Ved Parkash vs Parkash Wati and Another

V.S. Aggarwal, J.—Ved Parkash petitioner has filed the present revision petition directed against the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, Ludhiana, dated 7.8.1996 and of the learned Appellate Authority, Ludhiana, dated 18.5.1998. The learned Rent Controller had passed an order of eviction against the petitioner which had been upheld by the learned Appellate Authority.

The relevant facts are that respondents Parkash Wati and Sharan Kumar had filed a petition for eviction against the petitioner with respect to the suit property. The respondents claimed that they are the owners-landlords of the property and that the petitioner has not paid the arrears of rent from 27.12.1985. They asserted that they require the suit property for their own use and for members of their family. The accommodation presently in their occupation comprises of one room, one kitchen and two small rooms measuring 8 feet x 9 feet 4 inches on the first and second floor of the premises. The room in the adjoining building has gone, to the share of Rakesh Kumar s/o Faquir Chand on the basis of Will dated 31.10.1990, Respondent Sharan Kumar is, residing with his wife and four years school going daughter while Parkash Wati respondent is old and has three married daughters. The married daughters visit them occasionally. The sisters of Faqir Chand and that of Parkash Wati also visit them. Respondent Sharan Kumar is running a business and his customers and friends also visit him. The accommodation in their possession is totally, insufficient. Parkash Wati suffers from knee and joint pains in the legs. It is difficult for her to climb stairs and she, therefore, requires the ground floor of the premises. It is very inconvenient for her to live on the upper floor. The respondent are not, occupying any other residential premises. On these facts, eviction of the petitioner was prayed.

In the reply filed, relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was disputed. It was denied that the ground of eviction, that the respondents bona fide require the property for themselves and members of their families, is available. It was pleaded that there is one building which has two municipal numbers. The respondents are in occupation of three big rooms alongwith store, bath-room, kitchen and flush latrine on the ground floor of the building No.B-IX-1147. They also have three big rooms, kitchen and bath on the first floor of the building No.B-IX-1163. Rakesh Kumar was stated to be doing business at Dasuya.

Issues were framed and after the evidence was recorded, the learned Rent Controller returned the finding that inter se parties there was a relationship of landlord and tenant. With respect to the controversy about the agreed rate of rent, the plea of the petitioner was accepted but it was held that the respondent bona fide require the property and they have no other suitable alternative accommodation. On the said ground, an order of eviction was passed.

The petitioners had preferred an appeal. The learned Appellate Authority endorsed the findings of the learned Rent Controller. It was held that Faqir Chand had executed a Will. The respondent have only two rooms and a kitchen on the first floor and one Chubara (room) on the second floor, it was further concluded that respondent Parkash Wati is an old lady having joint pain in legs and it is difficult for her to climb the stairs. Otherwise also, it was held that the relations of the respondents, namely, married sisters of respondent No.2 and other persons visit them and they have no suitable accommodation to make them stay comfortably. It was, therefore, held that the requirement was bona fide and consequently the appeal was dismissed.

Aggrieved by the same, present revision petition has been filed.

During the course of arguments, there was no controversy raised with regard to the accommodation available. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner eloquently highlighted the fact that since the respondents were already in occupation of the premises in terms of Section 13(3)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for short "the Act"), suitability and sufficiency is not envisaged. He accordingly contended that the ground of eviction was not available and in support of his argument relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D. Devaji v. K. Sundarashana Rao, 1994(1) Rent Control Reporter, 185.

To appreciate the said argument, reference can well be made to the decision in D. Devaji''s case (supra). In the cited case, the landlord had filed an eviction petition u/s 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The ground of eviction was that the landlord bona fide required the demised property. The Rent controller directed eviction of the tenant. In appeal, the said findings were reversed. The matter went to the High Court. The High Court restored the findings of the Rent Controller. In Supreme Court, the findings of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh were set aside and it was held that the ground of eviction was not available:

According to the learned counsel, the ground of eviction under the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 are pari materia with the ground of eviction under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. He strongly relied upon the findings of the Supreme Court in D. Devaji''s case (supra). It reads as under:-

