High CourtsDivision Bench

Vattathara S.J. and Another vs Reverend Koshi and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 14 January 1937 · Citation: AIR 1937 Mad 494 : (1937) 45 LW 473

HON’BLE JUDGES
Pandrang Row, J
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Judgment

27 paragraphs · 659 words

Pandrang Row, J.—This is a petition to revise the order of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Trichinopoly, dated 23rd December 1936. That

order appears to have been passed on a petition presented u/s 145(4), Criminal P.C., on the same date. There wore previous petitions but the

order that is now sought to be revised is the order passed on 23rd December 1936 on a petition of that date. That order really does not purport to

be passed u/s 145 or Section 144, Criminal P.C. It does not in fact purport to be an order passed in the exercise of any jurisdiction conferred on

the Magistrate by any section of the Criminal Procedure Code or any other provision of law. An order of this kind would not probably have

induced any one to carry it in revision but for certain observations made therein which are considered by the petitioners to be prejudicial to their

interests. There was a dispute between what are known as loyal Christians, that is to say, those who accept the right of the Bishop to control the

ceremonies, etc., in the Chapel of Irudayapuram and the local Christians at Irudayapuram who are given the appellation of seceders. These

appellations or designations are used only for the purpose of convenience and should not be taken to mean anything more. The seceders are

apparently so-called because they seceded from the Church of the Lady of Seven Dolours and not because they refused to recognize the authority

of the Bishop altogether. The learned Magistrate did not decide as a matter of fact whether this dispute was likely to lead to a breach of the peace

or a disturbance of public tranquillity. This essential preliminary to assuming jurisdiction has not been found to exist and in this state of affairs his

order must be deemed to be an order having no legal force, and any expression of opinion contained therein must be deemed to be void of legal

force or effect and in particular the expression of opinion that

the seceders are even now in possession and enjoyment of the Irudayapuram chapel and are having prayers there.

2.

It is thus found that there is no order which requires to be formally set aside or modified in revision, the order complained of being one which

has really no legal force or effect. It will of course be open to the Magistrate after satisfying himself that a breach of the peace or disturbance of

public tranquillity is likely to arise as a result of the dispute between the parties to take appropriate action u/s 145 or, if the matter is really urgent,

u/s 144, Criminal P.C. In taking such action however he must necessarily follow the procedure prescribed by these sections, and it will not be

desirable that he should pass orders again which do not purport to be orders passed under any specific provision of law. In view of the fact that

the order now complained of was communicated to several police officers the petitioners complain that they have not been able to exercise their

rights with the same freedom as they would otherwise have done by reason of certain expressions of opinion found in the order in question. Such

an order must necessarily prejudice a party and it is not at all desirable that the Magistrate who has jurisdiction should omit to exercise his

jurisdiction in the manner prescribed by law but on the other hand proceed to deal with it in a way not contemplated by the law. If the Magistrate

of course finds that there is no likelihood of a breach of the peace or disturbance of public tranquillity as a result of the dispute, he will say so and

inform the petitioners accordingly and it will be for the petitioners to decide for themselves whether they will have recourse to a civil Court or not.

Nothing further can be done on behalf of the petitioners at this stage.