AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Balasubrahmanyan, J.—The question that arises in this second appeal involves the interpretation and application of Section 20(1) of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966.
Appellant Temple sued the Respondent for declaration possession and mesne profits in regard to a place of land in Uppalam, in Pondicherry Territory. The suit was filed in 1956 in the Courts of First Instance at Pondicherry. The Court dismissed the suit on merits on 10th October l958 upholding he Defendant''s plea of adverse possession. While dismissing the suit the Court of First Instance expressly declared that the decree was not subject to appeal.
This last direction of the Court was in accordance with the law and procedure as it subsisted in Pondicherry at the time. According to a Law passed in 1838, laid down under articles 454 and 455 of the French Civil Code, any Court of First Instance hearing a suit involving immovable property valued at 1,500 francs or bearing a yearly income of less than 60 francs shall determine the suit in a summary manner as a Court of last resort. The implication is that no appeal would lie against the decree in any such suit. The suit filed by the Desamuthu Mariamman Temple in the Court of First Instance was admittedly a suit which was governed by this law. Indeed, the Appellant Temple itself subscribed in the plaint its consent to the finality of the decree even while instituting the suit. Nevertheless, when the decree went against it, the Temple preferred an appeal to a Court of appeal called the Tribunal Superior d''Appel. If this Court of appeal had gone into the maintainability of the Temple appeal then and there, there is no doubt it would have dismissed the appeal as incompetent, and, if it had done so, ucb a dismissal would have been quite in accordance with the law that prevailed then in Pondicherry. But the Tribunal Superior d''Appel did not do so, and kept the appeal pending in its file. During such tendency, Parliament passed. The Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966. The Act came into force on 5th September, 1968. Under that Act, the Tribunal Superior d''Appel became the District Court, Pondicherry, andititook over all the matters pending before the Tribunal Superior d''Appel, including the Appellant Temple''s appeal. The appeal then came up for hearing in the District Court, before the Additional District Judge, at the hearing, the Respondent questioned the competence of the appeal saying that no appeal lay. against the decree of the Court of First Instance in this case. The learned District Judge upheld this objection and dismissed the appeal in liming.
This second appeal arises out of that decision. Masilamani, the Appellants'' learned Counsel relies on Section 20(1) of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966 and contends that when the Tribunal Superior d''Appel shed its French personality and became the District Court, the District Court was bound u/s 20 of the Act to treat the Temple''s Appeal as a appeal filed before it and pending on its file and not as an appeal taken from the (French) Court of First Instance and pending before the Tribunal Superior d''Appel. So viewed, he said, there was no question of any finality attaching to the decree of the trial Court. In these events, he said, the District Court was not only competent, but was bound to entertain the Temple''s appeal and dispose of it on merits.
Mr. Stanislas for the Respondent submitted, on the other hand, that the incompetence of the appeal before the Tribunal Superior d''Appel was rot cured by Section 20(1) of the Act.
The question thus turns upon the true construction of this provision. As the marginal note indicates this section deals with pending proceedings. But before I go into the wording of the Sub-section, I think it appropriate to refer to the background of this legislation.
The Territory of Pondicherry was under French domination for two centuries and more. The laws in force in that territory were patterned on French laws, because of the French connection, The Court system in the territory was also peculiar as compared to the judicial system in the rest of India. The administration of civil justice, for instance, was done by hierarchy of Courts, at three levels, called Judge do Paix, Courts of Tribunals delete Instance and the Tribunal Superior d''Appel. They corresponded, roughly, to our District Munsifs Court, Subordinate Judges Court and District Court. Above all these Courts in Pondicherry was a final Court or appeal in Paris. After British India became independent, the former French possessions in India in Pondicherry Mahe and Yanam were assimilated into the Indian Union by political action. It was done in two stages. There was first a de facto merger. It was followed some years later by a de jure transfer of the French possessions to the Indian Union. Even after the merger and even after the extension and application to Pondicherry of the laws of the Indian Union, the Courts of Pondicherry, which had been patterned on the French Model continued to administer civil Justice according to the French Code of Civil Procedure. But this was plainly a anachronism Parliament resolved to put an end to this situation and reorganize the entire Court system un Pondicherry so as to being it in line with the system of judicial administration in the rest of India. The Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966 was the outcome of this policy
