Vidya Devi vs Ram Lal

Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.—This application, u/s 151 CPC has been filed by the appellants with a prayer that appellants may be permitted to file additional substantial questions of law in the present case.

Before proceeding further, it may be noticed that when the appeal was being finally heard, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants requested time to file an application for framing additional substantial questions of law and as a matter of indulgence, one opportunity was granted to the appellants. Alongwith the application, as many as nine substantial questions of law proposed to have been framed, which according to the appellants are required to be determined by this court in the interest of justice and clearly are borne from the material on record.

The respondents have filed reply and have vehemently opposed this application. It is claimed that the application is misconceived and has been filed only with a view to delay the adjudication of the matter and with the sole object of filling in the lacunae in the case, which can not be permitted at such belated stage. It is further claimed that there are pleadings or issues on the points upon which the applicants now want adjudication.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records.

Mr. G.D. Verma, learned Senior counsel has made reference of various judgments of Hon''ble Supreme Court to claim that substantial questions of law could be framed at any stage of the appeal and even during the course of final arguments. The same need not be referred to, as the learned counsel for the respondents has not contested the proposition.

Now the only question, which requires determination by this court is as to whether the questions raised in this application are in fact substantial questions of law and is there any factual foundation for these? I find that the questions as framed in this application have not even been specifically raised in the original memorandum of the appeal filed in this court and therefore, by no stretch of imagination can these substantial questions of law be said to have arisen for just and proper adjudication of the case. The appellants were required to lay a proper foundation for determination of the questions now sought to be raised by way of the present application. Even otherwise most of the questions, as proposed to be framed as substantial questions of law, only relate to findings of fact. Undisputedly, the second appeal u/s 100 CPC after the amendment carried out in the year 1976 is not confined to cases where question of law is involved and such question must be a substantial one.

The treaties on this subject is judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Narayanan Rajendran and Another Vs. Lekshmy Sarojini and Others, , wherein their Lordships have discussed the entire law on the subject in the following terms:-

"20. In Gurdev Kaur and Others Vs. Kaki and Others, in which one of us (Bhandari, J.) was party to that judgment crystallized the entire legal position but unfortunately even thereafter in the number of cases it has come to our notice that the law declared by this court is not followed in a large number of cases by the High Courts.

Once again we are making serious endeavour to recapitulate the legal position with the fond hope that the High Courts would keep in mind the legal position before interfering in a case of concurrent findings of facts arrived at by the trial court and upheld by the first appellate court.

"33. Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, C.P.C.) corresponds to Section 584 of the old CPC of 1882. The Section 100 (prior to 1976 amendment) reads as under:

"100. Second appeal-(1) "Save where otherwise provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to a High Court on any of the following grounds, namely:

(a) the decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law;

(b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law;

(c) a substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, which may possibly have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits.

(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte."

A reference of series of cases decided by the Privy Council and this court would reveal true import, scope and ambit of Section 100 C.P.C."

Cases decided prior to 1976 amendment both by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court dealing with the scope of Section 100 C.P.C.

" 35.. The Privy Council, in Luchman v. Puna [ILR (1889) 16 Calcutta 753 (P.C.)], observed that a second appeal can lie only on one or the other grounds specified in the present section.

The Privy Council, in Pratap Chunder Ghose v. Mohandranath Purkait ILR (1890) 17 Calcutta 291 (P.C.)], the limitation as to the power of the court imposed by sections 100 and 101 in a second appeal ought to be attended to, and an appellant ought not to be allowed to question the finding of the first appellate court upon a matter of fact.

In Durga Chowdharani v. Jawahar Singh Chowdhri ILR (1891) 18 Cal 23 (PC), the Privy Council held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be. The clear declaration of law was made in the said judgment as early as in 1891. This judgment was followed in the case of Ramratan Shukal v. Mussumat Nandu ILR (1892) 19 Cal 249 (PC) and many others. The court observed:

"It has now been conclusively settled that the third court...cannot entertain an appeal upon question as to the soundness of findings of fact by the second court, if there is evidence to be considered, the decision of the second court, however unsatisfactory it might be if examined, must stand final."

