V.C. Chandhira Kumar and Others vs Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Secretariat and The Hon'ble Speaker

S. Rajeswaran, J.—This writ petition has been filed by six Members of the Legislative Assembly, who were elected to their respective

constituencies from the DMDK Political party. The first petitioner is the whip of the DMDK Political party which is the Opposition Party in the

Legislature. The case of the writ petitioners as stated in the affidavit is as follows:

There are 29 Members in the Legislature of the Assembly belonging to the DMDK Political Party. However, four of the Members without

resigning from the party or the post of Legislature, remained as disaffected Members of the party and they started behaving independently with an

intention to cause split in the DMDK Party.

On 08.03.2013 certain incident took place in the meeting of the Assembly. Though the alleged incident took place due to the provocation of not

only the above said four Members, viz., Tamil Alagan, Michael Royappan, R. Sundar Rajan and Arun Pandiyan of the DMDK party (who are

alleged to act with an intention to cause split), but, also from the AIADMK Members who forcibly participated in the above incident in support of

the above said four Members. The Speaker of the Assembly considering the incident as an alleged breach of privilege, referred the matter under

Rule 226 to the Privilege Committee to investigate and report not only the incident of the Members involving the writ petitioners, but also, against

all such persons whoever behaved like that. However, the proceedings and recommendations of the Privilege Committee dated 21.03.2013 was

deliberately restricted to the petitioners only without examining the video footage completely and without taking into consideration the statements of

the other members of the Privilege Committee. According to the writ petitioners, the proceedings of the Privilege Committee dated 15.03.2013

and 21.03.2013 which culminated into the report of the Chairman, dated 21.03.2013 are one-sided, arbitrary and erroneous.

It is the case of the writ petitioners that none of them was issued with a notice of the alleged breach of the privilege by the Privilege Committee

before making an enquiry, investigation and submission of report under Rule 229. When principles of natural justice are given a go-by, then, the

judicial review of the Privilege proceedings are very much available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to the writ

petitioners, the case reported in Vijayakant Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, , 2. The Hon''ble Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly,

Secretariat, Fort St. George, Chennai-600 009), which deals with a similar incident involving their Party Leader, Mr. Vijayakanth stands on a

different footing, as in that case, a notice was given to appear before the Privileges Committee, whereas none of the petitioners herein was issued

with a similar notice from the Privileges Committee, asking them to furnish their representation against the alleged breach of privilege. Therefore,

according to the writ petitioners, the writ petition is to be allowed on the ground of violation of principles of Natural Justice alone.

It is the further contention of the writ petitioners that the impugned proceedings are liable to be set aside in consonance with Article 194 read

with Rules made under Article 208 of the Constitution of India, as they restrict the scope of the proceedings only to the four walls of the

Legislature and not beyond the same. However, the impugned proceedings punishing the petitioners herein for the alleged breach of privilege inside

the house for their other functioning outside the House like the statutory benefits available to them under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Payment

of Salaries Act, 1951 and the rules framed thereunder including the provision under the Representation of People''s Act, 1951.

The petitioners contend that suspending them for a period of one year on 25.03.2013 which was subsequently modified as six months on

26.03.2013 is ultra-virus to Article 190 of the Constitution of India. According to them, Article 190 deals with disqualification of a Member and

vacation of his/her seat. Article 190(3) states that either on disqualification or on resignation with the permission of the Chairman, the seat will

become vacant. Article 190(4) states that if for a period of sixty days, a Member of a House of Legislature of the State is without permission of the

House, absent from all meetings thereon, the House may declare the seat vacant. In the present case, the petitioners were originally suspended for

a period of one year from 25.03.2013 and subsequently for a period of six months. Since Article 190 disqualifies a Member of the Assembly for

more than sixty days, both under six months suspension as well as one year suspension, there is an inherent restriction on the power of suspending

the Member beyond sixty days.

The petitioners relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Amarinder Singh Vs. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha and Others, and

Raja Ram Pal Vs. The Hon''ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and Others, contend that the punishment of taking away the salary and allowance is illegal,

arbitrary and without jurisdiction.

Hence, they prayed for an issue of a Writ of Declaration to declare that the entire proceedings are illegal and unconstitutional.

Notice was ordered by this Court to both the respondents herein. Notice was served on the first respondent and the notice sent to the second

respondent was returned as refused. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the first respondent and since the notice sent

to the second respondent was returned as refused, this Court requested Mr. A.L. Somayaji, the learned Advocate General of Tamil Nadu to act

as a Amicus Curiae in this matter.

A counter affidavit has been filed by the Secretary of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, Secretariat, the first respondent herein.

In the counter affidavit filed by the Secretary, it is stated that the writ petition itself is not maintainable as what is sought for is the intervention in

the internal affairs of the State Legislative Assembly, of which, the Privileges Committee is a part. Referring to Article 194(3) of the Constitution of

India, it is stated that the Legislative Assembly has all the powers, privileges and immunities by the British House of Commons at the time of

commencement of the Constitution. Further, under Article 212 of the Constitution, the House has powers to regulate its own proceedings and it is

the privilege of the House to conduct its internal proceedings within the four walls of the House free from interference including its right to impose

disciplinary measures against its Members for assault and disorderly conduct, as they constitute breach of privilege and contempt of the House.

The Assembly proceeded against its Members for interfering in the discharge of duties by a Fellow Member of their Party by intimidation and

assault and for bringing the House into dis-respect. Hence, according to the first respondent, the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226

of the Constitution of India.

It is stated by the first respondent that on 08.02.2013, during Question Hour, Thiru. K. Tamilalagan, M.L.A. of the DMDK Party representing

the Thittakudi (SC) Constituency was permitted by the Hon''ble Speaker to ask a supplementary question. Thiru. K. Tamilalagan thanked for the

welfare measures being implemented in his constituency following his meeting with the Hon''ble Chief Minister. Objecting to his statement, Thiru.

V.C. Chandhirakumar, the Whip of the DMDK Party, the first writ petitioner herein and many other M.L.A.s'' of the same party left their seats

furiously and simultaneously rushed towards Thiru. K. Tamilalagan in a threatening mood shouting at him, using derogatory words so as to prevent

him from proceeding further. Despite the repeated advice of the Hon''ble Speaker not to speak directly to the Member and return to their seats,

many DMDK Members ignoring the warnings of the Hon''ble Speaker, left in Block VI of the Assembly and proceeded enmasse to Block V to

attack Thiru. K. Tamilalagan with an intention to prevent him from continuing his speech. When Thiru. C. Michael Royappan, a DMDK Member

who was seated in the first row in Block V, in which, Thiru. K. Tamilalagan has also been allotted a seat, intervened and tried to pacify them, the

DMDK Members surrounded Thiru. C. Michael Royappan and assaulted him. In order to restore order and to prevent further scuffle and

pandemonium in the House and the continuous surcharged atmosphere in the House, the Hon''ble Speaker ordered eviction of the DMDK

Members who were involved in the clash and accordingly, they were evicted by the Watch and Ward Staff.

According to the first respondent, the incident of assault happened during sitting of the House within the view and knowledge of the members,

the Press, the Media covering the proceedings, the Officials and the persons in the Visitors Galleries. The Hon''ble Leader brought this incident to

the notice of the House and stated that it was a shameful incident and requested the Hon''ble Speaker to subject Thiru. V.C. Chandhirakumar, the

first writ petitioner and all other Members, who involved in the disorderly and barbaric assault, to stringent punishment so as to prevent recurrence

of such incidents in future.

It is further submitted that the DMDK Members are seated in Block V and Block VI i.e. the left side of the Speaker''s Stage. From whatever

he saw, the Hon''ble Speaker recalled the names of Thiru. V.C. Chandhirakumar, the first writ petitioner, Thiru. V. Parthasarathy, the second writ

petitioner, Thiru. L. Venkatesan, Thiru. S.R. Parthibhan, Thiru. C.H. Sekar and Thiru. Muthukumar and stated that the action indulged in by these

DMDK Members was against the decorum and decency of the House. He announced in the House itself that he was referring the issue to the

Privileges Committee under Article 226 of the Assembly Rules in order to identify from the video recording of the scene, all those who were

indulged in such action and for suitable action.

After the issue was referred to the Privileges Committee on 08.02.2013, later in the very same day, Thiru. V.C. Chandhirakumar, the first writ

petitioner and 21 other DMDK M.L.A.s submitted a written explanation to the Hon''ble Speaker regarding the incident. In their letter, they alleged

that DMDK members Thiru. C. Michael Royappan, Thiru. R. Sundar Rajan and Thiru. R. Arun Pandiyan berated them and they were also abused

by some Members from the ruling AIADMK party. They further stated that Thiru. C. Michael Royappan forcefully punched Thiru. D. Murugesan,

the third writ petitioner on the chest and pulled his shirt and threatened him of murder. The 22 DMDK Members requested the Hon''ble Speaker

to take action against the above said Members.

Thiru. C. Michael Royappan has also on the same day given an explanation to the Hon''ble Speaker narrating his version of the event. He

alleged that when Thiru. K. Tamilalagan was asking a supplementary question, several colleagues of his party shouted at him and tried to engage

him in a loud altercation. They also moved towards him and tried to attack him. As he was seated before Thiru. K. Tamilalagan, he tried to stop

them and Thiru. D. Murugesan, the third writ petitioner advanced menacingly and tried to attack and push him down. Further, he alleged that Thiru.

V.C. Chandhirakumar, the first writ petitioner, S. Senthil Kumar, the 5th writ petitioner, Thiru. B. Parthasarathy, the second writ petitioner, Thiru.

