Vijay Kumar and another vs B.K.Thapper and another

By a lease deed dated 12121966 Dharmarth Trust, plaintiff No. 2 here, leased out a theatre in the City known as 'Hari Talkies' together with its

machinery, fittings and furniture to the defendants here, S/Sshri B.K. Thapper and Ram Prakash, for a period of ten years effective from

10101964. Under Clause 15 of the lease deed it was stipulated that, upon the expiration of the period of lease, the lessees will hand over the

possession of the demised premises together with all machinery, fittings and furniture as also the improvements made by them during the

continuance of the lease to the lessor. The term of the lease expired on 3091974. Long before that date, on 1321974, Dharmarth Trust, through its

counsel, Mr. Janak Lal Sehgal served a notice on the lessees asking them to deliver the possession on due date failing which it was added, that the

lessees will be liable to pay damages for the use and occupation of the demised property at the rate of Rs. 35,000/ per month till such time they

handed back the possession to the lessor. Subsequently, by a lease deed dated 2791974, which has since been registered, Dharmarth Trust leased

out the theatre and Talkie equipment to Mr. Vijay Kumar plaintiff No. I here, for a period of ten years commencing from 2101974. On 2891974

Mr. B.K. Thapper and Mr. Ram Prakash filed a suit in the Court of Sub Judge (CJM), Jammu praying for permanent injunction restraining the new

lessee from disturbing or interfering with their possession of the leased premises. An ad interim order of maintaining status quo was issued by the

SubJudge, C. J. M. Jammu. It was subsequently vacated on an application made by the lessor and the new lessee whereby they undertook not to

evict the erstwhile lessees except in due course of law. Thereafter a dispute arose between the parties as regards possession which travelled into

the Court on a motion made by the police and has since been determined by SubRegistrar, Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, by his judgment dated

17121974 whereby he has declared the erstwhile lessees to be in possession of the demised premises and forbidden disturbance until they are

evicted in due course of law. On 16121974, that is, one day before the date of the judgment, the new lessee and the lessor filed this suit on the

original side of this Court for declaration that the plaintiff No. 1 was in possession of the theatre and the Talkie equipment and for permanent

injunction restraining the defendants and their employees, agents and servants from interfering with his possession: and, in the alternative, for

ejectment of the defendants from the disputed property including the machinery fittings, furniture and the improvements made therein.

Giving a background of the events stated above, which are not disputed, the plaintiffs have stated in their plaint that with a view to cover up the

increased expenditure on account of expansion in its field of activities, the Dharmarth Trust wanted to lease out the disputed property on better

financial terms than before, after the lease in favour of the defendants had expired. With this object in view they formulated certain proposals which

were put to the defendants, but these proposals were not acceptable to them. Plaintiff No. 1, however, accepted the proposals and as such by a

lease deed dated 2791974, a lease was granted of the disputed property in his favour effective from 2101974. The defendants entered into

negotiations with him as a result of which they voluntarily surrendered the possession in favour of plaintiff No. 2 on 2101974 who, in turn,

delivered the same to plaintiff No. 1 on the same day. It is added that the surrender of possession was conditioned to the payment of Rs. 50,000/

by plaintiff No. 1 to the defendants as also to the defendants being permitted to sell tickets in respect of the cinema shows exhibited on 2101974

which the said plaintiff fulfilled and posted his own gatekeepers and other staff at work, but at about 1130 in the night, after the last show was

over, the defendants started instigating their men to remove the gatekeepers and other staff posted by plaintiff No.1 and tried to dispossess him

with the result that the law and order machinery came into motion and, to begin with, clamped Section 144, Cri. P. C. in the premises of the

theatre and then followed it up by taking proceedings under Section 145, Cri. P. C.

Along with the suit the plaintiffs submitted an application which is styled as one under Order 40, Rule 1 and Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Civil P. C.

