Ved Prakash Shukla vs Chairman/Disciplinary Authority, Raigarh Kshetriya Gramin Bank and Others

Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J.�By this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed correctness and validity of order dated 21/04/95 passed by the Appellate authority/Board of Directors of the Bank, partly allowing the appeal by reducing the penalty of removal from service to reduction in rank at the lowest stage on the post of Clerk-cum-Cashier and further treating the period of suspension i.e. from 12/05/94 till the date of passing of the appellate order as period not spent on duty and not entitled to any pay or allowances from 12/05/94 till the date of passing of the order in appeal. The relevant facts of the case, necessary for decision of the petition, are that while the petitioner was working as Branch Manager of Raigarh Kshetriya Gramin Bank (a regional rural bank), he was placed under suspension vide order dated 30/04/87. Thereafter, a charge-sheet dated 02/11/87 (Annexure P/4) was served on the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply on 16/12/87 and enquiry officer was appointed vide order dated 21/01/88. The defence documents and list of witnesses were allowed to be filed by the petitioner. When the petitioner did not appear before the enquiry officer on 19/12/89, the enquiry was closed, written brief was presented by the presenting officer and the petitioner also submitted his written brief of defence.

During the pendency of first enquiry, another charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on 30/05/89 (Annexure P/11). The petitioner submitted his reply. On 07/09/89, enquiry officer was appointed. The second enquiry was also closed by enquiry officer on 10/04/92. The prosecution brief and defence brief were submitted. Thereafter, the enquiry officer submitted the report both in respect of first charge-sheet as well as in respect of second charge-sheet. The enquiry report, in respect of first charge-sheet was submitted before the disciplinary authority vide Annexure R/2 and the enquiry report in respect of second charge-sheet was submitted vide Annexure R/3. A show-cause notice dated 05/01/94 (Annexure P/6) was issued by the disciplinary authority to the petitioner which was replied by the petitioner. Vide order dated 10/02/94 (Annexure P/27) holding the petitioner guilty of charges which were held proved by the enquiry officer, disciplinary authority imposed penalty of removal from service without it being a disqualification for future employment. Aggrieved by the order of penalty, the petitioner filed a departmental appeal on 14/06/94. The appeal of the petitioner was however, partly allowed. Though the finding of enquiry officer and that of the disciplinary authority with regard to proof of charges were not interfered with, the disciplinary authority interfered with the quantum of punishment and instead of removal from service, penalty of reduction in rank from the post of Branch Manager to the post of Clerk-cum-Cashier at the initial stage of pay was imposed. The appellate authority also ordered that the period of suspension and the period from 12/05/94, till the date of passing of the appellate order shall not be treated as period spent on duty and the petitioner will also not be entitled to any pay or allowances from 12/05/94 till the date of passing of the appellate order. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of penalty and the appellate order, the petitioner has filed this petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the legality and validity of the order passed by the appellate authority as also validity of the enquiry proceedings, orders of the disciplinary authority and enquiry report mainly on the following submission--

i. First enquiry initiated by the enquiry officer on 02/11/87--It is contended that the charges were vague. She submits that the authorities did not give complete details as to how and in what manner, the petitioner violated the rules and norms, relating to grant of loan and the charges levelled against the petitioner, four in number, were highly vague and unspecific and therefore, the petitioner did not know, how to specifically reply these charges. The documents which were relied upon by the prosecution were not supplied to the petitioner along with the charge-sheet but they were only given at the subsequent stages of the proceedings. It is further submitted that during the course of enquiry, new documents were also presented without any appropriate notice and knowledge and the petitioner, therefore, was seriously prejudiced in his defence to effectively impeach the credibility and relevancy of the new documents which were made basis to substantiate charges against the petitioner. The enquiry officer was biased. He did not grant proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and conducted enquiry in the manner that the petitioner could not get due and proper opportunity to effectively defend himself. The manner in which the petitioner was not supplied the documents or supplied at later stage, new documents allowed to be presented at different stages of enquiry, proves bias of enquiry officer. It is also submitted that the petitioner was not afforded due opportunity to engage a defence assistant which also resulted in serious prejudice. It is next contended that the punishment of reduction to a lower rank of Clerk apart from being grossly disproportionate, is impermissible under the law as the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Branch Manager and therefore, a penalty of reduction to a post below the rank of Branch Manager could not be imposed. It is also submitted that the petitioner has been subjected to multiple penalties in as much as he has not only been reverted to a lower post but his pay scale is fixed at the stage of minimum of the pay scale and period of suspension has been treated as not spent on duty and salary not paid.

Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Nyadar Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , P.V. Srinivasa Sastry and others Vs. Comptroller and Auditor General and others, Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chhattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 , State Bank of India and Others Vs. Samarendra Kishore Endow and Another, , State of U.P. and Others Vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha, , Kashinath Dikshita Vs. Union of India (UOI)and Others, , Anil Gilurker Vs. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetria Gramin Bank and Another, , Shivalinga Swamy v. State of Karnataka, (1987) 1 SLR 422 and Narendra Khembhai Corporation Ltd. v. National Textile Corporation Ltd., (1989) 6 SLR 211.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/Bank denied all the allegations of irregularity in departmental enquiry or violation of principles of natural justice. He submitted that the charges are not vague. He further submits that the object and purpose of charge is to make known the delinquent employee as to what is the substantial allegation against him. He further submitted that the charge-sheet is not supposed to be encyclopedia of the complete material, oral and documentary evidence by which the charges are sought to be proved. It is contended that each of the charges are specific, giving sufficient details so that the petitioner could fully understand the charge against him. He submitted that the petitioner was supplied relevant documents which were provided by the prosecution. The documents which were relied upon during the course of the enquiry were also duly supplied to the petitioner and he had full opportunity to submit evidence in defence. It is further submitted that the petitioner was not only allowed to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses but he was allowed to lead oral and documentary evidence in defence. The petitioner, though, submitted some documents, despite repeated opportunities, he did not appear in the enquiry on the date fixed and therefore, the enquiry officer was left with no option but to conclude the enquiry as the enquiry could not be allowed to remain pending indefinitely. He further submitted that the petitioner was even allowed to engage defence assistant but he insisted to engage a lawyer which was rightly not allowed. Lastly, it is submitted that the enquiry officer, after taking into consideration the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, prepared report which was made a basis to impose penalty of removal from service by the appellate authority. The appeal of the petitioner was duly considered and examined by the appellate authority and on the finding of guilt recorded by the enquiry officer, a limited view was taken and instead of extreme penalty of removal from service, penalty was altered to one of reversion to a post thereby saving petitioner''s job and source of livelihood. He submits that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief on technical grounds unless the petitioner is able to clearly make out a case of prejudice. He further submits that it was permissible under the law to lead documentary evidence outside the list of documents supplied in support of the charge-sheet and the only requirement was that those documents should be disclosed and supplied to the petitioner, this, infact, was done in the two enquiries. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and Others Vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey, , Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , State of Punjab and Another Vs. Hari Singh, .

In relation to the second enquiry initiated on 30/05/89--

With respect to the second enquiry, it has been submitted that the charges were vague. As was the case in the first charge-sheet, there were no specific details of charges which the petitioner could fully understand and reply to the same. This seriously prejudiced the petitioner in his defence. He further submits that the documents which were relied upon by the prosecution were not supplied along with the charge-sheet. The next contention is that in the second enquiry, the enquiry officer allowed new documents to be produced by the prosecution without any prior notice to the petitioner and thus, the petitioner could not effectively defend the charges by submitting oral and documentary evidence to impeach credibility of the prosecution case. The petitioner was allowed to partly cross-examine the witness Bukhau whereas he was not given opportunity to cross-examine the other two witnesses namely Sunderlal and Budhram. Permission to engage defence counsel was refused and he was not allowed to engage lawyer which he needed to defend all the charges levelled against him. It is next contended that the petitioner was not allowed to lead his defence witness, which seriously prejudiced him against defence. The other common grounds raised to assail correctness and validity of second enquiry also are that the petitioner could not be down graded to a lower post which he never held. The punishment is shockingly disproportionate apart from it being a case of multiple penalty in nature.

In respect of the second enquiry, the challenge is also on the ground of bias of the enquiry officer.

There is a peculiar feature of the present case. While the petitioner was working as Branch Manager, two charge-sheets were issued to him and two enquiries on the basis of two different charge-sheets dated 02/11/86 and 30/05/89 were held almost parellaly against the petitioner. In the two enquiries, two different enquiry reports were submitted and the disciplinary authority, gave a common show-cause notice to the petitioner in respect of all seven charges, four charges in the first charge-sheet dated 02/11/87 and three charges in the second charge-sheet dated 30/05/89. A common order of penalty of removal from service was passed in respect of both the enquiries by the disciplinary authority by taking into consideration the charges of both enquiries and the appellate authority also passed common order.

The petitioner has raised number of grounds to challenge the two enquiries and at the same time, has raised common grounds assailing the correctness and validity of order of penalty and order passed by the appellate authority which shall be dealt with at appropriate stages.

