Vellay Gounder vs G.N. Thangavelu and Others

Sathar Sayeed, J.—The tenant is the Petitioner. The above revision is filed by the tenant questioning the correctness and legality of the order of the Land Tribunal in L.T.A., No. 52 of 1980, dated 18th February, 1982.

The facts of the case are as follows: The landlords filed Original Petition No. 2060 of 1976 before the Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), Coimbatore, contending that the tenant is holding lands in excess of cultivating tenant''s ceiling of 5.000 standard acres, and that the excess lands may be taken over and restored to them.

According to the landlords, the tenant is in possession of 23.07 acres of land. Apart from this, the tenant is also in possession of the lands belonging to Rukmani Ammal measuring 5.11 acres. That apart, the tenant is also owning lands benami in the name of his son to an extent of 3 acres. If the lands under the possession of the tenant are taken into consideration, it was contended by the landlords that the tenant would be holding more than 5 standard acres of land and the excess lands have to be restored to them. The tenant resisted the petition. It was contended that he is not in possession of 23.07 acres of lands, that there is a coconut thope, the extent of which has to be exempted, that in so far as Rukmani Ammal''s lands are concerned, they were surrendered long beck, and that he is not in possession of the same. With these pleadings, evidence was adduced before the Authorised Officer. The Authorised Officer by his order dated 6th December, 1979, held that the tenant is not holding the lands belonging to Rukmani Ammal. The Authorised Officer before passing the order inspected the lease hold lands on 2nd December, 1977 and found at the cultivating tenant has construed a house in an area of 0.10 acres, where he is living with his family. This alone was found eligible for exclusion u/s 3(22). The Authorised Officer further came to the conclusion that the lands belonging to Rukmani Ammal are not in his possession and have to be excluded. While computing the extent, the Authorised Officer accepted the allegation of the landlords and held that the tenant is in possession of his son''s lands and included, the same. Thus, the Authorised Officer u/s 61(3)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, (LVIII of 1961) gave a finding, that Vellay Gounder, the Petitioner herein is having a surplus extent of 3.824 standard acres, over and above the cultivating tenant''s ceiling area. Aggrieved by the order of the Authorised Officer, the tenant preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The landlords filed cross-objections to the appeal with reference to the findings of the Authorised Officer that the tenant is not in possession of Rukmani Ammal''s land. To Tribunal considering the cross-objections filed by the landlords, set aside the finding of the Authorised Officer and held that while computing the quantum of land possessed by the tenant, the lands belonging to Rukmani Ammal cultivated by the tenant, should also be taken in account. Thus the Tribunal, by the reasons mentioned therein, set aside the order of the Authorised Officer and remitted the matter to the Authorised Officer for fresh disposal. It is against this order of remand by the Tribunal, the tenant has filed the above revision.

Mr. E. Padmanabhan, learned Counsel for the Petitioner raises a point of law and contends before me that the Tribunal has exceeded its powers in considering the cross-objections filed by the landlords. According to him, the Tribunal constituted u/s 78 of Act LVIII of 1961 is only a creature of the statute, and has no power to entertain the cross-objections of the landlords on the appeal filed by the tenant.

The nest contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is, that the lands of Rukmani Ammal were surrendered by the tenant long ago and that there is no provision under the Act to take into consideration the lands which were surrendered by the tenant for the purpose of computing the standard, acres. Therefore, the question that requires for consideration in this revision is, whether the Tribunal is legally entitled to consider the cross-objections filed by the landlords on the appeal filed by the tenant and passing orders thereon.

It may be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, (LVIII of 1961). Section 77 of the said Act deals with the jurisdiction and powers of Land Tribunals.

Section 77(3) is to the effect that every Land Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908). Section 78 deals with the appeal to the Land Tribunal. Section 78(3), is to the effect that on receipt of an appeal under Sub-section (i) the Land Tribunal, after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard, shall determine a case finally, Section 79 deals with appeal to the High Court with which we are not concerned at present. Section 83 deals with revision by High Court which is as follows:

Subject to the provisions of Section 79 every Land Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Court Subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908), and its orders shall be liable to revision by the High Court under the provisions of that section.

In so far as the present case is concerned, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that as against the orders of the Authorised Officer, the tenant preferred an appeal to the land Tribunal u/s 78 of the Act and that Section 78 does not provide for the acceptance of cross-objection filed, by the landlords. It is further contended by the learned Counsel that the jurisdiction and powers of the Lard Tribunal Pre condensed, and well defined, in Section 77(3) of the Act and any act done by the Land Tribunal exceeding the powers conferred u/s 77 will have to be deemed to be an act exercised in excess of its jurisdiction.

In this regard, we have to consider whether the Tribunal has power to receive cross-objections while disposing of the appeal filed by the tenant. The learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents and the learned Government Advocate had referred to me to the rules framed under the Act, which the Authorised Officer has to follow at the time of enquiry, which does not help us on the question of receiving the cross-objections by the Tribunal.