They have prayed that a receiver be appointed pendente lite or else a temporary injunction be issued against the defendants restraining them from

interfering with the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of the property including the machinery, fixtures and furniture till the disposal of the suit. The

application is founded on the plea that the defendants have no right or title to the possession and enjoyment of the property; that the Jammu and

Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966 is not applicable to the present case; that the plea about statutory tenancy based on that Act

raised by the defendants in their suit filed before SubJudge CJM Jammu is baseless and unfounded; that the right and title to the possession and

enjoyment of the disputed property is vested in the plaintiffs; that if the property is allowed to remain in the hands of the defendants, there is danger

that it will be dissipated and irreparable mischief will be done particularly so because the relations between the parties are so much strained that the

defendants will not hesitate to destroy the machinery and furniture and render it useless; and, that the property as also the rights and interests of the

plaintiffs are exposed to manifest peril and require to be preserved and protected. The defendants have opposed the application. They have not

filed their written statement so far. In their objections to the application the defendants urged that the relief for the injunction much less a temporary

injunction asked for could not be granted in view of the decision under Section 145, Criminal P. C. As regards the prayer for the appointment of a

receiver, they opposed it both in their objections and at the hearing mainly on the ground that the prayer, if acceded to, would result in depriving

them of their legal and constitutional right to hold the property as statutory tenants under Houses and Shops Rent Control Act which, they said,

was applicable to the demised premises by virtue of notification No. 193 of 1961 adding that a receiver cannot be appointed in supersession of a

statutory tenant. They further urged that otherwise also they could not be deprived of the use and occupation of the disputed property including the

machinery, fittings and furniture by the appointment of a receiver because, said they, a receiver cannot be appointed in a case of ejectment against

a tenant overstaying the period of lease, particularly so when, as in the present case, the lessor has indicated that he will charge damages for

wrongful use and occupation. They added that the fears of the plaintiffs about damages to the property were baseless. They raised some technical

objections as well. At the hearing of the application the counsel for the plaintiffs did not press the prayer for issue of a temporary injunction for the

obvious reason that the decision of SubRegistrar, Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, in proceedings under Section 145, Criminal P. C. was an

impediment. He confined himself to the prayer for the appointment of receiver alone which the other side opposed.

The short question for determination is whether on the facts and circumstances of the present case a receiver can be justifiably appointed.

Order 40, Rule 1 of the Civil P C. empowers a court to appoint receiver of any property where it appears to the court to be just and convenient

that such appointment should be made. The exercise of this power is however limited by the proviso that the appointment of receiver will not

authorise the court

To remove from the possession or the custody of property any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove.

The proviso clearly refers to a case where a person in possession is a third person and the parties to the suit have no present right to disturb his

possession. This was the view taken by Ramesam and Cornish, JJ. in Vythulinga Pandarasannadhi v. Board of Control, Thiagarajaswami

Devasthanam, (AIR 1932 Mad 193). I fully agree with this view. I make these observations because it was argued by Mr. Inder Dass that the

provision was an impediment in the way of the appointment of a receiver in the present case having regard to the fact, as he said, that the plaintiffs

had yet to establish their right to eject the defendants and that way they had no present right to disturb their possession.

In the ordinary sense, the words 'Just and convenient', would denote what is practicable and what the interests of justice require. Now what is

practicable and in the interests of justice in one case may not be so in the other case. Different considerations arise in different cases depending on

the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court has, therefore, a wide discretion in the matter of appointment of Receiver but the discretion

must be sound and reasonable. The court may be influenced mainly by the particular facts of each case, it must also be guided by broad and well

established principles which have covered the previous practice and which, though unexpressed, may be said to be lying dormant in the provisions

of the Code.

According to the English decision, says Woodroffe.

If a right was asserted to property in the possession of the defendant claiming to hold under a legal title, the Courts did not interfere by appointing

a receiver unless a very strong case was made out.

The Court of Chancery would not at the instance of a person alleging a mere legal title against another party who was in possession of real estate

and who also claimed to hold by a like legal title, disturb that possession by appointing a receiver, but left the claimant to his remedy at law to have

his title declared. The Court would not interfere with a legal title unless there was some equity, and unless in cases of absolute destruction, waste

and imminent danger, or where the contest lay between a person having a clear title and one without any reasonable appearance of title and the

like.