R. Arulselvan, the 6th writ petitioner, Thiru. V. Muthukumar, Thiru. S.R. Parthibhan and Thiru. K. Nallathambi, the 4th writ petitioner surrounded,

assaulted and pushed him down. They also abused him in indecent language and extended murderous threats. Thiru. C. Michael Royappan

requested the Hon''ble Speaker to take action against those Members.

As the issue was already referred to the Privileges Committee of the House, the Hon''ble Speaker forwarded the written explanations to the

Committee along with the video clipping of the scene of assault. As per Rule 227 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules, the Privileges

Committee was elected according to the Principle of proportional Representation by means of a single transferable vote. The Hon''ble Deputy

Speaker of the State Assembly is Ex-officio, the Chairman of the Committee. The Committee consists of members belonging to the Ruling

AIADMK Party and members of Opposition Parties like the DMDK, the DMK, the CPI (M), the CPI and the Indian National Congress. The

leader of the Opposition belonging to the DMDK Party is also an ex-officio member of the Committee. Thiru. S.R. Parthiban of the DMDK, who

is a signatory to the explanation submitted by the first writ petitioner, is incidentally a Member of the Privileges Committee.

It is stated that the Privileges Committee had its first sitting on 15.03.2013 and all the members including Thiru. S.R. Parthibhan of the DMDK

saw the video clipping of the assault and went through the explanations of Thiru. V.C. Chandhirakumar and Thiru. C. Michael Royappan

forwarded by the Hon''ble Speaker. After detailed discussions, the Committee by majority decision concluded that six DMDK M.L.A.s, the writ

petitioners herein, committed breach of privilege and contempt of the House by obstructing a member from discharging his duties as an M.L.A.

inside the House and for attacking a fellow member who tried to pacify them. Accordingly, the Committee recommended that the six M.L.A.s of

the DMDK Party are to be suspended from the service of the Assembly for a period of one year and during that period, they are ineligible to

receive salary, any other benefits, privileges or entitlements admissible to them as the Members of the Legislative Assembly. In the draft report

containing the above recommendation, the same was considered by the Committee during its second sitting on 21.03.2013 and the report was

adopted by the Committee on the same day. The Committee authorised the Chairman to sign and present the report to the House on its behalf.

It is stated by the first respondent that as per Rule 229(a) of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules, the report was presented to the

Assembly by the Chairman of the Committee on 25.03.2013. As per Rule 229(b), the Hon''ble Leader of the House moved a motion that the

report be taken into consideration and the motion was put to vote of the House and was carried out. As per Rule 229(d), the Leader of the House

moved a motion that the House agrees with the recommendations contained in the report of the Privileges Committee. The motion was put to vote

of the House and the House resolved to accept the recommendations contained in the report. Consequently, the Hon''ble Speaker announced that

as per the resolutions passed by the Assembly, the six writ petitioners herein, belonging to the DMDK Party, were being suspended from the

service of the Assembly for a period of one year and during such period, they would be ineligible to receive salary, any other benefits, privileges or

entitlements admissible to them as Members of Legislative Assembly.

It is further stated that on 26.03.2013, the leaders of the parties spoke in the Assembly, acknowledging the right of the Privileges Committee

and requested for remission of the quantum of punishment. The Hon''ble Chief Minister intervened and recommended that keeping in view the

request of the Opposition Party members, the period of punishment awarded to the DMDK Members may be reduced to six months. The

Hon''ble Leader of the House moved a resolution that the six writ petitioners be suspended for a period of six months and that they may be made

ineligible to receive salary, any other benefits, privileges or entitlements admissible to them as Members of Legislative Assembly during such

period. This resolution was put to the vote of the House and carried.

The first respondent having narrated the factual aspects as above in the counter affidavit, further states that the incident of intimidation and

attempt to physical attack on Thiru. A. Tamilalagan is a direct negation of the freedom of speech inside the House guaranteed by the Constitution

under Article 194(1). This attempt and the subsequent assaults on Thiru. C. Michael Royappan created a ruckus inside the Assembly and

disrupted the smooth practice of the Question Hour on 08.02.2013. As the assault happened in full view of the House, an incident is never in

doubt, but, only the identity of each one of the perpetrators of the attack was in question. The House could have immediately proceeded against

the Members who took part in the assault by passing a resolution extending such punishment. However, as so many members simultaneously

rushed towards Thiru. K. Tamilalagan and surrounded and attacked Thiru. C. Michael Royappan, the Hon''ble Speaker and others sitting on the

Treasury Benches who were the eye-witnesses for the incident could not pin-point beyond reasonable doubt the identity of each one of the

Members in such a melee. Though the Hon''ble Speaker initially named a few members, in the interest of natural justice and with good intention, the

Hon''ble Speaker exercised his powers under Rule 226 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules and referred the issue to the Privileges

Committee for ascertaining from the video clipping of the scene, the identity of all those members who took part in the enraged action and for

recommending disciplinary and penal action thereon.

On the very same day, after the session was over, the first writ petitioner, who is the Whip of the DMDK Legislative Party, gave a written

explanation on the incident of assault to the Hon''ble Speaker in person which was counter signed by 21 other DMDK Members. Similarly, Thiru.

C. Michael Royappan gave an explanation regarding the incident of assault to the Hon''ble Speaker on the same day. Both these two explanations

were forwarded to the Privileges Committee. Therefore, according to the first respondent, the scope and ambit of the Privileges Committee''s

examination was not to trace the entire discussion in the Assembly that happened on 08.02.2013 or to investigate such incident happened or not or

to find out the reason which made the DMDK Members to leave their seats to engage in a physical attack, but, it was limited only to ascertaining

the identity of the members who actually took part in the unruly behaviour in the light of the videographed evidence of the footage and the contents

of the two written explanations voluntarily submitted by the DMDK Members. Therefore, what has been done by the Hon''ble Speaker is as per

Rule 226 of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules and therefore, the same cannot be questioned by the writ petitioners.

In so far as the grounds raised by the writ petitioners like violation of principles of natural justice, violation of their right to receive salary,

negation of fundamental rights, etc., are concerned the first respondent submits that these issues were already decided by this Court and the

Hon''ble Supreme Court in a number of judgments and therefore, those grounds do not support the case of the writ petitioners herein.

With regard to the non-issue of notice of the alleged breach of privilege by the Committee before enquiry investigation and submission of

report, it is stated that the principles of natural justice are not immutable, but are flexible. They cannot be case in a rigid mould and put in a straight

jacket and the compliance therewith has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case. According to the first respondent, in the light

of the above facts and circumstances, the need for sending Notice from the Committee did not arise at all. As written explanations were submitted

by DMDK members voluntarily giving their version of the event, they have pre-empted the Privileges Committee from issuing notice to them.

Further, Thiru. S.R. Parthibhan who was one of the signatories to the written explanation submitted on 08.02.2013, was a Member in the

Privileges Committee apart from the Leader of the Opposition belonging to DMDK party who is an ex-officio member. Thiru. S.R. Parthibhan

participated in the meeting and saw the video footage and he was given full opportunity to give explanation and arguments. Further, Thiru. S.R.

Parthibhan identified his party members in the video footage and his views were recorded in the proceedings of the Committee. Therefore, it is

submitted by the first respondent that it cannot be said that the basic principles of natural justice are violated in this case.

It is further stated that the Legislatures in India possess the powers and privileges of the British House of Commerce as available at the time of

the commencement of the Constitution under Article 194 and therefore, they have the right to punish the members and others for breach of

privilege and contempt and the result of such punishment may extend beyond the four walls of the Legislature and may not be limited to suspension,

but, may even extend the commitment to prison. It is further stated that the benefits, privileges, salary and entitlement of the petitioners are

admissible to them only on account of their membership in the Legislative Assembly and when such membership itself is suspended for a specific

period by a resolution passed by the House, suspension of salaries and other entitlements follows as a consequence.

With regard to the disqualification of a Member, as contemplated under Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India, it is stated in the counter

that Article 190(4) speaks about the absence without the permission of the House, but, in this case, the House itself has suspended the members

for a period of six months.

Hence, the first respondent prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition.

I have heard Thiru. K.M. Vijayan, the learned Senior Counsel for the writ petitioners, Thiru. V. Jayaprakash Narayanan, the learned Special

Government Pleader for the first respondent and Thiru. A.L. Somayaji, the learned Advocate General as Amicus Curiae. I have also gone through

the entire documents available on record including the counter affidavit of the first respondent.

The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners submits that the entire proceedings are to be set aside on the ground of denial of

principles of natural justice. He submits that none of the petitioners was given notice of the alleged breach either at the time of investigation or at the

time of enquiry or at the time of recommendations of the alleged breach by the Privileges Committee on 15.03.2013 and 21.03.2013. The above

lapse is a clear case for interference by this Court. He relies on the judgment of this Court reported in:

S. Balasubramanian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others,

Vijayakant Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, and

Raja Ram Pal Vs. The Hon''ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and Others,

He further submits that there is no alleged breach of privilege without the same being codified as required under Article 194(3) or by Rules

under Article 228 and re-course to British Parliamentary Practice is not permissible pursuant to Constitution''s 44th Amendment which did not

save the law as stood on 1950 when the Constitution was enacted as per Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. For the same reason, he contends

that except as a temporary provision, the reliance on the power of breach of privilege available under British Parliament cannot be relied upon

either on the ground that in Britain itself, the said power is diluted or on the ground that the Supreme Court took a view that recourse to British

Practice of Parliament is not available in a decision reported in Amarinder Singh Vs. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha and Others, It is his

further contention that the scope of approval is restricted to what happened inside the four walls of the Assembly and cannot travel outside the

assembly. He also submits that suspending a member of the Legislative Assembly for six months (for more than 60 days) is ultra-virus of Article

190(4) of the Constitution of India, according to which, if for a period of 60 days, a member of House of Legislature of a State is absent without

permission from the House from all meetings, the House may declare his seat vacant. He further submits that denial of salary and the other benefits

of a Member is ultra-virus to Article 195 read with the Provision of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act, 1951. He also attacks the impugned

order on the ground of violating Article 80(4) and 191 read with the provisions relating to Representation of People''s Act, 1951. The learned

Senior Counsel concludes his arguments by submitting that whenever a disqualification has to be treated on par with a privilege proceeding under

Article 194, the same requires legislation or constitutional sanction. When such an enabling power is not there, no privilege proceeding can be

taken against any member in violation of Article 190(4), 191, 195 and 80 respectively, even if such power is construed as an independent power.