First charge-sheet dated 02/11/87--

The charges of this charge-sheet have been alleged to be highly vague, unspecific and lacking in particular details. A perusal of charge-sheet dated 02/11/87 (Annexure P/4) shows that as many as four charges were levelled against the petitioner. The first charge states that during his posting, the petitioner exceeded his territorial jurisdiction and discretion in the matter of grant of loan and its distribution and rules, regulations and guidelines of the Bank and the Government violated. It has also been alleged that the petitioner did not take follow up action, which resulted in misuse of loan. In this regard, loan cases of Kalmugada, Vandan Singh, Vinod Kumar Kanwar, Sahes Kumar, Sikhan Uranw, Santosh Ram and Vivekaram have been specified. Though, to the extent, there is an allegation that the petitioner acted beyond his territorial jurisdiction to grant loan to persons named in the charges, which rule/guidelines of the bank or Government were violated have not been specifically enumerated. Similarly, it has been vaguely recorded that the petitioner did not take up proper follow up action. However, in respect of which particular amount and in what manner, follow up action were not taken by the petitioner has no where been examined. Therefore, first charge is partly vague, partly specific that the petitioner has exceeded territorial jurisdiction in granting loan to persons specifically named therein.

The second charge alleges that the petitioner misused his power, violated bank rules and instructions while issuing material delivery order to the borrowers. It has been alleged that in respect of more than one firms, delivery orders were directly given. Further allegation is that in some cases of borrowers, despite coming to know about exploitation of those borrowers in the hands of businessmen, the petitioner did not take any steps and thus, extended benefit to those businessmen. It has also been alleged that material delivery orders were given to those businessmen who were not engaged in trade and business of those particular items. It is further alleged that the petitioner pressurized the beneficiaries which indicates that the petitioner was inclined to receive undue benefit and advantage. To say the least, this charge is blissfully vague and contains no material whatsoever. The allegations are so vague that it is not possible for anyone to reply to these charges. Mere mention of the beneficiaries was not sufficient. The disciplinary authority was required to make specific allegations as to which firms were given direct delivery orders, in which cases, despite knowledge of exploitation of beneficiaries, action was not taken, how businessmen were benefited, which of the suppliers were not engaged in trade of particular item and how and in what manner, the petitioner obtained undue benefit for himself.

The third charge is that the petitioner withdrew an amount of Rs. 30/- from the account of Smt. Vidya Devi Shukla on 19/01/87 without her signature which raises doubt that the petitioner utilized the said account. Records of case show that Smt. Vidya Devi Shukla was the mother of the petitioner. Therefore, the only charge specifically levelled against the petitioner was that he allowed withdrawal of Rs. 30/- from the account of his mother without her signature. But again, what was the material and in which cases, the petitioner obtained undue benefit and payment from the borrowers or businessmen and got it deposited in that account, has not at all been mentioned.

As far as the fourth charge-sheet is concerned, it mentions that the petitioner is a habitual late comer in the office and has not discharged his duties on various instances like renewal of documents, balance of loan/documents, disposal of audit objections, failure to regularly dispatch/inform to the head office, keeping various register incomplete and other irregularities. The entire charge is vague without giving any detail whatsoever that on which date, the petitioner came late in the office, which particular cases of renewal or balance of loan and sanction were not complete in time, when and in what manner, audit objections were not disposed off, which reports were sent or not sent to the head office and which register and how it has not been kept complete has nowhere been mentioned.

It would thus be revealed that charge Nos. 1 and 3 were partly specific and partly vague whereas charge Nos. 2 and 4 were completely vague. In the case of Surath Chandra Chakrabarty Vs. State of West Bengal, , it has been held--

"5......The grounds on which it is propose to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This Rule embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him."

In subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gyan Chand (supra), it was held--

"33. In a case where the charge-sheet is accompanied with the statement of facts and the allegation may not be specific in charge-sheet but may be crystal clear from the statement of charges, in such a situation as both constitute the same document, it may not be held that as the charge was not stood vitiated. Thus, where a delinquent is served a charge-sheet without giving specific and definite charge and no statement of allegation is served along with the charge-sheet, the enquiry stands vitiates having been conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice."

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

In view of the above, law can be summarized that an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of changes. No enquiry can be sustained on vague charges."

