High CourtsSingle Bench

Vinay Pandey vs State Of Uttarakhand & Another

Uttarakhand High Court · Decided on 8 April 2025 · Citation: (2025) 04 UK CK 0792

HON’BLE JUDGES
Ashish Naithani, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 · Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138, 139, 142(b)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 1489 Of 2021
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Judgment

16 paragraphs · 749 words

Ashish Naithani, J

1.

This application under Section 482 CrPC has been filed by the applicant seeking quashing of Complaint Case No. 899/2021 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter “N.I. Act”), pending before the learned ACJM, Khatima, along with the summoning order dated 11.10.2021.

2.

The case arises from the alleged dishonour of Cheque No. 232022, dated 01.11.2020, drawn on Almora Urban Cooperative Bank, Khatima Branch, for ₹10,40,000/-, purportedly issued by the applicant in discharge of a legally enforceable debt. The cheque was dishonoured with the endorsement “Payment Stopped by Drawer” on 29.05.2021.

3.

Legal notice dated 15.06.2021 was issued by the complainant (respondent no. 2), demanding payment within 15 days. Upon failure to comply, the complaint was filed on 02.08.2021. The learned Magistrate took cognizance and summoned the applicant vide order dated 11.10.2021.

4.

The applicant argues that the cheque was not issued in discharge of any legally enforceable debt or liability, and that no financial transaction exists to support the complainant’s claim. It is further submitted that the complaint is barred by limitation and that the summoning order was passed mechanically without judicial application of mind.

5.

At the outset, it is imperative to note that Section 139 of the N.I. Act raises a presumption in favour of the holder of the cheque that it was issued for the discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. Once execution is admitted, the burden shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption. This legal position has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441.

6.

The applicant has neither denied issuance of the cheque nor presented any documentary evidence to rebut the statutory presumption. Mere allegations of fraud or misuse, without cogent evidence, are insufficient at the pre-trial stage to displace the presumption under Section 139 N.I. Act.

7.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan, (2001) 8 SCC 458, held that mere denial or vague allegation is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. Substantive evidence must be presented at trial.

8.

The contention that the cheque was misused after being fraudulently obtained raises disputed questions of fact, which can only be adjudicated after evidence is led. At this stage, no material irregularity has been pointed out in the order of summoning which would justify the invocation of inherent jurisdiction.

9.

As regards the issue of limitation, the record indicates that the dishonour occurred on 29.05.2021, legal notice was issued on 15.06.2021, and the complaint was filed on 02.08.2021. These dates are within the statutory period prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.R. Sukumar v. S. Sunaad Raghuram, (2015) 9 SCC 609, reiterated that computation of limitation involves mixed questions of law and fact, best left to be determined by the trial court.

10.

The allegation that the learned Magistrate took cognizance without application of mind is unsustainable. The complaint, cheque, return memo, and notice were duly considered, and the summoning order records reasons for proceeding against the applicant. In Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda, (2015) 12 SCC 420, the Supreme Court observed that if a magistrate is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, detailed reasoning is not required at the stage of cognizance.

11.

Section 482 CrPC is not a substitute for trial. It is well settled that inherent powers of the High Court should be sparingly exercised and not invoked to stifle legitimate prosecution. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Supreme Court laid down categories where interference under Section 482 may be justified. The present case does not fall in any of them.

12.

The arguments regarding absence of debt and misuse of the cheque are defense that require evidence. In Rajesh Agarwal v. State, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 484, it was held that where foundational facts are in dispute, the case must proceed to trial.

13.

The applicant has failed to discharge the burden of rebutting the presumption under Section 139. The complaint discloses all necessary ingredients of the offense under Section 138 N.I. Act, and no exceptional circumstance is made out warranting interference.

14.

In view of the above discussion and settled legal position, this Court finds no merit in the present application.

15.

The Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 1489 of 2021 is hereby dismissed. The applicant is directed to face trial in accordance with the law before the court below.