(The law relating to receivers, Woodroffe third edition)

The principles laid down in these decisions are equally applicable in India as held in Sidheswari Dabi v. Abhoyeswari Dabi, (1888) ILR 15 Cal

818 which is a leading case on this subject in this country. Accordingly a court will not appoint a receiver against a bona fide possessor with legal

title save in exceptional circumstances as, for instance, when the property is in danger of being wasted, destroyed or lost. But where he has no

legal right to possession as, for example, when he is a mere trespasser or one whose original entry was lawful and of right but whose right to the

possession has terminated, and he has refused or failed to quit despite demand, it is the duty of the Court to interpose and appoint a receiver at the

instance of the party having legal title to possession irrespective of the fact whether the possessor is guilty of waste, dissipation, or malversation or

the fact that damages are recoverable from such possessor for use and occupation.

Now in the present case the lease in favour of the defendants admittedly expired on 3091974. Before that date the lessor served them with

notice to vacate on due date. They did not heed it and continued in possession of the demised property. Under the ordinary law, once a tenancy

has ceased either by efflux of time or by a legal notice to quit, the tenant loses his right and title to possession if he has no other valid claim to

remain in possession. He has no right or title to continue in possession. Of course he is not liable to be evicted except in due course of law but it is

one thing to say that he cannot be ousted except in due course of law and another thing to say that he has no right and title to be in possession.

Some authorities have gone to the extent of saying that the possession assumes the character of trespass (See Ouseph Lonan v. Kochunarayana

Pisharady, AIR 1973 Ker 76 and N.H. Thadani v. Chief Settlement Commr., AIR 1958 Punj 314). The view expressed by me above is not

negatived by the decision of Supreme Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh, (AIR 1968 SC 620) as Mr. Inder Dass sought to

make out. In that case their Lordships of the Supreme Court approved the law as laid down by Chagla, C. J. in K.K. Verma v. Naraindass C.

Malkani, (AIR 1954 Bom 358) in the following words :

Under the Indian Law the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue

in possession after the termination of the tenancy his possession is juridical and that, possession is protected by statute. Under Section 9 of the

Specific Relief Act a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against his landlord if the landlord deprives him of possession

otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser who has been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court under Section 9 and claim

possession against the true owner.

The words ""although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy"" are clearly suggestive. They leave no

room for doubt that a tenant has no right to possession after the termination of the tenancy. Without anything else, therefore the defendants have no

right or title to possession in the present case.

The case of the defendants in their objections is that they have become statutory tenants under the Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966.

At the hearing, however, Mr. K.N. Raina, appearing for one of the defendants, argued that the lessor had consented to the defendants continuing

in possession and as such they were tenants holding over in the technical sense. Mr. Raina raked up this question by reference to the averments

made in the plaint that there were negotiations for compromise between plaintiff No. 1 i. e. the new lessee and the defendants as a result of which

the defendants were permitted to sell tickets for cinema shows exhibited on 21074 as part of the compromise whereby the plaintiff No. 1 was

allowed by the defendants to enter into the possession of the cinema from that day. It is too early to make any observation on this aspect of the

matter. The circumstances under which the defendants, if at all, were permitted to sell tickets on that day have yet to be investigated. Then there is

the new lease deed which was executed on 27th September, 1974. Its effect on the consent, if at all, given by the lessor on a date subsequent to

the deed has to be assessed. The averments cannot, therefore, be treated to be sweeping enough to find a prima facie case of holding over in the

technical sense in favour of the defendants.

That brings me to the case of the defendants that they are statutory tenants under the Houses and Shops Rent Control Act. Their contention is

that the income of one of the defendants, Ram Prakash, being less than Rs. 20,000/ per annum, the said Act is applicable. There is an obvious

impediment in accepting this contention. In the first place so far there is no evidence on the file on the basis of which the court would be justified in

holding that the income of Mr. Ram Prakash is less than Rs. 20,000/ per annum. Such evidence can only be expected to come on record when the

suit proceeds to trial. At present there is the statement of Incometax clerk in a pending suit on one side showing that the income of the defendants

for the assessment years 197172, 197273 and 197374 was more than Rs. 20,000/ and on the other side the certificate of the Incometax Officer

showing that Ram Prakash returned an income of less than Rs. 20,000/ per annum. Then the question would arise whether the income to be

considered should be of the tenants jointly or of only one of them particularly so because the lease was made in their favour jointly and the lease

deed expressly provided that they were accepting it as joint tenants.

