AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.—I need not repeat the facts which have been set out fully in the judgment just now pronounced by my learned brother.
So far as the case law is concerned. I do not wish to go further back than what has been laid down in Coopoosami Chetti v. Doraisami Chetti ILR
(1909) M. 67 : 19 M.L.J. 174 and in Coopoosami Chetti v. Duraisami Chetti (1912) M.W.N. 1220. On these caste questions, the law in my
humble opinion, ought to be made progressive. Social customs among Hindus have begun to change with quite appreciable rapidity and
conservative observations therefore which may be found in cases decided about 30 years ago (as in The Queen v. Sankara. ILR (1888) M. 381
and Venkatachalapathi v. Subbaroyan ILR (1887) M. 293), even though those observations were made by very learned and eminent Judges ought
not to be pushed now a days too far.
Even the highest Judicial minds like those of Lord Eldon, Lord Mansfield or Lord St. Leonards are affected to some extent by the spirit of
conservatism, or of liberalism as the case may be and the recognition of that fact by even lesser minds implies no disrespect to those great jurists. I
do not at all mean to question the soundness of the actual decisions in The Queen v. Sankara ILR (1883) M. 381 and Venkatachala Pathi v.
Subbaroyan ILR (1890) M. 293 but only to submit that all the incidental observations therein need not be strictly adhered to without the necessary
qualifications at the present day.
Mr. Justice Chandavarkar said in Natu v. Keshawji ILR (1902) B. 174 Roughly speaking, a suit raising a caste question must fall within one of
three Chases: firstly : it may be a suit brought by a member of a caste complaining of his expulsion from it and asking for a declaration that the
expulsion is illegal, and that he is still a member of the caste and as such entitled to its social privileges: secondly, a member of a caste expelled
from it may sue for a declaration that the excommunication is illegal, and that he is entitled to certain rights of property or office as a member of the
caste: or, thirdly, it may be a suit brought by such member for damages on account of toss of caste or character : The decided cases, of which
there is a large number, show that a suit involving a caste question must fall under one or other of these heads.
The present suit belongs to the third class. As regards this third class, Mr. Justice Chandavarkar says "" Turning now to the third class, suits
claiming relief for loss of caste and character are in the nature of suits for libel and fall within the law applicable to the latter. The Bombay
Regulation expressly provides for them. As held by West J. in Pragji Kalam v. Govind Gopal ILR (1887) B 534 "" the Civil Courts may discuss
and deal with a caste question where the membership and the character of a member have been unjustly injured"".
I do not know whether it is not a matter for some regret that the legislature should have given so wide a definition of Defamation in the Penal
Code (See Section 499, Explanation 4) as to include caste questions within it where the questions do not involve imputations as to moral
character. I have heard of a thieving caste in which a man born in that caste loses ""character in respect of his caste"" if he is taunted with not having
had a theft to his credit before he attains the adult age. If the words ""character of that person in respect of his caste "" in Section 499, Explanation 4
of the Indian Penal Code be too liberally interpreted, it would lead to a person ''taunted as above, bringing a suit for launching a criminal case in
respect of such an imputation.
In many cases, no doubt, a caste offence is committed by an act which implies a defect in the moral or intellectual character of the person as the
imputation of such an act is ""defamation irrespective of the fact that it is also a caste offence. The giving up of the rules of caste by birth now-a-
days does not, however, always mean any defect in the moral character as is shown by the actions of the members belonging to the Brahmo
Samaj; the Arya Samaj and other liberal movements. That a person does not care for the rigidity of caste rules is given as a sign of moral strength
in many cases, though of course in other as numerous cases, it is a sign of moral weakness if the neglect of caste rules is due to the weakness of the
will in resisting temptations of the flesh. The mere fact that Hindus who believe in caste by birth alone are just now in the majority and look down
upon those Hindus who do not believe exclusively in it is, in my opinion, immaterial in the consideration of the question. It was decided in an
English case that to call a man a Homeopath when Homeopaths were actually looked down upon as quacks is not defamation. It follows that to
impute actions to a Hindu which show him to be a reformer is not defamation unless it also necessarily implies that he has ceased to belong to his
caste. However it seems to be now settled that, to tell a man who does not wish to be out of his caste that he has been excommunicated or is out
of caste is defamation and it seems not possible to unsettle that view for several years to come.
