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Judgment
M.L. Mehta, J.—The present petition has been filed under Sec. 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, against the Order passed by
the Court of Senior Civil Judge cum Rent Controller (Central) Delhi, in Eviction Petition No. 26/2011 dated 25.04.2012, allowing the
respondents'' application seeking leave to defend. The brief facts leading to the present petition are as follows. The petitioner no. 1, M/s. Vijay
Kumar Jewelers, a partnership firm duly registered with the Registrar of Firms, purchased the premises bearing municipal No. 2814 to 2818,
constructed on the Plot No. 97 in Block-P, Gali no. 19, Beadonura, Ajmal Khan Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The petitioner no. 1 is carrying
business and is in occupation of the first floor and remaining portion on the ground floor of premises no. 2818. Shop nos. 2816 and ground floor of
2818 of the abovementioned premises were let out to Sh. Roshan Lal, by Sh. Kanhiya Lal Sharma, who was the previous owner of the suit shops.
The tenancy was renewed by virtue of an agreement of lease dated 23.04.1982. After the demise of Sh. Roshan Lal, by Law of Survivorship, Sh.
Ashok Kumar, the predecessor of the respondents, became the sole tenant in respect of the tenanted premises.
In 2007, the petitioners no. 2 to 4, wanted to induct their brother Sh. Ashwani Kumar as a partner and expand their business and thus served a
notice upon the respondents for eviction of the suit shop on the ground of bona fide requirement. After much deliberation, the respondent
suggested a joint development of the tenanted premises along with the adjoining properties owned by respondent no. 1. The parties agreed on the
mode of division of the developed property and they executed a Memorandum of Understanding date 09.08.2008. Upon the lapse of the MoU on
31.03.2009 and the lack of any action by the respondents, the petitioners filed for their eviction before the Ld. RC, under Sec. 14(1)(e) on the
ground of bona fide requirement of the petitioners to expand their business.
In the leave to defend application supported by the affidavits, the respondents contended that they were regularly paying the rent, but since the
petitioners were claiming rent at Rs. 5,000/- per day which was refused by them, the eviction petition was filed to coerce them. The respondents in
their application also contended that the petitioners were already in possession of sufficient accommodation to carry out the business on the ground
as well as the first floor of the suit premises. It was also contended by them that the petitioners had recently disposed off one shop in Bank Street
for a huge consideration. It was also contended that the petitioners had in their possession, one more shop which was lying vacant to the right of
their business premises.
Before proceeding to examine the submissions, it is vital to note that the powers of revision of this Court under Sec. 25B(8) are not as wide as
that of an appellate Court. If found that the impugned order is according to law and does not suffer from a jurisdictional error, then this Court has
no power to interfere. It must also be noted that the object behind the rent laws is to strike a balance between the rights of tenants and the
landlords. More so in cases where the landlord possesses properties other than the suit premises. The Apex Court in the case of Charan Dass
Duggal v. Brahma Nand, (1983) 1 SCC 301 , has held:
When landlord seeks possession for personal requirement he has to prove his present need. If he has any premises in his possession he must allege
and prove why that is not sufficient for his present use, or why he has to shift to the premises of which he seeks possession.
While it is settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirements, and neither the courts nor the tenant can dictate
terms to him, it cannot be said that everything the landlord states should be taken as gospel truth. Keeping this in mind, I have perused through the
impugned order and given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by the petitioners.
The Ld. RC has noted from the photographs of the suit premises, where the whole suit building is clearly shown that the shop of the petitioner is
shown to be on the left side of the ground floor and on entire first floor and the suit shop is in the center and the shop on the right corner, though it
is shown to be occupied in the photograph, but admittedly is lying vacant at present. The Ld. RC noted that when the petitioners for years have
been running business from the left side of the corner shop and the first floor shop, then why the shop lying vacant on the right side could not be
used for the expansion of the said business. He has also noted that it is not the case of the petitioners here that the shop lying vacant is smaller in
size or is inferior, in any way, to the suit shop or the shop already being used by the petitioner, which is on the left side corner of the ground floor.
The Ld. RC has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, , wherein it was held:
If a landlord wants to get a property from a tenant despite his having in his possession another property, the Court can justifiably require the
landlord to justify his decision to do his business only from the property from which the tenant is sought to be evicted.
He has also placed reliance upon S.M. Mehra v. D.D. Malik, CA No. 120/1990 where it was held:
Whether the landlord required additional accommodation or not could be properly determined only by granting leave to contest the eviction
petition to the tenant and there was no need to take a summary procedure.
The Ld. RC has observed that the petitioners have not been able to substantially prove that vacating the suit shop alone is the remedy for them
to expand their business. Mere saying that the business cannot be extended if the suit shop is not vacated, is no ground for claiming the suit shop,
since the shop lying vacant on the right side can also be used for extension purposes. In such situations it is upon, the petitioners to substantiate that
the said shop available with them is not suitable and sufficient to expand their business. It may be that they do need the suit shop, but then this
projected need is required to be tested objectively but the controller. It is settled law that where the projected requirement is of additional
accommodation, as in this case, the leave to defend is necessarily granted to the tenant.
If in the process of the landlord trying to prove his bona fide requirement, the tenant is able to raise any triable issue then the court has to allow
the leave to defend application. By allowing the leave to defend application, an opportunity is being given to the tenant to try and test the
contentions of the landlord. It is obvious that on mere assertion of the tenant leave cannot be granted, but if the tenant is able to bring about certain
issues which need to be examined then the rent controller is bound to allow him the leave to defend. In this case, the triable issue being whether the
bona fide need of the petitioners is a need of an additional accommodation. In light of the factual matrix and the principles of law as discussed
above, the Ld. RC has rightly allowed the application seeking leave to defend. I see no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order. The petition is
hereby dismissed.