Leave that alone, there is a more strong impediment in accepting the case of the defendants based on statutory tenancy. That impediment lies in

Section 2 (5) of the House and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966. That section reads:

Shop"" means a building or a part of a building suitable for occupation as such and includes a piece of land, with or without structure let for the

pupose of being used principally for business or trade;

By virtue of Notification No. 193 of 1961 dated 2451961 issued under the second proviso to Season 1 (3) of Jammu and Kashmir Houses and

Shops Rent Control Act, 2009, the Government was pleased to direct that the said Act shall apply to the buildings let for the purpose of any trade

or business or use for any industrial or commercial purpose in any area in which the said Act was in force and any such building shall be construed

as a 'shop' within the meaning of the said Act. That Act was repealed by the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Ordinance,

1966 which however continued the notifications issued under the previous Act by virtue of Section 34 (2) thereof as if such notifications were

issued under the Ordinance. A similar provision appeared in the Act replacing the Ordinance styled as the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops

Rent Control Act, 1966. The notification must therefore be read as one issued under the existing Act namely Jammu and Kashmir Houses and

Shops Rent Control Act, 1966. In accordance with the said notification any building let for commercial purposes must be construed as a 'shop'

within the meaning of the said Act.

In the present case what was demised to the defendants is described in Cl. 1 of the deed dated 12th December, 1966 which says :

The lessors granted and the lessees as joint tenants accepted a lease of the property known as Hari Talkies situated in Raghunath Bazar, Jammu,

consisting of Cinema Hall with its premises consisting of structures, fixtures and chobara in fit and perfect condition in accordance wilt the

Cinematograph Act and Municipal Bye Laws for the purpose of a licence, alongwith the Cine Machine, electric fittings, fans and furnitures in

perfect order the list of which is attached as Annexure A for the sole purpose of running the cinema business for the years from 1st October, 1964

at a monthly rent of Rs. 4,100/ (Rs. Four thousand and one hundred only) payable in advance on the tenth of each month at the Dharmarth Chest,

Jammu or at such a place as the lessor may instruct in this behalf.

Thus the lease was a composite lease of cinema premises and the talkie equipment including machinery, fittings and furniture and not a lease of a

mere building or building with land and structures or the like covered by the definition of 'shop' in the said Act. On a parity of reasoning it was held

in S. Raja Chetty v. Jagannathadas Govindas, (AIR 1950 Mad 284) that the lease of land and building together with fixtures, talkie equipment

machinery and other articles is not the lease of mere building or the building with mere furniture or the sort covered by the definition of the 'Building'

under Section 2 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Control) Act, 1946. In that case there was a provision in the deed which split up the monthly

rent and hire of Rs. 3,200/ into Rs. 1,600/ being rent for the ground and super structure, Rs. 800/ being hire of furniture and Rs. 800/ being hire of

talkie equipment machinery and fixtures, but the court held it was extremely artificial and not to effect a division of lease into two separate

contracts, namely, one of the rent of the building and the other of hire of the furniture so as to make the provisions of the Act applicable. Here the

position is even worse. No separate provision has been made for hire and rent. The amount payable by the lessee represents a gross amount in lieu

of both rent and hire. It was stated that the machinery and equipment were purchased by the defendants when they took the lease for the first time

in 1954 and the property therein could not be treated to have passed to the lessor when he demised it alongwith the premises in the year 1964.

There is no evidence on the file so far to justify the conclusion that the machinery and equipment were purchased by the defendants or in any case

that property therein had not passed to the lessor when he demised it in the year 1964. That evidence may come in the course of trial. But

presently no case can be found in favour of defendants on that plea.

In these circumstances one cannot help holding that the claim for title made by the defendants is not honest and bona fide. They must be

regarded having possession without any reasonable appearance of title which price facie vests in the plaintiffs and in any case in plaintiff No. 2, as

the owner of the property. On the principles set out above the court must therefore interpose and appoint a receiver pendente lite irrespective of

the fact whether there is any danger of waste, dissipation or loss of the property, although, in the circumstances of the case, when the relations

between the parties have become strained and the dispute between them is about a goose laying golden eggs as it amounts to when the dispute

relates to a cinema House, one can legitimately and reasonably apprehend that the defendants or for that matter anybody in their place will not

hesitate to spoil the machinery, fittings and furniture and render these useless if once they or he gets a feeling that the eviction is imminent. In any

case the premises, machinery and equipment will deteriorate in value even if used fairly and there is no justifiable reason why the defendants should

be allowed to use such premises and equipment to their advantage and to the manifest disadvantage of the lessor or the new lessee.