It is well known to every Hindu that while 30 years ago the fact that a South India Brahmin took even his ordinary meals in the presence of a
non-brahmin or on the same table with a non-brahmin might have entailed the penalty of Prayaschitham, such a risk is almost absolutely negligible
now-a-days, especially in towns like Madras or Kurnool, Again while dining with England--returned persons who had not undergone
Prayaschitham is even now a little risky, dining with those who have so dined is quite common and unnoticed now-a-days. Hence if a person
merely refuses to associate with another, giving out as his reason that he has associated in meals with a person who has contracted remarriage with
a widow or who has gone to and returned from England, such allegations do not impute to the persons about whom they are made an
unworthiness to call himself a member of the caste and are therefore not defamatory. Unless the words used in respect of a caste Hindu are
tantamount to saying "" you have become an outcaste or you have been excommunicated from your caste,"" the words are not defamatory. Such I
take to be the principles of the decisions for which Benson and Sankaran Nair JJ. are responsible in the cases of Kuppusami Chetty v. Dorasami
Chetty ILR (1909) M. 67 : 19 M.L.J. 719 and Kuppusami Chetty v. Dorasami Chetty (1912) M.W.N. 1220. It was held in those cases that even
if the rds imputed to the plaintiff a ceremonial impurity which equired an expiation by a prayaschitham provided that the prayaschitham to be
performed is not of the kind which is required to bring back an outcaste into the caste but only such minor ceremonies which are performed by
even those who remain within the caste and who have incurred only ceremonial impurities, the words are not defamatory and do not give rise to a
cause of action for libel. I might be permitted to say that the appeal decided in Kuppusami Chetty v. Dorasami (1912) M.W.N. 1220 was against
the decision of the City Civil Court presided over by Mr. Kumaraswami Sastri (now a judge of this Court and a profound Sanskrit scholar) and
that the appellate decision confirmed his veiws on this question.
It is rather curious that the plaintiff in this case who has in direct opposition to the opinion of the late Head of the Sringeri Mattam (a very
learned, respected and influential Matadhipathi) supported the Komatti Community in their claim as Vaisyas to study and pronounce the Vedas
and to perform Vedic Sandhyavandanam and other Vedokta cermomnies and who has thus definitely broken with the orthodox Brahmins should
consider himself libelled because he was said to have become liberalised a little further by countenancing the remarriage of widows, even to the
extent of dining at feasts given on the occasion of Brahmin widow marriage.
The words alleged to have been used by the defendant do not impute to the plaintiff that he has ceased to belong to the Brahmin caste but only
that the defendant does not wish to associate the plaintiff with the defendant''s ultra--orthodox purohits in the performance of Sradhas in the
defendant''s house. I am quite clear that to impute to a Brahmin''s unfitness to officiate or be the guest at a Sradha is necessarily to defame his
character in respect of his caste"". "" As Manu says in the 3rd chapter ""to a student who has not read the Vedas "" (now-a-days most of the caste
Brahmins have not read the Vedas, though it is obligatory to read at least one of the Vedas thoroughly) ""let him never give food at the sacred
obsequies. Physicians"" (many Brahmins are physicians) ""image-worshippers for gain must be shunned in obligations to progenitors. A public
servant"" (many are public servants) "" a man with whitlows on his nails, or with black yellow teeth, a deserter of the sacred fire"" (very few Brahmins
now keep up to sacred fire) ""one omitting to do the five great sacraments"" (same observations as above) "" a younger brother married before the
elder, an elder brother not married before the younger, the son of a twice married woman, a man who has lost one eye, one who teaches the Veda
for wages and one who gives wages for such a teacher, a man with elephantiasis, the husband of a younger sister married before the elder a father
instructed in the Veda by his own son, a blind man, one who teaches the use of arms, one who subsists by astrology, the husband of a twice
married woman, a Brahmin unlearned in holy writ, a sacrificer for the sudra, is considered unfit by many to officiate as priest at a Sraddha,"" Surely
if a man refuses to allow any of the above persons to officiate at a Sraddha in his house, it cannot be held that that person is libelled or slandered in
his character in respect of his caste.