The Act brought about the reorganization of the Courts in this way. Under the earlier system, there were, as I earlier pointed out, these grades of civil Courts, in the according scale namely, (i) the Judge do Paix, (ii) the Tribunal declare Instance and (iii)the Tribunal Superior d''Appel. u/s 3 of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966, these Courts were to be, supplanted respectively by (i) the Court of the District Munsif, (ii) the Court of the Subordinate Judge and (iii) the Court of the District Judge. Parliament, however, did not (SIC) that the old courts must be wiped out of existence, and the new Court must come into being, and start from scratch. On the contrary it declared u/s 6 that the existing French Courts shall themselves become the new Courts. Section 6 referred to this process, somewhat inappropriately, when it described the new Courts as succession of the old Courts whom they supplanted in the Act, Parliament made further detailed provision for the civil Courts in the new set-up, such for instance, as appointment of Judges (Section 4), situation of Courts (Section 5), Courts seals (Section 7), pecuniary jurisdiction of Courts (Section 8), jurisdiction in appeals (Section 9), duties of ministerial officers of Courts (Section (12),supervision of subordinate (Courts (Section 13), Court vacations (Section 17), and the like, As might be expected, at the time when this scheme of reorganization was in contemplation, there were pending proceedings in almost all the then existing Courts in Pondicherry State function under the old dispensation. It became necessary, therefore, the Parliament to make proper provision for the period of transi(SIC), and lay down how and in what manner the pending proceedings were to be dealt with and disposed of after the change over Parliament accordingly (SIC)acted Section 20, specifically providing for pending proceedings, Sub-section (1) of this section laid down as follows;
20 (1) Any proceedings of a civil nature pending in a court,-immediately before, the commencement of this Act shall on such commencement, be deemed to be transferred to the Court exercising jurisdictiction under this Act in which the proceedings would have lain if it had been instituted after such commencement, and the Court of which the proceedings is transferred shall proceed to try, hear and determine the matter as if it had been pending therein.
The question for consideration in this second appeal turns on a construction of Section 20(1) and its applicability to the present proceedings. Generally speaking, wherever a legislature brings about a change in the law, either substantial cr procedural, it has to reckon with legal proceedings of one-kind or another which even then would be pending under the old dispensation Of necessity, therefore, the Legislature will have to address itself to this phenomenon and take a decision as to what is to happen to those pending proceedings, while the law is being changed. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 contains a general provision'' as to the effect on pending proceedings of a change in the statute. Broadly stated, the principle laid down by this section is that pending proceedings will have to go on as if the law has not been, changed. But this is only a general rule of interpretation. And, in terms of that very section in the General Clauses Act, the rule of construction laid down as aforesaid, would apply only where the legislature does not express contrary intention in the amending enactment. The modern tendency in statute making is not to allow Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to have its way, but to include in the new enactment express provisions for pending proceedings every time there is a appeal or an-amendment or other change in the existing law. This is perhaps a correct way of providing for transitional problems, for the demands of remedial legislation and their impact on pending proceedings can by no means be uniform in every case, and may differ from statute to state.
To turn to the present case, when Parliament resolved, in 1966 to redesign the Court system in Pondicherry so as to bring it inline with the administration of justice in the rest of the country it could not very well ignore the good number of suits, appeals and other proceedings which were even then pending in that State in the various Courts functioning at different levels under the French Codes then in force. The introduction of a provision such as Section 2. (1) in the Act, itself is a clear indication that Parliament was not only alive to the situation, but had, thought fit to make special provision in that regard.
The task then is to construe Section 20(I) in the context in which that section and the Whole Act came to be enacted. One look at Section 20(1) would show that the legislative draftsman had employed the familiar drafting device of the statutory fiction to bringing out the intention of Parliament. A closer look will show that the Sub-section contains, not one, but two fictions. The first one says that any proceedings of a civil nature pending in a Court immediately before the commencement of the Act shall be deemed to be transferred to the corresponding Court under the new set-up in which the proceedings would have lain if that proceeding had been instituted after the commencement of the Act. The other fiction says that the Court to which under the new set-up. the pending proceedings shall be deemed to have been transferred shall there upon proceed to try, hear and determine the proceedings as fully and as effectively as if that proceeding had been pending in that very Court.