The learned counsel for the defendants relied on the decisions in case Sankara Pillai Madhavan Pillai v. Inez Rosario, (AIR 1971 Ker 27) and

R. Chinnaswamy Gounder v. C.H. Laxminarayana Hariyachar, (AIR 1972 Mys 20) and an unreported case of this court in S. Joginder Singh v.

Balkishen to oppose the prayer for receivership. But none of these cases has any bearing on the present case. In the first case the facts were like

this:

The plaint property belonged to one Peter Rosario since 1956. A tutorial college had been conducted in one of the buildings erected upon the

property by one Prabhakaran. While so, the third defendant got an assignment of this shed in 1960. Thereafter the said defendant executed a lease

deed with the fourth defendant who was the uncle of the plaintiff. The third defendant remained in possession under the renewed lease deed dated

2411966 on payment of Rs. 200/ as ground rent per year to the fourth defendant. The fourth defendant was the agent of Peter Rosario who left

for Penang in 1959. In the meanwhile he had assigned the property to the plaintiff who was his son. By the time the plaintiff and his father came

back from Penang, the third defendant had executed a fresh deed dated 2941966 in favour of the 4th defendant. The third defendant had also

erected three more sheds for the conduct of the tutorial college. The ground rent under the latest arrangement was Rs. 400/ a year. In the rent

deed dated 2941966 it was stated that when Peter Rosario came back from Penang, the third defendant would surrender the property on

demolition of the sheds erected by him upon the property. Since there was no surrender effected, the plaintiff instituted a suit for possession and

mandatory injunction to demolish the sheds. On the application of the plaintiff the trial court granted a temporary injunction restraining the

defendants from conducting tutorial colleges in the four sheds constructed by the third defendant and from putting up any additional shed or from

interfering with the possession of the plaint schedule property of the plaintiff. In revision the High Court of Kerala set aside the order and dismissed

the application of the plaintiff for injunction subject to the direction that the defendant shall not erect any new sheds pending the suit holding that the

order of injunction in other respects was unjustifiable.

In AIR 1972 Mys 20 the plaintiff instituted a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession of the

suit property. His case was that he was cultivating the land as tenant under the first defendant since 25th July, 1956 agreeing to pay a cash annual

rent of Rs. 300/. His further case was defendants Nos. 1 to 3 had colluded and were trying to destroy his right as a tenant and sought a permanent

injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession. An application for interim injunction was filed. The trial Judge issued an

order of interim injunction and after notice to the defendants confirmed it on 2911970. Thereafter on 391970 an application for appointment of

receiver was made by the defendant No. 1. On 18121970 the trial Judge appointed Tehsildar Magistrate Taluq as receiver. The application for

receivership was based ors the plea that taking advantage of the temporary injunction the plaintiff was damaging and wasting the estate, cutting the

trees and removing the pumps installed in the estate and had already disposed of some of the pumps. It was further alleged that he had removed

the pipe lines and sold the same and also stated that he had been damaging the coconut trees, mango trees and other jungle trees and trying to sell

them and that he was not properly cultivating the lands. On appeal Datar, J. set aside the order observing:

I am therefore of the opinion that in the present case as the suit is pending and tenancy is undisputed having regard to the provisions of Section 22

of the Act (Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961) the court below should not have passed an order appointing a receiver and thus depriving the

tenant's right to remain in possession of the property which he is entitled until the notice as required by Section 22 of the Act is given and

proceedings under Section 41 of the Act initiated against him."" and added that the assertions about damage were bald and unfounded.

