Vinod Kumar vs State of Haryana

S.S. Dewan, J.

Vinod Kumar petitioner was convicted under Section 7 read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short, the Act) and was sentenced to six months'' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/ by the SubDivisional Judicial Magistrate, Panipat. On appeal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal, in an exhaustive and lucid judgment had adverted to every contention raised on behalf of the petitioner and repelling the same has maintained the conviction and sentence. He has now come up by way or revision.

On 29.3.1982, Shri A.N. Sharma, Government, Food Inspector accompanied by Dr. R.K. Tandon visited the business premises of the petitioner and purchased 600 grams of chillies powder from him for analysis. After completing the formalities, the Food Inspector sent one of the samples of chillies powder to the Public Analyst who vide his report Ex. PD held it to be adulterated as it contained ash insoluble in dilute hydrochloric acid 4.3% against the maximum prescribed standard of 1.3% and 3.5% grit.

The case against the petitioner rested primarily on the unimpeachable testimony of Shri A.N. Sharma Food Inspector and Dr. R.K. Tandon. The petitioner rather took vacillating plea in defence and the trial Court unhesitatingly found it as merely a cock and bull story and rejected it out of hand. The appellate Court has affirmed the said finding.

Mr. H.S. Gill appearing for the petitioner has raised the indentical arguments which were earlier urged before the appellate Court and which have been elaborately dealt with. To my mind, it would be totally wasteful to tread the same ground over again. It suffices to mention that I would endorse in toto the reasoning and the findings of the appellate Court.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, tried to raise a new point to the effect that Shri P.L. Khanduja, SubDivisional Judicial Magistrate, Panipat who had passed the impugned order of conviction, had no jurisdiction to try the accusedpetitioner. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance upon Section 16A of the Act, which runs as follows :

"Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under subsection (1) of Section 16 shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial.

Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this Section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year ;

Provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of a summary trial under this Section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is for any other reason undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code."

A perusal of the aforesaid Section clearly indicates that a Judicial Magistrate First Class has been empowered to try and accused summarily for an offence under Section 16 (1) of the Act. He is also authorised to pass a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding one year. If, at any stage, he is of the opinion that the sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year should be passed, then the Magistrate after hearing the parties has to record an order to that effect and thereafter he will try the case in the manner provided by the Code. In the instant case, the sentence which has been passed by the SubDivisional Judicial Magistrate is six months'' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/ which is obviously less than the sentence of imprisonment of one year, which he is authorised to pass in a summary trial under the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, candidly conceded that this point was neither taken in the Courts below nor in this Court. Further, the learned counsel could not convince me that any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by such trial.

Sentence of six months'' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/ is the minimum provided under the Act for the offence in question. Moreover, the extent of adulteration was rather heavy. In these circumstances, no relief can be granted even on the question of sentence. There is no merit in this revision which is hereby dismissed.