To understand the implication of this double fiction is not difficult, if we pay regard to the changes brought about by the Act. In the first place, the old Courts functioning under the French system ceased to exist on 5th September 1968. Secondly a wholly new set of civil Courts took their place on the very same day. Thirdly, the presiding officers of the old Courts automatically assumed the role of presiding officers of the new Courts. It is in the context of these new realities that Section 20(1) asks us to view the position of the pending proceedings as though they all stand transferred to the respective newly-established Courts. A transfer of judicial proceedings, as ordinarily understood pre-supposes the co-existence of both the transferor Court and the transferee Court, at least at the moment of transfer. Under the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, however, the old French Courts, were abolished or put an end to, and their places were taken by the District Munsif''s Court, the Subordinate Judge''s Court and the District Judge''s Court respectively. So, there can be no transfer as such intervolves of any pending proceedings. The marginal note to Section 6 of the Act described the Courts under the new set-up more or less as successors of the old French Courts. Succession is a difficult conception altogether from transfer. In the one case, the proceedings remains where it is, but a different Court takes seizen of the matter. In the other case, the proceeding changes hands from one Court to another. If the new Courts , were successor of the old French Court, then, the transfer of pending proceeding to the new Court can be regarded only as devolution of proceeding on the extinction of the old Courts. It is perhaps, due to the inadequacy of conventional legal terminology to satisfactorily describe the process which must have driven the Parliamentary draft man to employing the device of a fiction. The effect thereby intended is, however, clear. For, when pending proceedings were to be deemed to have been transferred to the newly established Courts, these proceeding will have to be dealt with thereafter only by the new Court. The Practical result of abolishing the order Courts is also that. The other statutory fiction in Section 20(1) is a little more involved, in language. But it si(SIC) pjaimy intended to regulate how and on what basis the new Courts are to give a disposal to the pending proceedings transferred to their files. Not only is the language a bit involved, but it also demands a feat of the reader''s imagination. What is more, the way the section requires the pending proceedings to be disposed of by the Courts is also alien and quite unknown to the French Courts in which they were pending before the Act was brought into force. The manner of disposal of pending proceedings laid down in Section 20 by the employment of the other fiction means of this fiction, the section directs that the proceeding which stand fictionally transferred to the new Courts established under the Act shall Be dealt with and disposed of by them, not as proceedings which were pending before the supercoeded French Courts, bat as though they ware proceedings pending before the newly established Courts. This fiction also undoubtedly requires a feat of the imagination. For, when the recognised Courts started functioning only as and from 5th September. 1968, there could be no question of any proceedings being regarded as having been already filed before the newly-constituted Courts and kept pending. In other words, under this part of Section 20(1), the newly established Courts start their career with arrears of pending cases. The further effect of this fiction is that the newly-established Courts should proceed to try, hear and determine the said proceedings in the same manner as they would have done had these proceedings been filed before them and were pending before them.
On this analysis of Section 20(1), I have no doubt whatever that the pending proceedings in this case have got to be proceeded with and disposed of only in accordance with the law which prevails under the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act subsequent to 5th September 1968. The section makes a clean break with the past even in regard to pending proceedings. In this sense, the provisions of Section 20(I) are diametrically opposed to the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
In the present case, the suit was for a declaration, injunction and for other relief''s concerning an item of immovable property. Hence, if such a suit had to be filed in Pondicherry after 5th September, 1968, it could only have been filed in the District Munsif''s Court. If so, then against the decree by the District Munsif, an appeal would certainly lie to the District Court. The mandate of Section 20(1) is that the District Court must proceed as though the appeal had been instituted before it from a Court Subordinate to it, and as though such an appeal was pending disposal before it, even though the appeal had been actually filed only before the Tribunal Superior d''Appel. On this basis, therefore the bar against appeal no longer exists. The District Court undoubtedly was under an obligation to proceed to try, hear and determine the appeal as if it had been pending before it.