The learned Special Government Pleader, for the first respondent, per contra, submits that Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India enshrines

that the Legislative Assembly has all powers, privileges and immunities and Article 212 of the Constitution states that the House has powers to

regulate its own proceedings and it is the privilege of the house to conduct its internal proceedings within the walls of the house free from

interference. He submits that the Assembly and the Privileges Committee acted in exercise of the powers lawfully vested with them and therefore,

Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not be invoked to quash the proceedings in the absence of any unconstitutionality or illegality.

Referring the entire factual aspects which arose on 08.02.2013 and ended on 26.03.2013, he submits that there was no illegality in the

proceedings and therefore, the same could not be challenged before this Court.

With regard to violation of principles of natural justice, he submits that there is no such violation and in fact opportunity was given to them by

receiving their explanations and forwarding them to the Committee. They were also duly represented by their own Member (Thiru. S.R.

Parthibhan) in the Privileges Committee. In fact, he also saw the video and identified all the petitioners. Hence according to him, there is no

question of violation of principles of natural justice.

Regarding the judgment reported in Vijayakant Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, he submits that, the benefits, privileges, salary and

entitlements of the petitioners are admissible to them only on account of their Membership in the Legislative Assembly and when such membership

itself is suspended for a specified period by a resolution passed by the House, the suspension of salary and the other entitlements follows as a

sequence. Similarly, he submits that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu payment of Salaries Act and the Representation of People''s Act could not

be pressed into service to attack the proceedings, as such arguments were already overruled by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal case

(cited supra).

With regard to the power of the Privileges Committee, under Article 194 of the Constitution of India, it is submitted that this issue was gone

into in detail Raja Ram Pal''s case and the Hon''ble Supreme Court repelled such contentions by holding that the Legislatures in India are definitely

having the power to even expel a Member leave alone suspending a member. Relying on the very same Hon''ble Supreme Court''s judgment of

Raja Ram Pal''s case (cited supra), he submits that disqualification is different from expulsion or suspension and therefore, Article 190(4) could not

be relied upon by the writ petitioners to contend that no person could be suspended beyond the period of sixty days.

The learned Special Government Pleader further submits that the writ petitioners could not rely on the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court

reported in Amarinder Singh Vs. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha and Others, as in that case, Thiru. Amarinder Singh was expelled from

the Membership of the 13th Assembly of Punjab for alleged improper exemption of vacant plot of land from a developed scheme during his tenure

as Chief Minister during the 12th Assembly period. The resolution for his expulsion was held invalid as alleged improper exemption was an

administrative act and it would not cause obstruction of legislative proceedings. Therefore, he submits that the law laid down in that case is on

different facts and circumstances and it will not support the case of the writ petitioners herein.

While winding up his arguments, he submits that S. Balasubramanian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, is not applicable to the facts of the

present case, as in that case, action was taken against a non-member and that action was tested by this Court in the light of violating his

fundamental rights. Therefore, he prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition.

The learned Advocate General, as amicus curiae placed before me all the relevant articles of the Constitution of India and other provisions of

the Acts like the Representation of People''s Act and Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act, 1951, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly Rules, etc.

and quoted extensively from the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in Raja Ram Pal Vs. The Hon''ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and

Others, .

After placing the entire facts along with the relevant legal aspects, the learned Advocate General assisted the Court in the best possible manner

and I place on record the appreciation of this Court of his able and valid assistance.

I have considered the rival submissions and the submissions of the amicus curiae carefully.

In the light of the above factual aspects and in the light of the arguments advanced, the following questions arise for consideration in this writ

petition:

a) Whether the entire proceedings are vitiated and are liable to be set aside on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice?

b) Whether the State Legislature has the power and privilege under Article 194 to suspend the writ petitioners?

c) If the answer is affirmative for question number (b) then, whether the writ petitioners could be suspended for more than 60 days in the light of

Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India?

d) Whether the privilege is restricted to what happened inside the four walls of the Assembly and Whether it can travel outside the Assembly?

e) Whether the Legislative Assembly has the power to suspend the salary and other benefits of a Member including their right to vote in the Raja

Sabha in the capacity of a Member of the Assembly?

Now, let me take up the above questions one by one which arose for consideration before this Court:

(b) The learned senior counsel for the petitioners submits that Article 194 deals with powers, privileges and immunities of State Legislature and

their Members. Article 194(3) states that powers, privileges and immunities of a House of a Legislature of a State and the Members and the

Committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by Legislature by law and until so defined, shall be

those of that House and all its Members and committees immediately before coming into force of Section 26 of the Constitution (44th Amendment)

Act, 1978. He submits that in so far as Article 194(3) is concerned, even though the word breach of privilege is not coined there, it was originally

traced to the power of British Parliament as a temporary provision until appropriate law is made by the Parliament or the State Legislature. The

learned senior counsel submits that as on date there is no law codifying the power and breach of privilege under Article 194(3) and the transitory

provision taking recourse to British Parliamentary Practice is not now available due to the fact that the Constitution was amended by 42nd

Amendment in 1976 and further by 44th Amendment in 1978 substituting the original Article 194(3). The transitory provision of taking recourse to

British Parliament Practice is not at all suffered by the 44th Constitutional Amendment as the law stands today, the learned Senior Counsel

contends that is due to recourse to Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners contends that

there is no alleged breach of privilege without the same being codified as required under Article 194(3), a recourse to British Parliament Practice is

not at all permissible pursuant to 44th Amendment to the Constitution which did not save the law as stood on 1950 when the Constitution was

enacted as per Section 7 of the General Clauses Act. Further, he contends that the power of breach of privilege available under the British

Parliament is no longer available as in Britain itself, the said power itself is very much diluted and therefore, the entire action initiated is illegal and

unconstitutional warranting interference by this Court. To support his contention, he relies on the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported

in Amarinder Singh Vs. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha and Others,

The learned Senior Counsel further submits that Article 208 of the Constitution also does not specify about what conduct would amount to

breach and the procedure to punish thereof. Therefore, according to him, until an appropriate law is made by the State Legislature, it is not open to

the Assembly to expel or suspend a Member by way of punishment for alleged breach of privilege.

I am unable to accept the above submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, as a similar argument was made before the

Constitution Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal''s case (cited supra) but, the majority judgment rejected such argument and

held that the Assembly has got power under Article 194(3) to even expel a Member and therefore, the arguments advanced by the learned Senior

Counsel in this regard are to be rejected.

In this regard, it is appropriate and useful to refer to the findings of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal''s case, which are as follows:

We would like to dispose of here itself a small argument put across by learned counsel for the petitioners. The argument is that the fact that

the provisions of Article 105 were amended by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, thereby deleting the reference to the House

of Commons with effect from 20.06.1979, the subject of powers and privileges are to be construed and pegged to that date and further that since

the House of Commons had not exercised the power of expulsion after 1947, such power, even if it existed in the House of Commons in 1947 has

become obsolete and non-existing. While arguing that such power has not been inherited by the Indian Parliament, counsel would also refer to

certain recent developments in United Kingdom, in particular Parliamentary Privilege-First Report, published on 30.03.1999, in the wake of which

a recommendation has been made that ""the Parliament''s power to imprison a person whether Member or not, who are in contempt of Parliament

should be abolished"" and further that, ""the power of the House of Lords to suspend its Members should be clarified and confirmed.

We are not impressed with any of these arguments. The amendment brought into force in 1979 does not turn the clock ahead. The powers

and privileges of the House of Commons of Parliament of the United Kingdom as on the date of commencement of the Constitution of India were

the powers and privileges available to Parliament before the amendment and that is the package which continues to be available post-amendment.

Use of a particular power in 1947 would rather make it closer in terms of time to the crucial date of commencement of the Indian Constitution. Its

disuse in later period is of no consequence. In this view, we are also not concerned with subsequent developments.

From the above, it is very clear that the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the above decision, clearly held that the power of expulsion is not negated by

any of the constitutional or statutory provisions. If that being so, when the Assembly has got power under Article 194(3) to even expel a Member,

it cannot be said that it has no power at all to suspend a person which is a lesser punishment than the punishment of expulsion.

In Amarinder Singh Vs. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha and Others, , it is true that another Constitution Bench of the Hon''ble

Supreme Court held that British precedents are to be followed only to the extent compatible with our Constitutional Scheme, as Indian Legislatures

are controlled by a written Constitution and therefore, they do not have absolute power of self-composition unlike British House of Commons

which is controlled by an un-written Constitution. But, this judgment is not at all in conflict with the judgment rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme

Court in Raja Ram Pal''s case (cited supra). In fact, even in Raja Ram Pal''s case, the Hon''ble Supreme Court referred to In the matter of: Under

Article 143 of the Constitution of India, which was delivered by a Seven Judges Bench wherein it was held that the findings in the U.P. Assembly

case that there are some powers of the British House, which cannot be claimed by the Indian Legislatures, do not mean that the power of

expulsion falls in that category. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal''s case made it very clear that in U.P. Assembly case, the Supreme

Court was mainly concerned with power claimed by the Legislature to issue a general warrant and claimed conclusive character thereof. There was

no challenge in that case to the power to punish for contempt, much less the power to expel. It is further held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that

the ratio of U.P. Assembly case cannot be interpreted to have held that all the powers of the House of Commons enjoyed in its capacity as a

Court of record are unavailable to the Indian Parliament, including the power to punish for contempt. The relevant findings in Raja Ram Pal''s case

could be usefully referred to as follows:

Thus, in U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No. 1 of 1964) the Court was mainly concerned with the power claimed by legislature to

issue general warrant and conclusive character thereof. There was no challenge in that case to the power to punish for contempt, much less the

power to expel, these issues even otherwise being not inherent in the strict frame of reference made to the Court.

