Vallimayil Ammal vs The Commission of Inquiry (The District Judge) and Another

Kailasam, J.—This petition is filed by Vallimayil Ammal, mother of Rajendran, who died as a result of police firing on 27th January 1965 at Chidambaram for the writ of mandamus directing the Commission of Inquiry, Chidambaram to permit her Counsel to cross-examine the witnesses, who have given evidence adverse to the deceased boy, Rajendran, and such other witnesses as might give evidence adverse to the interests of the boy, Rajendran, and to furnish copies of documents asked for in the petition presented before the Commission on 2nd March 1965, for effective cross-examination.

There were disturbances in Chidambaram on 27th January 1965 in which the police party opened fire which resulted in the death of Rajendran. On getting in formation about the disturbances on the same day, i.e., 27th January 1965, the Government decided the there should be a full inquiry into the circumstances which led to the opening of fire and passed G.O. Ms. No. 108, Public (General), dated 27th January 1965 appointing Sri M. Ramaiah Pillai, District and Sessions Judge, Cuddalore, South Arcot to conduct the inquiry. The inquiry is to cover all the incidents, which culminated in the opening of fire by the police. The inquiry is to be open to the public and the press, and it was directed that all relevant evidence should be recorded from persons having personal knowledge relating to these incidents, including such persons as might volunteer to give material evidence. The inquiring officer was directed to submit a report with his findings with particular reference to (i) whether the firing was justified, and (ii) whether the force used was justified under the circumstances.

On 29th January 1965 in G.O. Ms. No. 110, Public (General-A) the Government of Madras in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (Central Act LX of 1952) directed Sri Ramaiah Pillai, District and Sessions Judge, South Arcot, who has been appointed by the Government to inquire into the events that happened at Chidambaram on 27th January 1965, to exercise all the powers conferred by Sections, 4, 5 and 8 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. The Commission of Inquiry commenced its work on 9th February 1965 at Chidambaram. The Petitioner apprehending that the conduct of her son, Rajendran, who was killed in the disturbances, would also be inquired into, engaged a Counsel to take part in the inquiry. It is alleged by the Petitioner that the Commission of Inquiry in its first sitting on 9th February 1965 decided on the following procedure to be adopted in the inquiry:

(1) The Public Prosecutor representing the police and the Counsel representing other parties should file statements accompanied by affidavits of their witnesses to be examined in the inquiry and both sides should exchange copies of such statements ;

(2) Counsel for both sides should have the right of cross examination of witnesses of the opposite party;

(3) The police should furnish the Counsel for the other parties copies of all documents and papers that might be filed in the inquiry.

The inquiry was adjourned to 19th February 1965 and the parties were directed to file statements and affidavits. According to the Petitioner, the Commission informed the parties that it would sit on 15th February 1965 to receive the statements if they were ready, but on that date, the Commission of Inquiry revoked the procedure laid down by it on 9th February 1965 and decided not to receive any statement or affidavit. On 22nd February 1965, the Counsel for the Petitioner presented a petition to the Commission of Inquiry asking for certain documents and praying for the adjournment of the inquiry pending furnishing documents. The (Commission refused the adjournment holding that for the purpose of the inquiry copies of statements and documents mentioned in the petition need not be granted. The inquiry was conducted from 22nd to 26th February 1965.

The Petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 867 of 1966, on 24th February 1965 to permit the Counsel for the Petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses, who have given evidence adverse to the boy, Rajendran, and furnish copies of the documents asked for in the petition. The High Court dismissed the petition observing that it would be open to the Petitioner to make a request, at the time when evidence adverse to Rajendran was given by some witness, for permission to cross-examine that witness and it would be for the Commission of Inquiry to consider that request. Regarding the documents asked for, this Court observed that it would be a point for the Commission to consider any document filed before it involved a reflection on the conduct of the boy, Rajendran, and whether the Petitioner was entitled to ask for and obtain copies thereof for suitable cross-examination of the witnesses who adduced proof of such documents. On 1st March 1965, a petition was filed on behalf of the Petitioner before the Commission of Inquiry. It was prayed that the witnesses already examined before the Commission might be recalled for the purpose of enabling her Counsel to cross-examine them. Copies of documents were also prayed for. Reference was made in the petition to the observations of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 867 of 1965. This petition was dismissed by the Commission of Inquiry and this writ petition is filed for a direction to the Commission of Inquiry for permitting the Petitioner''s Counsel to cross-examine the witnesses, who have already given evidence and who are likely to give evidence adverse to the deceased boy, Rajendran.