Pleadings of the parties further show that when charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner, i.e. on 17/11/87 along with charge-sheet, neither list of witnesses nor list of documents were supplied. Even the documents relied upon by the prosecution were not supplied. Given the vagueness of the charges noted hereinabove, the petitioner was virtually unaware of the basis of allegations against him. It is also not disputed between the parties and it has been clearly admitted by the respondents that list of documents and witnesses was supplied to the petitioner during the course of enquiry only on 15/04/88 that too when the petitioner raised serious objection on 04/04/88 that without list of documents and witnesses, he will be unable to participate in the proceedings.

At this stage, it is relevant to note that on 12/03/88, the petitioner was given an opportunity to engage a defence assistant. The order dated 04/04/88 does not contain any decision of the enquiry officer nor does it show that on that day, the petitioner submitted the name of any particular defence assistant. That was probably for the reason that the petitioner was insisting on supply of documents and list of witnesses and refused to participate further unless such list is supplied to him. On 15/04/88, the list of documents and witnesses was supplied to the petitioner and at that time, the petitioner sought permission to engage a lawyer. This request of the petitioner was turned down. On that day or thereafter, the petitioner did not furnish the name of any defence assistant on his behalf. In the absence of there being any provisions under the law giving any right to engage a lawyer in departmental proceedings, request of the petitioner to engage a lawyer was rightly rejected, more so when the department''s case was being presented by an officer of the department only and not by a lawyer. The petitioner, therefore, cannot raise any grievance on this ground that he was not allowed to engage a defence assistant.

On 15/4/88, as the proceedings indicate, the petitioner raised a valid grievance that the relevancy of the documents and witnesses has not been indicated which objection was arbitrarily rejected. As has already been noted hereinabove, the charge''s were blissfully vague and the list of documents and witnesses were supplied to the petitioner as late as on 15/04/88 and amongst others, list of documents stated all the loan cases of the named persons. Had the charges been indicated in clear and specific statement of allegations of charges, it would have been possible for the petitioner to ask for inspection of those records of disbursal of loan to various beneficiaries whose names were stated in the list. However, in the absence of any such details in the charge-sheet, it was not possible for the petitioner or for any other person of ordinary prudence and intelligence to even speculate as to what are specific allegations and which are documents on the basis of which those allegations are sought to be substantiated. The beneficiaries, in whose names loans were advanced were not cited as witness but only records of loan cases were proposed as documents of the prosecution. Therefore, in this background, the petitioner''s prayer to clarify which documents were sought to be used against him as also purpose of examination of particular witness was quite reasonable. Thus, at this stage also, the irregularities of the departmental proceedings prejudiced the petitioner as much as it could.

On 30/04/88, ignoring petitioner''s objection regarding specific charges for which the documents and witnesses were proposed to be used against him, the presenting officer produced documents (Annexure P/1 and P/2) which were not enlisted in the list of witnesses. On 13/06/88, another document (Annexure P/3) was produced in the departmental proceedings, which was again objected to by the petitioner stating that none of these documents were proposed in the list of documents. These objections of the petitioner were not given proper heed to. The presenting officer kept on taking out documents one after the other being exhibited as Annexure P/4, P/5, P/6 and P/7 which documents were neither disclosed in the list of documents nor supplied to the petitioner earlier.

Curiously enough, on 06/07/88, the petitioner was asked to lead his defence evidence when the prosecution had not completed its case with regard to the charges to which the petitioner stated that the prosecution should first complete its own presentation. On that day, the records relating to delivery order book were presented during enquiry and certain specific entries therein were sought to be used against the petitioner. In the list of documents, delivery order book was stated as one of the records to be used against the petitioner, but in the absence of specific allegation, it was not possible for the petitioner to anticipate as to how and which of the entries of the delivery order book would be used against him. With reference to different entries made therein, the prosecution sought to build case against the petitioner that delivery orders were given to different parties and that too, many orders were given to different agencies for supply of items for which loan was sanctioned. During the enquiry, all of a sudden, copies of prerecorded statements/complaints and various letters issued to the petitioner from the head office from time to time were produced for the first time to utter surprise and shock and were marked as Annexure- P/17, P/18, P/19, P/20, P/21 and P/22. The prosecution sought to build up a case of irregularities in the matter of grant of loan producing for the first time and the delivery orders, complaints made against the petitioner by the beneficiaries. It is difficult to comprehend as to how a delinquent employee would be able to confront these documents of incriminating nature which, all of a sudden, had emerged as a phoenix from des at the instance of prosecution during the course of enquiry. It is crystal clear the petitioner was seriously prejudiced. The manner in which the departmental enquiry was held, from its very inception, charges were not specific, list of documents and witnesses were disclosed belatedly during the course of enquiry and by production of many more documents which were never disclosed to the petitioner at earlier point of time.

