Vaibhav Gupta & Ors vs Union Of India

G.S.Sistani, J

This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioners seeking a writ of mandamus to quash the order dated 29th

October, 2015 passed by the ADM/LAC (West). A direction is also sought to refer the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to the

Court of learned Additional District Judge for determination of the market value of the acquired land. Pleadings in this matter are complete.

Counsel for the Land Acquisition Collector (LAC) submits that it is not necessary to file the counter-affidavit. Counsels agree that the writ petition

may be heard and disposed of at this stage itself.

The necessary facts noticed for the disposal of the writ petition are that a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was issued on 15th June, 2006, Section 6 notification was issued on 14th June, 2007 and an Award

No.06/DC (W)/2007-2008 was made on 1st May, 2008. The petitioners claim that late Shri J.P.Gupta, and Smt. Sarla Gupta were the Bhumidhar of

the land falling under Khasra No. 38/19/2(0-05), 38/21 min (0-18), 38/22/1(0-16), 38/21 min (2-00) situated in the revenue estate of village Tikri Kalan,

Delhi. The petition also discloses that upon the death of Shri J.P. Gupta, petitioners being his legal heirs received the compensation amount under the

award dated 11th May, 2012.

It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioners were never served with any notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. However, the possession of

the land was taken from the petitioners and compensation of Rs. 22,20,114/- was released in their favour on 11th May, 2012 and further a sum of Rs.

22,05,777/- was released subsequently. It is the case of the petitioners that, it is only at the time of receiving the said amount, the petitioners learnt

about the award having been published. Thereafter without any delay a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was filed on 15th

May, 2012 vide diary No. 1201. Since the aforesaid reference was not traceable, the petitioners filed a fresh petition under Section 18 of the Act vide

diary No.754, which was received on 10th June, 2015.

The grievance of the petitioners is that the reference petition has been dismissed by the Land Acquisition Collector (West) on the ground of

limitation. It may also be noted at this stage that the petitioners had approached this Court by filing the W.P.(C) No. 6637/2016. The aforesaid writ

petition was dismissed on 21st November, 2016 as the petitioners had sought leave to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file an appropriate

petition which would be listed before the learned Single Judge of this Court.

Counsel for the petitioners submits that no notice was issued by the LAC to the petitioners prior to passing of the order dated 29th October, 2015 to

enable the petitioner to convince the Land Acquisition Collector that the reference petition was filed within the period of limitation. He further submits

that since the Land Acquisition Collector is a Quasi Judicial Authority, the Land Acquisition Collector should have followed the principles of natural

justice and opportunity of hearing should have been granted by the LAC to the petitioners and in the absence thereof, their rights have been severally

affected.

Learned counsel for the respondents has opposed this petition on the ground that the reference petition which was received on 10th June, 2015 is

patently beyond the period of limitation. Counsel submits that the petitioners received compensation as far back as on 11th May, 2012. Thus, the

petitioners not only had knowledge about the passing of the award but the petitioners were also aware about the contents of the award. It is only

based on the knowledge that the compensation was claimed and was granted in the year 2012.

Ms. Jyoti Tyagi further submits that there is no evidence on record to show that a reference petition was filed on 15th May, 2012 as neither of copy

thereof has been filed alongwith the present petition and upon verification, the diary number appears to be incorrect. She further submits that in the

reference petition which was received on 10th June, 2015 (second petition). No reference was made of an earlier reference petition having been filed,

nor there is any correspondence placed on record to show that the petitioners ever ascertained from the office of the LAC, the result of the earlier

alleged petition having been filed. She further submits that the reference petition, which was received on 10th June, 2015 is categorically on the face

of the record beyond the period of limitation and thus the same could not have been entertained by the LAC. Moreover, no purpose would be achieved

by either issuing notice in such a case to the petitioners as it would amount to a useless formality.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 reads as under:

“18. Reference to Court.-(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require

that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the

amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:

Provided that every such application shall be made,-

if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date

of the Collector’s award;

in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from

the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire.â€​

A mere reading of the Act would show that the period of limitation for filing a reference petition is six weeks, if a person is present or represented

before the Collector at the time when the award is made, six weeks from the receipt of notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) of the Act or six

months from the date of the Collector’s Award whichever period shall first expire. It is the case of the petitioners that the petitioners had filed a

petition under Section 18 on 15.05.2012 which has not been decided. It is also the case of the petitioners that since no decision was taken or received

by the petitioners and the petitioners were forced to file a second petition, which was received on 10.06.2015. The first question which arises for our

consideration is whether the petitioners in fact filed a petition on 15.05.2012? We find that the submission made that a petition was filed on 15.05.2012

is a false claim. It may be noted that no diary number has been disclosed. No copy of the reference petition alleged to have been filed on 15th May,

2012 has been filed and in the absence of any reference made in the subsequent reference petition which was received on 10th June, 2015. Having

regard to the fact that after 15th May, 2012, there is not a single correspondence filed to show that the petitioners ever enquired about the outcome of

such an application, we find it hard to believe that any application under Section 18 of the Act was filed by the petitioners on 15th May, 2012.

Accordingly, the only reference petition which was filed before the LAC and copy of which has been filed before this Court is dated 10th June,

2015. Reading of reference petition would show that there is no averment explaining the delay in filing the reference petition except the oral

submission made in the Court today that an earlier petition was filed and that petition would have been within the period of limitation. There is no

material on record to support such a submission.

No doubt the Land Acquisition Collector is a Quasi Judicial Authority. We may note that in another Writ Petition (C) No.10039/2016 titled as

Shanti Devi and Others vs. Union of India this court has held that in case of any deficiency or short coming or in case, where the reference petition is

beyond the period of limitation, the LAC must issue notice to the applications and afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing and then pass a reasoned

order. However, in the facts of the present case, we are of the view that it would be an absolute useless formality to remand the matter back to the

Collector and direct an opportunity of hearing as we have afforded a complete hearing to the petitioners and we find no ground whatsoever to show

that the reference petition was filed within the period of limitation.

We may also note that it is a settled law that the Land Acquisition Collector has no power to condone the delay, it would be useful to refer to the

observation made by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sh. Bale Ram vs. Land Acquisition Collector, 2005 (121) DLT 454, wherein it has

been held as under:

“ Filing of an application within time is a sine qua none for its entertainment by the Collector in terms of the provisions of the statute. As

the Collector is discharging its statutory functions he is bound by the provisions of the statute. The Land Acquisition Act is a complete court

in itself and does not permit for application of general principles of law and even of the Limitation Act by the Collector. The Collector in

fact has no power to condone the delay. Thus essentially he would have to reject an application which is beyond the prescribed period of

limitation as per the provisions of section 18 of the Act. The Supreme Court in the case of Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and

Anr. v. Shah Manilal Chandulal and ors. (1996) 9 SCC 414 held in unambiguous term that the Act clearly makes a distinction between the

Collector and the Court. This dichotomy cannot be loose sight of and the Land Acquisition Collector has no power to condone the delay.

Earlier the view taken by some of the High Courts was that mere intimation of the award would be sufficient and the prescribed period of

limitation of six months would commence from that date, when the award was announced and mere intimation was sent to the claimant. In

view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, this view cannot be regarded as correct law. The most fair and reasonable construction of this

proviso would be the date of knowledge of contents of the award which would be sufficient to enable the applicant to pursue his remedy

like a common prudent man and in accordance with law. Unlike other proviso to section, sources of information or knowledge would not be

a material consideration. It is the ultimate provided by the legislature for preferring an application under section 18 of the Act. In other

cases, it would be within six weeks from the date of receipt of notice by the claimant under section 12(2) and in the event of the party being

present at the time of announcement of the award within six weeks from the Collector's award. In no event, the Collector would have

jurisdiction to entertain and make a reference to the Court of competent jurisdiction under section 18 of the Act in excess of six months from

the date of Collector's award. In other words, within six months from the date, the party had constructed and/or actual knowledge or

information of the award in regard to its essential features. The last part of the second proviso has not defined the word ""Collector's

Award"" and this would have to be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case but in view of the principle aforestated. Once the

award has been made and the party has knowledge about its ingredients, the time limit on a realistic interpretation would commence from

that date and has expired on lapse of six months. Prohibition of limitation in a statute is normally to be construed strictly and the equitable

or ethical consideration would not normally be with the courts in giving it totally a liberal interpretation so as to wipe out the very effect of

the limitation clause.