The Commission of Inquiry was appointed u/s 11 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. It is empowered to exercise all the powers conferred by Section 4, 5 and 8 of the Act. It is directed that the inquiry will cover all the incidents which culminated in the opening of fire by the police and the inquiry will be open to the public and the press and all relevant evidence will be recorded from persons having personal knowledge relating to these incidents, including such persons as may volunteer to give material evidence. The inquiring officer is required to submit a report to the Government with his findings particularly with reference to (i) whether the firing was justified and (ii) whether the force used was justified under the circumstances. Section 3 of the Act empowers the Government to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions as may be specified in the notification. Section 4 vests in the Commission the powers of a civil Court, while trying a suit under the Code of CPC in respect of several matters specified therein, namely summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, requiring the discovery and production of any document, receiving evidence on affidavits, requisitioning any public record or copy thereof from any Court or office, issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents. Section 5 empowers the Government by notification in the official gazette to confer additional powers as provided in all or any of the Sub-sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of that section. Section 6 provides that no statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence before the Commission shall subject him to, or be used against him in, any civil or criminal proceedings, except a prosecution for giving false, evidence by such statement, provided that the statement is made in reply to a question which he is required by the Commission to answer, or is relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry. Section 8 empowers the Commission to regulate its own procedure (including the fixing of places and times of its sittings and deciding whether to sit in public or in private) subject to the rules that may be made in this behalf. Section 12 empowers the appropriate Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. The Central Government in exercise of its powers conferred u/s 12 of the Act has framed the Central Commissions of Inquiry (Procedure) Rules, 1960. Rule 2 prescribes the procedure for issuing a notice to persons concerned in the inquiry and all persons acquainted with the subject-matter of the inquiry to furnish statements along with the documents, etc. The procedure for recording evidence is provided under Rule 3. Rules 4 and 5 are important and may be considered so far as they are relevant for the purpose of this petition. Rule 4 provides that if the Commission is of opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry it shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence. Rule 5 provides that a person whose reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected(i) may cross-examine a witness, (ii) may address the Court, and (iii) may be represented before the Commission by a legal practitioner or with the consent of the Commission by any other person. The Government of Madras that appointed the Commission of Inquiry has not framed any rules. But the failure of the State Government to frame rules would not deny any person adversely affected, the application of the principles of natural justice, namely of a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and of the right to produce evidence in his defence.

The duty of the Commission of Inquiry is to submit findings as to (i) whether the firing was justified, and (ii) whether the force used was justified under the circumstances. Findings on the two questions would involve whether in the circumstances of the case the police were justified in the exercise of right of private defence or under any law, in firing and using the force which they did. In this case admittedly the Petitioner''s son was killed in the police firing and it may be that the police may justify the firing and use of force because of the conduct of Rajendran. If the evidence ought to be adduced is adverse to Rajendran his reputation will be at stake and the Petitioner would be a person interested. The inquiry is open to the public, and it is directed that all relevant evidence be recorded from persons having personal knowledge relating to these incidents. From the nature of the duties of the Commission of Inquiry it is clear that the Commission is not called upon merely to gather materials for the information of the Government but to give an objective finding on the evidence recorded. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the Respondent submitted that the inquiry as contemplated is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial and that a writ in the nature of certiorari or mandamus does not lie. It was also contended that the function of the Commission of Inquiry was only to make recommendations to the Government, which are not enforceable proprio vigore and, therefore, the Commission could not be designated as a Court or a Tribunal exercising judicial functions.

There can be no doubt that the Commission of Inquiry appointed in this case is not a Court and is not exercising judicial functions, but the functions are not merely administrative in character. It is the duty of the Commission to record evidence of persons concerned and give an objective finding. In arriving at findings as to whether the firing was justified and the force used was justified, the Commission has to come to an objective conclusion and decide on the facts which may adversely affect the interests of the Petitioner. As the rights of parties are involved and as the Commission of Inquiry is to act objectively in submitting the report, the exercise of its functions is quasi judicial in nature.