I should like on the question of plaintiff''s claim for damages to quote a few further passages from the judgment of Mr, Justice Chandavarkar in
Nattu v. Keshawji ILR (1902) B. 174:
In the second place, so far as the plaintiffs claim for damages on account of loss of reputation, they have not proved that their reputation has
suffered or that they have sustained any damages on that account. Their own evidence and the evidence they have led proves that about twenty of
their caste people still hold social intercourse with them, and all that has occurred is that the other members of the caste do not invite them to dinner
or give them water. Assuming that their reputation has suffered by reason of their exclusion from the social privileges by a majority of the caste,
there is nothing to show that they have sustained any damage beyond the loss of some dinners, or how, if they have suffered in reputation, the
damages are to be estimated. In fact, no specific issue was raised in the lower Court, nor was any evidence led on the points. On this ground
therefore, the claim for damages must fail.
In the present case also it is clear that even if the plaintiff has associated with Brahmins who had partaken meals at a widow marriage, he is still
in very good company and there are very influential and good men in Kurnool who are remaining in the Brahmin caste notwithstanding their
encouragement of the widow remarriage movement by dining at such remarriages and there is no evidence worth the name that he has sustained
any damages. Three witnesses have been examined for the plaintiff including the plaintiff himself. Even his own statements do not prove that he has
sustained any damages while neither of the other two witnesses gave evidence that any pecuniary damage has been sustained by the plaintiff.
I might be permitted to state that a person like the plaintiff who is himself a social reformer should not be too sensitive on account of its being
stated that he is a reformer no tonly in the matter of allowing Vedoktha ceremonies to Komatties performing such ceremonies in Komatty house
but also in considering that remarriage of widows is not prohibited by the shastras. It is even difficult to state in these changing times whether it is
defamatory at all to call a person a social reformer or as one supporting reform. Unless words are used regarding a person which impute that that
person is no longer a member of his caste, courts ought not to encourage suits for libel or defamation merely because some of his (plaintiff''s,)
castemen or even a majority of his castemen state that they will not associate with him in meals or ceremonies on the ground that he holds reformed
views or has done actions which the extreme orthodox party disapprove of or that he has associated with reformers provided these latter have not
been excommunicated. In the result, I agree that the second appeal and the memorandum of objections should be dismissed with costs.
Hannay, J.
The plaintiff sued for damages for slander claiming Rs 50 as the amount of damages. In the court of the District Munsif he succeeded in getting
a decree for Rs. 20. On appeal to the District Court, however in respect of the amount disallowed, the plaintiff''s suit was dismissed. The plaintiff
now appeals.
The parties belong to Kurnool. The plaintiff is a Purohit Brahmin who appears to have settled at that place about 5 years before suit. The
defendant is a Komatti. The plaintiff appears to have gained the respect of the Komatti community since he settled at Kurnool for, the evidence
shows that although he is not himself a family purohit of the Vaisya community there, he is allowed to officiate jointly with the family purohits of
Komatties during family ceremonies and on one occasion he was selected by the Vaisya community to represent them at an assembly when the
Vedoktha rights of Vaisyas came up for discussion (see Exhibit A). The defendant admits that the plaintiff officiated at his second marriage. This
state of affairs continued for several years until a widow marriage was celebrated at Kurnool, which resulted in dissension in the Brahmin
community at'' that place, some approving of the marriage while others condemning it as being contrary to the Shastras and the recognised custom
among Brahmins. Those who approved of the marriage appear to have testified their approval either by directly dining with the re-married widow
or by dining with those who had dined with her. This act of dining as well as other acts indicating approval are regarded by those who oppose
widow marriage as a sin. The defendant''s purohits Seshiah and Viriah are opposed to such marriages. The plaintiff, though he does not admit, he is
in favour of widow marriages, says he is willing to dine with persons who are in favour of them. There can be little doubt that the plaintiff''s attitude
in that matter has given ground for the view that he supports the party in favour of widow marriage. It is found as a fact, however, that the
plaintiff''s did not go so far to take meals at the widow marriage at Kurnool.