The contents of proceedings dated 20/07/88 also show that on that day, the prosecution presented as documentary evidence, various entries in the savings account of Smt. Vidya Devi Shukla. It is relevant to note that the third charge stated that the entries in the savings account No. 3/554 were highly doubtful and the only specific allegation was that on 19/01/87, an amount of Rs. 30/- was withdrawn without the signature of the account holder. The records disclosed that Smt. Vidya Devi Shukla was the mother of the petitioner and she has not raised any complaint against the withdrawal. Therefore, if Rs. 30/- was withdrawn from the account, that perhaps could make out an allegation against the petitioner that he withdrew an amount of Rs. 30/- from the account of his mother without her signature. However, the third charge nowhere whispered with reference to other entries that the other entries related to deposits of certain amounts in the account of petitioner''s mother, which were received by the petitioner by way of commission either from the suppliers or from the beneficiaries to whom, loan were advanced. However, during the proceedings, each entry was separately exhibited and with reference to each entry, a case was built up that commission was received by the petitioner in respect of each delivery orders which was deposited in the accounts by the petitioner. The pre-recorded statements of Jairam Manjhi, Lalit Kumar and Sahes Kumar, out of which Jairam Manjhi and Lalit Kumar were sited as prosecution witnesses were used against the petitioner during the enquiry but these documents were earlier not supplied to the petitioner. Sahes Kumar was brother of Lalit Kumar. Endorsements made in various entries in Account No. S.B.3/554 of Smt. Vidya Devi were used, which were nowhere referred in the statement of allegations against the petitioner so as to disclose as to how and in what manner, those entries were proposed to be used against the petitioner. Various endorsements were separately exhibited, copies of which were supplied to the petitioner on that day itself. Thus, it would be seen that amongst documents. (Annexure P/1 to P/45), except few documents, most of the documents were those which were not shown to the petitioner and relevancy of those documents was nowhere referred to in the charge-sheet and therefore, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the petitioner was seriously prejudiced. Statements of witnesses which were recorded earlier were also used as prosecution documents, details of which were never disclosed to the petitioner, much less copies of those documents were supplied to the petitioner well in advance. The petitioner was examined by the presenting officer on 23/09/88. During the course of examination of the petitioner, specific questions with regard to petitioner being habitual late comer in the office and failing to complete various works was for the first time posed to the petitioner. These facts were nowhere stated in the charge-sheet but were for the first time made specific during the course of enquiry by putting questions to the petitioner.

On 02/11/88, one Vivek Kumar S/o. Budram was presented as prosecution witness who was not named in the list of witnesses. It was followed by examination of Kalmu Gada and Hariram who were not stated as prosecution witnesses. The names of these witnesses find place only to show that the loan records concerning these benefits were sought to be used as documentary evidence against the petitioner but neither Vivek Kumar nor Kalmu Gada nor Hariram were enlisted in the list of witnesses as the proposed witnesses of the prosecution. The prosecution, thereafter, examined Lalit Kumar, Pradeep Kumar Mishra.

On 23/01/89, the prosecution examined Shri J.R. Manjhi as prosecution witness. Thereafter, on 22/02/89, the petitioner was present but the prosecution witnesses were not present but without recording evidence of those prosecution witnesses, the petitioner was given last opportunity of 15 days to submit witness of defence documents and witnesses. On 24/10/89, the petitioner was not present but the list of witnesses and documents sought to be relied upon by the petitioner was sent by Registered Post which was received by the enquiry officer on 16/10/89. The next date of hearing was fixed on 16/10/89 and thereafter, 21/11/89. On 19/12/89, recording absence of the petitioner, enquiry was closed.