In the case of Ram Gopal v. Shakshaton [ILR (1893) 20 Calcutta 93 (P.C.)], the court emphasized that a court of second appeal is not competent to entertain questions as to the soundness of a finding of facts by the courts below.

The same principle has been reiterated in Rudr Prasad v. Baij Nath ILR(1893) 15 Allahabad 36]. The court observed that a judge to whom a memorandum of second appeal is presented for admission is entitled to consider whether any of the grounds specified in this section exist and apply to the case, and if they do not, to reject the appeal summarily.

Similarly, before amendment in 1976, this court also had an occasion to examine the scope of Section 100 C.P.C.. In Deity Pattabhiramaswamy Vs. S. Hanymayya and Others, , the High Court of Madras set aside the findings of the District Judge, Guntur, while deciding the second appeal. This court observed that notwithstanding the clear and authoritative pronouncement of the Privy Council on the limits and the scope of the High Court''s jurisdiction u/s 100, Civil Procedure Code, some learned Judges of the High Courts are disposing of Second Appeals as if they were first appeals. This introduces, apart from the fact that the High Court assumes and exercises a jurisdiction which it does not possess, a gambling element in the litigation and confusion in the mind of the litigant public. This case affords a typical illustration of such interference by a Judge of the High Court in excess of his jurisdiction u/s 100, Civil Procedure Code. We have, therefore, no alternative but to set aside the judgment of the High Court which had no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence.

In M. Ramappa v. M. Bojjappa [(1963) SCR 673], the Andhra Pradesh High Court interfered with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court which, in turn, had itself reversed the trial court''s finding on the same question of fact. While setting aside the decree of the second Appellate Court, this court observed: (AIR pp. 1637-38, para 12)

"12. ....It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact, but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid."

It may be pertinent to mention that as early as in 1890 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be and they added a note of warning that no Court in India has power to add, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Even before the amendment, interference u/s 100 C.P.C. was limited, which has now been further curtailed, which we would be dealing in cases decided by this court after the amendment.

We have given reference of a large number of cases decided by the Privy Council and this court to clearly understand the ambit and scope of Section 100 before amendment.

The Amendment Act of 1976 has introduced drastic changes in the scope and ambit of Section 100 C.P.C. A second appeal u/s 100 C.P.C. is now confined to cases where a question of law is involved and such question must be a substantial one. Section 100, as amended, reads as under:

"100. Second Appeal: (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.

(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.

(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.

(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.

(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question."

Cases decided after 1976 amendment

24" 46.. In Bholaram Vs. Ameerchand, a three-Judge Bench of this court reiterated the statement of law. The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law.

47... In Kshitish Chandra Purkait Vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait and others, , a three judge Bench of this court held: (a) that the High Court should be satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law and not mere question of law; (b) reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded; (c) it has the duty to formulate the substantial questions of law and to put the opposite party on notice and give fair and proper opportunity to meet the point. The court also held that it is the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate substantial question of law involved in the case even at the initial stage.

This court had occasion to determine the same issue in Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade Vs. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, . The court stated that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction u/s 100 C.P.C. only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of the such duly framed substantial questions of law.

49.. A mere look at the said provision shows that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction u/s 100 C.P.C. only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. The impugned judgment shows that no such procedure was followed by the learned Single Judge. It is held by a catena of judgments by this court, some of them being, Kshitish Chandra Purkait Vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait and others, and Sheel Chand Vs. Prakash Chand, that the judgment rendered by the High Court u/s 100 C.P.C. without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained. On this short ground alone, this appeal is required to be allowed.

In Kanai Lal Garari and Others Vs. Murari Ganguly and Others, the court has observed that it is mandatory to formulate the substantial question of law while entertaining the appeal in absence of which the judgment is to be set aside. In Panchugopal Barua and others Vs. Umesh Chandra Goswami and others, and Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwai (Dead) by Lrs., the court reiterated the statement of law that the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law. These judgments have been referred to in the later judgment of K. Raj and Another Vs. Muthamma, . A statement of law has been reiterated regarding the scope and interference of the court in second appeal u/s 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) Thr. Lrs. Vs. Sohan Lal (Dead) By Lrs., , this court in para 10, has stated (SCC p. 441):

"10. Now u/s 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so."