It was after this marriage, that the incident occurred which, has given rise to this suit. It appears that on the 27th Nov. 1911 a ceremony called
Aradhana was to take place at the defendant''s house. Aradhana appears to be equivalent to an annual ceremony among Brahmans. The lower
courts find that the defendant invited the plaintiff to attend at his house and to bring 4 or 5 other Brahmans with him in order to assist at the
ceremony. The plaintiff as plaintiff''s witness No. 1 states that the defendant asked him to bring the other Brahmans because he feared that his own
family purohits might refuse to perform the ceremony along with the plaintiff. However that may be, when the plaintiff and the other Brahmans
arrived at the defendant''s house, it is found by the lower courts that Defendant turned them away, saying, in effect that as they had messed and
taken part in other things during widow marriages, his purohits Seshiah-and Viriah refused to attend, if they were present--what the exact words
used were has not been found by either of the lower Courts, but I take it that the above, (which is reproduction from the plaint) contains the
substance of what the defendant said. When the Lower Appellate Court sent back the case for findings upon certain points the plaintiff, who was
then examined, as defendant''s witness No. 2 stated that the words used were. ""As you have taken meals at a widow marriage, our purohits Seshia
and Viriah refuse to come, so, you are not fit. Hence go-away."" The words ""so you are not fit"" do not appear in the plaint or in the original
deposition made by the plaintiff as plaintiff''s witness No. 1. These words are plainly an after thought on the part of the plaintiff and as the lower
Courts do not find that the defendant used any such; words they must be left out of consideration.
The question is whether the defendant can be said in these circumstances to have slandered the plaintiff. For the plaintiff''s reliance is placed
upon the cases of Queen v. Sankara ILR (1883) M. 381 Venkatachalapathi v. Subbaroyudu ILR (1889) M. 293 Ccopoosamy Chetti
v.Doraisdtrii Chetti ILR (1909) M. 67. In the first case it was held by Sir T. Muthusarni Aiyar that widow remarriage is contrary to the usage and
custom of Brahmans and other regenerate classes in this Presidency and the case further shows that a person who attended at and advocated a
widow marriage was then liable for excommunication at the hands of the spiritual head of his caste, not with standing that the legislature had
legalised widow marriages, by Act XV of 1856. In the case the continuance of the general usage in a particular temple was held to be sufficient
ground for excluding a Brahman, who had married a widow, from entering the temple. As regards the case in Coopoosami Chetty v. Dorasami
Chetty ILR (1909) M. 67 reliance is placed on the observation at 69; ""words which are intended to bring about disastrous consequences resulting
from loss of caste such as de-privation of religious and social communion, by imputing un worthiness to any person to continue a member of his
caste are prima facie defamatory and give rise to a cause of action. They certainly lower him in the estimation of his own caste and other castes.
The decision of this case seems to me to turn upon the question whether at the present time attending or advocating widow marriages
necessarily involves liability to excommunication and whether the defendant intended by his allegation to impute that the plaintiff was an outcaste or
had lost caste status. The cases cited for the plaintiff no doubt shew that in 1883 attendance at a widow marriage, resulted in excommunication and
that in 1890 in a particular institution a person who had married a widow was on that subjected to disability in that they had lost caste status in
respect of that institution. There is however nothing in the evidence in the present case to show that the act attributed to the plaintiff, even if true,
would in present conditions have rendered him liable to be outcasted or otherwise caused him to lose his caste status.. The plaintiff no doubt says
he has lost hundreds of rupees through the defendant''s accusation but he does not prove a single specific instance in which he has lost anything and
he values his damages at Rs. 50. He admits he has not been excom-municated. It seems to The therefore that the Lower Appellate Court is right in
holding that the defendant had not libelled the plaintiff inasmuch as he has not called him an outcaste and is not proved to have said anything which
necessarily implies that he was an outcaste or had lost caste status. The case of Coopoosami Chetty v. Dorasami Chetty ILR (1909) M. 67 is, if
anything, against the plaintiff, because the words there used "" Prayaschitham must be performed as Coopoosami Chetti attended the
Karmanthiram"" were held not to imply that Coopoosami Chetti was an outcaste and that therefore there was no cause of action (See Coopoosami
Chetti v. Doraisami Chetti ILR (1909) M. 67). On the whole, I think the Lower Appellate Court was right in taking the view that the words
complained of in this case meant nothing more than that the defendant desired no longer to associate with the plaintiff or utilize his services on the
ground that he was a sympathizer with the party in favour of widow marriage. I would, therefore, dismiss this second appeal with costs. The order
of the Lower Appellate Court refusing defendant his costs seems to roe to be right and I would therefore also dismiss the memorandum of
objections with costs.