The petitioner had moved an application for setting aside ex parte proceedings vide his application dated 08/03/90 (Annexure P/9), wherein the petitioner stated that petitioner''s wife was sick and due to unavoidable circumstances, the petitioner had sent a letter on 18/11/89. He further stated that for this reason, the order closing his defence needs to be recalled and required to give him opportunity to lead his defence. In the enquiry report (Annexure R/2) which relates to charge-sheet dated 02/11/87, the enquiry officer has stated that he did not receive another letter of the petitioner and therefore, closed the case, as the petitioner was granted enough opportunities. This approach of the enquiry officer, to say the least, was in utter prejudice to one of the valuable rights of the petitioner to lead defence in rebuttal of charges. Various order sheets show that barring few occasions, the petitioner had been regularly participating in the departmental enquiry and he had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses including those who were cited and examined as prosecution witnesses all of a sudden, without being enlisted in the list of witnesses. It is also relevant to note that after an opportunity to lead defence witness was afforded to the petitioner by the enquiry officer on 22/02/89, the petitioner had sent by Registered Post, documents as also the list of witnesses which were duly received and so recorded in proceedings dated 24/10/89. Therefore, it could not be inferred that the petitioner had started avoiding proceedings. This was more so because the petitioner had already submitted defence documents and list of witnesses and there was no reason for him to give up this opportunity. The order sheet dated 23/11/89 shows that on 21/11/89, the enquiry officer himself was not present and the case was taken up on 23/11/89 only. Merely because the petitioner had not appeared before the enquiry officer on 18/11/89, the enquiry officer was not justified in jumping to the conclusion that the petitioner deliberately did not appear on 18/11/89 to avoid proceedings. No attempt was made to verify the statement of the petitioner for non-appearance i.e. illness of his wife. It was not the case that the petitioner was granted repeated opportunities to lead evidence and he failed. Thus, the petitioner''s most valuable right to lead defence in the departmental enquiry was seriously prejudiced. In the case of State of U.P. and Others Vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha, , it was held in Para 30--

"30.....When a departmental inquiry is conducted against a delinquent it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The inquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a close mind. The inquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that the delinquent is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service."

From the aforesaid considerations, it would appear that right from the issuance of charge-sheet till closing of the case till 19/12/89, the enquiry proceedings were not only highly irregular but in utter violation of principles of natural justice. Charge Nos. 1 and 3 were partly vague whereas charge Nos. 2 and 4 were completely vague. The prosecution did not supply the list of witnesses and documents along with the charge-sheet but were supplied belatedly during the course of enquiry and the petitioner had no opportunity to defend due to late supply of those documents. Large number of documents were produced during the course of enquiry. Witnesses, who were not enlisted, were examined by the prosecution and the petitioner was not allowed to lead defence witnesses. Therefore, the entire enquiry against the petitioner was vitiated.

Thus, insofar as enquiry under charge-sheet dated 02/11/87 is concerned, it was completely vitiated.

Second charge-sheet dated 30/05/89--

In respect of this charge-sheet also, one of the foremost objection taken by the petitioner is that the charges, as contained in this charge-sheet are also vague, unspecific and lacking in particular details.

Charge-sheet dated 30/05/89 contained as many as three charges against the petitioner. Charge No. 1 alleges that the petitioner distributed loan under Minor Irrigation Scheme for construction of tube-well without physical verification and contrary to the rules and guidelines of the bank which resulted in misuse of loan and despite distribution of entire loan amount, tube-well was not installed. This allegation has been made in respect of loan cases of three beneficiaries, namely Assiram, Dhansai and Chatur Singh. The charge, as it stands, is quite vague. What kind of financial verification was required under the rules and regulation has not been stated in the charge-sheet. Moreover, which rules and regulations were violated has also not been stated. It is not the allegation that the loans were not disbursed nor is it the allegation that the loans were disbursed to fictitious persons. The delinquent employee/petitioner, obviously had no idea as to precisely what allegation has been levelled against him. In his reply dated 09/08/89, the petitioner, at the very first instance petitioner raised an objection that the charge is vague. The petitioner referred to charge No. 1 and stated that the charge is highly vague. During the course of enquiry, however, prosecution came out with specification and particulars of charge No. 1 only on 18/12/89. Therefore, it has to be held that first charge of charge-sheet dated 30/05/89 was highly vague.

The second charge alleges that the petitioner sanctioned loan beyond his powers in as many as four cases, details of which have been given in the charge. In this particular charge-sheet, the specific number of loan, amount sanctioned and date of sanction has been clearly mentioned. The reply to this charge was only to the extent that the charge is vague and it has not been stated as to how the petitioner exceeded his jurisdiction. The petitioner asked the authorities as to what are the discretionary powers. However, on this ground, second charge cannot be held to be vague. The charge was quite clear that the petitioner sanctioned loan beyond his discretionary powers. The petitioner, being an officer of the bank, had full knowledge as to what is his jurisdiction and it was for the petitioner to satisfy the authority that he disbursed loan within the limits of pecuniary jurisdiction only. Therefore, this charge cannot be held to be vague.

