Vijender Kumar vs Oriental Bank of Commerce and Others

Ranjit Singh, J.—While working with the respondent-Oriental Bank of Commerce, the petitioner was charge sheeted and proceeded against for unauthorisedly pocketing a sum of Rs. 50,000/-. This was alleged to be a misconduct in terms of Paragraph 19.5 (j) of Bipartite Settlement dated 19.10.1966. This Paragraph creates a misconduct in regard to doing any act prejudicial to the interests of the Bank. Enquiry Officer was detailed, who found the petitioner guilty of the charge. Rather the petitioner was also found blameworthy for destroying the relevant documentary evidence. Copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner and after considering his representation and after issuing show cause notice for the proposed punishment, the petitioner was dismissed from service on 11.6.1991. His appeal was dismissed on 27.8.1991.

The petitioner, thereafter raised an industrial dispute, which was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court, Chandigarh. Labour Court vide its order dated 15.9.2003 came to take a view that the enquiry proceedings were defective being held in violation of the principle of natural justice. The liberty was given to the Bank to lead evidence to prove the misconduct before the Labour Court. The petitioner as well as the Bank approached this Court against the said order. These writ petitions were disposed by Division Bench of this Court on 7.10.2004. Part of the impugned order, whereby the Bank was directed to pay subsistence allowance to the workman, was set-aside, while disposing of the writ filed by the Bank. The writ filed by the workman was dismissed. The parties, therefore, again went before the Labour Court, which has now passed the award upholding the order of dismissal. The petitioner-workman, thus, has filed this writ petition to impugn the said award passed on 9.3.2010.

Mr. H.C. Arora, counsel for the petitioner submits that the charge alleged against the petitioner was vague and could not be established. He also made reference to paragraph 19.4 of the Bipartite Settlement to say that the petitioner could not have been dismissed.

I have perused the impugned judgment as well as the documents placed on record. As per the material available on record, the petitioner had confessed his guilt about which clear and cogent evidence was given by number of witnesses. Evidence on this aspect has been appreciated by the Labour Court, which is as follows:

The cumulative inference from the pleadings and the affidavits filed by the witnesses of the management is that the workman was transferred from the concerned branch to another branch. The bank Manager Shri O.P. Taneja was on leave on 1.12.1988. He proposed to relieve the workman on 30.11.1988 before his proceeding on leave but could not because of the request of the workman. The workman was thereafter relieved by Shri R.S. Gupta, who was officiating as Manager on 1.12.1988. The workman worked for whole of the day on 1.12.1988. He also visited the bank on 2.12.1988. On disclosure of fraud of Rs. 50,000/- FIR was lodged in the appropriate Police Station and the workman in the presence of the witnesses admitted his fault. It has also come before this Tribunal that even father and brother-in-law of the workman came to the bank when workman admitted his fault and they prayed not for recording FIR. The father and brother-in-law of the workman handed over the FDR of Rs. 30,000/-and had also given withdrawal form of Rs. 50,000/- of the Savings Bank Account No. 7303 of Shri Richpal Singh with the intention of returning the said amount to the bank.

The petitioner could have easily produce his father and brother-in-law if he was to contest the evidence as referred to above. It is not only the oral confession or admission which was produced before the court but was supported by the fact that FDR of Rs. 30,000/- was also given to the Bank after withdrawal, which would further indicate that the admission was truthful and reliable. In this background, the petitioner cannot either plead that the charge was vague or that the same was not supported by cogent and reliable evidence.

The submission made on the basis of Paragraph 19.4 of the Bipartite Settlement can also not be accepted. The right of the petitioner to draw subsistence allowance and payment of the arrears was set-aside by Division Bench of this Court while disposing of the earlier writ petition filed by the Bank. Even otherwise, this para of the Bipartite Settlement cannot be read to mean that Bank could not have dismissed the petitioner on the ground that he was found innocent by the police so far as criminal liability was concerned. This paragraph of the Bipartite Settlement only talks of a situation when steps are taken to prosecute an employee but he is not put to trial within a year. The management then is given liberty to deal with him as if he has committed an act of gross misconduct. It is further provided that when the authorities come to the conclusion that there is no case of prosecution, then also it is open to the management to proceed against the employee under the provisions set out in Clauses 19.11 and 19.12 for discharge. How the period of suspension is to be regulated is then provided in this paragraph of the Bipartite Settlement.

Paragraph 19.4 cannot be read in the manner as urged by the counsel for the petitioner to say that petitioner could only be discharged. This para clearly provides that when a person is not put to trial, the management may deal with him as if he has committed a gross misconduct. The petitioner has, thus, been proceeded against under the relevant provision of the Bipartite Settlement and the order passed is perfectly within the jurisdiction of the respondent-Bank. The reference made by the counsel to the case of Anil Kumar Jaggi v. Presiding Officer, Central Government, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-1, Chandigarh and Anr. 2010 (1) RSJ 155 is wholly misplaced. This was a case where the employee was punished by awarding stoppage of two increments. The issue arose about treating the suspension period. FIR had also been lodged in the said case against the workman where the workman was found innocent. The management had not inflicted the punishment of dismissal and in this background it was observed that the question of treating the suspension period as not spent duty was not available in view of Regulation 12(3). The facts in the said case were entirely different. Here the order impugned is that of dismissal and issue of treating the suspension period is not under consideration.

There is, thus, no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed in limine.