Indeed, the thrust of the decision was on the examination of the power to issue unspeaking warrants immune from the review of the courts,

and not on the power to deal with contempt itself. A close reading of the case demonstrates that the Court treated the power to punish for

contempt as a privilege of the House. Speaking of the legislatures in India, it was stated: (U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No. 1 of 1964).

AIR p. 786, para 125)

There is no doubt that the House has the power to punish for contempt committed outside its chamber, and from that point of view it may

claim one of the rights possessed by a court of record.

(emphasis supplied)

Speaking of the Judges'' power to punish for contempt, the Court observed: (U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No. 1 of 1964), AIR

p. 791, para 142)

We ought never to forget that the power to punish for contempt large as it is, must always be exercised cautiously, wisely and with circumspection.

Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger or irritation would not help to sustain the dignity or status of the court, but may sometimes

affect it adversely. Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at

large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity of their approach, and by the restraint, dignity and decorum which

they observe in their judicial conduct. We venture to think that what is true of the judicature is equally true of the legislatures.

(emphasis supplied)

It is evident, therefore, that in the opinion of the Court in U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No. 1 of 1964), legislatures in India do

enjoy the power to punish for contempt. It is equally clear that while the fact that the House of Commons enjoyed the power to issue unspeaking

warrants in its capacity of a court of record was one concern, what actually worried the Court was not the source of the power per se, but the

judicial"" nature of power to issue unspeaking warrant insofar as it was directly in conflict with the scheme of the Constitution whereby citizens

were guaranteed fundamental rights and the power to enforce the fundamental rights is vested in the courts. It was not the power to punish for

contempt about which the Court had reservations. Rather, the abovequoted passage shows that such power had been accepted by the Court. The

issue decided concerned the non-reviewability of the warrant issued by the legislature, in the light of various constitutional provisions.

Last, but not least, there are many differences between U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No. 1 of 1964) and the one at hand. The

entire controversy in the former case revolved around the privileges of the House in relation to the fundamental rights of a citizen, an outsider to the

House. The decision expressly states that the Court was not dealing with internal proceedings, nor laying down law in relation to Members of the

House. In the words of the Court: (AIR pp. 781 & 790, paras 108 & 141)

The obvious answer to this contention is that we are not dealing with any matter relating to the internal management of the House in the present

proceedings. We are dealing with the power of the House to punish citizens for contempt alleged to have been committed by them outside the four

walls of the House, and that essentially raises different considerations.

In conclusion, we ought to add that throughout our discussion we have consistently attempted to make it clear that the main point which we are

discussing is the right of the House to claim that a general warrant issued by it in respect of its contempt alleged to have been committed by a

citizen who is not a Member of the House outside the four walls of the House, is conclusive, for it is on that claim that the House has chosen to

take the view that the Judges, the advocate, and the party have committed contempt by reference to the conduct in the habeas corpus petition

pending before the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court.

(emphasis supplied)

In the light of the above, we are of the opinion that the ratio of U.P. Assembly case (Special Reference No. 1 of 1964) which was decided

under significantly different circumstances, cannot be interpreted to have held that all the powers of the House of Commons enjoyed in its capacity

as a court of record are unavailable to the Indian Parliament, including the power to punish for contempt.

In the light of the above, I am of the considered view that the observations made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Amarinder Singh''s case is

not at all helpful to the case of the petitioners herein, because in Amarinder Singh''s case, a resolution was passed directing expulsion of a former

Chief Minister of Punjab for his alleged conduct of exempting improperly vacant plots of land licensed to a private party from a pool of 187 acres

of land notified for acquisition by Amritsar Lands Improvement Trust for a development scheme. Only on the basis of the above facts and

circumstances, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Amarinder Singh''s case held that Punjab Vidhan Sabha exceeded its powers by expelling the

former Chief Minister on the ground of breach of privilege when there existed none. The Hon''ble Supreme Court further held that alleged

improper exemption of lands was an executive act and that act did not distort, obstruct or threaten the integrity of legislature proceedings in any

manner. Hence, it was held that the action taken under Article 194(3) is not proper and the resolution directing expulsion is constitutionally invalid.

Therefore, the law as decided in Amarinder Singh''s case is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case.

In the light of the above, Question No. (b) as referred to above, is answered in the affirmative that the State Legislature has the power and

privilege under Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India to suspend the writ petitioners.

Question (c):

The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that suspending a member of the Legislature Assembly for more than 60 days is ultra-virus

of Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India. According to the learned Senior Counsel, disqualification of Members are dealt with under Articles

190 to 193. As per Article 190(4), if for a period of sixty days, a member of a House of the Legislature of a State is without permission of the

House absent from all meetings thereof, the House may declare his seat vacant. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners contends

that if a member is suspended for more than sixty days, as happened in this case, the seat of the member would become vacant and therefore, any

suspension beyond a period of sixty days is ultra-virus to Article 190(4).

I am unable to accept this submission also. I am again referring to Raja Ram Pal''s case, wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that the

term vacancy, disqualification and expulsion have different meanings and they do not overlap. Disqualification strikes at the very root of the

candidate''s qualification and renders a member unable to occupy a member seat. Expulsion on the other hand deals with a member who is

otherwise qualified, but in the House of the Legislature is unworthy of membership. While disqualification operates to prevent a candidate from re-

election, expulsion occurs after the election of the member and there is no power of re-election. As far as the term vacancy is concerned, it is a

consequence of the fact that a member cannot continue to hold membership. The reason may be any one of the several possible reasons which

prevents the member from continuing membership, for example, disqualification, death or expulsion.

In view of the above, I am of the considered view that Article 190(4) has nothing to do with Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India, as

under Article 190(4), if a Member is absent without the permission of the House for a period of 60 days from all the meetings thereof, then, the

House may declare the seat vacant. Under Article 194(3), the House enjoys powers, privileges and immunities which include the power to punish

a person for contempt and the power to expel or suspend a person. When a person is expelled or punished beyond a period of sixty days, it

cannot be said that member is absent without the permission of the House for a period of sixty days. When a person is suspended for more than

sixty days by the House, it is the House which makes him stay away from all the meetings and the member is not absent without the permission of

the House for a period of sixty days as contemplated under Article 190(4) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the argument that suspending a

Member for more than 60 days would be ultra-virus to Article 190(4) is far-fetched and misconceived. Therefore, it is to be held that the State

Legislature has power and privilege to suspend a member for more than sixty days and it does not in any way offend Article 190(4) of the

Constitution of India.

Questions (d) and (e):

According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that denial of salary and other consequential benefits to the writ petitioners highlights

Article 195 and Section 12 and Section 12A of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act. The learned Senior Counsel contends that by a

proceeding under privilege of breach, there is no enabling power to deny salary and other benefits of a member. For making the above submission,

the learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in Maru Ram and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and

Others,

The learned Senior Counsel further contends that the impugned proceedings are ultra-virus to Article 80(4) and 191 read with the provisions

relating to the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the petitioners have a right to

choose a member of Rajya Sabha in their capacity as member of Legislative Assembly. Rajya Sabha Elections are contemplated in July, 2013 and

the petitioners have a right to elect a member of their choice in the elections. However, the impugned proceedings taken under the pretext of

breach of privilege, impair the right to vote for the Rajya Sabha and therefore, on this ground, the impugned proceeds are liable to be set aside.

I am unable to accept this submission also. Provisions relating to salary, etc. of an expelled or a suspended member came to be considered by

the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal''s case. In that case also, it was contended that the provisions in the Constitution relating to salary

and the term for which they serve in the House are the constitutional rights of the members and the power of expulsion by terminating their

membership violates these constitutional rights. The relevant provisions are, Article 106 on the subjects of salary and Article 83(2) in relation to the

duration of the House of Parliament. However, the Hon''ble Supreme Court rejected the argument by holding that they are not constitutional rights

and therefore, it cannot be contended that provisions relating to salaries and duration of the House would have supremacy over the power of

expulsion of the House. The following observations of the Hon''ble Supreme Court could be usefully referred to in this regard.

Similar arguments were made in K. Ananda Nambiar v. Chief Secy., Govt. of Madras. In that case, certain Members of Parliament were

detained by the Government of Madras and one of the grounds on which they challenged their detention was the violation of their constitutional

rights. In support of this contention, the petitioners relied on various provisions relating to Members and proceedings of Parliament including

Articles 79, 85, 86 and 100. They claimed that they continued to exercise all the ""constitutional rights"" that flow from membership unless the

member is disqualified. The contention was that: (AIR p. 662, para 11)

If a Member of Parliament incurs a disqualification, he may cease to be such Member, but if he continues to be qualified to be a Member, his

constitutional rights cannot be taken away by any law or order.

This Court rejected this argument holding that (AIR p. 664, para 18)

...they are not constitutional rights in the strict sense, and quite clearly, they are not fundamental rights at all.