Mr. Stanislas, learned Counsel for the Defendant, submitted that when the Plaintiffs filed the suit, they filed it in the Court of First Instance specifically committing themselves to a decision of that Court as one of last resort. The decree passed by the Court of First Instance dismissing the suit was also expressly made not appeal able. This decree was passed prior to the coming into force of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966. In these circumstances, according to learned Counsel, finality was attached to the decree of the Court of first instance, and no appeal lay to any appellate Court. Mr. Stanislas further submitted that Section 20 was in the nature of a transitional provision and could not be so construed as to confer aright on a suit or litigant which was not there before the commencement of the Act. He submitted that a right of appeal has to be conferred in express terms and cannot be implied. He went to the extent of saying that Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966 would have no relevancy at all in the present discussion. According to learned Counsel, the concern of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966 was only to declare what he described as the equivalency of the, Courts, that is to say, for resolving the question'' as to which French Court of old is equivalent to the new Courts established under the Act. Mr Stanislas further submitted that even assuming that the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966 created new Courts and conferred jurisdiction on them both original and appellate, that cannot help decide the question at issue in the present case. According to learned Counsel, the question is not whether the District Court, Pondicherry, as at present constituted, has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the District Munsif''s Court, but whether the Appellant''s appeal was competent, even after the coming into force of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966. According to learned Counsel, a Court''s jurisdiction is one thing, but the competency of an appeal before that Curtis quite another. Learned Counsel pointed out that even u/s 9(2) of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966, appeals from the decrees and orders of the District Munsif''s shall lie to the Court of the District Judge only when such appeals are allowed by the law. Learned Counsel submitted that the right of appeal from a decree in a suit is conferred only u/s 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure". It was submitted that the Code was extended to the territory of Pondicherry only with effect from 5th September, 1968 under the Pondicherry (Extension of Laws) Act, 1968 (Central Act XXVI of 1968. Learned Counsel pointed out that the appeal in the instant case was presented on 6th September, 1965 at a time when there was no right of appeal. It was conferred only under the CPC which was extended to Pondicherry only with effect from 5th September, 1968.
The arguments addressed by Mr. Stanislas seem quite impressive when considered in themselves, and without reference to Section 20 of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966. I quite agree that theoretically speaking, there is a difference between a Court''s jurisdiction and the competency of an appeal in that Court. Again, theoretically speaking, where an appeal does not lie and, in that sense, the decree of the trial Court is final, then the finality of that decree cannot be rendered unfinal merely because in a subsequently enacted statute a right of appeal is so conferred. Furthermore, again, in strict theory, when a right of appeal is conferred by a statute for the first time with effect from a given date, only appeals filed subsequent thereto can be regarded as competent. There are propositions of law, which when considered in isolation, are theoretically quite. sound For purposes of our present discussion, however, their validity has got to be tested in the context of the peculiar provisions of Section 20 of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966. I have earlier extracted verbatim Sub-section (1) of Section 20. On the purport of this provision, Sub-section (2) of the same section may throw further light. That Sub-section reads as under:
Any appeal from a decree or order passed by a court and not appealed against before the commencement of this Act shall lie to the Court exercising jurisdiction under this Act to which such appeal would have laid if it had been preferred after such commencement.
The provision deals with a case where a decree or order has been passed by a Court under the French System against which no appeal has been preferred prior to the commencement of the Act, namely.
5th September, 1968. In such a case it is provided that an appeal shall lie from that decree to a Court exercising appellate jurisdiction under the Act in the same way as an appeal would lie to that Court from a decree passed after the commencement of the Act. The marginal note to Section 20, as a whole, is pending proceedings. Strictly speaking, in a case where a decree had been passed and no appeal has been preferred against that decree, there are not proceedings pending. And yet Section 20 (2) provides that an appeal shall lie to the newly constituted appellate Court. In other words, Section 20(2) not only indicates which would be the appellate Court to which an appeal shall be filed, but it also confers a right of appeal against a decree which has not been appealed against before the commencement of the Act.
Sub-section (2) of Section 20 obviously does not apply to the instant case because an appeal had been actually preferred by the Appellant as early as on 6th September, 1965. The appropriate provision to apply therefore, is Sub-section(l) of Section 20 which I have earlier extracted. All that Sub-section (1) requires for its applicability is that the proceedings must be pending in that Court immediately before the commencement of the Act. The section does not say and it does not care whether the pending proceeding is a valid proceeding pending before a Court at the time of the commencement of the Act, then according to Sub-section (1) of Section 20, that proceeding shall stand transferred to the newly-constituted Court of the same statute and then be dealt with by that Court as if that proceeding had been filed in that Court and is pending before it as on the date of the Commencement of the Act.
It is true that the appeal in this case was filed on 6th September, 1965 at a time when Section 93 of the CPC had not been extended to Pondicherry. In that sense, the appeal may be incompetent. But that does not alter the fact that the appeal was pending in that Court on the date when the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act came into force, namely, 5th September, 1968 Even an incompetent appeal, if it is retained on file is a pending proceeding and as a pending proceeding, it is covered by Section 20(1) of the Act. Indeed, even under the term of Article 455 of the French CPC Code, an incompetent appeal must be held to be pending so long as the Court has not held it to be incompetent and dismissed it on that ground. Hence, the moment the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966 came into force, there was an automatic transfer of that incompetent appeal to the file of the District Court, but virtue of Section 20(1) even though it was incompetent. The position, however, changed the moment the pending appeal got transferred. Although the appeal might have been incompetent under the French Law before Section 20(1) of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Aet, 1966 came in to force, the incompetence did not survive once the Act came into force After Section 20(1) came into effect, in order to see whether the pending appeal was or was not competent, one had to look, not to the French Law, but to the law which would apply to it if the appeal had been instituted after the commencement of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1969 Mark the word:
it shall be deemed to be transferred to the Court exercising jurisdiction under this Act in which the proceedings would have lain, if it had been instituted after such commencement.