".......We find no force in the contention. The analysis of the provisions made herein before indicates that the landlord must be in possession of a non-residential building in the city, town or village and if he requires another non-residential building for expansion of his business or to establish another business or needs additional accommodation of a non-residential building in the same city, town or village. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) creates an embargo. Suitability or convenience does not appear to have, form the language found therein, been envisaged by the legislature. As pointed out in Vijayalaxmi Printing Press''s case it would be open to the legislature to clarify the position, but on the explicit language, it is difficult to give countenance to the respondent''s contention. In Pandu''s case the finding was that the non-residential building which the appellant sought for eviction ceased to be a non-residential building by virtue of its conversion into a residential building. Therefore, this question had not arisen in Pandu''s case for decision. The ratio therein would be confined to those facts and circumstances. The decisions of the Madras High Court relied on by the learned counsel does not appear to have laid down the law correctly. The language in the Madras Act in pari material is the same as in the Section 10(3)(a)(iii). In the light of the above interpretation, the construction put up by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court is not correct. Therefore, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Baliah''s case has not correctly laid the law."

Before the learned counsel for the petitioner can take advantage of the cited decision, it becomes necessary to see whether the provisions as applicable to Andhra Pradesh, are pari materia to the provisions of the Act as applicable to Punjab. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act applicable to Andhra Pradesh reads as under:-

"Section 10(3)(a)(iii)- A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building:

(I) in case it is a residential building;

(a) if the landlord is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city or village concerned and he requires if for his own occupation:

xx xx xx (iii) in case it is any other non-residential building if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which, is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise.

(a) for the purpose of a business which he is carrying, on the date of the application; or

(b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller the landlord bona fide proposes to commence:

Provided that a person who becomes a landlord after the commencement of the tenancy by an instrument intervivos shall not be entitled to apply under this clause before the expiry of three months from the date on which the instrument was registered.

Provided, further that where a landlord has obtained possession of a building under this clause he shall not be entitled to apply again under this clause:

(i) in case he has obtained possession of a residential building for possession of another residential building of his own;

(ii) in case he has obtained possession of non-residential building for possession of another non-residential building of his own."

On the contrary, the provisions of Section 13(3)(a) of the Act applicable to Punjab are to the following effect:-

"(3)(a). A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession -

(i) in the case of a residential building, if-

(a) he requires it for his own occupation;

(b) he is not occupying another Residential building in the urban area concerned; and

(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area;"

Though at the first glance it appears that the provisions of both the Acts are pari materia, but on close scrutiny it is obviously clear that they are not so. In the case of residential premise''s, in Andhra Pradesh the necessary ingredients are that the building should be residential and the landlord should not be occupying a residential building of his own in the city or village concerned. The proviso further prescribes that where a landlord has obtained possession of a residential building, he shall not be entitled to apply again under this clause. In the Act applicable to Punjab, the position is little different. Firstly, the requirement is that the landlord should require the premises for his own occupation. Secondly, in between Sub-clause (b) and (c) of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act the expression "and" occurs and, therefore, they have to be ready together. Besides the requirement, the landlord has to show that he is not occupying any other residential building in the urban area concerned and that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause. Thus, merely occupying another residential building is not all over emphasising. In the present case in hand, it has been found as a fact that the respondents, require more residential accommodation for their occupation. Though they are in occupation of a residential portion of the building but they have not vacated such a portion without sufficient cause. Not only the provisions of the Act applicable to Punjab differ from those of the corresponding provisions of the Act applicable to Andhra Pradesh, but in the present case, the case of the petitioner falls within the purview of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act. In fact, it, hardly needs to be emphasised that in D. Devaji''s case (supra), the Supreme court was concerned with commercial premises and not residential premises.

Reference in this connection can well be made to the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Messrs Sant Ram Des Raj v. Karam Chand, (1962)64 P.L.R. 758, wherein somewhat similar question has been agitated. In paragraph 21 of the judgment, the answer was given to the controversy in the following words:-

"The answer, therefore, to the question posed in Civil Revision No.373 of 1960 and Civil Revision No. 190 of 1961 is that where a landlord establishes that he has made his application for eviction of his tenant in good faith and that he requires the premises for his own occupation and further that the premises already in his occupation do not meet his requirement and needs, he is entitled to evict his tenant u/s 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act."

The decision of the Full bench squarely answers the argument so much thought of by the petitioner''s learned counsel. Therefore, it must be held that despite the respondents being in occupation of a part of the building, since they require more accommodation, they can certainly seek eviction as the requirement is bona fide.

No other argument was raised.

For these reasons, the revision petition being without merit must fail and is accordingly dismissed.

The petitioner is granted two months time to vacate the demised premises.