(emphasis supplied)

Although this case involved detention and the arrest of the Members of Parliament, which are matters relating to a field distinct from that of

the rights claimed in the cases at hand, we are of the view that the logic in the case applies equally to the present situation. In this case certain

provisions regarding Members and their functioning within Parliament were held not to create independent rights which could be given supremacy

over a legal detention. Similarly, in the present case, where there is a lawful expulsion, the Members cannot claim that the provisions relating to

salaries and duration of the House create such rights for the Members that would have supremacy over the power of expulsion of the House.

With specific reference to the power of expulsion, a similar argument with respect to the duration of the Legislative Assembly of a State was

rejected by the Madras High Court in K. Anbazhagan. The High Court rightly held that such a provision could not negate the power of expulsion.

It stated: (AIR p. 303, para 73)

Therefore, it cannot be said that merely because Article 172 provided for a period of five years to be the duration of the Legislative Assembly each

member must necessarily continue to be a Member for five years irrespective of the other provisions of the Constitution.

As far as the provision for the duration of the House is concerned, it simply states that the normal duration of a House is to be five years. It

cannot be interpreted to mean that it guarantees to the Members a term of five years. The respondents have correctly pointed out that a Member

does not enjoy the full five-year term under various circumstances; for example when he or she is elected mid-term, when the term of the House is

cut short by dissolution, when the Member stands disqualified or the seat is rendered vacant. We find that a correct view in this regard has been

taken in K. Anbazhagan in line with the view expressed by this Court in K. Anandan Nambiar. If the provisions mentioned by the petitioners were

actually to create rights in respect of Members, then each of the above situations would be liable to be challenged for their violation. This quite

obviously is not what is intended by the Constitution. Expulsion is only an additional cause for the shortening of a term of a Member.

Further, as far as the provision relating to the salary of the Member is concerned, it is quite absurd to claim that because the Constitution

makes a provision for salaries, the power of the House to expel is negated since the result would be that the Member would no longer be paid.

Salaries are obviously dependent upon membership, and the continuation of membership is an independent matter altogether. The termination of

membership can occur for a variety of reasons and this is at no point controlled by the fact that salaries are required to be paid to a Member.

Thus, in our view, the above provisions do not negate the power of expulsion of the House, and there is no inconsistency between the

House''s power of expulsion and the said provisions. (iii) The right of the constituency to be represented and the right to vote.

In Vijayakant Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, , identical question arose for consideration before this Court and this Court in the above

judgment held that placing an elected member under suspension is the cause and all other things are its consequences. After referring to Raja Ram

Pal''s case, the learned Judge who decided Vijayakant''s case held that an elected member who is de-barred by virtue of an order of suspension

from discharging his duties and functions, may have to suffer all the consequences that go with the office. Therefore, the argument that the

impugned proceedings violate Article 195 and Sections 12 and 12(A) of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Salaries Act are untenable and unacceptable.

Similarly, the reliance placed on by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Maru Ram

and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, is also not applicable to the facts of the present case and therefore, the findings of the Hon''ble

Supreme Court in para-72 of the above judgment are not useful to the case of the writ petitioners herein.

Similarly, contending that the impugned proceedings are ultra-virus to Article 80(4) and 191 read with provisions relating to Representation of

People''s Act, 1951, is also not acceptable for the simple reason that placing a member under suspension is the cause and all other things are its

consequences. Once it is held that the House has the power and privilege to expel or suspend a member for committing breach, then, it is for the

house to decide what would be the punishment that should be given to the member. Once a punishment is given and a resolution is passed

thereafter and there is no violation of any constitutional and fundamental rights affecting the person who is to be suspended, then he/she has to face

the consequences including the denial of salary, attending the House, function as a member of the House, etc. Once a Member is suspended for a

period and during the period, if any intervening circumstances arise, then, as a suspended member, he is not entitled to participate in those events in

his capacity as a member of the House. Denial of salary and the other privileges like voting in an election are not constitutional rights nor the

fundamental rights and in such circumstances, it is not open to the petitioners to contend that as these rights are affected, the impugned proceedings

are violated and are liable to be set aside. Therefore, the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners in this regard are rejected.

Question (a):

Now, let me consider this question viz., whether the entire proceedings are vitiated on the ground of ""violation of principles of natural justice"". It is

mainly argued that none of the petitioners were given notice of the alleged breach either at the time of investigation or at the time of enquiry or at

the time of recommendation of alleged breach by the Privileges Committee on 15.03.2013 and 21.03.2013 or at the time of recommendation of

the Privileges Committee was accepted by the House on 25.03.2013. Therefore, according to the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners, this

lapse is illegal warranting interference by this Court. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgment reported in Vijayakant Vs. Tamil Nadu

Legislative Assembly, and a Full Bench decision reported in S. Balasubramanian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, .

In Raja Ram Pal''s case, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that presumption in favour of Legislature should be a matter of a rebuttable

presumption and though it is the duty of the Court to ensure that there is no abuse or mis-use of power by the Legislature, it cannot overlook the

fact that the Court is not a superior organ or an appellate forum over the other constitutional functionaries. The Hon''ble Supreme Court should

therefore exercise its power of judicial review with utmost care, caution and circumspection. The Hon''ble Supreme Court further held that exercise

of power or privilege by the Legislature are not to be tested on the traditional parameters as applicable to administrative action and the Court

would confine itself to the acknowledged parameters of judicial review and within the judicially discoverable and manageable standard, such as on

grounds of lack of jurisdiction or the impugned decision being a nullity for some reason such as gross illegality, irrationality, violation of

constitutional mandate, malafides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity. The twin tests and grounds of judicial review that are

available are:

a) legality and b) constitutionality Proceedings tainted on account of substantive illegality or unconstitutionality as opposed to those suffering from

mere procedural irregularity cannot be held to be protected from judicial scrutiny by Article 122 or 212. Prohibition contained in Article 122 or

212 does not provide immunity in cases of illegalities. However, as mere irregularity of procedure cannot be a ground of challenge, some view can

be adopted as to the element of irrationality as a ground of judicial review.

The following findings of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal''s case are usefully extracted for the purpose of better appreciation:

In state of Rajasthan v. Union of India while dealing with the issues arising out of communication by the then Union Home Minister to the nine

States asking them to advise their respective Governors to observe the Legislative Assemblies and therefore seek mandate from the people, this

Court observed in para 40 as under: (SCC p. 616)

This Court has never abandoned its constitutional function as the final judge of constitutionality of all acts purported to be done under the

authority of the Constitution. It has not refused to determine questions either of fact or of law so long as it has found itself possessed of power to

do it and the cause of justice to be capable of being vindicated by its actions. But, it cannot assume unto itself powers the Constitution lodges

elsewhere or undertake tasks entrusted by the Constitution to other departments of State which may be better equipped to perform them. The

scrupulously discharged duties of all guardians of the Constitution include the duty not to transgress the limitations of their own constitutionally

circumscribed powers by trespassing into what is properly the domain of other constitutional organs. Questions of political wisdom or executive

policy only could not be subjected to judicial control. No doubt executive policy must also be subordinated to constitutionally sanctioned

purposes. It has its sphere and limitations. But, so long as it operates within that sphere, its operations are immune from judicial interference. This is

also a part of the doctrine of a rough separation of powers under the supremacy of the Constitution repeatedly propounded by this Court and to

which the Court unswervingly adheres even when its views differ or change on the correct interpretation of a particular constitutional provision.

(emphasis supplied)

We reaffirm the said resolve and find no reason why in the facts and circumstances at hand this Court should take a different view so as to

abandon its constitutional functions as the final judge of constitutionality of all acts purported to be done under the authority of the Constitution,

though at the same time refraining from transgressing into the sphere that is properly the domain of Parliament.

While it is true that there is no challenge to the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha and the Rules of Procedure and

Conduct of Business in the Council of States, as made by the two Houses of Parliament in exercise of enabling powers under Article 118(1), we

are of the opinion that mere availability of rules is never a guarantee that they have been duly followed. What we are concerned with, given the

limits prescribed in Article 122(1), is not ""irregularity of procedure"" but illegalities or unconstitutionalities.

We may summarise the principles that can be culled out from the above discussion. They are:

(a) Parliament is a coordinate organ and its views to deserve deference even while its acts are amenable to judicial scrutiny;

(b) The constitutional system of government abhors absolutism and it being the cardinal principle of our Constitution that no one, howsoever lofty,

can claim to be the sole judge of the power given under the Constitution, mere coordinate constitutional status, or even the status of an exalted

constitutional functionaries, does not disentitle this Court from exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review of actions which partake the character of

judicial or quasi-judicial decision;

(c) The expediency and necessity of exercise of power or privilege by the legislature are for the determination of the legislative authority and not for

determination by the courts;

(d) The judicial review of the manner of exercise of power of contempt or privilege does not mean the said jurisdiction is being usurped by the

judicature;

(e) Having regard to the importance of the functions discharged by the legislature under the Constitution and the majesty and grandeur of its task,

there would always be an initial presumption that the powers, privileges, etc. have been regularly and reasonably exercised, not violating the law or

the constitutional provisions, this presumption being a rebuttable one;

(f) The fact that Parliament is an august body of coordinate constitutional position does not mean that there can be no judicially manageable

standards to review exercise of its power;

(g) While the area of powers, privileges and immunities of the legislature being exceptional and extraordinary its acts, particularly relating to

exercise thereof, ought not to be tested on the traditional parameters of judicial review in the same manner as an ordinary administrative action

would be tested, and the Court would confine itself to the acknowledged parameters of judicial review and within the judicially discoverable and

manageable standards, there is no foundation to the plea that a legislative body cannot be attributed jurisdictional error;

(h) The judicature is not prevented from scrutinising the validity of the action of the legislature trespassing on the fundamental rights conferred on

the citizens;

