Vinod Kumar @ Parmod @ Bunty Tota @ Ambulance vs State Of Haryana

Sandeep Moudgil, J

Prayer

This petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)/438 CrPC for the grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner in case FIR No. 319 dated 29.11.2025 (P/1) registered under sections 20 of The NDPS Act, 1985 at Police Station Ballabgarh Sadar, District Faridabad.

2 Contention

On behalf of the petitioner

Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the contraband involved in the instant FIR is marginally over and above the commercial quantity i.e. 1 Kg. and 468 gram of Ganja. He further contends that there is nothing on record to link the petitioner with the alleged recovery. He urges that main accused Captail @ K.D. and co-accused Dev Kumar have already been granted regular bail.

Notice of motion.

On behalf of the State

Since the State-respondents were served with an advance copy of the petition,Mr. Ved Parkash, Sr. DAG, Haryana, puts an appearance and accepts notice on their behalf. He is not in a position to controvert the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner.

Analysis

Keeping in view the fact that learned State counsel has not been able to point out any independent material connecting the petitioner with the alleged contraband as well as the fact that it is also not disputed that the recovery in question is 1 Kg. and 468 gram of Ganja and the same is stated to be marginally above the prescribed commercial quantity.

Taking into consideration the following orders passed by the Coordinate Benches of this Court wherein the recovery from the accused was marginally over and above the commercial quantity for the respective contraband in each case, the Courts have taken a lenient view while granting bail to the accused therein i.e. Sukhchain Singh @ Manga Versus State of Punjab, CRM-M-7857-2022 decided on 04.04.2022, Pardeep Singh versus State of Punjab, CRM-M-46244-2022 decided on 19.01.2023, Hari Yadav @ Haiya versus State of Punjab (CRM-M-37645-2021)' decided on 11.11.2022, 'Jang Kanwar Versus State of Punjab (CRM-M-53415-2021)' decided on 19.01.2022, 'Shankar Prashad Chanau Versus The State of Punjab, CRM-M-24090-2020, decided on 27.08.2020, Gurpreet Kumar Versus State of Punjab, CRM-M-17021-2021, decided on 31.08.2021, Salim Versus State of Haryana, CRM-M-42436-2020, decided on 24.02.2021, Gagandeep Versus State of Punjab, CRM-M-3055-2021, decided on 27.01.2021, Gurpreet Gopi Versus State of Punjab, CRM-M-41039-2019, Singh decided on 26.02.2020, Dalbara Singh Versus State of Punjab, CRM-M-47880-2022 decided on 16.01.2023', and Vivek Watts versus State of Punjab, CRM-M-13791-2022 decided on 15.02.2023.

Reliance can be placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in "Dataram versus State of Uttar Pradesh and another", 2018(2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 131, wherein it has been held that the grant of bail is a general rule and putting persons in jail or in prison or in correction home is an exception. Relevant paras of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-

"2. A fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence is the presumption of innocence, meaning thereby that a person is believed to be innocent until found guilty. However, there are instances in our criminal law where a reverse onus has been placed on an accused with regard to some specific offences but that is another matter and does not detract from the fundamental postulate in respect of other offences. Yet another important facet of our criminal jurisprudence is that the grant of bail is the general rule and putting a person in jail or in a prison or in a correction home (whichever expression one may wish to use) is an exception. Unfortunately, some of these basic principles appear to have been lost sight of with the result that more and more persons are being incarcerated and for longer periods. This does not do any good to our criminal jurisprudence or to our society.

There is no doubt that the grant or denial of bail is entirely the discretion of the judge considering a case but even so, the exercise of judicial discretion has been circumscribed by a large number of decisions rendered by this Court and by every High Court in the country. Yet, occasionally there is a necessity to introspect whether denying bail to an accused person is the right thing to do on the facts and in the circumstances of a case.

While so introspecting, among the factors that need to be considered is whether the accused was arrested during investigations when that person perhaps has the best opportunity to tamper with the evidence or influence witnesses. If the investigating officer does not find it necessary to arrest an accused person during investigations, a strong case should be made out for placing that person in judicial custody after a charge sheet is filed. Similarly, it is important to ascertain whether the accused was participating in the investigations to the satisfaction of the investigating officer and was not absconding or not appearing when required by the investigating officer. Surely, if an accused is not hiding from the investigating officer or is hiding due to some genuine and expressed fear of being victimised, it would be a factor that a judge would need to consider in an appropriate case. It is also necessary for the judge to consider whether the accused is a first-time offender or has been accused of other offences and if so, the nature of such offences and his or her general conduct. The poverty or the deemed indigent status of an accused is also an extremely important factor and even Parliament has taken notice of it by incorporating an Explanation to section 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. An equally soft approach to incarceration has been taken by Parliament by inserting section 436A in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

To put it shortly, a humane attitude is required to be adopted by a judge, while dealing with an application for remanding a suspect or an accused person to police custody or judicial custody. There are several reasons for this including maintaining the dignity of an accused person, howsoever poor that person might be, the requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution and the fact that there is enormous overcrowding in prisons, leading to social and other problems as noticed by this Court in In Re-Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, 2017(4) RCR (Criminal) 416: 2017(5) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 408 : (2017) 10 SCC 658

The historical background of the provision for bail has been elaborately and lucidly explained in a recent decision delivered in Nikesh Tara chand Shah v. Union of India, 2017 (13) SCALE 609 going back to the days of the Magna Carta. In that decision, reference was made to Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 in which it is observed that it was held way back in Nagendra v. King-Emperor, AIR 1924 Calcutta 476 that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. Reference was also made to Emperor v. Hutchinson, AIR 1931 Allahabad 356 wherein it was observed that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. The provision for bail is therefore age-old and the liberal interpretation to the provision for bail is almost a century old, going back to colonial days.

However, we should not be understood to mean that bail should be granted in every case. The grant or refusal of bail is entirely within the discretion of the judge hearing the matter and though that discretion is unfettered, it must be exercised judiciously and in a humane manner and compassionately. Also, conditions for the grant of bail ought not to be so strict as to be incapable of compliance, thereby making the grant of bail illusory."

Therefore, to elucidate further, this Court is conscious of the basic and fundamental principle of law that right to speedy trial is a part of reasonable, fair and just procedure enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This constitutional right cannot be denied to the accused as is the mandate of the Apex court in "Hussainara Khatoon and ors (IV) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna", (1980) 1 SCC 98. Besides this, reference can be drawn upon that pre-conviction period of the under-trials should be as short as possible keeping in view the nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence, reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant.

In the light of above, this Court is of the considered view that there is no valid or cogent reason to deny the bail to the present petitioner, wherein he has bona fide intentions and is ready and willing to join the investigation and cooperate for furtherance of the same so that the final report can be submitted by the Investigating Agency in time.

Relief:-

Hence, the petitioner is directed to be released on anticipatory bail subject to his joining investigation with the Investigating Officer concerned within a period of one week from today, on furnishing of personal/surety bonds to the satisfaction of Arresting Officer/Investigating Officer. The petitioner shall also abide by the terms and conditions as envisaged under Section 482(2) of BNSS, which are reproduced below:-

'When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub¬section (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including-

(i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required;

(ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer;

(iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court;

(iv) such other condition as may be imposed under sub-section (3) of section 480, as if the bail were granted under that section.'

However, it is made clear that in case the petitioner does not comply with the aforesaid direction of joining the investigation within a period of one week, the order passed by this Court today shall automatically stands cancelled.

In the aforesaid terms, the present petition stands allowed.