Venkatrama Iyer and Others vs Swamesnath Aiyer

Ayling, J.—The sole ground on which we are asked to revise the decision of the lower Appellate Court in this case is that all the Bench

Magistrates who were present at the earlier stages of the case did not take part in the decision thereof or sign the judgment. It is not denied that the

two Magistrates who did sign the judgment were present throughout all the earlier hearings and heard all the evidence or that they constituted a

legal quorum. I see no reason to differ from the view taken in Karuppana Nadan v. Chairman, Madura, Municipality 21 M. 246 : 2 Weir 217.,

which is clear authority for holding that the conviction is not illegal. This conflicts with no provision of law, and no consideration of justice or

expediency. The contrary view would materially hamper the work of Benches of Magistrates in all but the very simplest cases. I do not think any

argument can be based on a supposed analogy with the case of a Jury or a body of Arbitrators. The law and practice in England appears to be

similar to what I hold to be legal here, vide Section 29 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act.

I would dismiss the petition.

Seshagiri Aiyar, J.

In this case, the accused were charged with assault u/s 352 of the Indian Penal Code and convicted. The trial was before a Bench of Honorary

Magistrates for the town of Kumbaconam. At the commencement of the trial six members of the Bench, including the President, took part. On

adjourned hearings sometimes four and sometimes two only took part. The trial which was concluded on the 19th June 1913 was attended by only

two. They delivered the judgment in the case. It is conceded that these two Magistrates took part in the trial throughout. The question is whether

the proceedings are vitiated by the fact that those who took part in the trial in the baginning and in the intermediate stages ware not present to give

their final decision is the case. Section 15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Clause (1), empowers the Local Government to direct ""two or more

Magistrates to sit together as a Bench."" If a Bench had been constituted in this manner it may well be argued that if any member of the Bench

ceases to take part in the subsequent proceedings, the trial is not regular. In the second clause of that section, the Legislature has provided that the

powers of a Bench shall be ""of the highest class conferred on any one of its members"". If a Bench took cognizance of a case triable by a first class

Magistrate on the ground that one of its members was a Magistrate of the first class, can it be tried by the remaining members in his absence ? The

intention of the Legislature apparently is that all the members before whom the case was begun should continue to take part in the proceedings until

judgment. Therefore, if the matter were res Integra, I would have felt considerable hesitation in holding that the proceedings in this Case are

regular. But it was decided in this Court in Karuppana Nadan v. Chairman, Madura Municipality 21 M. 246 : 2 Weir 217. that the absence of

some of the Magistrates from the further stages of the trial and at the time of judgment will not vitiate the proceedings. I am unwilling to disturb a

practice which has guided lower Courts for such a long period. Ordinarily Honorary Magistrates will not sit continuously and it may result in undue

prolongation of trials, if they are required to attend throughout. The object of appointing Honorary Magistrates to hear cases is to ensure speedy

disposal that will be defeated by insisting upon the attendance of all the members of the Bench from beginning to end. While thus alive to the

difficulties which may result from not following Karuppana Nadan v. Chairman, Madura Municipality 21 M 246 : 2 Weir 217., I would suggest

that the Government u/s 16 of the Code should frame rules to obviate the difficulty. The Legislature must also make some change in the language of

the section. The analogy of arbitrators is not in point. As pointed out by Mr. J. C. Adam for the Public Prosecutor the arbitrators derive their

power under a contract and each of the referring parties is entitled to say that he has the right to the experience and guidance of every referee in

deciding his case. Thammiraju v. Bapiraju 12 M. 113. proceeds on that principle. Nor is the provision relating to the termination of the

proceedings when one of the impanelled Jurors is unable or unwilling to take part in the trial pari materia with this case. The minimum number of

Jurors has been fixed by the notification of the Government in the different Districts of the Presidency. The absence of one of the Jurors will vitiate

the trial as the required number does not take part in it. On the other hand, the rules promulgated in England for trials by Justices of the Peace

(Halsbury, Volume XIX, Section 1259) seem to indicate that the trial will become invalid only if persons who did not take part in the taking of the

evidence assisted in arriving at the final decision. Hardwar Singh v. Khega Ojha 20 C. 870. and Damn Thahur v. Bhowani Sahoo 83 C.

194.proceed upon this principle. I agree with my learned colleague in dismissing this petition.