Vairana Pillai vs The State

Anantanarayanan, J.—The Appellant before us, an elderly man named Vairana Pillai, has been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge of

Madurai of the murder of his wife Nallammal, and also of causing grievous hurt with a deadly weapon to his sister-in-law Vellayammal (P.W. 1),

during the course of the same transaction. He was sentenced by the learned Judge to imprisonment for life upon the capital charge, and to rigorous

imprisonment for three years u/s 326, Indian Penal Code, the sentences being directed to run concurrently.

The facts are very simple, and the background is of some significance, with regard to the particular plea advanced by the learned Counsel for

the Appellant on his behalf. The evidence abundantly proves that the Appellant was not leading a happy married life with Nallammal (deceased),

mainly owing to the aggressive and unyielding temperament of the latter, and her unfeeling behaviour towards her husband. We have the evidence

of close relatives and neighbours like P.Ws. 1 and 4, who gave certainly no reason to distort the facts in favour of the Appellant, that the deceased

was not giving even a quarter anna to the Appellant for his expenses, though he was turning over all his earnings to his wife. Actually, one of the

witnesses picturesquely states that even if the Appellant bent on his knees before Nallammal (deceased) and implored her, she was likely to prove

obdurate, and would not grant him cash for his expenses. In addition to this, there was discord because of the food habits of the pair, the Appellant

was a non-vegetarian, and the deceased was a woman of pious disposition who observed vegetarian restrictions, and would not prepare non-

vegetarian food. Above all, the deceased who was in her early forties, was a devotee of Lord Muruga, and, in consequence of her vows, she

persistently denied the Appellant his marital rights. There is abundant evidence on this point, and of frequent quarrels between the pair on this

account.

We now come to the events on the actual date of occurrence (30th September 1961), at about 10 a.m., and the facts here are very simple. It

appears that Nallammal (deceased) was conversing with P.W. 4 when the Appellant called her. As the deceased was then engaged in taking cow-

dung for domestic work, she said that there was no hurry, and that she would come later after fetching the cow-dung. Learned Counsel for the

Appellant argues, upon the facts of the record, that, shortly after this, not merely should the Appellant have gone into his house, but also that the

deceased and P.W. 1 should have done so. The record does show that a very brief altercation between the husband and wife might have

immediately followed. In any event, according to P.W. 1, she heard the cries of the deceased, and ran in and saw the Appellant stabbing his wife

with a knife (Material, Object 1) on her chest, flanks and other parts of the body. When P.W. 1 attempted to intervene, the Appellant stabbed her

on her forehead, left arm and back. A little boy Ramaswami (P.W. 2), son of P.W. 1, tried to interfere, and protested. The Appellant chased this

boy, and the evidence is very clear that the boy had to escape an assault with the knife by taking to his heels. A little later P.W. 4, the Village

Munsif (P.W. 9) and the Talayari and others came to the spot, and the Appellant was disarmed. After Material Object 1 was wrested from him,

he was tied up. The Village Munsif recorded a dying declaration from Nailammal (exhibit P-11), in which the offence is very clearly described.

It is unnecessary for us to proceed into the other minute particulars of the evidence in this case. For, there can be no doubt Whatever that the

Appellant did inflict fatal injuries on his wife with the knife (Material Object 1) and also did cause grievous hurt to Vellayammal (P.W. 1) when she

tried to interfere. At the trial, the Appellant put forward a version that Nallammal (deceased) and even P.W. 1 assaulted him, by attempting to

squeeze his testicles or actually doing so, and that, in great fear for his life, he lost control over himself, and was not even aware of his subsequent

precise acts. It is needless for us to say that there is nothing in the record, to probabilise this extraordinary version. We are willing to assume that

there might have been a wordy altercation between the husband and wife, proceeding the actual incident of offence. But there is absolutely no

reason for us to presume that the Appellant was assaulted, or that his testicles were squeezed in the manner he has claimed, either by the deceased

or by P.W. 1 or by both. The question of the application of exception (4) to Section 300, Indian Penal Code, to the facts of this case, does not

really arise. There was no actual fight, and there is nothing to justify even a suspicion that the wife (deceased) attempted any physical violence

towards her husband.

In this state of the evidence, two arguments have been advanced by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, Sri Srinivasan. The first is that it is at

least possible that the main offence committed by the Appellant would not be murder, because he appears to have worked himself into a frenzy,

and to have indiscriminately stabbed his wife with the weapon (Material Object 1). But we find from the medical evidence that injuries Nos. 1 and

2 on the woman were necessarily fatal in character of which injury No. 1 was very grave, cutting through the pleura, the inferior margin of the

lower lobe of the left lung, and the spleen and the left lobe of the liver. Though this was one among the several injuries inflicted by a man who has

practically run amok, it was certainly fatal, and the inference must be that the Appellant is guilty of murder under the third Clause to Section 300,

Indian Penal Code, with regard to this injury. This argument has, therefore, to be rejected.

The next argument of the learned Counsel is that it is at least conceivable that the Appellant received grave and sudden provocation, and would

thus be entitled to the benefit of Exception (1) to Section 300, Indian Penal Code. Learned Counsel emphasised the sad background to this crime,

and the abundant evidence of the overwhelming domination of the husband by the wife, leading to great bitterness harboured by the husband. The

argument is that such a course of prolonged provocation might have proved explosive with regard to the particular provocation which, though it

might not ordinarily be of sufficient gravity to attract Exception (1) to Section 300, Indian Penal Code, might, by its suddenness and its relation to

the prior history of provocation, justify the application of that exception. That argument is sought to be supported by certain observations in Sir

Hari Singh Gour''s Edition of the Indian Penal Code and by an early decision of this Court in The Empress v. Khogayi ILR (1879) Mad. 122. But

the facts of that decision were entirely different, and that was a case in which very violent abuse was addressed to a man, who had been just

previously enraged by the conduct of the son of the deceased. We do not think that we would be justified in taking into account a certain, course

of living, which is said to have constituted a continuing source of provocation to one or other spouse, as adequate to attract the exception, when

the actual provocation, was sudden, but not grave. At any rate, that would indeed be an unsafe doctrine, and we have been shown no authority for

such a view. We are not prepared to hold, in the circumstances of this case, that Exception (1) to Section 300, Indian Penal Code, would apply.

Hence, the conviction of the Appellant for murder is correct and must be confirmed. The learned Sessions Judge took a perfectly proper view of

this case in imposing the lesser sentence of imprisonment for life, instead of the extreme penalty of the law. We confirm the sentence also. The

conviction of the Appellant u/s 326, Indian Penal Code, and the sentence imposed therefor, are also confirmed.

Before parting with this appeal, we would desire to stress the unfortunate features of the case which have culminated in this crime, which must

have been unpremeditated and due to sudden frenzy. These features may be appropriately taken into account by the authorities of the State, in

considering the reduction of the life sentence to a lesser period and we advance the suggestion accordingly.