High CourtsDivision Bench

Vikram Singh vs Ramesh Kumar And Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 10 June 2020 · Citation: (2020) 06 P&H CK 0077

HON’BLE JUDGES
Jaswant Singh, J · Sant Parkash, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 — Section 51, 51(5), 51(3)(b), 175(v) · Constitution Of India, 1950 — Article 226
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Letter Patent Appeal No. 378 Of 2020 (O&M) In Civil Writ Petition No. 21057 Of 2016
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Judgment

68 paragraphs · 1,410 words

Sant Parkash, J

The present intra-court appeal is directed against the judgment dated 18.03.2020, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, vide which the writ

petition filed by the petitioner-Ramesh Kumar has been allowed to the extent of directing the Deputy Commissioner, Panipat, to inquire into the matter

on merits, and take a reasoned decision thereafter, on facts and in accordance with law.

Brief facts of the case are that both the petitioner and the appellant contested the election of Sarpanch of Village Bohli, Post Office Kabri, Tehsil

Madlauda, District Panipat. The appellant having been elected, was appointed as Sarpanch of the said village. Thereupon, the petitioner made a

complaint to the authorities alleging that at the time of submission of the nomination papers, the appellant had furnished a fake Matriculation certificate

and he was not entitled to hold the post of Sarpanch, being not having the minimum educational qualification of Matriculation from a recognized

Institution/Board, as required under the provisions of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (for short, ‘the 1994 Act’).

Initially, the petitioner filed CWP No. 10127 of 2016, which was disposed of vide order dated 20.05.2016, with a direction to the Deputy

Commissioner, Panipat, to take a decision on the representation made by him, in accordance with law. The Deputy Commissioner, Panipat, vide order

dated 20.08.2016 (P-7) decided the representation of the petitioner by observing that as the status of Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh, was

sub judice before the Civil Court, no action could be taken at this stage and deferred the matter on that ground. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner again

approached this Court by filing present CWP No. 21057 of 2016, which has been disposed of by learned Single Judge, in terms as indicated

hereinabove. Hence, the present appeal.

Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that since the petitioner has approached this Court without availing the alternative remedy of statutory

appeal under Section 51(5) of the 1994 Act against the order dated 20.08.2016 (P-7), therefore, the writ petition filed by the petitioner ought not to

have been entertained and liable to be dismissed. Secondly, the learned Single Judge while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution ought to have called for the records from the Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh and enquired the matter at own level. Finally, he

has submitted that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge be set aside as the learned Single Judge has wrongly allowed the writ

petition.

Before dwelling upon the merits of the case, it would be appropriate to consider the statutory scheme of the 1994 Act in this regard. Section 51

thereof deals with suspension and removal of a Sarpanch or a Panch from office. Section 51(3)(b) of the 1994 Act postulates that the Director or the

Deputy Commissioner may remove a Sarpanch or a Panch from office after following the due procedure if he was disqualified to be member of the

Gram Panchayat at the time of his election. Section 175(v) of the 1994 Act sets out the disqualifications in relation to various posts, including that of a

Sarpanch. It provides that, generally, a male candidate, who has not passed Matriculation examination or its equivalent examination from any

recognized Institution/Board, shall not be a Sarpanch or a Panch. Therefore, any male ordinarily aspiring to the post of a Sarpanch must have passed

Matriculation examination or its equivalent from a recognized Institution/Board. Be it noted that, in terms of that restriction, it is not necessary that

such recognition must be by a local Board of Institution in the State of Haryana only and even if the Matriculation certificate is recognized by any

Institution/Board from any other State, it would serve the purpose.

In the present case, the appellant claimed to have passed his Matriculation course from Takshila College, Karnal, which has now been renamed as

Manas Sanskrit Maha Vidyalaya/Manas Model Senior Secondary School, Karnal and is under the control of the Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar

Pradesh. The said Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh, offers courses not only at the Matriculation level but also up to higher studies and a

litigation arose between Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh and the University Grants Commission, New Delhi, by way of a civil suit in RS

No.336 of 1998, which was pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), South Lucknow.

A careful perusal of the plaint of said suit makes it evidently clear that Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh, claimed to be a Society registered

under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and its aim was to provide education to the general public. Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad,

Uttar Pradesh never claimed either to be a University or affiliation to a University and its grievance was that the University Grants Commission, New

Delhi, was brandishing it to be a fake University. In this backdrop, a declaration has been sought that it was not claiming to be a University but only a

registered Society, promoting education amongst the common people in accordance with the standard and norms settled by itself and consequently it

was issuing its own certificates to the successful candidates. It was only on account of the pendency of the aforesaid civil suit, the Deputy

Commissioner, Panipat, has deferred consideration of the petitioner’s claim against the appellant.

Coming to first submission of counsel, the learned Single Judge, while disagreeing with the submission, has observed that the writ petition was pending

consideration before this Court since October, 2016 and, therefore, it would not be proper to non-suit the petitioner at this stage on the ground of

availability of an effective alternative remedy. Learned Singh Judge has further observed that be it noted that the said doctrine does not postulate a

straitjacketed formula and it would be well within the discretion of this Court to entertain a writ petition notwithstanding the availability of an

alternative remedy.

We are in total conformity with the observations of the learned Single Judge. From the impugned order, it was crystal clear that there was no proper

application of mind and the Deputy Commissioner, Panipat, without going into the merits of the case before it, decided it merely as per the directions

of this Court contained in the order dated 20.05.2016 passed in CWP No.10127 of 2016. The pending litigation pertains to the status of Bhartiya

Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh, vis-Ã -vis the University Grants Commission, New Delhi. The said Commission is only concerned with education at

the University level and not at Matriculation level. Therefore, the pendency of said civil suit, which obviously, has reference to the graduation degrees

etc. offered by the Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh, has no impact on the validity or otherwise of the Matriculation certification in question.

Otherwise also, there is no material to support this submission that every institution in the country which offers Matriculation Course would invariably

have to be recognized by the Council of Boards of School Education. When the statutory provision merely require recognition by any Institution/Board,

it was for the authorities concerned to verify, as a matter of fact, whether such recognition was conferred upon the institution which issued the

Matriculation certificate. However, no such exercise was undertaken by the Deputy Commissioner, Panipat to ascertain whether Matriculation

Certificate secured by the appellant from Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Uttar Pradesh, was recognized by any Board/Institution in the State of Uttar

Pradesh or from elsewhere.

With regard to the next submission that the learned Single Judge ought to have conducted such enquiry at its own level as to whether Matriculation

certificate conferred upon the appellant was issued by any recognized Board/Institution, the same is totally misconceived. While exercising the

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court is not required to collect evidence on behalf of either of the parties. This Court is

not a fact finding Court. The only question before the learned Single Judge was as to whether the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Panipat

was in consonance with the canons of justice. We do not hesitate to observe that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Panipat, is totally

non-speaking and sketchy and the learned Single Judge has rightly issued the directions to the Deputy Commissioner, Panipat in the terms as indicated

above.

In view of above, we find no merit in the present appeal warranting interference in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.