In the unreported judgment of this court mentioned above, the facts were like this: One, S. Uttam Singh Khurrana, sued Baldev Krishen

Thapper and Sita Ram for recovery of possession of a cinema known as 'Uttam Talkies'. S. Uttam Singh died during the pendency of the suit and

his legal representatives were brought on record in the case. The parties subsequently compromised the suit in terms whereof the defendants were

allowed to remain in possession upto 31121962 and pay rent at the rate of Rs. 3,000/ per month in the following proportion :

S. Devinder Singh ... Four annas in a rupee

S. Joginder Singh ... Six annas in a rupee

M/s. Devindra Singh,

Gopal Das and

Manohar Lal ... Six annas in a rupee. Subsequently Devendar Singh and M/s. Devendra Singh, Gopal Dass and Manohar Lal entered into a fresh

lease with Baldev Krishan and Sita Ram in respect of their share of the property. Joginder Singh transferred his share in favour of Sudhir Kumar,

Sarat Chander, Ashok Kumar and Chander Sheikhar minors by means of a registered sale deed. The transferees thereafter applied for the

execution of the decree and made a prayer for the appointment of a receiver, in respect of cinema business. A learned Single Judge of this court,

Justice Bhat, as he then was, refused the prayer observing:

The decreeholders admittedly have no right or interest in the earning or the running or the management of the cinema business. As such, the

request of the learned counsel for the petitioners for the appointment of a receiver who shall take charge of the cinema business and keep accounts

is meaningless and is clearly beyond the scope of the dispute between the parties. The matter has nothing to do with the execution application and

as such it is not within the power of this court to take action of any kind so far as the running of the cinema and its management and the accounts of

the earnings therefrom are concerned. The later application of 3rd May does not disclose any ground for the appointment of a receiver. I think the

delay on the part of the judgmentdebtors to protract the proceedings in the execution application is no ground for the appointment of a receiver.

This in my opinion would dispose of the application for the appointment of a receiver, but as the case has been argued, unnecessarily though at a

very great length, I shall consider the various arguments advanced in this behalf by the parties without making any commitment with respect to the

other arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties about the maintainability of the application for execution or the executability of the

decree at the present moment.

After discussing the various authorities, the learned Judge further observed :

From a discussion of the above authorities, it would be clear that equitable execution can only be ordered in favour of a party when he cannot at

law enforce his rights under the decree. Further, all cases of equitable execution relate to the satisfaction of some money claim which could not be

satisfied by an attachment of the property of the judgment debtors or by taking recourse to other methods of execution as laid down in Section 51

of the Civil P. C. In this case the doctrine of equitable execution has no application. The decree if at all there is one, executable, is for ejecting the

judgmentdebtors from a six anna share in a rupee from the premises of the Uttam Talkies, its fixtures, fittings and furniture. No amount has been

decreed against the judgment debtors for which the ordinary proceedings of law cannot give the decreeholder the requisite relief. In my view the

doctrine stated above has nothing to do with the facts of the present case. The argument was simply ingenious and too far fetched to apply to the

facts of the present case.

All these cases are distinguishable both on facts and law from the present case.

Towards the end Mr. Raina urged that the date of the cause of action was not correctly stated in the plaint and, that being so, the suit was not

maintainable in its present form and as such the prayer for appointment of receiver could not be granted. There is no force in this argument and

must be rejected. Where the court finds from the facts and circumstances on record that there is case for the appointment of receiver, it will not

allow its hands to be tied up by mere formal objections particularly so where the objection is one which can be corrected by amendment.

In the result I accept the application for appointment of receiver and hereby appoint Mr. A.N. Saraf, District Judge, Jammu as receiver for the

suit property with the following directions :

He will take the property into his charge after making a proper inventory of the machinery, fittings, fixtures, furniture etc. found in the building;

He will lease out the premises and talkie equipment on usual terms and conditions for a period of six months terminable on either side by fifteen

days' notice;

He will deposit the lease money in this court;

He will be entitled to take all such measures as may be necessary for the safety and preservation of the property.

The Receiver shall get a sum of Rupees 1,500/ as his fee. He will be assisted in his by M/s. O.N. Kaul and HafiqudDin, Nazirs of this court, who

will get Rs. 500/ each as their renumeration. The amount of fee and remuneration shall be payable by the plaintiffs. The lease money shall, after it is

deposited by the Receiver in this court, be kept by the Registrar in fixed deposit with J. and K. Bank for three months, to begin with. The

application shall be filed.

Application allowed.