(i) The broad contention that the exercise of privileges by legislatures cannot be decided against the touchstone of fundamental rights or the

constitutional provisions is not correct;

(j) If a citizen, whether a non-Member or a Member of the legislature, complains that his fundamental rights under Article 20 or 21 had been

contravened, it is the duty of this Court to examine the merits of the said contention, especially when the impugned action entails civil

consequences;

(k) There is no basis to the claim of bar of exclusive cognizance or absolute immunity to the parliamentary proceedings in Article 105(3) of the

Constitution;

(l) The manner of enforcement of privilege by the legislature can result in judicial scrutiny, though subject to the restrictions contained in the other

constitutional provisions, for example Article 122 or 212;

(m) Article 122(1) and Article 212(1) displace the broad doctrine of exclusive cognizance of the legislature in England of exclusive cognizance of

internal proceedings of the House rendering irrelevant the case-law that emanated from courts in that jurisdiction; inasmuch as the same has no

application to the system of governance provided by the Constitution of India;

(n) Article 122(1) and Article 212(1) prohibit the validity of any proceedings in legislature from being called in question in a court merely on the

ground of irregularity of procedure;

(o) The truth of correctness of the material will not be questioned by the court nor will it go into the adequacy of the material or substitute its

opinion for that of the legislature;

(p) Ordinarily, the legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having acted for an extraneous purpose or being actuated by caprice or mala fide

intention, and the court will not lightly presume abuse or misuse, giving allowance for the fact that the legislature is the best judge of such matters,

but if in a given case, the allegations to such effect are made, the court may examine the validity of the said contention, the onus on the person

alleging being extremely heavy;

(q) The rules which the legislature has to make for regulating its procedure and the conduct of its business have to be subject to the provisions of

the Constitution;

(r) Mere availability of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business, as made by the legislature in exercise of enabling powers under the

Constitution, is never a guarantee that they have been duly followed;

(s) The proceedings which may be tainted on account of substantive or gross illegality or unconstitutionality are not protected from judicial scrutiny;

(t) Even if some of the material on which the action is taken is found to be irrelevant, the court would still not interfere so long as there is some

relevant material sustaining the action;

(u) An ouster clause attaching finality to a determination does ordinarily oust the power of the court to review the decision but not on grounds of

lack of jurisdiction or it being a nullity for some reason such as gross illegality, irrationality, violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-

compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity.

Article 122 and Article 212 are worded similarly and identically and Article 122 deals with the proceedings in Parliament and Article 212 deals

with the proceedings in the Legislature of a State. For better appreciation, Article 122 and Article 212 are extracted below:

Art. 122. (1) The validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.

(2) No officer or member of Parliament in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of

business, or for maintaining order, in Parliament shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers.

Courts not to inquire into proceedings of Legislature.

Art. 212. (1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of

procedure.

(2) No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the

conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any court in respect of the exercise by him of

those powers.

C1. (1): Courts not to inquire into proceedings of the Legislature.- 1. It is clear from the above clause, that our Courts would not be entitled to

question the validity of any ''proceeding'' in Parliament on the ground of irregularity of ''procedure''. Thus,-

(i) The Courts cannot invalidate an Act on the ground that changes were introduced into the Bill by the Select Committee in contravention of the

Rules of Procedure and business of the House, or that the members or the Speaker had not taken the oath.

(ii) Where a bill is duly endorsed by the Speaker as passed it cannot be questioned in the Courts on the ground that proceedings of the Legislature

do not record that the bill was formally put to the House under the rules of business and carried by it.

(iii) Proceedings inside the Legislature cannot be called into question on the ground that they have not been carried on in accordance with the rules

of business. Thus,

A notice issued by the Speaker of a Legislature for breach of its privilege cannot be quashed by the Supreme Court or any other Court on the

ground that the Rules of Procedure relating to proceedings for breach of privilege have not been followed by the Legislature.

But the immunity from judicial interference is confined to matters of irregularity of procedure. There would be no immunity if the proceedings are

held without jurisdiction, e.g., in defiance of the mandatory provisions of the Constitution or by exercising powers which the Legislature does not

under the Constitution possess.

The question whether the Speaker himself has been duly elected according to the provisions of the Constitution is not a question relating merely

to irregularity of proceedings in the House, and a proceeding for Quo Warranto lies to challenge his right to the office.

C1. (2): Powers exercisable by an officer of the Legislature.- 1. Even an erroneous decision or interpretation of the Rules of procedure by the

Speaker cannot be the subject-matter of scrutiny in a Court of law. The High Court or the Supreme Court cannot act as a Court of revision against

the Legislature or the rulings of the Speaker, with respect to the proceedings within the House in question.

By reason of this provision, the High Court cannot give a direction upon the Speaker on the question whether the discussion on the address of

the Governor would come under Art. 176(2) or would be treated as a discussion of an ordinary resolution.

No writ will lie against the Speaker or other officer of the Legislature to interfere with proceedings of the Legislature, e.g., to prevent a

resolution from being moved or to restrain the Legislature from enacting any legislation even if it be ultra vires or unconstitutional.

If, however, a law is passed or a motion or resolution carried, which is not in accordance with the Constitution, it can be declared invalid by the

Courts.

The immunity is restricted to matters of ''procedure'' and would not extend to any matter relating to the constitution of the Legislature itself, e.g.,

the absence of a notification unders. 74 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

''By or under''.-These words have been used to include not only the powers vested by the Constitution itself but also by intra vires Rules made in

exercise of powers conferred by the Constitution.

''Conduct of business''.-1. It has been held by the Travancore High Court that the taking or administering of the oath under Art. 99 or 188 of the

Constitution is not an item of ''conduct of business'' within the meaning of Art. 122(2) or 212(2) but is only a condition precedent to entitle the

members to sit in the assembly and conduct the business. Hence, a wrongful refusal by the Speaker to allow a member to take the oath can be

interfered with by the Court. It has also been held that where the Speaker is authorised by the President or Governor to administer the oath under

Art. 99 or 188, he discharges the function not as an ''officer'' of the Assembly and that, in the discharge of the function, he cannot claim the

protection given by Art. 122(2) or 212(2).

A point of order raised by a member relates to the conduct of business of the Assembly. So also is the giving of notice of a question.

Before me, the action of the State Legislature is in question and therefore Article 212(1) will apply to the validity of the proceedings.

According to Article 212(1), the validity of any proceeding in the Legislature of a State, shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged

irregularity of procedure. In Raja Ram Pal''s case, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that ""the Court would confine itself to the acknowledged

parameters of judicial review and within the judicially discoverable and manageable standards."" The Hon''ble Supreme Court further held that the

judicature is available when:

1) the Legislature trespasses on the fundamental rights conferred on the citizens; and

2) when fundamental rights are affected by the act of Legislatures.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court acknowledged the prohibition contained in Article 122(1) and Article 212(1) and therefore held that the truth or

correctness of the material will not be questioned by the Court nor it will go into the adequacy of the material or substitutes its opinion for that of

the legislature. In short, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that the proceedings which may be tainted on account of substantive or gross illegality or

unconstitutionality are not protected from judicial scrutiny.

In the light of the above, it is very clear that the action of the State Legislature can be interfered with by the Court only when it is tainted with

gross illegality or unconstitutionality as is different from mere irregularity in procedure. According to the writ petitioners herein, the entire action is

tainted with gross illegality as principle of natural justice has been violated right from the beginning to the end of the proceedings.

In the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent, it is stated that the incident of assault happened during the sitting of the House within the

view and knowledge of all the members. Immediately, the Hon''ble Speaker announced in the House itself that he was referring the issue to the

Privileges Committee under the Rule 226 of the Assembly Rules in order to identify from the video recording of the scene all those who indulged in

such action and also for suitable follow up action. The issue was referred to the Privileges Committee by the Hon''ble Speaker on 08.02.2013 and

on the very same day, Thiru. V.C. Chandhirakumar, the first writ petitioner and 21 other DMDK M.L.A.s on their own volition gave a

representation in writing to the Hon''ble Speaker regarding the incident. Thiru. C. Michael Royappan also on the same day gave a written

representation to the Hon''ble Speaker narrating his version of the event. As the issue was referred to the Privileges Committee, both the

representations received by the Hon''ble Speaker forwarded to the Committee along with the Video Clippings for identifying the persons who

indulged in the unruly action and for taking necessary follow up action thereon. In the Privileges Committee itself, Thiru. S.R. Parthibhan of DMDK

is a Member and he is also a signatory to the representation submitted by Thiru V.C. Chandhirakumar, the first writ petitioner herein. The case of

the writ petitioners was taken up by Thiru. S.R. Parthibhan on their behalf and Thiru. S.R. Parthibhan himself identified all the writ petitioners in the

video clippings. The above said facts, as narrated in the counter, were not at all denied by the writ petitioners. Therefore, they themselves

submitted a representation and that was considered by the Committee. Further, their own colleague who is a Member of the Privileges Committee

took up the matter on their behalf and after seeing the video clippings, the writ petitioners were identified by the Members including Thiru. S.R.

Parthibhan. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioners case was not at all represented nor they were denied an opportunity to

present their case. It is true that the principles of natural justice are not followed strictly and had it been a case of administrative action, normally

this Court would go to the rescue of the writ petitioners on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been followed properly. But,

when the action of the legislature is questioned before this Court, this Court does not have the very same parameters of judging case arising out of

an administrative action and the parameters that are available to the Court while judicially taking note of the action of the legislature is not the same

and only when the action is tainted with unconstitutionality and substantive illegality as different from mere irregularity, this Court can interfere with

the same.

