Vanamayil vs The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Others

Nainar Sundaram, J.—The prayer in the writ petition is for the issue of a writ of mandamus, directing respondents 1 and 2 to implement the

requirements of the Tamil Nadu Contract Labour (Abolition and Regulation) Act 37 of 1970, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and the Rules

framed thereunder and to enforce the same in all the labour contracts and in particular with regard to the contract labour hired in the Basin Bridge

Thermal Power House at Madras. Mr. V. Prakash, learned counsel for the petitioner, coveted for issue of a writ of mandamus in the above terms,

putting forth-three grounds. Learned counsel firstly expressed a grievance that the wages as such to the workmen like the petitioner have not been

disbursed by the fourth respondent, the contractor, as enjoined by S. 21(1) of the Act and as such, the principal employer, namely, the first

respondent is liable to pay the same and recover it from the fourth respondent as per S. 21(4) of the Act. Learned counsel was conscious of the

fact that if there is non-payment of wages, the remedy for recovery of wages lies elsewhere and not before this Court in Writ Jurisdiction. Hence, I

have to eschew this ground urged on behalf of the petitioner. Secondly, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the provisions of the

Act and the Rules relating to welfare and health of contract labour have not been complied with and direction should issue to respondents 1 and 2

to enforce the said provisions. S. 16 relates to canteens; S. 17 relates to rest rooms; S. 18 relates to other facilities, and S. 19 relates to first aid

facilities. There are corresponding rules expatiating the requirements and delineating the fulfilment of the requirements with very many minute

details. Respondents 1, 3, and 4 have not taken up a stand that they are not bound to comply with the provisions of the Act and the rules in this

regard. On the other hand, they have put forth a stand that the provisions of the Act and the rules have been satisfied. If this is so, the controversy

is really as to whether the minute details with regard to the provisions for the welfare and health of contract labour do stand satisfied or not. The

provisions are cumbersome and the details cover a large area, going into which will lead this Court to a thick factual controversy. It is a well settled

rule that this Court, sitting in writ jurisdiction, shall not embark upon an investigation into disputed facts and materials. Though this Court can try

issues, both of fact and of law, yet, if the matter involves complex questions of fact as in the present case, the resolution of which will require

adduction of evidence in any form whatsoever, assessment thereof and adjudication of the same, this Court will not indulge in such determination of

disputed questions of fact. As stated above, the respondents have not projected a stand that they are not bound by the provisions of the Act and

the rules in this regard. Furthermore, if the respondents commit default in due compliance with the requirements of the statutory provisions, the face

the risk of penal consequences which could be onerous and recurring, depending upon the continuance of the default, and the criminal Court can as

well investigate and adjudicate as to how far the provisions of the Act have been violated. In this view, it is not possible to issue a writ of omnibus

mandamus as prayed for in the writ petition.

Thirdly, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that on account of the alleged violations of the provisions of the Act, the registration of

the principal employer, namely, the first respondent, requires cancellation as contemplated under S. 8 of the Act as well as the licence in favour of

the fourth respondent requires cancellation as contemplated under S. 14 of the Act. The power to revoke registration is given to the registering

officer and the power to revoke the licence is given to the licensing officer under the respective sections and there are contingencies contemplated

therefore, and this Court, sitting in writ jurisdiction need not arrogate to itself such powers.

Mr. V. Prakash, learned counsel for the petitioner, relics on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of

India (UOI) and Others, Learned counsel admitted that in the instant case there is no question fundamental rights involved. I am not able to see

how the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner could be pressed into service for coveting the relief asked for in the present writ

petition on the facts and circumstances of the case. After I dictated the order and at its conclusion, Mr. V. Prakash learned counsel for the

petitioner would submit that there is a clause in the contract between the first respondent and the fourth respondent which contemplates

cancellation of the contract in case of violation of the conditions contemplated therein. Certainly, the writ process cannot be resorted to for

enforcing the terms and conditions of the contract inter se between the first respondent and the fourth respondent I am not persuaded to

countenance the prayer with regard to the issuance of the writ of mandamus on the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner,

which submissions I have discussed above, and this obliges me to dismiss the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. I make no order

as to costs.