That the Commission of Inquiry is not a Court has been held by the Nagpur High Court in M.V. Rajwade v. Dr. S.M. Hasan ILR (1951) Nag. 1. The question that arose for consideration in that case was whether the Commission of Inquiry is a Court within the meaning of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. It was held that the least characteristic that was required of a Court was the capacity to deliver a definitive judgment and the mere fact that the procedure adopted by it was of a legal character and it had the power to administer an oath would not impart to it the status of a Court. Under the provisions of the Act, it was held that the Commission was a civil Court only for the purpose of the contempts punishable under Sections 175, 178, 179, 180 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code subject to the condition that it had not the right itself to punish the contemners, a right which other Courts possessed. It may be noted that in this decision the Court was not concerned with the question whether the Commission of Inquiry was exercising quasi-judicial functions and amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Ram Krishna Dalmia Vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Others, the Supreme Court, while considering the question whether by appointment of the Commission the Government had arrogated to themselves judicial powers which did not belong to their respective domains, observed that, as the function of the Commission was to make recommendations, which were not enforceable proprio vigore, there could be no question of usurpation of judicial functions. Regarding the power of the Commission the Court observed that the Commission had no power of adjudication in the sense of passing an order which could be enforced proprio vigore. The Supreme Court further observed at page 293:

A clear distinction must, on the authorities, be drawn between a decision which, by itself, has no force and no penal effect and a decision which becomes enforceable immediately or which may become enforceable by some action being taken. Therefore, as the Commission we are concerned with is merely to investigate and record its findings and recommendations without having any power to enforce them, the inquiry or report cannot be looked upon as a judicial inquiry in the sense of its being an exercise of judicial function properly so called and consequently the question of usurpation by Parliament or the Government of the powers of the judicial organs of the Union of India cannot arise on the facts of this case....

The Supreme Court did not go into the question whether the Commission of Inquiry was a quasi-judicial body or not.

It was contended on behalf of the Respondent that even if the functions are judicial in character, as the findings themselves are not enforceable, the proceedings are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. In Rex v. Electricity Commissioners London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ex parte (1924) 1 K.B. 171 the question arose whether a writ could issue against the Electricity Commissioners established by Section 1 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919. Under the Act the scheme that might be framed had no force or effect by itself. It had to be passed on to the Minister for Transport who might confirm or modify the scheme. Even then the scheme had no force. It had to be approved by a resolution passed by each House of Parliament. and then only the order passed by the Commissioner had any force or effect. After discussing the case-law on the subject Bankes L.J., concluded that there was abundant precedent for the Court taking action at the present stage of the proceedings of the Electricity Commissioners, provided it was satisfied that the Commissioners were proceeding Judicially in making their report, even though that report needed the confirmation of the Minister of Transport and of both Houses of Parliament before it became effective. The learned Judge also observed that under the Act the Commissioners were required to hold local inquiries for the purpose of giving interested parties the opportunity of being heard and that powers so far reaching, affecting as they did individuals as well as property, were powers to be exercised judicially, and not ministerially. Atkin L.J,, stated the position thus at page 205:

Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King''s Bench Division exercised in these writs.

The learned Judge further found as follows at page 208:

In the provision that the final decision of the Commissioners is not to be operative until it hat been approved by the two Houses of Parliament I find nothing inconsistent with the view that in arriving at that decision the Commissioners themselves are to act judicially and within the limits prescribed by Act of Parliament, and that the Courts hare power to keep them within those limits.

The above decision is an authority for the proposition that a Tribunal did not cease to function judicially, merely because the finding it was called upon to submit was subject to confirmation by some other body and did not take effect by itself. In Rex v. The London County Council, The Entertainments Protection Association Ex parte (1931) 2 KB 215, 233 following the decision in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners'' London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ex parte (1924) 1 KB 171 Scrutton L.J., observed as follows:

It is not necessary that it should be a Court in the sense in which this Court is a Court; it is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition ; and it is not necessary to be strictly a Court; if it is a tribunal which has to decide rights after hearing evidence and opposition, it is amenable to the writ of certiorari ;....

In this case it cannot be denied that the question will have to be decided on evidence between the proposal namely whether the firing was Justified and the force used was justified and the opposition that it was not justified. The Tribunal has to decide the question after hearing evidence for the proposal and the opposition. Slesser L.J., in his judgment at page 243 enumerated the four conditions under which a writ of certiorari may issue. They are: wherever any body of persons (i) having legal authority (ii) to determine questions affecting rights of subjects (iii) having the duty to act judicially and (iv) act in excess of their legal authority a writ of certiorari may issue. In Province of Bombay Vs. Kusaldas S. Advani and Others, the Supreme Court approved "the principles laid down by Atkin L.J., In Rex v. Electricity Commissioners'' London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ex parte (1924) 1 K.B. 171 and Slesser L.J., in Rex v. The London County Council. The Entertainment Protection Association Ex parte (1931) 2 K.B. 215, 933 and observed as follows at page 633:

It seems to me that the true position is that when the law under which the authority is making a decision itself requires a judicial approach, the decision will be quasi-judicial. Prescribed forms of procedure are not necessary to make an inquiry judicial, provided in coming to the decision the well-recognised principles of approach are required to be followed. In my opinion, the conditions laid down by SLESSER L. J. In his judgment correctly bring out the distinction between a judicial or quasi-judicial decision on the one hand and a ministerial decision "on the other.