It has already been seen, and Mr. Stanislas himself has emphasized the circumstances, that the CPC was to force in Pondicherry from 6th September, 1965 onwards, so that on 5th September 1968, when the pending appeal stood transferred to the District Court u/s 20(1) of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966, that Court had to deal with the appeal as if it had been validly filed before it u/s 95 of the CPC Code, and been kept pending. It follows that the District Court had thereafter to proceed to try and determine the matter as though the appeal had been validly prescribed before it and had been pending before it.
Factually speaking, the pending appeal was, no doubt, an appeal pending from a decree passed by the Judge Paix. Never be held to be an appeal from a decree passed by a District Munsif''s Court. This is because Section 21 of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966 inter alia enacted that the reference in any in law force in the Union Territory to a Judge de Paix shall be construed as a reference to the Court of the District Munsif. u/s 20(2) of the Act. a decree of a District Munsif is appeasable to the District Court if that appeal had been instituted after the commencement of the Act. Likewise, u/s 2C (1) of the Act any appeal pending in a Tribunal Superior d''Appel must be regarded as a pending appeal taken from a decree passed by the District Munsif''s Court after the commencement of the Act. So treated, the fact that the appeal was incompetent prior to the commencement of, the Act is not a matter of any moment. Section 20(1) only requires answer for three things; (i) Is the proceeding pending (ii) Which Court will have to take it one file? (iii) How that Court will have to give a disposal to it? From these three points of view, it is quite clear that the appeal in the present case must be dealt with by the District Court as an pending on its file having been brought from a decree passed by the District Munsif''s Court. Consider the Problem every way, the conclusion is inescapable that the appeal, in the present case, has got to be dealt with as quite competent.
Mr. Stanislas referred me to Section 24 of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966, as leading to the opposite conclusion. This section deals with repeals and sayings. Sub-section (1) of this section declares that as from the commencement of the Act, any law in force in the Union Territory of Pondicherry to the extent that it makes provisions for matters covered by the Act shall stand repealed. Nothing turns on this Sub-section. But Sub-section (2) was particularly relied on by learned Counsel. This Sub-section reads as follows:
Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions, the constitution and organization of Courts under this Act shall not prejudicially effect the continued operation of any notice served, injunction issued, direction made or proceedings taken before the Commencement of this Act by any Court under the powers conferred upon it by any law for the time being in force, Accordingly to learned Counsel, Section 24(2) has the effect of preserving the finality of the decree passed by the Juga de Paix in the case of a small claim, and it also preserves the old French Law under which the Court of first instance was also the Court of last resort.
I do not agree with this contention. For purposes of the present case, the effect of Section 24(2) is no more than that the decree under appeal, although passed by the Judge de Paix would still be a valid decree even after that court stood abolished. Section 24 (2) does not touch Section 26(2) which provides for the disposal of pending proceedings. Section 24(2) only deals with the" validity of proceedings upto the stage of the commencement of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966 It is only on that limited matter that Section 24(2) lays down that no one can question the validity of earlier proceedings, by reason only of the re-organization of Courts under the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966. Section 24(2) does not take away anything from, or add anything to, Section 20(2). Section 20(2) deals with pending proceedings as on the commencement of the Act. Section 24(2) deals with the validity of the proceedings up to the date of the commencement of the Act. The Two provisions operate in different fields altogether.
Citation of case-law was made by learned Counsel on both sides. But none of them had any direct hearing on the construction and application of Section 20 and other related provisions of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966. I have, therefore, dealt with the issue of competency of the appeal which has been argued before me, as one of first impression. I would., however, briefly deal with the decisions cited only to show how far away they are from being helpful authorities for deciding the question at issue in the Present case.
