Vaddi Seshayya vs G.K. Padalamma

Subba Rao, C.J.

1.The facts are simple stated. One Bapanamma had sion and enjoyment of the property. She died in the year 1936. On. 11th December, 1929, she executed a gift deed giving the said property to the Plaintiff, who is the wife of Bapanamma''s brother. In the document it is stated that the said property was gifted to the donor by her parental family, that she was in possession and enjoyment of the said property and that she was conveying the same to the Plaintiff with absolute rights. It was attested by a nephew of the Defendant, and subsequent to the gift, the item was entered in the revenue accounts in the name of the donee. The donee was put in possession under the gift deed and she continued to enjoy the property in her own right Paying the cist. The Defendant, who is the vendee from the step-son of the Plaintiff, claiming to have acquired the said property under a sale deed trespassed upon the land. The suit was had for the aforesaid reliefs. Both the, Courts found that Bapanamma had an absolute interest in the suit item, and therefore had the right to make an absolute of the same to the Plaintiff. The Defendant preferred the above appeal.

Mr. Ramachandra Reddy broadly contends that in the case of a gift of property to a female member of the family, the presumption is that only the life interest in the said item was granted. He further argues that having, regard to the circumstances of the case, it should be held that the gift must have been only of the life estate in the suit, item. Reliance is placed upon the judgment at the Judicial Committee in Mahomed Shunooi v. Shewukram, 2 Ind App 7 (P.C.) (A), in support of the contention that there is a preoption, that in the case of a gift to a female ''ember, the gift is only of the life estate. In case, the Judicial Committee held on the con-tion of the document before them that the was only of a life estate. At page 14, their Lordships observed:

In construing the will of a Hindu it is not improper to take into consideration what are known to be the ordinary notions and wishes of Hindus with respect to the devolution of property. It may be assumed that a Hindu generally desires that an estate, especially an ancestral estate, shah be retained in his family; and it may be assumed that a Hindu knows that, as a general rule, at all events, women do not take absolute estates of in-heritance which they are enabled to alienate. Having reference to these considerations together with the whole of the will, all the expressions of which must be taken together without any one being insisted upon to the exclusion of Ors. , their Lordships are of opinion that the two courts in India, who both substantially agree upon this point, are right in construing the intention of the testator to have been that the widow of his son should not take an absolute estate which she should have power to dispose of absolutely, but that she took an estate subject to her daughters. succeeding her in that estate.

It is seen from the aforesaid passage that though the Judicial Committee relied upon the notions prevailing in th0 Hindu society at the time the decision was given, they emphasised: the fact that the document should be construed having re-sard to all the recitals found therein. A Divisional Bench or the Madras High Court consisting of Pandrang Row and K. S. Monon, JJ., in Mangainma v. Dorayya, ILR 1937 Mid 335 :AIR 1937 Mad 100. held an the facts before them that the property allotted at the partition to n widowed daughter conveyed to her only a life estate in the property. At page 338 (of ILK Mud): (at p. 101 of AIR) the learned Judges lay down the following propositions:

The rule itself is based on the genersd principle that, where the terms of a grant are ambiguous or where there is no grant in writing, is permissible, in order to find out the intention of the grantor to look to the surrounding circumstances of the transaction; and the notions and ideals of the grantor would b0 one of such circumstances to be taken into consideration." It is not necessary to express our view whether the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges on the facts is correct or not.

But he proposition so stated is unexceptionable. Chandrasohhara Aiyar, J., in Nagammal v. Subbalakshmi Antrial, 1947 Mad LJ 64: air 1947 Mad 3JO restated the law on the subject at page 65 (of Mad Lj): (at p, 320 of AIR) as follows:

According to the law as understood at Present, there is no presumption one way or the other, and there is no difference between a gift to a male and a gift to a female. The fact that the donee is a woman does not make the gift any the less absolute where the words would be sufficient to convey an absolute estate to a male. Rut .this position is quite different from what a Court may, and has to, presume from the surrounding circumstances and probabilities as regards the nature of any property which is allotted to a person for maintenance.

The same learned Judge of the Supreme Court in Ram Gopal Vs. Nand Lal and Others, stated that die rule of interpretation laid down in 2 Ind App 7'' (P.C.) (A) has come to be regarded as unsound.

The law on the subject has been considered and authoritatively restated by the Supreme Court of India in Nathoo Lal Vs. Durga Prasad, , at page 501 (of SCJ) (at p. 358 of AIR) as follows:

We are further of the opinion that the High Court was in error in thinking that it is settled principle of law that unless there: are express terms in ''the deed of gift to indicate that the donor who had absolute interest intended to convey absolute ownership, a gift in favour of an heir who inherits only a limited interest cannot be construed as conferring an absolute interest. It is true that this was the principle once deduced from the Privy Council decision in 2 Ind App 7 (PC) (A), wherein it was held that a bequest to a daughter-in-law passed a limited estate. The proposition laid down-in 2 Ind App 7 (P.C.) (A), was. construed by the High Counts in India to mean that a gift of immovable property to a woman could not bo deemed to confer upon her an absolute estate of inheritance which she could alienate at her pleasure unless the deed or will gave her in express terms a heritable estate or power of alienation. Later decisions of the Judicial Committee made it clear that if words were used conferring absolute ownership upon the wife, the wife enjoyed the rights of ownership without their being conferred by express and additional terms. 2 Ind App 7 (P.C.) (A) has been examined in recent years in some High Courts and it hag been observed that according to the law as understood at present there is no presumption one way or the other and there is no difference between the case of a male and the case of a female, and the fact that the donee is a woman does not make the gift any the less absolute where the words be sufficient to convey an absolute estate to a male.

It is therefore manifest that in construing gifts there is no distinction in the mode of construction between a gift to a male and a gift to a female. There is no presumption in the cases of gifts to females that the gift is only of a life estate. If the terms of the document are clear and unambiguous, the recitals therein shall be construed irrespective of the sex of the grantee. If the recitals of the document are ambiguous, Courts will rely upon the surrounding circumstances to ascertain the intention of the donor.

Having regard to the aforesaid principles, ''we shall proceed to consider the interests acquired by Bapanamma, which she subsequently conveyed to the Plaintiff. There is no document disclosing how Bapanamma acquired the property. But she was admittedly in enjoyment of the suit item till a few years before she died and it is in evidence that she lived up to a very old age. In .1929, when she executed Exhibit A-l, the gift deed in favour of the Plaintiff, she in clear terms mentioned that she got the property from .her parental family absolutely and that she was in possession from the date of the gift to her. There are no other circumstances of the case to show that the gift was not absolute or was subject to any conditions. In these circumstances, as there is no presumption one way or the other, we have no ''hesitation to agree with the Courts below that the gift made to Bapanamma by the members of her parental family was absolute and she had the right to gift the same to the Plaintiff. The finding of the Courts below is correct.

The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.