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Judgment
19 paragraphs · 1,308 wordsV.S. Aggarwal, J.
Petitioner Vipin Kumar is husband of respondent No. 2, Neelam Rani. Petitioner Raj Rani and Kamal Kumar (Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3) are relations of Vipin Kumar. Marriage of petitioner No. 1 with respondent No. 2 was solemnized on 22.2.1992 according to Hindu rites. It is alleged that at the time of marriage, father of respondent No. 2 had given adequate dowry including ornaments made of gold, furniture, refrigerator etc. After her marriage she lived well in the house of the petitioner at Ambala, for a period of 1520 days. Thereafter, the petitioner and others started harassing respondent No. 2 on the count that her father has given her less dowry. She was told that if she did not bring scooter from her father, she will lose her life. Respondent No. 2 came to Rohtak and told all facts to her father and brother. Rs. 10000/ were paid to meet the demand. Petitioner No. 1 came to Rohtak to take her to Ambala. After some time she was given threats and harassed besides being assaulted. Respondent No. 2 became sick. Petitioners left her at Rohtak. She made the complaint which is the basis of F.I.R. lodged at Rohtak.
The learned Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak on 20th May, 1993 discharged the other accused persons besides the petitioners. It was recorded that prima facie case under Section 498A is made out and that the Court at Rohtak had the jurisdiction to try the same.
Petitioner seeks quashing of the F.I.R. and also the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak.
The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the court at Rohtak, had no jurisdiction to try the case because in his opinion, harassment, if any, with respect to Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, took place at Ambala and that filing of the complaint at Rohtak is an abuse of process of the Court, when there is no controversy that ordinarily every offence is to be tried by the court in whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
I have heard the parties counsel and considered the relevant submissions.
Section 498A of I.P.C. is incorporated in the Indian Penal Code by virtue of Amendment (Act 46 of 1983) which reads as under :
"498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine."
The provision reproduced above specifically indicates that if husband or any relative of the husband of a woman subjects such woman to cruelty then it would be an offence punishable under Section 498A. Explanation defines cruelty and includes harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coerce her or any of her relative to meet any unlawful demand. It can be at one or more places.
Each case has to be examined in the light of its own circumstances.
It is apparent from the complaint that the respondent No. 2 alleges that she was being harassed for bringing insufficient dowry. She was left at Rohtak to bring new scooter. Father of respondent No. 2 gave her Rs. 10,000/. Thereafter they were making fresh demand of Rs. 10,000/ more. Respondent No. 2 was threatened and assaulted. She became unwell. It is in the same sequence that she recites that second demand of Rs. 10,000/ was made and that her husband, motherinlaw, and petitioner No. 3 left her at Rohtak. The act of leaving her at Rohtak is one of harassment. The colour of offence in the form of harassment started at Ambala and it continued in the same sequence when the petitioners came and left her at Rohtak after making the demand of Rs. 10,000/. It must be termed to be a harassment at Rohtak also and thus Rohtak Court will have the jurisdiction to hear the case.
Reference may be made to the decision of this Court in the case of Basant Kaur and others v. State of Haryana and others, 1992(2) C.C. Cases 62 (HC). Facts of the cited case are somewhat identical and in paragraph 3 it was held :
"Thus, there appears to be no vagueness in these allegations. The incident of giving beating at Delhi on 31.7.1989 and leaving the complainant at Jind on the next day are part of the same transaction."
The same view prevails with Allahabad High Court in case Vijay Rattan Sharma and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1988 Crl.L.J. 1581. In paragraph 5 it was held as under :
"When the wife fell ill at Ghaziabad on account of the mental shock created by the treatment of the accused it means that consequences of maltreatment and cruelty ensued at Ghaziabad. Section 179 Crl.P.C. says that where an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of consequence of which has ensued the offence may be tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing was done or such consequence ensued. Mal treatment was meted outside Ghaziabad but it became cruelty on account of the consequence that the woman fell ill on account of the mental shock. She fell ill at Ghaziabad. The woman is being harassed by not being called by her in laws so that her parents may meet their unlawful demand for dowry. When woman is at Ghaziabad and she is not being called this harassment can also be said to have taken place at Ghaziabad."
The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the decision of this Court in the case of Jatinder Singh and others v. State of Haryana, 1993(2) Recent Criminal Reports 121 : 1993(1) S.L.J. 783. The facts relevant for coming to the conclusion are given in paragraph 4 which reproduced for the sake of facility.
"The second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the parties resided at Kaithal as husband and wife and if the allegations in the complaint are taken to be correct for the sake of argument, even then offence of cruelty is alleged to have been committed at Kaithal and therefore the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind, had no jurisdiction to frame the charge under section 498A I.P.C. against the petitioner. A perusal of the impugned order would show (i) that the marriage between Harjeet Kaur and Jatinder Singh was solemnized at Jind on January 19, 1986; (ii) that the parties resided as husband and wife at Kaithal upto December 19, 1987; (iii) that from January, 1988 to June, 1988, the complainant resided at Jind with her parents and (iv) that the complainant again resided with her husband at Kaithal from July, 1980 to October 24, 1990. Therefore, the petitioners never resided with the complainant at Jind and hence they had no occasion to subject her to cruelty at Jind. The offence under section 498A if at all, was committed at Kaithal and not at Jind. In this situation, the court at Jind has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the complainant wife under section 498A I.P.C."
A bare reading of the relevant extract from paragraph 4 shows that the facts of the case are not identical with the facts of the present case. I have already concluded above that the court at Rohtak had the jurisdiction to hear the case. She was left at Rohtak in her parents'' house because the demand of Rs. 10,000/ was not met. Therefore, the cited case is not identical to the present case.
On the appraisal of the facts and circumstances I find no reason to interfere with the order so passed.