If the situation warrants that the principles of natural justice are to be followed, then, this Court will definitely interfere, if there is absolutely no

opportunity whatsoever has been given to the affected party, even when the action of the legislature is challenged before this Court. However, each

case has to be decided on its own merits and factual aspects. First of all, in this case, the incident took place in the House itself and in front of all

the members of the House. As rightly contended by the Amicus curiae, action could have been straight away taken by the Hon''ble Speaker

against the erring person there itself. But, the Hon''ble Speaker chose to refer the matter to the Privileges Committee to identify the members who

indulged in unwarranted action like threatening, pushing and assaulting the other member. Therefore, what is required in this case is to see the video

clippings to find out whether the members have indulged in such activities. Already representations were given by the writ petitioners along with the

other party men, narrating the entire incident. Similar representation was also submitted by the other group of the very same party. Video

recordings were played again and again before the Privileges Committee to identify the members and in that Committee, Thiru. S.R. Parthibhan

belonging to the very same party i.e. the DMDK, is a Member who took up the matter on behalf of the writ petitioners. In such circumstances, it

cannot be said that the principles of natural justice are flagrantly violated in this case, as opportunity was given and in fact, taken by the writ

petitioners themselves by submitting a representation and therefore, their case was articulated by their own party man who is a member of the

Privileges Committee. It may be that the procedure adopted by the Privileges Committee is irregular and the opportunity given is inadequate. It

may be that the evidence viz., the video clippings are insufficient to establish the guilt of the petitioners beyond any doubt. However, irregularity in

procedure, inadequacy in giving opportunity and the weight of the evidence or otherwise placed before the Legislature are not relevant

consideration for this Court to interfere with the action of the Legislature. Therefore, it cannot be said that the entire proceedings are tainted with

substantive illegality as different from mere irregularity.

In A.K. Bose, M.L.A., 225-B, Jeeva Nagar, Second Street, Jaihindpuram, Madurai -11 Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly and The

Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly this Court held as follows:

It appears that no notice whatsoever was served on the petitioner with regard to the allegation levelled against him nor any explanation called

for from him. Of course, the Speaker has the power to exercise his discretion to waive the procedure. The point to be answered in regard to the

above issue is whether the non-observance of procedure contemplated constitutes an act of ""irregularity"" or ""illegality"". On a perusal of the entire

materials available before this Court and upon analysing the various decisions and after giving due credence to the contentions raised and the

procedure adopted by the first respondent in passing the impugned resolution, it cannot be said that the impugned resolution is a result of illegality

inasmuch it is only a procedural irregularity which is involved in the matter. In such view of the matter, I do not find any merit or substance in the

plea of the petitioner in this regard.

On the aspect of proportionality of punishment, taking into account the situation under which the power has been exercised by the constitutional

functionary to impose punishment on the petitioner only for a temporary period, I am of the view that this Court has no power to go into the same

for the reason that imposition of punishment on a Member is in the domain of the said constitutional functionary and moreover, as stated earlier, the

petitioner''s continuance as a Member of Legislative Assembly after the expiry of the prescribed period is not at stake taking into account the

behaviour of the petitioner, he has been suspended only for a limited period and it appears that proportionate punishment has been decided by the

House. Thus, in view of the settled proposition that a Court would not go into the proportionality or quantum of punishment, there is no scope for

interference in this aspect as well.

In view of the aforesaid findings, the challenge to the impugned resolution cannot be sustained and consequently, this petition questioning the

suspension of the petitioner for a shorter period of time is liable to be dismissed for being devoid of any merit.

In Vijayakant Vs. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, this Court held as follows:

Coming to the third stage viz., the stage at which the House considered the report of the Committee and passed a resolution imposing a penalty

upon the Petitioner, the allegation of Violation of Natural Justice is made on two counts viz., (i) that the proceedings before the Committee, the

preparation of the report of the Committee, the listing of additional agenda before the House and the passing of the resolution all happened in a

span of few hours at breakneck speed, and (ii) that even without furnishing copies of the report to all the members of the House, the motion was

carried through.

On the first count, I do not think there is much to be said. It was represented by the learned Additional Advocate General that normally a

battery of stenographers keep recording the proceedings of the House and its Committees, simultaneously. This is with a view to make a record of

the proceedings contemporaneously. Therefore, the speed with which the report of the Committee was made ready, cannot lead to an inference as

though everything was pre-planned and prepared in advance. While speedy action can be criticised on the ground that it was a product of pre-

meditated plans, a slow paced action can be criticised on the ground that it was a product of inefficiency and lethargy. In fact, the Supreme Court

answers this contention of the Petitioner in paragraphs 446 & 447 of its decision in Raja Ram Pal, in the following words:

Regarding non-grant of reasonable opportunity, we reiterate what was recently held in Jagjit Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Others, that the

Principles of Natural Justice are not immutable but are flexible; they cannot be cast in a rigid mould and put in a straitjacket and the compliance

therewith has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case.

We outrightly reject the argument of denial of reasonable opportunity and also that proceedings were concluded in a hurry. It has become

almost fashionable to raise the banner of ""justice delayed is justice denied"" in case of protracted proceedings and to argue ""justice hurried is justice

buried"" if the results are quick. We cannot draw inferences from the amount of time taken by the Committees that inquired the matters as no

specific time is or can be prescribed. Further such matters are required to be dealt with utmost expedition subject to grant of reasonable

opportunity, which was granted to the Petitioners.

Therefore, the first count is liable to be rejected, since I cannot draw an inference that the proceedings were pre-planned, merely because the

report was made ready in a record time. An allegation of lack of adequate opportunity of being heard cannot be made on presumptions and

surmises.

On the second count, it is an admitted fact that the copies of the report of the Committee of Privileges was not circulated to all the members of

the House. It is also an admitted fact that 5 copies were made available in the Library of the Assembly, for the perusal of any member who wanted

to peruse the same.

But it is equally an admitted fact (i) that the Deputy leader of the party to which the Petitioner belongs, was supplied with a copy of the report,

and (ii) that none of the members demanded copies of the report, before the resolution was put to vote.

The report of the Committee can be compared to the report of an Enquiry Officer. Till the advent of the decision in E.C.I.L. v. Karunakar, the

non-furnishing of a coy of the report was held to vitiate the outcome of the proceedings. But in E.C.I.L., the Supreme Court made it clear that the

delinquent should also establish the prejudice caused to him on account of the non-furnishing of the copy of the report.

The case of the Petitioner is much worse than that of an employee whose case will be governed by the ratio in E.C.I.L. v. Karunakar. The

reasons are:

(i) The requirement to furnish a copy of the enquiry report, is always an obligation to the delinquent and not to others. In this case, the Petitioner is

not complaining that he was not furnished with a copy of the report. His complaint is that the copies of the report were not furnished to the other

members of the House. The only person who could have effectively defended the Petitioner, is the Deputy leader of his own party. To him, the

copy of the report was furnished. Therefore, the requirement actually stands fulfilled on first principles.

(ii) In any event, the Petitioner has not established the other limb viz., the prejudice caused to him on account of non-supply of the copies of the

report to the other members of the House.

Therefore, the second contention of the Petitioner that the proceedings of the House were vitiated for non-compliance of the Principles of

Natural Justice, cannot hold water.

From the above, it is very clear that even when principles of natural justice are not followed, then, the person who is complaining about the

same should show how he/she has been prejudiced by not following the same. In this case, the writ petitioners are not able to show how they have

been seriously prejudiced and affected by not issuing a notice to them, getting their explanation, giving a report and thereafter passing the order.

I have already made it clear that the parameters are different when the action of the Legislature is questioned. Even then, I find that some

principles of natural justice has been followed, if not in its entirety. Further, I have referred to the fact that the purpose of the Privileges Committee

is to see the video clipping to find out the persons who are guilty of bad behaviour and assault. In such circumstances, not following the usual

formalities and the entire principles of natural justice do not vitiate the proceedings. Further, an opportunity of representing their case was availed

by the writ petitioners themselves and their case was very well articulated by their own member in the Privileges Committee.

In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, this Court held as follows:

While harping on the above point, the learned counsel for the petitioner has questioned the authenticity of the procedure of video recording.

But, it has been brought to the notice of this Court that simultaneous recording of proceedings of the House has been done from 16.08.2001

onwards as per the orders of the then Speaker and such video recording has been in vogue for more than six years and the same has not been

disputed or objected by any Member of Legislature or political parties till now and nor its veracity, reliability and authenticity ever questioned or

disputed. Accordingly, the act of the petitioner in throwing the cap of the Watch and Ward towards the table of the Speaker has been witnessed

by the Speaker himself and other Members as well on 19.10.2007 subsequent to which a motion was moved and the impugned resolution was

passed.

From the above, it is very clear that simultaneous recording of the proceedings of the House has been done from 16.08.2001 onwards and its

reliability or authenticity could not be disputed. When such is the case, there are definite materials before the Privileges Committee to come to the

definite conclusion that the writ petitioners are guilty of obstructing the conduct and functioning of the House and therefore, its adequacy and

reliability should not be gone into by this Court.

Before parting with, I would also like to refer to the other decisions cited by the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

In P.V. Narsimha Rao Vs. State (CBI/SPE), the two questions that came up before the Constitution Bench of the Hon''ble Supreme Court

are:

1) Whether by virtue of Article 105 of the Constitution, a member of a Parliament can claim immunity from prosecution on a charge of bribery in a

Criminal Court? and

2) Whether a Member of Parliament is a Public Servant, falling within the purview of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988?

The majority judgment quoted that:

1) A Member of Parliament does not enjoy immunity under Article 105(2) or under Article 105(3) of the Constitution from being prosecuted

before a Criminal Court for an offence involving offer or acceptance of bribe for the purpose of speaking or by giving his vote in Parliament or in

any Committee thereof.

