Venus Sugar Ltd. vs Nishi Chopra

Valmiki J Mehta, J.

Caveat No. 219/2011

No one appears for the Respondent/caveator. Caveat stands discharged.

RFA No. 147/2011

The challenge by means of this Regular First Appeal u/s 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is to the impugned judgment and decree dated 22.11.2010 whereby the suit of the Respondent/Plaintiff/landlady for possession and recovery of mesne profits was decreed with respect to the ground floor of the property bearing No. C-493, Yojna Vihar, New Delhi.

The fact that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is not disputed. It is also not disputed that rent was paid at Rs. 12,500/- per month till September, 2006 and thereafter on account of service of legal notice dated 29.9.2006 rent was increased to Rs. 15,100/- per month and which rent was paid for three months of October, November and December, 2006. The Respondent/landlady served another notice dated 18.12.2006 for termination of the tenancy and where after, the subject suit for possession and mesne profits was filed.

The notice dated 18.12.2006 was served by registered AD post and UPC and which documents have been exhibited before the Trial Court as Ex.PW1/7 (collectively). There is no dispute that the notice dated 18.12.2006 was sent to the correct address of the Appellant/Defendant.

Counsel for the Appellant argued two main contentions:

(i) Since the rent was increased after service of notice dated 29.9.2006, a fresh tenancy came into existence at a higher rate of rent at Rs. 15,100/- per month and therefore the suit for possession could not have been filed.

(ii) The notice dated 18.12.1996 cannot be said to be a notice whereby the tenancy was said to have been terminated.

So far as the first argument is concerned of creation of a fresh tenancy at an enhanced rent after service of notice dated 29.9.2006, the same is an undisputed fact and also the fact that higher rent at Rs. 15,100/- per month was paid for the months of October, November and December. However, it is also an undisputed fact that thereafter another notice dated 18.12.2006 was served terminating the tenancy and thereafter there is no acceptance of any rent, much less enhanced rent higher than Rs. 15,100/- from January, 2007 onwards. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is, therefore, misconceived because the suit is based upon the legal notice dated 18.12.2006.

So far as the second argument that the notice dated 18.12.2006 did not terminate the tenancy, at the first blush, the argument appears attractive, however, the notice terminating the tenancy (which is a month to month tenancy) has to be liberally interpreted because the only object of such notice is to give a 15 days period for vacation of the premises by the tenant. In fact to ensure that no technicalities are raised by the tenant with respect to service of legal notice terminating the tenancy, the legislature amended Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 by Act 3 of 2003 whereby no defence was permitted with respect to defective legal notice as long as a suit for possession was filed after 15 days of service of notice. The second contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant/Defendant is also therefore misconceived and is rejected.

No other point or argument was raised before this Court. In view of the above, I do not find and illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment and decree which calls for interference by this Court. There is also no need of summoning of the Trial Court record in view of the admitted facts as appearing with respect to relationship of landlord and tenant, the tenancy being a month to month tenancy which could be terminated by virtue of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, rent being more than Rs. 3,500/- per month whereby the tenant would not have the protection under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and the fact that the notice has been proved to have been served at the correct address as shown from the exhibited documents.

The appeal is therefore misconceived, and is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.