High CourtsDivision Bench(1946) 01 MAD CK 0006

Vennety Satyanarayana vs Pydimarri Satyanarayana, Managing Director of Andra Pracharini Ltd., Rajahmundry

Madras High Court · Decided on 15 January 1946 · Citation: (1946) 1 MLJ 135

HON’BLE JUDGES
Byers, J

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Judgment

18 paragraphs · 434 words

Byers, J.—It follows from what has been said by Mockett, J., in C. Moothaliondam Chetty Vs. G. Venkatesam Chetty, that the law

applicable to the plaintiff''s suit for eviction was the House Rent Control Order as it stood in its unamended form at the time of the institution of the

suit in April, 1944. The amendment of Section 7-A in July, is said to have taken away from the plaintiff the right to get a decree in eviction; but with

all due respect to the learned Judge who decided the case in Mahmood H.Y. Vs. The Kerala Corporation Ltd., . I think the learned District Judge

was wrong in his view that the right of the plaintiff to get a decree for eviction was in any way affected. The Madras House Rent Control Order,

1941, was passed in exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (bb) of Sub-rule (2) to Rule 81 of the Defence of India Rules which have been

delegated by the Central Government to the Provincial Government and the rule contemplates an order to provide inter alia for "" preventing the

eviction of tenants and sub-tenants from such accommodation in specified circumstances."" It cannot be said that these words are wide enough to

deprive the Civil Courts of their jurisdiction to pass decrees; all that the rule contemplates is the control of the relief of eviction. Mr. Raghava Rao

contended that what the plaintiff should have done after validly instituting the suit and finding that the position had been changed by the amendment

of July, 1944, was to withdraw his suit and then apply to the Collector for an order of eviction; but although the plaintiff might have done this, there

was in my view nothing to prevent him from proceeding to a decree if he chose to do so in the hope that he would be able to execute it when the

ban imposed by the control order had been lifted. It may be that the plaintiff could see that under the amended order he would have little or no

chance of succeeding in evicting his quondam tenant, but the section does not prevent him from obtaining the decree in the hope that he may be

able to execute it later on. As Mr. Raghava Rao points out the question is now of Little more than acamedic interest because as things stand a

decree cannot be executed.

2.

In the result the appeal is accepted, the decision of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the decree for eviction passed by the trial Court is

restored with costs throughout.