Again in Roop Singh (Dead) Through LRs Vs. Ram Singh (Dead) Through LRs., , this court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads (SCC p. 713):

"7. It is to be reiterated that u/s 100 CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction u/s 100 CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of the matter the High Court did not even notice the question of law formulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal as there is no reference of it in the impugned judgment."

"51... Again in Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwai (Dead) by Lrs., , another three-Judge Bench of this court correctly delineated the scope of Section 100 C.P.C.. The court observed that an obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant proposes to urge before the court. In the said judgment, it was further mentioned that the High Court must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. According to the court the word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means-of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with-technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code of Article 133(1) (a) of the Constitution.

In Smt. Kanti Devi and Another Vs. Poshi Ram, the court came to the conclusion that the finding thus reached by the first appellate court cannot be interfered with in a second appeal as no substantial question of law would have flowed out of such a finding.

In Thiagarajan and Others Vs. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil and Others, , this court has held that the High Court in its jurisdiction u/s 100 C.P.C. was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact. The court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible.

In the same case, this court observed that in a case where SLP was filed against a judgment of the High Court interfering with findings of fact of the lower appellate court. This court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This court further observed that the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible.

This court again reminded the High Courts in Commissioner Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Vs. P. Shanmugama and Others, that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the finding of facts.

Again, this court in the case of State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi [(2005) 10 SCC 139] has reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This court observed that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Again, in the case of Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai [(2005) 10 SCC 553], this court observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This court observed that it is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same.

Again, in the case of Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh [(2005) 12 SCC 270], this court with anguish has mentioned that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court. In this case, the findings of the trial court and the lower appellate court regarding readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract was set aside by the High Court in its jurisdiction u/s 100 C.P.C. This court, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below.

In the case of H.P. Pyarejan Vs. Dasappa (Dead) by LRs. and Others, delivered on 6.2.2006, this court found serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. This court observed that it suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court. u/s 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing of substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it invokes reappreciation of evidence. This court found that the impugned judgment of the High Court was vulnerable and needed to be set aside.

In Chandrika Singh (Dead) by LRs. and Another Vs. Sarjug Singh and Another, , this court again reiterated legal position that the High Court u/s 100 CPC has limited jurisdiction. To deal with cases having a substantial question of law, this court observed as under:

"12.... While exercising its jurisdiction u/s 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court is required to formulate a substantial question of law in relation to a finding of fact. The High Court exercises a limited jurisdiction in that behalf. Ordinarily unless there exists a sufficient and cogent reason, the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below are binding on the High Court..."

In Chacko and Another Vs. Mahadevan, , while dealing with the jurisdiction of sections 96 and 100 CPC, this court laid down as under:

"6. It may be mentioned that in a first appeal filed u/s 96 CPC, the appellate court can go into questions of fact, whereas in a second appeal filed u/s 100 CPC the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact of the first appellate court, and it is confined only to questions of law."

In Bokka Subba Rao Vs. Kukkala Balakrishna and Others, , this court has clearly laid down that without formulating substantial questions of law u/s 100 CPC, the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact. The court laid down as under:

"4.... It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court in second appeal, before allowing the same, ought to have formulated the substantial questions of law and thereafter, to decide the same on consideration of such substantial questions of law...."

In Nune Prasad and Others Vs. Nune Ramakrisna, , this court laid down that the legislature has conferred a limited jurisdiction u/s 100 CPC on the High Court to deal with the cases where substantial question of law is involved.

In Basayya I. Mathad Vs. Rudrayya S. Mathad and Others, , this court has held that interference by the High Court without framing substantial question of law is clearly contrary to the mandate of section 100 CPC.