2) A Member of Parliament is a public servant u/s 2(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and

3) Since there is no authority competent of removing a Member of Parliament and to grant sanction for his prosecution u/s 19(1) of the Prevention

of Corruption Act, 1988, the Court can take cognizance of the offences mentioned in Section 19(1) in the absence of sanction, but, till provision is

made by Parliament, in that regard by suitable amendment in law, the prosecuting agency before filing a charge sheet in respect of an offence

punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the 1988 Act against a Member of Parliament in a Criminal Court, shall obtain the permission of

the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha/Speaker of the Lok Sabha as the case may be.

From the above, it is very clear that the facts contained in the above case are totally different and therefore, any observations made in that case

could not be straight away imported to the present case in which the facts are totally different and the questions arose for consideration are also

totally different.

S. Balasubramanian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, was very much relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in support

of his submissions. In fact, the following paragraphs are very much relied on by Thiru. K.M. Vijayan, the learned Senior Counsel to contend that

this Court can interfere with the impugned proceedings of the Assembly.

On a careful consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side in the light of the principles laid down in the above

decisions, we propose to take up first for consideration the question as to the scope and extent of interference by Courts exercising jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters of the nature concerning the legality, propriety and constitutionality of the action taken in

the purported exercise of the privileges of the House of legislature engrafted in Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India. It is by now well settled

and there could be no serious controversy over the position reiterated by more than one decision of the Supreme Court that the Constitution reigns

supreme and the rights, powers and privileges of the various limbs of the State are subject to the provisions contained in the Constitution, the basic

and fundamental law which provides for the governance of the State. It is equally well settled that the final authority to state the meaning of the

Constitution and to settle constitutional controversies exclusively belongs to the Supreme Court and the High Courts which are constituted as the

sentinels of both the Constitution and democracy, as well as the fundamental rights of the citizen inclusive of their life, liberty and freedom. That

apart, the Legislature in India have to function within the limits prescribed by the material and relevant provisions of the Constitution of India and

adjudication of any dispute as to whether legislative authority has been exceeded or fundamental rights have been contravened is solely and

exclusively left to the Judicature of this country and, therefore, inevitably the decision about the construction of Article 194(3) of the Constitution,

the privileges, powers and immunities claimed or action taken in vindication thereof cannot be said to be in the exclusive domain or of the sole

arbitral or absolute discretion of the House of Legislature. Of course, the Courts having regard to their own self imposed limits would honour the

sentiments particularly keeping in view the plenary powers of the Legislature within the constitutionally permitted limits so long as such action of the

Legislature does not result in the negation of the fundamental rights secured under the Constitution or the life, liberty, freedom and dignity of the

citizen. The all powerful postures or claims of sky-high powers or suzerain claims of sovereignty or over-Lordism are to be brushed aside as

nothing but fossils of the tyrannical and anarchical past and not keeping in tune with the basic and fundamental principle of rule of law, the bedrock

of the Constitution or the democratic ideals which are the avowed object of the Republic ushered in by the Constitution of India. The contentions

to the contrary have no basis or recognition of law and do not have the merit of acceptance by courts in this country.

The further question that requires to be considered before ever embarking upon the issue relating to the propriety of the decision taken in this

case by the House of the alleged breach of privilege or the contempt of the authority of the House or its members on the peculiar facts and

circumstances of the case, is as to whether the House has acted in conformity with the Rule of law in taking an action or resolving to decide and

impose a punishment on a citizen resulting in the deprivation of his life or personal liberty. It is an axiomatic principle firmly incorporated in and

which permeates the provisions of our Constitution that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure

established by law and the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of

India. Consequently, no law or procedure laid down by law or the action taken thereunder can be arbitrary or irrational or oppressive and the

requirement of compliance with the principles of natural justice are implicit in Article 21 and every action of the State has to be tested on the anvil

of Article 14, 19 and 21 read together. (Vide Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak and

Another, . No immunity can be claimed from the scrutiny of this Court to see whether any Act or action of the Legislature, as in the case of the

other limb of the State, violates the above cardinal principles.

So far as the facts of the present case are concerned to which a detailed reference has been made even in the beginning, the moment a member

has brought to the notice of the Speaker and raised the issue, the then Speaker appears to have made a statement about the offending nature of the

publication itself and declared that he demands on behalf of the members of the House and orders the Journal in question to publish in the front

page their apology for the publication in question making it also known that on failing to do so, summary sentence will be passed by the House

itself. It appears that there were cheers at that stage, as seen from the record of the proceedings. This record of events as transpired in the House

only confirms the plea of the petitioner that the alleged guilt of the petitioner has been decided and pronounced upon by the then Speaker himself

and declaration to that effect was made by him even before any opportunity to show cause or a hearing was given to the petitioner and what was

proposed to be communicated to the petitioner and demanded of him was the apology to be expressed by another publication on threat of

imposition of a summary sentence by the House itself, on the petitioner failing to do so. The communication dated 31.3.1987 which emanated from

the third respondent thereafter also confirms the position that the then Speaker has made an order in the Assembly in this regard. This position is

further confirmed by the then Speaker himself even in the proceedings held on 4.4.1987, as could be seen from the record of proceedings, that the

magazine has failed to comply with the order to publish an apology in response to the ruling given by him. The record of proceedings dated

6.4.1987 places this aspect of the matter beyond any controversy wherein it is found that in the teeth of certain objections raised by some of the

members of the manner of decision, the then Speaker affirmed stating that the punishment was given after enquiring with them meaning thereby

some of the members. The leader of the House (Dr. Era Nedunchezhian) also refers to the decision taken on 29.3.1987 to be the decision of the

then Speaker. The petitioner in his subsequent article in the issue of the magazine dated 5.4.1987, more as a matter of explanation to the readers of

the magazine also has been critical of the pre-determined and authoritarian nature of the decision arrived at by the then Speaker himself even

before and without even giving an opportunity to the petitioner and lamenting upon the futility of giving even any explanation at that stage. After the

speeches made by some of the members who were permitted to participate by making such speeches the House was said to have considered and

passed a resolution, holding that after consideration it was resolved that the Magazine in question, by publishing the offending cartoon, had

committed breach of privilege of the House and consequently decided to arrest and detain the petitioner in the Central Jail at Madras for

undergoing three months rigorous imprisonment.

First of all, that case arose out of a different set of facts. In that case, two writ petitions were filed by the said S. Balasubramanian who was the

Editor of the Tamil Weekly Anandha Vikatan at that time. The controversy between the parties had its origin centering around a Cartoon published

on the Outer Wrapper of the Tamil Weekly Anandha Vikatan. The magazine was available at the shops for sale on 27.03.1987. On 28.03.1987,

when the Tamil Nadu Assembly was in session, one of the Members raised an issue out of the above referred two Cartoons as offending and

ridiculing the members of the Legislature by describing them as Anti-social Elements and that such things must be put an end to. The then Speaker

of the Assembly said that the publication is derogatory and the reputation of the M.L.A.s and Ministers have been injured. Hence, the Speaker

ordered Anandha Vikatan to publish in the front page their apology for the said publication, failing which, summary sentence would be passed by

the House itself. Consequently, the Secretary of the Assembly addressed a communication dated 31.03.1987 to the petitioner therein, demanding

him to publish an apology expressing ''regret'' in the front page of the next issue. The petitioner therein by reply stated that the explanation to the

publication of the Cartoon is being published in the issue dated 05.04.1987 and the copy of the same being sent to him for his perusal. The

enclosed article was published on 05.04.1987 stating that the Charicature was a mere and an ordinary offenceless joke with no one in mind or to

offend anyone and the same has to be taken jovially. The subject matter again engaged the attention of the House on 04.04.1987. Since the

petitioner therein failed to express his apology, the leader of the House proposed a resolution, proposing that by publishing the offending Cartoon,

the petitioner had committed a breach of privilege of the House and therefore, the petitioner-Editor must be arrested and detained in the Central

Prison for three months to undergo rigorous imprisonment. Pursuant to the resolution of the House, the Speaker seemed to have issued a General

Warrant for arrest of the petitioner therein and the police arrested him on the same day at his farm house and brought him to Chennai and lodged

him in the Central Prison. Only in the above context, Thiru. S. Balasubramanian approached this Court and a Full Bench of this Court held that

every action of the State has to be tested on the anvil of Article 14, 19 and 21 read together and no immunity can be claimed from the scrutiny of

this Court to see whether any act or action of the Legislature as in the case of the other limb of the State violates the above cardinal principles.

After going through the entire documents, the Full Bench came to the conclusion that the then Speaker gave his ruling unilaterally and commanded

the petitioner to convey his apology on threat of summary imposition of sentence. The Full Bench further found that there was a gross violation of

law as also principles of natural justice in dealing with the case of the petitioner and punishing him with imprisonment and the entire procedure

adopted smacks of arbitrariness and oppressiveness besides the same being most unreasonable.

From the above, it is very clear that S. Balasubramanian''s case has been decided on a different set of facts involving a non-member of the

House and affecting his fundamental rights and therefore, the observations made by the Full Bench would not come to the rescue of the petitioners

herein. Though serious constitutional questions arose for consideration in this writ petition, all the questions that arose were already dealt with by

the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal''s case and by this Court in A.K. Bose case and in Vijayakant''s case. The above said three

decisions have been rendered in identical facts and circumstances and they are very much applicable to the facts of the present case. If the

principles laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court and this Court in the above said three decisions are applied to the facts of the present case, I

am of the considered view that all the questions raised by the writ petitioners herein were already answered against them and therefore, there are

no merits in their contentions. Accordingly, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed as devoid of merits. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed.

No costs. Consequently, the other applications are also closed.