Vir M.Khosla and another vs State of Punjab

V.S. Aggarwal, J.

Complainant Dr. Loveleen Arora was married to Dr. Sameer Arora at Jalandhar on 10.7.1989. Soon after the marriage, it ran into rough weather. The complainant mentioned that after few days before the marriage, her husband, his mother and both the petitioners Sangita Khosla and Vir Khosla had come to her house at Jalandhar. Sangita Khosla is the sister of the husband of the complainant and is married to Vir Khosla. They told the father of the petitioner that they would bring the marriage party only if the particular dowry articles are provided. The father of the complainant told them that he would do his utmost to provide the dowry articles. He could not purchase all the demanded articles. With the help of his friends and relatives he was able to get some of the dowry articles. The marriage was solemnized. On the date of the marriage also the petitioner and others approached the father of the complainant to show them the dowry articles.

After the marriage both the petitioners and others stated maltreating the complainant for bringing insufficient dowry. The complainant informed her father. The father of the complainant sent a draft of Rs. 1,08,218.50 and another draft of Rs. 50,365/ for the purchase of car and other household articles. The husband of the complainant opened the account in his name and the complainant and had withdrawn the entire amount. Thereupon, it was represented that, that money was hardly sufficient for purchase of household articles. She was again maltreated and demand was made for bringing more dowry. So much so, the complainant sold her plot and took the money with her. But she was again maltreated badly and demand for Rs. 3 to 4 lacs was made so that the sister of her husband could be married.

On these broad facts FIR No. 60 was registered with respect to offences punishable under Sections 406 and 498A IPC.

Petitioners Vir M. Khosla and her wife Sangita Khosla seek quashing of the said first information report and the subsequent proceedings alleging that petitioner No. 1 Vir M. Khosla is running business at Delhi and petitioner No. 2 is a doctor. They had never made any demand for dowry and had never visited the house of the complainant before the marriage. There are no allegations against them. The complainant was living with her husband at Madras and there was no question of the petitioners harassing her.

In the reply filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, the said petition as such has been contested. It was denied that there are no averments against the petitioners or that they had never demanded dowry or harassed the complainant.

The arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners were the same as were the allegations in the petition. He urged that there are no assertions against the petitioners nor in fact ingredients of Sections 498A and 406 Indian Penal Code were drawn. Therefore, he prayed that the proceedings as well as the first information report should be quashed.

The grounds on which the proceedings or the first information report can be quashed indeed can never be enumerated exhaustively. The Supreme Court while holding that extra ordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly, held in the case of State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 that it should be so used only to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. Certain guidelines were prescribed which read :

"(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for preceding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge".

Same question was again considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others v. B.R. Bajaj and others, 1994(1) Recent Criminal Reports 592 (SC) : AIR 1994 SC 1256 . It was held that inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have not to be exercised to stiffle legitimate prosecution. A preliminary decision should not be awarded. The High Court is not to treat the matter as if it was an appeal. If the FIR discloses the commission of the cognizable offence, it should be allowed to be probed. In other words, the inherent powers have to be used with restraint if a cognizable offence is disclosed. In normal circumstances the proceedings have not to be quashed unless there are other cogent reasons to come to an end that it is an abuse of the process of the Court.

Learned counsel for the petitioners to buttress his arguments referred to certain decisions of this Court. He relied on the decision of this Court in the case of Gurdev Singh v. Smt. Nachhattar Kaur alias Mandip Kaur, 1993(3) RCR 328 . The question for consideration was that there is no misappropriation of customary gifts given by the parents of the bride at the time of the marriage because in the facts it was held that there is no entrustment. The decision will have no application in the facts of the present case because herein it is not an customary gift but articles given and handed over on demand as dowry. Consequently, the decision rendered in the case of Gurdev Singh (supra) will not help and come to the rescue of the petitioners. It was further urged that there is a general tendency on the part of the wife to involve the other relatives of the husband and, therefore, qua the petitioners who have nothing to do with the strained matrimonial relations of the complainant and her husband, the present FIR should be quashed. Attention of the Court was drawn to the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Anil Sharma v. S.N. Marwaha and another, 1995(1) RCR 415 . In that case the husband had been divorced. He had contacted a second marriage without disclosing that he had a son from the first wife. A complaint was filed under Section 420 IPC. It was in that background that it was observed that it was an abuse of the process of the court to implicate all members of the family. The ratio decidendi of this decision is totally inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Herein when specific allegations are made, it cannot be held that it is merely an attempt to implicate the close relatives of the husband of the complainant.

Sum and substance of the complaint in the form of FIR has already been given. It recites as to how the complainant was being (sic). It recites bringing insufficient dowry. It included the petitioners. It cannot in these circumstances, in face of specific assertions be held that no case is made out or that the FIR requires to be quashed.

For these reasons, the petition being without merit must fail and is dismissed. Nothing said herein should be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the main case which shall be decided by an appropriate court.