Vikas Yadav vs State Of Jharkhand

Anil Kumar Choudhary, J

Heard the parties.

This Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with a prayer to quash the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Complaint Case No.C/1 Case No.2537 of 2016 including the order taking cognizance dated 01.06.2017 by which the learned Magistrate has found prima facie case for the offences punishable under Section 385, 386, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner.

The allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner was in business relationship with the complainant. On 26.09.2016 at about 12:00 noon, the accused persons visited the office of the complainant. During the settlement talk, the complainant insisted the accused persons to take back the rejected spools from the complainant’s firm. On the other hand, the petitioner demanded the value of the rejected spools amounting to Rs.7,44,947/- and on the complainant refusing to pay the same, the petitioner threatened the complainant and his son with their life.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the allegation against the petitioner is false. The dispute between the parties has been referred to the arbitrator and the award has been made by the arbitrator on 11.05.2016 and by the said award, the petitioners’ company was awarded Rs.5,04,947/- along with interest of Rs.3,64,807/-. It is then submitted that suppressing this material fact, the complaint has been filed with an evil intention to arm twisting the petitioner maliciously and for wrecking vengeance. It is next submitted that if the allegations made in the complaint, statement on solemn affirmation and the statement of the enquiry witnesses are considered to be true in their entirety, still none of the offence punishable under Sections 385, 386, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioners. Hence, it is submitted that the prayer, as prayed for in this Cr.M.P., be allowed.

Learned Spl.P.P. appearing for the State and the learned counsel for the opposite party No.2 on the other hand vehemently oppose the prayer of the petitioner as prayed for in this Cr.M.P. and submit that if allegations made in the complaint, statement on solemn affirmation and the statement of the enquiry witnesses are considered to be true in their entirety, then all the three offences punishable under Sections 385, 386, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioner. Hence, it is submitted that this Cr.M.P., being without any merit, be dismissed.

Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after carefully going through the materials available in the record, it is pertinent to mention here that in order to constitute the offence punishable under Section 385 or 386 of the Indian Penal Code, extortion is one of the common essential ingredients. The essential ingredients to constitute the offence of extortion is that:-

(1) The accused puts a person in fear of injury to such person or any other person;

(2) The putting of a person in such fear must be intentional;

(3) The accused must thereby induce the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security;

(4) Such inducement must be done dishonestly as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of R.S. Nayak vs. A. R. Antulay & Another reported in (1986) 2 SCC 716.

Now, coming to the facts of the case, there is no allegation of any inducement by the petitioner to the complainant. The only allegation against the petitioner is that the complainant was telling them to take back the unused spools but they were insisting upon the spools supplied by them to be retained by the complainant and the complainant to pay back the money and during the talk of settlement, some hot exchange of words has taken place and the same in the considered opinion of this Court is not sufficient either to constitute the offence punishable under Section 385 or 386 of the Indian Penal Code.

So far as the offence punishable under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, it is a settled principle of law as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Vikram Johar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another reported in (2019) 14 SCC 207 paragraph-25 of which reads as under:-

Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by Fiona Shrikhande [Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715] has also to be applied when question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edn. with regard to proof of offence states the following:

“… The prosecution must prove:

(i) That the accused threatened some person.

(ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested;

(iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.”

A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.” (Emphasis supplied)

that in order to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, the essential ingredients are:-

(i) That the accused threatened some person.

(ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested;

(iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.

Now, coming to the facts of the case, the exact words uttered by the petitioner during the settlement talks has not specifically been mentioned anywhere. The admitted case of the parties is that there was business transaction between them and the hot exchange of words took place in respect of payment to be made for the articles supplied by the petitioner to the complainant. Whereas the complainant was insisting upon the petitioner to take back the unused spools and was declining to pay the amount of the unused spools. There is no allegation of any other of occurrence taking place. The only occurrence which took this was during settlement talks.. There is no allegation of intentionally, the petitioner has been done any overt act, which could cause alarm in the mind of the complainant. Therefore, the allegations made as indicated above in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment; in the considered opinion of this Court is insufficient to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code because the allegations appear to be only ornamental in nature in the facts of the case.

In view of the discussions made above, this Court is of the considered view that continuation of this criminal proceeding against the petitioner will amount to abuse of process of law and this is a fit case where the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Complaint Case No.C/1 Case No.2537 of 2016 including the order taking cognizance dated 01.06.2017, as prayed for by the petitioner, be quashed and set aside.

Accordingly, the entire criminal proceedings in connection with Complaint Case No.C/1 Case No.2537 of 2016 including the order taking cognizance dated 01.06.2017, as prayed for by the petitioner, is quashed and set aside.

In the result, this Cr.M.P., stands allowed.

In view of disposal of the instant Cr.M.P., the interim relief granted vide order dated 05.07.2019, is vacated.