Vineet Kumar Singh alias Babboo Singh vs State of U.P. and Others

G. Malaviya, J.—By this petition the Petitioner has challenged the notice dated 16.10.1996 issued to him by A.D.M. Administration, Karvi, district Banda u/s 3 of the U.P. Control of Goonda Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as Act).

Sri. Jagdish Singh Sengar says that the impugned notice does not confirm to the requirement as were set up by the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Ram Ji Pandey v. State of U.P. 1981 Cri LJ 1983. His contention is that the "general nature of material allegations" as contemplated u/s 3(1)(d) have not been provided to the Petitioner by the said notice.

We have examined the present case and have also gone through the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ram Ji Pandey (supra) in 1981 Cri LJ 1983. However, we are unable to agree with the contention of Sri. Sengar that the notice does not confirm to the requirement as set out by the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court.

In para 7 of the judgment by the Full Bench in Ram Ji Pandey v. State of U.P. the following observation is relevant:

The word allegation means statement or assertion of facts. Thus the notice u/s 3(1) should contain the essential assertions of facts in relation to the matters set out in Clauses (a), (h) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. It need not refer to any evidence or other particulars or details, the names of witnesses and persons who may have made complaint against the person against whom action is proposed to be taken or the time, date and place of the offence committed by the person. There is a distinction between the "general nature of material allegations" and particulars of allegations. In the former the notice need not give any details of the allegations; instead the requirement of law would be satisfied if the notice contains a general statement of facts which need not contain any details or particulars.

Therefore Ram Ji Pandey''s case makes it clear that the notice need not contain details or particulars but should provide general statement of facts. In other words, all that is needed by the notice is that the person concerned understands as to on what grounds the district authority proposes to take action against him. Once we examine the present notice, we are satisfied that the "general nature of material allegations" as supplied to the Petitioner under the said notice quite clearly convey the grounds on which the action against the Petitioner has been proposed.

Sri. Sengar learned Counsel for the Petitioner strongly relied upon the observation of the Full Bench relating to the Mahbub Khan''s case which has been approved by Supreme Court. Placing reliance on the notice as quoted in para 10 of the judgment, Sri. Sengar contended that Mahbub Khan was made aware of the facts in the following manner:

(1) you way-lay, rob and extort money from the persons at the point of knife and under threats of violence.

(2) You demand money from the persons and on their refusal to pay, you beat them.

(3) You consume eatables from the place of public entertainment without payment and when legal dues are demanded, you beat the person.

You are engaged in several acts as mentioned in Paras (1), (2) and (3) above and that the witnesses to the above incidents are not willing to come forward to depose against you in public by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person and property.

Consequently, it is urged that unless the allegations are communicated in the manner as was done in the case of Mehbub Khan, mere paraphrasing of the crime number would not be enough to give it the character of "general nature of material allegations."

A perusal of the notice given to the Petitioner shows that the authority had clearly mentioned that the "General nature of material allegations" in support of (a), (b) and (c) were as follows, ''Thereafter mentioning the crime number as also the fact as to who had lodged the report on which elate against the Petitioner for which offence. At the end, it was also mentioned in the Sub-paras t and 2 that from the facts stated above, it was clear that the aforesaid Babboo Singh was the person, who indulged in activities as were mentioned earlier and that the witnesses who had seen him committing the crime were apprehending danger to their lives and property from the Petitioner and as such were not willing to give evidence against him. These two paragraphs almost give the same type of information to the Petitioner as was given to Mehbub Khan in the case quoted in the Full Bench of Ram Ji Pandey. Even otherwise, we are of the view that the brief details of the crime which have been mentioned in the notice are sufficient to let the Petitioner know about the "general nature of material allegations" against him. In this connection, we cannot ignore the fact that the provisions of the Maharashtra Act and U.P. Act are not identical.

Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition which is hereby dismissed.