Nani Gopal Mitra Vs. The State of Bihar, This case arose under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Court of first instance applied to the case before it a rule of presumption enacted in Section 5(3) of the Act and convicted an accused of an offence u/s 5(1). The accused filed an appeal against his conviction. During the tendency of the appeal, section 5(3) was omitted from the Act by an amendment. It was urged that the appellate Court ought to Judge the evidence without applying the Presumption which the Court of first instance had applied. This contention was repelled by the Supreme Court by reference to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Court held that even though Section 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was omitted by a subsequent amendment, its previous operation was not thereby affected, nor did it affect the decision of the Court of first instance which was, and had to be based on that provision. This ruling cannot be applied to the present case. I have earlier shown that the rule relating to pending-proceedings laid down by Section 20(2) of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966, is diametrically opposed to the rule of interpretation laid down by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act itself says that the rule laid down by it will not apply in cases where the legislature evinces, a different intention.
Mr. Stanislas then relied on an old Calcutta case, Hurrosundari Dahi v. Bhojohari DasManji ILR (1886) Cal. 86 as a nearer precedent. In the case, there was a suit for recovery of rent arrears by a landlord against a tenant. The suit, when instituted was governed by Bengal Act VIII of 1896. u/s 102 of that Act, a second appeal was prohibited. This Act was repealed by Act VIII of 1885,under which a second appeal was provided to the High Court in suits similar to the one which had been filed in that case. This Act came into force on 1st November, 1885. In a second appeal preferred after that day from an appellate decree dated 28th July, 1885, the question was whether the second appeal was competent. The Calcutta High Court held in the negative. relying on the rule of interpretation enacted in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1868, which was more or less similar to Section 6, of the General Clauses Act, 1897, Mr. Stanislas relied on the concluding passage of the judgment in that case in which the learned Judges observed that even as an appeal which was competent under the repealed Act cannot be taken away by the repealing Act, the repealing Act cannot give an appeal in cases whose the repealed Act excluded an appeal This decision is of significance only in the cases that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has been applied both to a case where an appeal was taken away and to a case it was newly conferred under" a repealing enactment. The decision, obviously, is of no use in a case where the legislature enacts provisions in a repealing or amending Act which makes a clean break with the repealed provisions even as respects pending proceedings and past proceedings as is the case with Sections 20(1) and (2) of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966.
One other case cited in argument was, AIR 1927 242 (Privy Council) . In that case, the Privy Council had to deal with the question whether Section 66-A of the Indian income tax Act, 1922, providing for a right of appeal to the Privy Council from a judgment of the High Court in an income tax reference can he relied upon in a case decided prior to tin introduction of that section, and which had become final. The Privy Council held applying the principle of Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irvine (1905) AC 1369 that provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of a statute ought not to be applied retrospectively. The Privy Council added that among provisions which touch existing rights are provisions which, if applied retrospectively, would deprive of their existing finality orders which when the statute in question come into force were final. Mr. Stanislas urged that the Privy Council ruling must be applied to the present case. He said that under the terms of the decree in this case and is accordance with the French Code which applied at the material time. The decree was not appeasable and had become final. This existing finality according to Mr. Stanislas, cannot be disturbed merely by reason of any subsequent enactment in the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966.
The argument of learned Counsel has missed an important rider which the Privy Council itself has set out, namely, that where the Legislature itself has given a clear indication that vested rights ate to be affected, then that overrides the rule against retrospectively and the rule against deprivation of the finality of orders Indeed the Privy Council''s decision in that case was based on the circumstance that Section 66-A did not clearly provide that it would apply to orders which had become final at the date when it came into force. The position in the present case is in marked contrast Section 20(i) of the Pondicherry Civil Courts Act, 1966, clearly sets out to deal with pending proceedings in a way quite different from the conventional treatment of such proceedings under an amending or repealing statute.'' The whole object of Parliament was to scrap the existing French Civil System and to forthwith introduce in its place the system prevailing in the rest of India. This object did not spare even pending proceedings. The question of annulling the finality of orders does not arise as a problem in statutory interpretation since the statute itself does not (SIC)matters, but has made express provisions in that regard.
For all the reasons stated above, I hold that the learned District, Judge was under a duty to proceed with the appeal on merits dealing with it as a competent appeal. Since he had dismissed the appeal as incompetent, he has not had occasion to go into the merits of the appeal. Now that I have held that he is bound to entertain the appeal and deal with it on merit his judgment and decree dismissing the appeal in liming are set aside. The appeal restored to his file and he is directed to hear and determine the appeal on the merits, and in accordance with law.
The second appeal is allowed on these terms. in the peculiar circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.