From the decisions cited above it is clear that when the authority making a decision which may affect the rights of parties is required to adopt a judicial approach even though the decision by itself may not take effect, the proceeding will be quasi-judicial.

The question whether the principles of natural justice would be applicable before the Tribunals, which are called upon to submit a report, fell to be considered, by the Supreme Court in Manak Lal Vs. Dr. Prem Chand, Under the Bar Councils Act. 1926 a Tribunal was constituted by the High Court to hold an enquiry into the conduct of an Advocate and to submit a report to the High Court. It was contended in that case that the Tribunal was improperly constituted, as one of the members had bias against the Advocate and, therefore, the report made by the Tribunal as well as the subsequent order passed by the High Court were invalid. For the other side it was urged that the principles of natural justice should not be applied to the proceedings before the Tribunal appointed under the Bar Councils Act, as the Tribunal was not empowered to pass final orders on the enquiry and the report made by the Tribunal was to be submitted to the High Court for final decision. In repelling this contention the Supreme Court observed as follows at page 583:

If it is true that in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings justice must not only be done but must appear to be done to the litigating public, it is equally true that when a lawyer is charged for professional misconduct and is given the privilege of being tried by a tribunal of the Bar Council, the enquiry before the tribunal must leave no room for a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the lawyer that the tribunal may have been even indirectly influenced by any bias in the mind of any of the members of the tribunal.

Thus the Supreme Court has held that the principles of natural justice is applicable not only to the authorities that could decide the matter finally but also to authorities who were called upon to submit a report for further consideration by some other body. The contention that merely because the authority was submitting a report on facts and it had no effect by itself the decisions cannot be questioned in writ proceedings cannot be upheld in view of the decisions in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners'' London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ex Parte (1924) 1 KB 171 and Manak Lal Vs. Dr. Prem Chand, The Privy Council took more or less the same view in the decision in University of Ceylon v. Fernando (1960) 1 All ER 581. An act of the University of Ceylon empowered the Vice-Chancellor, if he was satisfied that any candidate for examination had acquired knowledge of the nature or the substance of any question or the content of any paper, to suspend that candidate from the examination and report the matter to the Board of Residence and Discipline for such further action as the Board might decide to take. On receiving such a report the Board might suspend the candidate from any university examination indefinitely. The Vice Chancellor appointed a commission of inquiry, consisting of himself and two others, to assist him in inquiring into certain allegations which had been made against a candidate. The commission found that the allegation made was true and reported accordingly. The Board accepted the report and suspended the candidate indefinitely. It was alleged that when some witnesses were examined before the commission the candidate was not present. Two witnesses were questioned by the Vice Counselor alone in the absence of the other members of the commission. Before the Privy Council, the Counsel for the University disclaimed the contention that the Vice-Chancellor''s functions were administrative and not quasi-judicial but submitted that on the footing that these functions were quasi-judicial, the claims of natural justice had been fully satisfied. Under Clause (8) of part I of chapter VIII, of the General Act of the University of Ceylon the Vice Chancellor was empowered to suspend the candidate from the university examination or remove his name from any pass list and report the matter, to the Board of Residence and Discipline for such further action as the Board may decide to take. Under clause 14 when any matter was reported to the Board of Residence and Discipline, the Board was powered to take action by removal of the name of the candidate from any pass list, by suspension of the candidate from any university examination, etc The Privy Council observed that Clause (8) was silent as to the procedure to be followed by the Vice-Chancellor in satisfying bin self of the truth or falsity of a given allegation. The Privy Council further observed as follows at page 638:

But as no special form of procedure is prescribed it is for him to determine the procedure to be followed as he thinks best, but to adopt to the present case the language of the judgment of this Board in De Verteuil v. Knaggs (1918) AC 557, 560, subject to the obvious implication that some form of inquiry must be made such as will enable him fairly to determine whether he should hold himself satisfied that the charge in question has been made out...In the absence of my express requirement, he is thrown back on the necessary implication that the Vice-Chancellor''s procedure will be such as to satisfy the requirements indicated in the passages from De Verteuil v. Knaggs (1918) AC 557, Local Government Board v. Arlidge (1915) AC 120 and Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society (1958) 2 All ER 579,....and thus to comply with those elementary and essential principles of " fairness " which must, as a matter of necessary implication be treated as applicable in the discharge of the vice-chancellor''s admittedly quasi-judicial functions under also (8), or, in other words, with the principles of natural justice.