Reliance placed by the petitioners upon the judgments of the Supreme Court afore-referred is certainly well founded. It is a settled principle

that the knowledge must relate to essential contents of the award and not merely the information that the Collector has passed the award. It

will be necessary for us to refer to the relevant dictum of the supreme Court in this regard. In the case of Raja Harish Chandra (supra), the

Court held as under :-

The award made by the Collector under section 12 is, in a sence, a decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as

prescribed by the Act. It is a decision, inter alia, in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in

the property acquired; but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined

by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer no further proceedings is required to be

taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded. If, however, the owner does not accept the offer, section 18 gives

him the statutory right of having the question determined by Court, and it is the amount of compensation which the Court may determine that

would bind both the owner and the Collector. In that case, it is on the amount thus determined prejudicially that the acquisition proceedings

would be concluded. It is because of this nature of the award that the award can be appropriately described as a tender or after made by

the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for acceptance. Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in

law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property then the making of the award as properly

understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. Thus considered the date of the award cannot be

determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office, it must involve the

consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively.

This principle was reiterated with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Mst.Quiser Jehan Begum (supra) with further expansion to

the word `knowledge and/or information of the award' and clearly interpreting the expression `six months from the date of Collector's

award, the Court held as under :-

(5) As to the second part of cl. (b) of the proviso, the true scope and effect thereof was considered by this Court in Harish Chandra's case,

1962-1 SCR 676: (AIR 1961 SC 1500) (supra.) It was there observed that a liberal and mechanical construction of the words ""six months

from the date of the Collector's award: occurring in the second part of cl.(b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and ""the knowledge

of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice, the

expression.... used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually

or constructively."" Admittedly the award was never communicated to the respondents. Therefore the question before us boils down to this.

When did the respondents know the award either actually or constructively? Learned counsel for the appellant has placed very strong

reliance on the petition which the respondents made for interim payment of compensation on December 24, 1954. He has pointed out that

the learned Subordinate Judge relied on this petition as showing the respondents' date of knowledge and there are no reasons why we

should take a different view. It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandra's case, 1962-1 SCR 676 :(AIR 1961 SC

1500) (supra) is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the

date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The

knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is

communicated to a party under S.12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he

reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in Court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the

Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of

the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award.

In the case of Bharat Chand Dilwali v. UOI 1988, Rajdhani Law Reporter 224 as well as a Division Bench of Gujrat High Court in the case

of Rsulkhanji Sardar Mahomad Khanji v. H.P. Rathod 3rd Spl Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmd and Anr. 1975 (16) Gujrat Law Reporter

911 took the view that mere knowledge of the award or taking part in the proceedings under section 30 of the Act would not be helpful for

holding that limitation had commenced from such a date. For this purpose, the date would be when either the award was communicated to

the party actually or he had knowledge of essential contents of the award actually or constructively.

Now we would apply to the above well settled principles of law to the facts of the present case. In this regard, at the very outset, we may

also notice that complete and correct facts have not been disclosed by the petitioners in these petitions. The award was announced on 19th

June, 1992 and possession of the property in question was taken on 25th January, 2000. The claimants were obviously fully aware about

the acquisition proceedings and they filed the application for receiving of compensation on 23rd June, 2001. In this application reference

was made to the essential features including the number of the award. In regard to amount of compensation payable to the petitioners they

had specified definite figures in the indemnity bonds and other documents annexed with the applications or filed subsequent thereto. The

indemnity bond and surety bonds and other documents were filed by Bale Ram on 3rd December 2001 while the application was filed on

23rd March, 2001. These documents clearly show that the petitioners had complete and full knowledge and information about the passing

of the award and essential contents thereof for the purposes of upholding their remedy under section 18 of the Act in accordance with law.