As far as charge No. 3 is concerned, therein, it has been alleged that the petitioner sanctioned supplementary loans to the borrowers whereas these loan cases were seriously irregular and therefore, they were not entitled to supplementary financial assistance. It has also been stated that this was done by the petitioner to obtain undue advantage. To make it specific, the names of the borrowers namely Ghanshyam Singh, Prapdhoba, Bhukhau, Ghasiya Prasad, Sadhram, Sunder, Manbodh and Budhman Das have been mentioned. This charge cannot be said to be vague. Clear allegation against the petitioner was that the stated loan cases were irregular, therefore, financial assistance could not be provided. The petitioner having sanctioned loan and he being in possession of the loan cases should have replied to each cases that those cases were not irregular or even if there were irregularities, he had discretion to provide supplementary financial assistance. The petitioner only avoided to reply this charge-sheet by alleging that the charge is not clear. The petitioner was given specific names of the borrowers. The documents relating to those loan cases were also cited as prosecution documents along with circular and copies of complaints along with deposit slips.

Therefore, the conclusion is that the second charge-sheet dated 30/05/89, the first charge was vague whereas other two charges cannot be held to be vague.

List of documents and witnesses, in support of the second charge-sheet was however supplied to the petitioner for the first time on 18/12/89 as is clear from the proceedings of that date. Moreover, the proceedings on 18/12/89 further show that the petitioner was supplied copy of all prosecution documents. Departmental enquiry was thereafter adjourned to 12/01/90. On that day, the petitioner sought permission to engage a lawyer but that permission was not granted on the reasoning that the presenting officer is also not a lawyer and the petitioner, if wants, may engage a defence assistant of the department. The enquiry officer recorded that the request of the petitioner was forwarded to the disciplinary authority. Thereafter, the petitioner did not appear on subsequent dates of proceedings on 09/02/90 and 27/03/90. On 18/04/90, one of the prosecution witnesses, Bhukhau was produced and he was partly cross-examined by the petitioner. The next date was fixed on 15/05/90. The order sheet, however, records the next date of hearing as 20/07/90 which was adjourned due to absence of witnesses. On 03/08/90, the proceedings were adjourned due to it being declared holiday. On 30/08/90, the petitioner did not appear. A request for adjournment was made on the ground of illness. Therefore, even though the prosecution witnesses, Budhman Das, Sunder and Bhukhau was present, hearing was adjourned to 10/09/90 but order sheet records that notice was issued to the petitioner. On 10/09/90, it was recorded that the petitioner neither appeared nor has sent any information.

On 10/09/90, two witnesses namely Sunderlal and Budhman Das were examined. On the next date of hearing i.e. 6n 11/10/90, the petitioner submitted a letter that he could not appear on 10/09/90 for want of service of notice of date of hearing. On this objection of the petitioner, the enquiry officer stated that the matter shall be decided after obtaining necessary information and the petitioner would be informed. However, further order sheets show that the enquiry officer did not decide this issue and till the conclusion of enquiry, the left over witness Bhukhau who was partly examined and other two witnesses Budhman Das and Sunder were not called for examination, as requested by the petitioner. It would thus be clear that insofar as charge No. 3 is concerned, out of three prosecution witnesses namely Budhman Das, Sunder and Bhukhau, the petitioner was not allowed full cross-examination of Bhukhau whereas he was not allowed to cross-examine provided other two prosecution witnesses i.e. Sunder and Budhman Das. Thus, petitioner''s right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses was seriously prejudiced. It is also relevant to note that thereafter, the petitioner did participate in the enquiry as the petitioner had examined another witness of prosecution namely Shri L.N. Singh, the then Branch Manager.

Curiously enough, on 22/10/91, prosecution witness L.N. Singh was not present but the enquiry officer insisted the petitioner to lead his defence. The petitioner resisted by submitting that he is entitled to submit list of witnesses and documents upon completion of examination of prosecution witnesses. It appears that thereafter, there was a long examination and cross-examination of those witnesses and the enquiry proceedings were fixed on various dates and certain disputes also cropped up during the course of enquiry. The subsequent order sheets show that the petitioner was asked to lead his defence but the petitioner insisted that he be allowed to complete the cross-examination of L.N. Singh which could not be completed due to the dispute which arose during the enquiry and the enquiry had to be adjourned. The enquiry officer, however, recorded that the petitioner is not cooperating with the enquiry and making false allegations and therefore, the enquiry was closed on 10/04/92.

It would, thus, appear that insofar as second charge-sheet is concerned, while charge No. 1 has been found to be extremely vague, the petitioner was not given full opportunity to cross-examine Bhukhau and L.N. Singh and two witnesses namely Budhman Das and Sunder were examined in the absence of the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner was not allowed to lead his defence also. Thus, for all these reasons, the second enquiry was equally vitiated. The second enquiry also suffered from arbitrariness because even with regard to engagement of a defence counsel, decision was kept pending stating that instruction were sought from the disciplinary authority. At a later stage of enquiry, when one of the witnesses L.N. Singh was examined, the petitioner was given an opportunity to engage a defence assistant. Thus, on this aspect, the enquiry cannot be said to be just and fair.

