. We have to see whether this delay has

been properly explained and whether the accused are prejudiced thereby and deprived of a reasonable opportunity to defend the charges. The

contention of the State that innumerable witnesses had to be examined, that a large number of documents had to be verified and sent for the

opinion of the expert and that sanction had to be obtained in respect of some of the accused, is not proper explanation for this inordinate delay of 9

years and 2 months. It is obvious that the investigation has proceeded in the usual lethargic manner at the convenience of the investigating

Inspectors and the charge sheet has been filed, luckily, within a decade. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the delay of over 9 years in

this case of investigation is unreasonable, unexplained and inexplicable. In the circumstances the accused must be held to be seriously prejudiced in

the defence and to be deeply deprived of a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves, on account of the inordinate and inexplicable delay, This

would amount to violation of the principle of natural justice and the prosecution must, therefore, be struck down.

S.A. Khader, J. based his findings, on the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 246 of 1982 Ramanarayanan v. Food

Corporation of India I am satisfied, that the enunciation of law by S.A. Khader, J. will stand attracted to the present facts.

The Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar, held, that the question whether the right to a speedy trial which forms part

of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 has been infringed is ultimately a question of fairness in the administration of

criminal justice even as ""acting fairly"" is of the essence of the principles of natural justice and a ''fair and reasonable procedure'' is what is meant by

the expression ''procedure established by law'' in Article 21.

As pointed out by the Apex court, several question arise for consideration in this connection, was there delay? How long was the delay? Was

the delay inevitable having regard to the nature of the case, the sparse availability of legal services and other relevant circumstances? Was the delay

unreasonable? Was any part of the delay caused by the wilfulness or the negligence of the prosecuting agency? Was any part of the delay caused

by the tactics of the defence was the delay due to causes beyond the control of the prosecuting and defending agencies? Did the accused have the

ability and the opportunity to assert his right to a speedy trial? Was there a likelihood of the accused being prejudiced in his defence Irrespective of

any likelihood of prejudice in the conduct of his defence, was the very length of the delay sufficiently prejudicial to the accused?

In T.J. Stephen and Others Vs. M/s. Parle Bottling Co. (P) Ltd. and Others, on the ground of delay of about 20 years, the Supreme Court

quashed the prosecution initiated under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act. Though the Supreme Court observed that there was no enquiry in

favour of the accused, and the delay after the complaint had been filed, had been mostly on account of his mala fide move, they did not think it

would be in the interest of justice to allow a prosecution to start 20 years after the offence had been committed. On facts, no explanation has been

offered for the inordinate the unconscionable delay, in laying the charge sheet. Mr. B. Sriramulu pointed out that sanction to prosecute was

accorded even in 1982. Lethargy and ineptitude on the part of the prosecuting agency proclaimed themselves.

Keeping in view, the enunciated law, I hold, that the long and unexplained delay would certainly, seriously prejudice the defence. Further,

inordinate and unreasonable delay would amount to violation of principles of natural justice. The concept of speedy trial postulated under Article

21 of the Constitution appears to have been thwarted. I have no hesitation m allowing these petitions and quashing all further proceedings in CC.

No. 64 of 1989 pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Chengam in so far as it relates to the Petitioners. Both these petitions are allowed.