In conclusion the Privy Council found that one essential witness against the Plaintiff was examined in the absence of the candidate and the objection of the candidate would have been more formidable if he had asked to be allowed to question the witness and his request had been refused. Though the Vice Chancellor was only making an inquiry for submitting a report to the Board of Residence and Discipline who alone could have inflicted any punishment, and though no procedure was prescribed for the conduct of the inquiry, it was held that the Vice-Chancellor was exercising judicial functions and the principle of natural justice were available to the candidate who was inquired before the Vice Chancellor. This decision would establish that even though the commission is only making a report to the Government and is not itself taking any action, as it is required to act Judicially and come to an objective conclusion which would affect the right of the Petitioner, the Petitioner is entitled to claim that the requirements of the principles of natural justice should be fulfilled. The requirements of natural justice, as stated by the Privy Council in De Verteuil v. Knaggs (1918) AC 557, 560 areas follows:

Their Lordships are of opinion that in making such an inquiry there is, apart from special circumstances, a duty of giving to any person against whom the complaint is made a fair opportunity to make any relevant statement which he may desire to bring forward and a fair opportunity to correct or controvert any relevant statement brought forward to his prejudice.

As observed by the Privy Council, in the absence of any rules prescribed by the State Government, the Commission of Inquiry is bound as a matter of necessary implication to observe the principles of natural justice and to allow a fair opportunity to the Petitioner to make any relevant statement which she may desire to make and a fair opportunity to correct or controvert any relevant statement brought forward to her prejudice. These principles are embodied in the rules framed by the Central Government under Rules 4 and 5 which afford a right of cross-examination to the party whose reputation is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry. It is clear from the nature of the report called for from the Commission of Inquiry the mode of inquiry prescribed and the position of the Petitioner, whose son''s reputation is likely to be affected, that the right of the Petitioner to cross-examine witnesses, whose evidence is likely to affect the reputation of the Petitioner''s son, cannot be denied.

Before leaving this question a decision of the Bench of this Court in Rajangam v. State of Madras ILR (1959) Mad. 12 may be referred. The question that arose for consideration in that case was whether the proceedings u/s 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the cause of the death of a person in the custody of the police were judicial or quasi-judicial amenable to writ of certiorari. A person died at the Kodambakkam Police Station and the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Madras acting under the provisions of Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directed the Fifth Presidency Magistrate to make an inquiry into the cause of the death of that person, and the Fifth Presidency Magistrate after inquiry submitted a report to the Chief Presidency Magistrate. Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers a Magistrate, when a person dies in the custody of the police, to hold an inquiry into the cause of death either instead of or in addition to the investigation held by the police officer. The Bench after an elaborate consideration of the case-law on the point held that the proceedings before the Fifth Presidency Magistrate were not judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, that the proceedings were nothing more than a fact finding inquiry and had none of the characteristics of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, that it was only optional for the Magistrate holding the inquiry u/s 176 to make a report or not, that the object of the inquiry was nothing more than to furnish materials on which action might be taken or not, that the report by itself would purely be recommendatory and not one effective proprio vigore of the Government and that it did not dispose of the rights of parties. In the inquiry with which we are concerned the inquiry officer is required to make a report, and it is not optional for him to make a report or not as in the case of a report u/s 176, Code of Criminal Procedure. In an inquiry into the cause of the death of a person the rights of other persons are not involved whereas in the inquiry with which we are concerned the question that has to be decided is whether the firing is justified or not which involves the interests of other persons also. The Bench decision which relates to an inquiry u/s 176, Code of Criminal Procedure not involving the rights of parties is not applicable to the facts of this case.

