Virendra Singh vs State of M.P.

R.C. Mishra, J.—This appeal has been preferred against the judgment-dated 11.9.1997 passed by Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Chhatarpur in S.T. No. 79/97, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under-

With the direction that the jail sentences shall run concurrently

The appeal, so far as it relates to other appellant Laxmi Bai, has abated consequent to her death during pendency thereof.

Prosecution story, in short, may be narrated as under-

Guddo Bai @ Durgesh Nandini (since deceased), a resident of Damoh, was the daughter of Munna Singh & Tulsa Bai and younger sister of Sulekha (PW 5). Her marriage was solemnized with the appellant on 29.5.1994. Her matrimonial life was not happy and cheerful as she had been persistently subjected to cruelty and harassment by the appellant and his mother Laxmi Bai. She was made to starve and work hard. Ultimately, on 20.10.1996, in a seriously burnt condition, Guddo''s dead body was found in Kotha (room) of appellant''s house only. Cause of her death was ascertained as shock due to ante-mortem burns.

The appellant pleaded false implication at the instance of Sulekha (PW 5) who, according to him, had demanded money for not speaking against him. In the examination, u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he further asserted that his marriage with Guddo had taken place nearly 8 years prior to the incident. To substantiate the defence, he preferred to examine only himself as a witness. His statement also contained an explanation that Guddo had accidentally sustained burn injuries while cooking.

Legality and propriety of the impugned convictions have been challenged on the ground of what has been termed as mis-appreciation of the evidence on record. According to learned counsel, none of the convictions is sustainable in law in view of the following facts-

(i) Parents of the deceased, whose case diary statements were recorded by Investigating Officer Bhaskar Datt Tripathi (PW 8) on 22.10.1996, were not even cited as witnesses in charge sheet.

(ii) Probable cause of the suicide, not attributable to the appellant, was given by none other than Kripal Singh (PW 1), the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat.

(iii) No external injury on the body of Guddo was noticed by Autopsy Surgeon Dr. R.C. Malarya (PW 4) and availability of undigested and digested food in the intestine was sufficient to belie the allegation as to starvation.

In response, learned Panel Lawyer, while making reference to the incriminating pieces of evidence, has submitted that the convictions are well founded.

In order to appreciate the merits of the rival contentions in a proper perspective, it is necessary to first advert to the medical evidence as well as to the nature of death.

Dr. R.C. Malarya (PW 4) testified that the autopsy was conducted by a panel comprising himself as well as Dr. Smt. Sushma Khare. He further reiterated these findings, as recorded in the post mortem report (Ex. P-4)-

(a) Guddo''s dead body was having pugilistic appearance and burns to the extent of 90% were found thereon.

(b) No external injury was found on the body of Guddo.

(c) Mode of death was shock caused by ante-mortem bums.

Correctness of this opinion was not questioned by the defence. Further, no suggestion was made that death of Guddo was accidental in nature. As reflected in the inquest panchnama (Ex. P-1) and spot map (Ex. P-11) prepared respectively by B.P. Pavaiya (PW 7), the SDO (P) and Bhaskar Datt (PW 8), the investigating officer, Guddo''s dead body was not found in the kitchen. In the face of these surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, learned trial Judge did not commit any error in holding that it was a case of suicide.

Adverting to the other incriminating evidence on record, it may be observed that Sulekha (PW 5) was not cross-examined in respect of her assertion that marriage of Guddo was solemnized with the appellant nearly 2 years prior to her untimely death. It could, therefore, easily be concluded that appellant''s statement on oath suggesting that a period of more than 8 years had already elapsed after the marriage was apparently an afterthought.

According to Sulekha, during their meeting at Chitrakoot on the occasion of Somwati Amavasya, Guddo revealed as to how she had been persistently subjected to cruelty and harassment by the appellant and his mother Laxmi Bal due to non-satisfaction of demand for a watch and a cycle in dowry and even made to starve for days together. However, these allegations did not find place in her police statement (Ex. D-1) recorded on 5.2.97 i.e. nearly 2� months after the untimely death of Guddo. Further, charge sheet submitted after due investigation did not relate to the offence u/s 304B of the IPC. Moreover, Kripal Singh (PW 1) clearly stated that no custom of dowry was prevalent in the Society to which the appellant belong. As pointed out already, the parents of the deceased, who could be the best witnesses to describe the instances of cruelty meted out to her in the matrimonial home, were not examined. Amongst the neighbours, only Kripal Singh (PW 1) was produced in evidence and he did not state any incriminating fact against the appellant. According to him,-

(a) On the preceding day only, Guddo and her Devrani known as Revnawali, after taking all their ornaments, had run away from matrimonial home.

(b) On being brought back from Chandla by Bhawanideen, deputed by him only for the purpose, both Guddo and Revnawali were reprimanded by him and the co-villagers.

(c) Feeling ashamed for the misconduct, Guddo had committed suicide by setting herself ablaze.

To sum up, the statutory presumption u/s 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act was applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case as the marriage was less than seven years old yet, there was no evidence as to any proximate direct or indirect cause attributable to the appellant that could drive Guddo to take the extreme step of self-immolation. In such a situation, the conviction of the appellant u/s 306 of the IPC merely on the allegation of harassment to the deceased was not sustainable ( Mahendra Singh and Another, Gayatribai Vs. State of M.P., referred to).

However, acquittal of the appellant of the offence u/s 306 would not, by itself, be sufficient to record the finding of not guilty in respect of the offence u/s 498A of the IPC in view of the basic difference that under the former, the suicide is abetted and intended whereas under the latter, cruelty drags the women to commit suicide (See. Sushil Kumar Sharma Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,

Sulekha (PW 5) clearly deposed that Guddo had vividly described the cruel treatment meted out to her at the hands of the appellant. Nothing could be elicited in her cross-examination so as to suggest that she was, in any way, interested in securing conviction of the appellant on absolutely false grounds. For want of corresponding suggestion in her cross-examination, the story that she had demanded money for keeping quiet was rightly rejected as concocted one. This apart, her act of leaving the matrimonial home also warranted irrestible inference that Guddo had been subjected to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC. The conviction under this penal provision deserves to be affirmed as well merited for the reasons mentioned above.

Coming to the question of sentence, it may be observed that a considerable period of more than 16 years has already elapsed after the incident in question and meanwhile, the appellant has already suffered imprisonment for nearly 9 months. As such, no useful purpose would be served by sending the appellant back to jail for undergoing remaining part of sentence. Consequently, the appeal is allowed in part. In the result-

(i) The conviction of the appellant u/s 306 of the IPC and consequent sentences are hereby set aside. Instead, the appellant is acquitted of the offence.

(ii) His conviction u/s 498-A of the IPC is maintained but the term of custodial sentence is reduced to the period already undergone by him and the amount of fine is enhanced from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 1500/- with the stipulation that in default, he would suffer imprisonment for a period of 3 months.

Needless to say that the amount of fine already deposited shall be adjusted against the fine hereby enhanced.