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Vatschala Uttam More (Smt.) vs Shivaji Dnyanu Patil and Another

Bombay High Court · Decided on 5 February 1990 · Citation: (1990) ACJ 1001 : AIR 1991 Bom 234 : (1990) 2 BomCR 276 : (1990) 92 BOMLR 268 : (1990) MhLj 621

HON’BLE JUDGES
Ashok Agarwal, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 — Section 92A(4)
CASE NUMBER
First Appeal No. 54 of 1990
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Judgment

8 paragraphs · 1,260 words

Ashok Agarwal, J.—This Appeal seeks to challenge the judgment and order dated the 22nd December, 1989 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Satara in M.A.C.P. No. 217 of 1988 whereby the applicant''s application u/s 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act for payment of compensation on the principle of no fault liability was rejected.

2.

On the 29th October, 1987 at about 4.00 a.m. an accident occurred on the high-way never village Kavathe in Taluka Wai, District Satara. In a collusion between a truck and a petrol tanker, the petrol tanker was over turned and thrown on the side of the highway. The incident which gave rise to the filing of the present application occurred at about 7.00 a.m. when the tanker exploded killing 27 persons and injuring about 31 persons on the spot. The present applicant is a claimant in respect of the death of her son. She made an application to the Tribunal for grant of compensation of Rs. 15,000/- u/s 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. By the impugned judgment and order the learned Member was pleased to hold that the explosion which occurred at about 7.00 a.m. had no connection with the accident which had taken place at 4.00 a.m. He found that certain villagers had tried to pilfer the petrol from the tanker. This may have been the cause of the explosion. According to him, this outside agency was responsible for the explosion and fire. This situation was created by the villagers themselves. Hence, the explosion could not be said to be an accident arising out of the use of the tanker. Consequent upon these findings, the application was rejected. Taking exception to this order, the original applicant has preferred the present Appeal.

3.

Having heard the learned Counsel on either side, I am of the view that the learned Member of the Accidents Tribunal has erred in the view taken by him. It is no doubt true that the explosion which occurred at 7.00 a.m. has no concern with the accident which has taken place at 4.00 a.m. However, the tanker in question was lying turtle by the side of the high-way. It is true that it was no bang on the high-way itself but some distance away, say about 20 feet from the main high-way. The learned Member was influenced by the fact that certain villagers were trying to pilfer petrol from the tanker at the material time. There, however, is no evidence to indicate that the explosion was a direct consequence of the attempt of pilfering the petrol from tanker. In my view, the learned Member was not justified in proceeding on the assumption that all the injured and the deceased were engaged in pilfering the petrol and the explosion was a direct consequence of the same.

4.

Section 92-A(4) provides as under:---

"92-A(4) A claim for compensation under sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful Act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death of permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement."

The above provision would show that even if there is a wrong Act, neglect or default on the part of the deceased or the injured, the claim u/s 92-A for compensation for no fault liability cannot be rejected. It may be that the tanker at the material time was not being driven on the high-way but was lying turtle on its side. That, however, will make no difference. It was still a vehicle lying on the side of the high-way. In the case of Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Suman Navnath Rajguru and Others, it was held that in case of an explosion of oil tanker parked near a footpath attracted the provisions of section 92-A. In that case a tanker which was parked near the footpath burst and exploded as a result of which the deceased therein was thrown up and sustained fatal injuries. In that case it was urged that the insurance policy covers liability which may be incurred by the owners in respect of death or fatal injuries to a third party "caused by or arising out of a use of the vehicle in the public place". It was urged that the vehicle during the material time was not ''in use'' much less in a public place and as the accident did not occur when the vehicle was in a state of locomotion but allegedly due to bursting of the inflammable petrol, the company was not liable. The precise contention has been raised in the present case. The Division Bench of this Court negatived this contention. Reliance was placed on the case of Elliott v. Grey, reported in 1959(3) All.E.R. 733 where it was held that the owner of the vehicle had ''use'' of it on the road notwithstanding the fact that the vehicle could not be driven as such for want of a battery, which had been removed from the vehicle. Further reliance was also placed on the case of Pushpa Rani Vs. Anokha Singh etc., . In the present case the petrol tanker was lying by the side of the high-way. Though it was not in a state of locomotion, it was still a vehicle which was making use of the public place viz. the public road. The word ''use'' occurring in section 110 of the Act has been used in a wide sense. It covers all employment by the motor vehicle on the public places including its driving, parking, keeping stationary or for any other purpose. The condition in which the motor vehicle is kept and the purpose for which it is being driven or is being kept stationary is not the jurisdictional fact to determine the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide the claim. The provisions of section 92-A(4) make it clear that the compensation payable for no fault liability cannot be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made. It would not be just to hold that all the injured as also the deceased who met their fate on account of the explosion were all engaged in the crime of pilfering of the petrol. That however is not relevant for a claim under no fault liability. The learned Member of the Tribunal, in my view, has clearly erred in the view he has taken while rejecting the application for compensation u/s 92-A. In my judgment, the applicant will be entitled to the payment of compensation under the no fault liability u/s 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.

5.

In the result, the Appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order dated 22nd December, 1989 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Satara in M.A.C.P. No. 217 of 1988 is set aside and the respondents are directed to pay to the applicant the amount of Rs. 15,000/- u/s 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act within two weeks from today. The applicant will be entitled to the costs of this Appeal as also of the application before the Tribunal.

In the view I have taken hereinabove, the respondents may consider making payment of the no fault liability to the other applicants whose applicants have also been rejected by the impugned judgment and order without insisting upon their filing appeals and incurring costs therefore.