In Dharam Singh Vs. Karnail Singh and Others, , this court again crystallized the legal position in the following words:

"14. The plea about proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 100 instead of supporting the stand of the respondent rather goes against them. The proviso is applicable only when any substantial question of law has already been formulated and it empowers the High Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law. The expression "on any other substantial question of law" clearly shows that there must be some substantial question of law already formulated and then only another substantial question of law which was not formulated earlier can be taken up by the High Court for reasons to be recorded, if it is of the view that the case involves such question."

In Narendra Gopal Vidyarthi Vs. Rajat Vidyarthi, this court laid down that the High Court would be justified to interfere u/s 100 CPC only if it involves substantial question of law.

In a recent judgment U.R. Virupakshaiah Vs. Sarvamma and Another, , this court has once again crystallized the legal position after 1976 Amendment of the CPC. The court observed as under:

"15. "The CPC was amended in the year 1976 by reason of CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976. In terms of the said amendment, it is now essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law. The judgments of the trial court and the First Appellate Court can be interfered with only upon formulation of a substantial question of law..."

Legislative Background in the 54th Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in 1973:

"60. The comprehensive 54th Report of the Law Commission of India submitted to the Government of India in 1973 gives historical background regarding ambit and scope of Section 100 C.P.C. According to the said report, any rational system of administration of civil law should recognize that litigation in civil cases should have two hearings on facts-one by the trial court and one by the court of appeal.

In the 54th Report of the Law Commission of India, it is incorporated that it may be permissible to point out that a search for absolute truth in the administration of justice, however, laudable, must in the very nature of things be put under some reasonable restraint. In other words, a search for truth has to be reconciled with the doctrine of finality. In judicial hierarchy finality is absolutely important because that gives certainty to the law. Even in the interest of litigants themselves it may not be unreasonable to draw a line in respect of the two different categories of litigation where procedure will say at a certain stage that questions of fact have been decided by the lower courts and the matter should be allowed to rest where it lies without any further appeal. This may be somewhat harsh to an individual litigant; but, in the larger interest of the administration of justice, this view seems to us to be juristically sound and pragmatically wise. It is in the light of this basic approach that we will now proceed to consider some of the cases which were decided more than a century ago.

The question could perhaps be asked, why the litigant who wishes to have justice from the highest Court of the State should be denied the opportunity to do so, at least where there is a flaw in the conclusion on facts reached by the trial court or by the court of first appeal. The answer is obvious that even litigants have to be protected against too persistent a pursuit of their goal of perfectly satisfactory justice. An unqualified right of first appeal may be necessary for the satisfaction of the defeated litigant; but a wide right of second appeal is more in the nature of a luxury.

The rational behind allowing a second appeal on a question of law is, that there ought to be some tribunal having jurisdiction that will enable it to maintain, and, where necessary, re-establish, uniformity throughout the State on important legal issues, so that within the area of the State, the law, in so far as it is not enacted law, should be laid down, or capable of being laid down, by one court whose rulings will be binding on all courts, tribunals and authorities within the area over which it has jurisdiction. This is implicit in any legal system where the higher courts have authority to make binding decisions on questions of law.

It may be relevant to recall the statement of Douglas Payne on "Appeals on Questions of Fact" reported in (1958) Current Legal Problem 181. He observed that the real justification for appeals on questions of this sort is not so much that the law laid down by the appeal court is likely to be superior to that laid down by a lower court as that there should be a final rule laid down which binds all future courts and so facilitates the prediction of the law. In such a case the individual litigants are sacrificed, with some justification, on the altar of law-making and must find such consolation as they can in the monument of a leading case.

Historical Perspective:

"65 The predecessors of the High Courts in their civil appellate jurisdiction were the Sadar Divani Adalats. The right of appeal to the Sadar Divani Adalat was very wide initially, but came to be severely curtailed in the course of time. The "Conwallis Scheme", for example, made provision for two appeals in every category of cases, irrespective of its value. By 1814, this was reduced to one appeal only. Only in cases of Rs. 5,000 or over, there could be two appeals; one to the Provincial Court of Appeal and second to the Sadar Divani Adalat. As Lord Hastings observed,-

"The facility of appeal is founded on a most laudable principle of securing, by double and treble checks, the proper decision of all suits, but the utopian idea, in its attempt to prevent individual injury from a wrong decision, has been productive of general injustice by withholding redress, and general inconvenience, by perpetuating litigation".

