High CourtsDivision Bench

Varasuki and Co. vs The Province of Madras

Madras High Court · Decided on 13 July 1950 · Citation: AIR 1951 Mad 254 : (1950) 63 LW 925 : (1942) 55 LW 925 : (1950) 2 MLJ 449

HON’BLE JUDGES
Subba Rao, J · Panchapakesa Ayyar, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 — Section 19, 3, 4
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Appeal No. 811 of 1947
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Judgment

41 paragraphs · 1,010 words

Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.—This is an appeal against the judgment; and decree of the District Judge of Tirunelveli in O. S. No. 1 of 1947 and

raises an interesting question of law. The appellant, who was the plaintiff, filed a suit against the Government for a declaration that the sales-tax

collected from him to the extent of Rs. 1202-8-6 on the turnover calculated only on the price of the gunny bags containing the salt sold by him

(excluding, of course, the price of the salt, which is exempted from sales-tax) was illegally collected and ought to be refunded to him as salt could

not be sold except after being put into gunny bags and he had merely purchased the gunny baga from dealers for the sake of filling them with salt

and had included only the cost price of the gunny bags in the ultimate price charged by him for the salt baga. The learned District Judge held that

only salt had been exempted from sales-tax and not the gunny bags in which id had been packed and that the gunny bags could not be regarded as

inevitably included in the exemption, and that anybody who buys and sells gunny bags, like the appellant, even though along with the salt, would be

liable for sales-tax as being a ""dealers"" of goods within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the General Sales-tax Act. So he dismissed the appellant''s

suit with costs.

2.

We have perused the records and heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Government-Pleader contra. The learned counsel

for the appellant relied on three main contentions. The first was that the appellant was not a ""dealer"" within the meaning of Section 2 (b) as he was

not carrying on the business of buying and selling gunny bags (which were admitted to be ""goods""), but only the business of buying and selling salt.

It appears to us that he was carrying on the business of buying and selling gunny baga also in addition to the business of buying and selling salt. It is

admitted that he bought the gunny baga and sold them. It is obvious, and it is conceded by learned counsel for the appellant, that a man may carry

on a number of businesses in different ""goods"", separately or jointly. His contention is that when any article is incapable of being sold without being

packed in gunny bags the gunny bags must be exempted from the sales tax when the article viz, salt is also exempted, on the ground of

''''necessity."" We cannot agree. It seems to as that this is a matter more for moving the Government to exempt the gunny bags, in which salt has to

be packed for being sent to the customers, in addition to the salt itself as ""necessity"" will be of no avail as the customers could have supplied the

gunny bags or taken away the salt themselves, The Government, we understand, have been moved subsequently for the amendment of the rules

and to exempt the price of gunny bags also from sales-tax, and that they have conceded this demand. That itself shows that, originally, there was

no such intention on the part of the Government to exempt the gunny bags, and this suit relates to the period when gunny bags were not exempted.

On principle, it seems to us that any exemption of any article must be strictly construed and confined to the exemption itself and not extended.

Thus, if salt is exempted, but not the gunny bags in which it is packed and sold, if we exempt the gunny bags without a special exemption to that

effect, than gunny bags in which rice and other articles are packed, and drums and tins in which oil is packed, etc., will also claim exemption, and it

is admitted that they have not been exempted and that they cannot be exempted because they will be included in the definition of ""turnover"" under

the rules.

3.

The next contention was that the appellant had not made any profit from the sale of the gunny bags, and that the contention of the Commercial

Tax Officer that he had made a profit of eight pies on each gunny bag was not well founded as the appellant was proved to have sold salt in some

cases for less than the controlled price and the profit of 6 1/4% allowed to him. We consider that the question of profit and loss is irrelevant for this

purpose. If a man is a ""dealer"" in ""goods"", he will be liable to pay sales-tax on his ""turnover"" even if he has suffered a loss, and in this case, there is

also no need for any undue sympathy for the appellant as he had collected sales-tax from the customers on the entire price including the price of

gunnies admittedly included by him in this bills.

4.

The last contention was that the appellant had acted only as ""an agent of the customers"" for purchasing the gunny bags and had only recovered

their actual price from the customers, and that as sales-tax had been paid on the original sale by the dealers in gunny bags to him, a second sales-

tax should not be levied, in justice and equity, now. There is no evidence to show that he was acting as ""an agent of the customers"" in purchasing

these gunny bags. No customer wrote to him any letter asking him to buy the gunny bags on his behalf, or sent him an advance for purchase of

gunny bags; nor were accounts for the gunny bags alone rendered by the appellant to his customers. The question of the second payment of sales-

tax is not material as in some cases sales-tax has to be paid, under rules, twice over not only on these articles but in the case of many others.

5.

In the end, therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the judgment and decree of the lower Court. This appeal deserves to be and is hereby

dismissed with costs.