There are certain common grounds raised by the petitioner regarding two enquiries which relate to bias of enquiry officer, imposition of penalty of reduction of rank to a post lower than that on which, he was initially appointed, quantum of punishment. However, in view of aforesaid considerations, for reasons assigned, this Court has found that the enquiry in both the cases is vitiated being highly irregular, violative of principles of natural justice and in utter prejudice to petitioner''s right to effectively defend charges, vagueness of the charges, it is not necessary to examine further aspects of the matter.

The petitioner has been subjected to penalty of reduction in rank by the impugned order dated 21/04/95. It is relevant to mention that the disciplinary authority had removed the petitioner from service vide order dated 12/05/94 and the appellate authority reduced the penalty from removal to reduction in rank, meaning thereby that though petitioner''s job has been saved, he was downgraded to the post of Clerk in the Bank.

Ordinarily, when it is found that the departmental enquiry is vitiated due to procedural defects and violation of principles of natural justice, the matter is remanded to the disciplinary authority to afford proper opportunity and pass orders. The facts of the present case are, however, peculiar in nature. The petitioner was issued charge-sheet in the year 1987 and 1989 and the enquiry was concluded in the year 1994 and the appellate order was passed in the year 1995. The writ petition was filed in the year 1996. Remand of the case, at this stage, i.e. after 27 years of the date of initiation of departmental enquiry would not serve cause of justice. On the contrary, the petitioner would be subjected to de novo enquiry after having already suffered an enquiry and litigation in the last 27 years. At the same time, for management also, it would be an uphill task to collect relevant records of the loan cases almost 30 years back and calling witnesses after almost three decades and in all likelihood, most of the witnesses whether it be of the prosecution or proposed by defence, may not be available due to long lapse of time.

In the case of G. Vallikumari Vs. Andhra Education Society and Others, , in almost similar circumstances, the Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction not to remand the case for enquiry afresh on following considerations-

"21. Since the order of punishment passed by the Chairman of the Managing Committee is vitiated due to violation of the statutory rules and the principles of natural justice, we may have remitted the matter to the Tribunal with a direction to consider whether or not the penalty of removal from service imposed upon the appellant was disproportionate to the misconduct found against her or the action taken by the management was wholly arbitrary or unjust but keeping in view the fact that the appellant was removed from service more than 13 years ago, we do not consider it proper to adopt that course.

In Superintendent (Tech. I) Central Excise, I.D.D. Jabalpur and Others Vs. Pratap Rai, , this Court held that if an order passed by the disciplinary authority is annulled on a technical ground, the authority concerned is free to pass fresh order but, at the same time, the Court declined to give such liberty to the administration on the ground that a period of 15 years had elapsed since the framing of charge.

In Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya Vs. Commissioner of Police Delhi and Others, , a somewhat similar approach was adopted by this Court by recording the following observations: (SCC p.566, para 14)

"14. Thus, the present one is a case wherein we are satisfied that the punishment of removal from service imposed on the appellant is not only highly excessive and disproportionate but is also one which was not permissible to be imposed as per the Service Rules. Ordinarily we would have set aside the punishment and sent the matter back to the disciplinary authority for passing the order of punishment afresh in accordance with law and consistently with the principles laid down in the judgment. However, that would further lengthen the life of litigation. In view of the time already lost. we deem it proper to set aside the punishment of removal from service and instead direct the appellant to be reinstated in service subject to the condition that the period during which the appellant remained absent from duty and the period calculated up to the date on which the appellant reports back to duty pursuant to this judgment shall not be counted as a period spent on duty. The appellant shall not be entitled to any service benefits for this period. Looking at the nature of partial relief allowed hereby to the appellant, it is now not necessary to pass any order of punishment in the departmental proceedings in lieu of the punishment of removal from service which has been set aside. The appellant must report on duty within a period of six weeks from today to take benefit of this judgment."

(Emphasis supplied)

Exercising my discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, on aforesaid relevant considerations and keeping in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of G. Vallikumari Vs. Andhra Education Society and Others, , it would be proper in the interest of all to close the chapter. The impugned order of penalty and appellate order, both are quashed. The petitioner shall be deemed to be in service as Branch Manager without any interruption and all consequential benefits of notional pay fixation, seniority shall be granted to the petitioner. In the circumstances of the case, I am not inclined to grant the difference of pay of the post of Branch Manager and that of the Clerk-cum-Cashier. The petition is consequently partly allowed. No order as to costs.