The limitation for filing an application by the petitioner under section 18 thus would commence at best from 23rd March, 2001 and even if

any liberal attitude, which is not called for, is given to the petitioners, then the limitation would commence from 3rd December, 2001 and

would expire on 23rd September, 2001 and 3rd June, 2001 while admittedly the application under section 18 of the Act was filed on 30th

May, 2002 and 3rd June, 2002.

The Supreme Court in the case of Msmt. Qaisar Jehan Begum (supra) had granted relief to the petitioner because their Lordships of the

Supreme Court as a finding of fact held that the claimants had no knowledge of the contents of the award and did not know the amount of

compensation which have been awarded. This judgment, therefore, is of no help to the petitioners as they themselves had submitted all

necessary documents for payment of compensation including all essential contents required for that purpose.

We may also notice here that the claimants filed application for payment of compensation and received the same without protest in the surety

and indemnity bonds submitted by them before the authorities. It is nowhere stated that they were receiving the compensation under protest

or without prejudice to their rights. However, in the applications submitted by them under section 18 of the Act in 2002, it is stated "" that the

petitioner had not accepted the market value of the Land Acquisition Collector and other contents of the award"". The payment admittedly

was received by them on 15th April, 2002 in pursuance to the documents and applications submitted without protest in March, 2001. In light

of the judgment of the Supreme court in the case of Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivabai and Ors. JT 1997 (5) SC 123, it is held that the

claimants having received the payment without protest; reference which was barred by limitation was also without jurisdiction, both the

petitioners had submitted similar applications and similar documents and thus application under section 18 of the Act would also be not

maintainable in addition to the fact that it is barred by limitation.

Argo, for the reasons aforerecorded, we find no merit in these petitions and the same are dismissed while leaving the parties to bear their

own costs.â€​

Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Premji Nathu vs. State of Gujarat, 2012 (5) SCC 250, in

support of his submission that the period of limitation would begin only when the petitioners had knowledge of the contents of the award, it has been

held as under:

“14. The reason for providing six months from the date of the award for making an application seeking reference, where the applicant

did not receive a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, while providing only six weeks from the date of receipt of notice under Section 12(2)

of the Act for making an application for reference where the applicant has received a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act is obvious.

When a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act is received, the landowner or person interested is made aware of all relevant particulars of the

award which enables him to decide whether he should seek reference or not. On the other hand, if he only comes to know that an award

has been made, he would require further time to make enquiries or secure copies so that he can ascertain the relevant particulars of the

award.

What needs to be emphasised is that along with the notice issued under Section 12(2) of the Act, the land owner who is not present or is

not represented before the Collector at the time of making of award should be supplied with a copy thereof so that he may effectively

exercise his right under Section 18(1) to seek reference to the Court.

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

In Bhagwan Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2010) 3 SCC 545, this Court interpreted Section 18 and laid down the following

propositions: “(i) If the award is made in the presence of the person interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the

application within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award itself. (ii) If the award is not made in the presence of the person

interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the application seeking reference within six weeks of the receipt of the notice

from the Collector under Section 12(2). (iii) If the person interested (or his representative) was not present when the award is made, and if

he does not receive the notice under Section 12(2) from the Collector, he has to make the application within six months of the date on which

he actually or constructively came to know about the contents of the award. (iv) If a person interested receives a notice under Section 12(2)

of the Act, after the expiry of six weeks from the date of receipt of such notice, he cannot claim the benefit of the provision for six months

for making the application on the ground that the date of receipt of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was the date of knowledge of the

contents of the award.â€​

The Court in Bhagwan Das then held:

“When a person interested makes an application for reference seeking the benefit of six months' period from the date of knowledge, the

initial onus is on him to prove that he (or his representative) was not present when the award was made, that he did not receive any notice

under Section 12(2) of the Act, and that he did not have the knowledge of the contents of the award during a period of six months prior to

the filing the application for reference. This onus is discharged by asserting these facts on oath. He is not expected to prove the negative.