Arrears:

"66. The primary cause of the accumulation of arrears of second appeal in the High Court is the laxity with which second appeals are admitted without serious scrutiny of the provisions of Section 100 C.P.C. It is the bounden duty of the High Court to entertain second appeal within the ambit and scope of Section 100 C.P.C.

The question which is often asked is why should a litigant have the right of two appeals even on questions of law? The answer to this query is that in every State there are number of District Courts and courts in the District cannot be final arbiters on questions of law. If the law is to be uniformly interpreted and applied, questions of law must be decided by the highest Court in the State whose decisions are binding on all subordinate courts.

Rationale behind permitting second appeal on question of law:

"68. The rationale behind allowing a second appeal on a question of law is, that there ought to be some tribunal having a jurisdiction that will enable it to maintain, and, where necessary, re-establish, uniformity throughout the State on important legal issues, so that within the area of the State, the law, in so far as it is not enacted law, should be laid down, or capable of being laid down, by one court whose rulings will be binding on all courts, tribunals and authorities within the area over which it has jurisdiction. This is implicit in any legal system where the higher courts have authority to make binding decisions on question of law.

The analysis of cases decided by the Privy Council and this court prior to 1976 clearly indicated the scope of interference u/s 100 C.P.C. by this Court. Even prior to amendment, the consistent position has been that the courts should not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts.

Now, after 1976 Amendment, the scope of Section 100 has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The High Courts would have jurisdiction of interfering u/s 100 C.P.C. only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved and those questions have been clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. At the time of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial questions of law and then only the High Court is permitted to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law. The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as "substantial question of law" which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become "third trial on facts" or "one more dice in the gamble". The effect of the amendment mainly, according to the amended section, was:

(i) The High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved;

(ii) The substantial question of law to precisely state such question;

(iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate substantial question of law before hearing the appeal;

(iv) Another part of the Section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question.

The fact that, in a series of cases, this court was compelled to interfere was because the true legislative intendment and scope of Section 100 C.P.C. have neither been appreciated nor applied. A class of judges while administering law honestly believe that, if they are satisfied that, in any second appeal brought before them evidence has been grossly misappreciated either by the lower appellate court or by both the courts below, it is their duty to interfere, because they seem to feel that a decree following upon a gross misappreciation of evidence involves injustice and it is the duty of the High Court to redress such injustice. We would like to reiterate that the justice has to be administered in accordance with law.

When Section 100 C.P.C. is critically examined then, according to the legislative mandate, the interference by the High Court is permissible only in cases involving substantial questions of law.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be and they added a note of warning that no Court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100.

The High Court seriously erred in interfering with the findings of facts arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by the first appellate court.

The scope of interference by the High Court in second appeal u/s 100 CPC after 1976 Amendment is strictly confined to cases involving substantial questions of law. The High Court would not be justified in dealing with any second appeal without first formulating substantial question of law. The legislative intention has been clearly spelt out in a series of cases of this court. "

Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law, I see no reason why this application should be allowed, that too, when the arguments in this case were already part-heard on 18.7.2014 when the counsel for the appellants had requested for time for filing the present application.

In case such applications are encouraged, there would be no end to litigation. Otherwise also, the appellants at the time of filing of the appeal had proposed four substantial questions of law, which according to him arose for the determination of the appeal, but this court vide its order dated 24.12.2011 admitted the appeal only on one substantial question of law. Not only this, the appellants appear to be contended with the order of admission on the question of law so framed and even chose to argue the matter on the said question of law.

It has to be borne in mind that the appeal is pending adjudication before this court for more than nearly 14 1/2 years and the appellants never felt the necessity for insisting upon framing of additional substantial questions of law, until he faced difficulty while arguing the matter on 18.7.2014. Therefore, I find no merit in this application and the same is dismissed.

List the case for hearing on 21.8.2014.