Reliance was next placed by the Respondent on the decision of the Punjab High Court in Allen Berry and Co. Private Ltd. and Another Vs. Vivian Bose and Others, . A Commission of Inquiry was appointed by the Central Government to inquire into the affairs of the Petitioners and various other persons and companies mentioned in the notification for the purpose specified in the notification. On a consideration of the facts the Bench held that there was no contest between the Government and the Petitioners and that there would be no determination of disputes between any parties or that the opinion or views expressed by the Commission would in any way prejudicially affect the rights of the Petitioners. In the present inquiry the reputation of the deceased boy Rajendran is involved and admittedly evidence has been adduced adverse to the boy Rajendran. As the reputation of the son of the Petitioner is at stake, the Petitioner is a party affected. The contention that the inquiry officer has no right to take any action but only to submit a report for consideration by the Government will not make any difference. Whether any action is finally taken or not, if the report is adverse to the Petitioner''s son, the Petitioner will be prejudicially affected and she has a right to be heard in the proceedings. In view of the authorities discussed above much reliance cannot be placed on the decision of the Punjab High Court.

There is not much dispute regarding the facts in this case. The allegation of the Petitioner is that on 9th February 1965 the Commission of Inquiry in its first sitting settled the procedure. It was decided that both sides should file statements accompanied by affidavits of their witnesses to be examined at the inquiry and that Counsel for both sides should have the right of cross-examination of the witnesses of the other side. The allegation of the Petitioner is that this procedure which was drawn up in consultation with all the parties was revoked by the Commission on 15th February 1965 in the absence of the Petitioner, and no reason was given for revoking the procedure adopted earlier. These allegations are not denied. In the counter affidavit filed it is not denied that the procedure agreed upon was revoked in the absence of the Petitioner without assigning any reason. It is stated that the Petitioner could not rely on the procedure suggested in the first sitting on 9th February 1965 as it was open to the inquiring authority to change or modify the procedure suggested by it, that the Petitioner had no legal right to compel the inquiring authority to follow a particular procedure only and that it was not necessary for the inquiring authority to issue notice to anybody or give reasons for revoking or modifying the procedure which it would follow in the conduct of the inquiry. the stand taken by the Respondent cannot be justified. Though the Commission of Inquiry is entitled to follow any procedure, having fixed a particular mode of procedure, it is the duty of the Commission to hear the concerned parties before any alteration is made. In any event in the absence of any procedure prescribed, the Commission of Inquiry is bound to observe the principles of natural justice and safeguard the interests of persons who may be affected by giving a proper hearing. It was further alleged in the affidavit that the Commission rejected the request of the Petitioner for copies of certain documents, which, according to her, were relevant for the purpose of cross-examination. It is not stated in the counter affidavit that the documents are not necessary for the purpose of cross-examination, but it is contended that the Petitioner is not entitled to the documents asked for in the petition, as the Petitioner has no legal right to get copies of the documents. It is alleged by the Petitioner that among the witnesses examined the Superintendent of Police and the Deputy Superintendent of Police and a sepoy in Special Armed Police, Andhra Pradesh, had given evidence that the Petitioner''s son was in the forefront of the crowd and was behaving very violently, that he stooped to pick up a stone and that as his behavior and that of the crowd appeared to be unruly, fire was opened and he received a bullet while in a stooping position to pick up a stone. This allegation is not denied in the counter affidavit of the second Respondent.

It is not stated in the counter affidavit or pleaded in the Court that the Petitioner was given an opportunity to cross-examining witnesses and that opportunity was not availed of. The stand taken is that the Commission of Inquiry is entitled to follow its own procedure and that the Petitioner is not entitled to cross-examining witnesses. In the absence of any procedure, as already pointed out, the inquiring officer will have to follow the principles of natural justice and assure a fair hearing to the Petitioner, which would include the right to cross-examining witnesses, who speak adverse to her son''s interests. The Respondent''s contention that the Petitioner will not be prejudiced by her not cross-examining any of the witnesses cannot be accepted. On the facts, therefore, it is clear that the Petitioner had no reasonable opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses who have spoken against the conduct of her son. The principles of natural justice have not been followed by the Commission of Inquiry and the inquiring officer has failed to discharge his duty. The Commission of Inquiry is directed to give the Petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, who have deposed against the conduct of the son of the Petitioner.

Regarding the request for copies of documents, it is not possible to give any direction without knowing the contents of the documents. It is for the Commission of Inquiry to look into the documents, and if it is satisfied that a copy of any document should be furnished for effective cross-examination of the witnesses relating to the adverse evidence given by them against the son of the Petitioner, it shall direct such copies to be furnished to the Petitioner before cross-examination. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.