Once the initial onus is discharged by the claimant/person interested, it is for the Land Acquisition Collector to establish that the person

interested was present either in person or through his representative when the award was made, or that he had received a notice under

Section 12(2) of the Act, or that he had knowledge of the contents of the award. Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the

award can be established by the Collector by proving that the person interested had received or drawn the compensation amount for the

acquired land, or had attested the mahazar/panchnama/proceedings delivering possession of the acquired land in pursuance of the

acquisition, or had filed a case challenging the award or had acknowledged the making of the award in any document or in statement on

oath or evidence. The person interested, not being in possession of the acquired land and the name of the State or its transferee being

entered in the revenue municipal records coupled with delay, can also lead to an inference of constructive knowledge. In the absence of

any such evidence by the Collector, the claim of the person interested that he did not have knowledge earlier will be accepted, unless there

are compelling circumstances not to do so.â€​

In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether the conclusion recorded by the Reference Court, which has been approved by the High

Court that the application filed by the appellant was barred by time is legally sustainable.

A careful reading of the averments contained in paragraph 2 of the application filed by the appellant under Section 18(1) shows that

the notice issued by the Collector under Section 12(2) was served upon him on 22.2.1985. Thereafter, his advocate obtained certified copy

of the award and filed application dated 8.4.1985 for making a reference to the Court. This implies that copy of the award had not been

sent to the appellant along with the notice and without that he could not have effectively made an application for seeking reference.

On behalf of the State Government, no evidence was produced before the Reference Court to show that copy of the award was sent to

the appellant along with the notice. Unfortunately, while deciding issue No.3, this aspect has been totally ignored by the Reference Court

which mechanically concluded that the application filed on 8.4.1985 was beyond the time specified in Section 18(2)(b). The learned Single

Judge of the High Court also committed serious error by approving the view taken by the Reference Court, albeit without considering the

fact that the notice issued by the Collector under Section 12(2) was not accompanied by a copy of the award which was essential for

effective exercise of right vested in the appellant to seek reference under Section 18(1).â€​

There is no quarrel with the proposition sought to be raised by the counsel for the petitioners that the Land Acquisition Collector (LAC) being a

quasi-judicial authority must comply with the principles of natural justice. There is also no quarrel with the proposition in view of the law laid down by

the Apex Court, which has been noticed in the case of Sh. Bale Ram (supra) and the law laid down in the case of Premji Nathu (supra) that the

period of limitation would start from the knowledge of the contents of the Award. The judgment in the case of Premji Nathu (supra) relied upon by the

counsel for the petitioners, in our view, would not apply to the facts of the present case for the reason that in the case of Premji Nathu (supra) the

applicant had made an application for the grant of certified copy and he explained the delay on the ground that certified copy was not made available

to him.

In the present case, it is the case of the petitioners that the petitioners made an application under Section 18 of the Act on 15.05.2012. The effect

of this averment would be that on this date, the petitioners were fully aware of the contents of the award. The grievance of the petitioners is that this

application is not traceable and no order was passed by the LAC forcing the petitioner to file a second petition, which was received on 10.06.2015. In

case, the alleged application filed by the petitioners on 15.05.2012 was dismissed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, then the

submissions of the counsel for the petitioners would hold good but the factual position is otherwise. As we have observed in the paragraphs

aforegoing, we are not convinced that any application under Section 18 of the Act was filed on 15.05.2012 for the reasons that (1) no copy of such

application has been filed; (2) no diary number has been provided; (3) no document has been placed on record to show steps taken to pursue the

application; and, (4) no reference of earlier alleged application in the second application which was received on 10.06.2015. The abovementioned

factors, in our view, conclusively hold that the submissions made that the earlier application was not considered, is false. The award in this case was

made as far back as on 01.05.2008. The petitioners being legal heirs of late Sh.J.P.Gupta received compensation on 11.05.2012. In this backdrop the

application, which was received on 10.06.2015, is patently beyond the period of limitation. We find no reason to remand the matter back to enable the

LAC to give opportunity of hearing to the petitioner as we have already granted a full hearing to the petitioners and remanding the matter back would

be a useless formality. Resultantly, we find no merit in this writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.

At this stage counsel for the petitioners submits that he will make an application under Section 28(A) of the Land Acquisition Act in case such a

relief is open to him.