But it must be noted that a similar and analogous provisions as found u/s 77(3) of Act LVIII of 1961 is found under the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXVI of 1948). Section 51(3) of the said Act is as follows:

The Special Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (Central Act V of 1900) when trying a suit or when hearing an appeal.

This provision is similar to Section 77(3) of the LVIII of 1961 with a only difference that the words when trying a suit or when hearing an appeal are omitted u/s 77(3) of Act LVIII of 1961. On the wording of Section 51(3) of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 a question arose whether any right is concerned on an aggrieved person, to file a memorandum of cross-objections in an appeal. In Vedanthachariswami v. Muthiah Chettiar (1955) 1 M.L.J. 229 a Bench of this Court held, that a memorandum of cross-objections does not lie under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948.

Section 51 confers a special right on the aggrieved person in certain cases to appeal to a Special Tribunal constituted by the Chief Justice. There is no provision in the Act attracting the entire procedure laid down in the CPC moulding the right to file cross-objections and the right of the aggrieved person is restricted to an appeal u/s 51. The rule on which reliance is placed only empowers the Special Tribunal to exercise all the powers exercisable by a civil Court in the trial of suits and appeals, but it does not confer any right upon the litigant to file cross-objections instead of an appeal; and we think, therefore that there is no right conferred upon the aggrieved person to file a memorandum of cross-objections in this appeal.

A similar point regarding the right to file cross-objections and if cross-objections can be treated as a memorandum of appeal arose under Sections 44 and 55 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1953 (V of 1954) in Bishnu Pada Datta and Others Vs. Joydeb Datta and Others, . The Bench of Calcutta High Court at page 687 held as follows:

In my opinion it is quite clear that the Statute under consideration has not made the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 applicable. Section 44(3) of the said Act provides for an appeal to a Tribunal to be preferred in the manner prescribed and within such period and on payment of such Court fees as may be prescribed. The manner prescribed under the Rules also does not invoke the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code. Section 55(2) of the Act provides for appointment of the Tribunal. Undoubtedly this Sub-section also provides that the Tribunal as appointed shall have all the powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. These provisions, in my opinion, only clothe the Tribunal with all the powers of a civil Court, but that does not necessarily mean that because of such provisions the proceedings before the Tribunal attract all the necessary provisions of the CPC providing for entertainment and disposal of appeals and proceedings relating thereto, To construe Section 55(2) to mean as such, is to extend the implications beyond the normal and ordinary meaning flowing from the words use.

In this case, we have to considers whether Section 77(3) of the Act confers any power on the Tribunal to entertain cross-objection filed by a party in an appeal pending before it. The right to file cross objection is a right of the party whether like a right of appeal, must be conferred upon him by the Statue and under the provisions of the Act. In the absence of specification provisions in the Statue, Order XLI, Rule 22, CPC would not be attracted.

The learned Counsel for Respondent 1 to 9 relying on the decision reported in contended that the landlord are entitled to file cross objections. In that case a preliminary objection was taken by the Appellant with reference to the maintainability of the cross objection filed before the High Court under Sections 47 and 51 of Hyderabad Jagirdars Debt Settlement Act XII of 1952). A Bench of the Andhra High Court while interpreting Sections 47 and 51 of the said Act observed as follows:

What Section 51 provides is for the application of the provisions of the CPC to all proceedings under Chapter III, unless some other procedure is prescribed with respect to say particular matter. The provisions of Sections 47 to 49 deal with appeals and Court-fees and grounds of appeal and in so far as this provision is concerned, it must be deemed that the provisions of the CPC in respect thereof are (sic) (not) applicable. But that does not prevent the application of Order XLI, Rule 22 which provides for objections to the decree or award as if he had preferred a separate appeal. Having regard to the general scope of the application of the provisions of CPC u/s 51 we cannot accept the argument of the learned Advocate for the Appellant that Order XLI, Rule 22 does not apply to a case of appeal filed u/s 47.

These observations were based on the wordings of the Sections found therein are not applicable to the facts of the instant case. A close reading of Act LVIII of 1961 clearly reveals that a Tribunal constituted under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Act should function within the power conferred under that Act, since the Tribunal in creature of the Statute. That apart, the order of the Tribunal cannot be said to be a decree as defined u/s 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

From the foregoing discussions, it is thus clear that there is to provision in the Act enabling a person to file cross-objections before the Tribunal. Hence the Tribunal in the instant case erred in receiving the cross-objections and disposing of the same, and the findings rendered on the cross-objections are not binding on the tenant. It is on this ground, I am of the view that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in resolving the cross objections and passing orders thereon. Under these circumstances, the order of the Tribunal to the extent it deals with the memo of cross objections is set aside and in other respects the order of remand stands. Accordingly, the civil revision petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. Since the matter is remitted by the Tribunal to the Authorised Officer for fresh disposal, I direct the Authorised Officer to dispose of the same expeditiously. No costs.