Virupaxappa Basappa vs Land Tribunal Dharwar and Others

The petitioner Virupaxappa Basappa has filed this writ petition under Art 226 of the Constitution to assail the validity of the order Ex-A dated 3-12-1979 passed by the 1st respondent-Land Tribunal, Dharwar, rejecting his claim for registration of occupancy in respect of certain lands claimed, by him on the ground that his application filed, in Form-7 as required under S. 48A(1) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (for short the ''Act'') was beyond the last date fixed for making the applications and as such. it had no jurisdiction. It appears to me that the tribunal was right in rejecting the claim of the petitioner.

S. 48A(1) of the Act, which is relevant for our purpose, as it stood prior to the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1978 (Karnataka Act No. 1 of 1979), hereinafter referred to as the ''Amendment'' Act, reads thus "Every person entitled to be registered as an occupant under S. 45 may make an application to the Tribunal in this behalf. Every such application shall, save as provided in this Act, be made on or before the 31st day of December 1974 provided that the tribunal may, for sufficient cause shown, admit an application made beyond that date but on or before 30th June 1977.

S. 48A was amended by S. 14 of the Amendment Act and the amended S. 48A(1) reads as follows:

"Every person entitled to be registered as an occupant under Sec-45, may make an application to the Tribunal in this behalf. Every such application shall, save as provided in this Act, be made before the expiry ofa period of six months from the date of the commencement of section 1 of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1978."

It is provided in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 1 of the Amendment Act that S. 14 of the Amendment Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st day of March, 1974. From this provision, it is abundantly clear that S. 48A(1) as amended by S. 14 of the Amendment Act, was engrafted on the statute viz., the Act with effect from 1st March 1974. As per the amended provision of S. 48A(1), the last date for making applications in. Form-7 claiming occupancy was on or before 30th June 1979 since the amendment Act came into force on 1-1-1979. No provision is made either in S. 48A or in any other provision of the Act to admit an application made beyond the time prescribed, by the Tribunal on any ground. A provision to that effect which was found in sub-section (1) of Sec. 48A, as it stood prior to its amendment by the Amendment Act, was omitted by the Legislature by delating the words-"provided that the Tribunal may, for sufficient cause shown, admit an application made beyond that date but on or before 30th June 1977. This would clearly indicate the intention of the legislature, that the last date for making the application was fixed, as 30th June, 1979 and the tribunal was not left with any discretion to admit an application made beyond the period prescribed either suo motu or On an application filed by the claimant for admitting the application made beyond the time prescribed under the Act.

Admittedly, the petitioner filed his application in Form-7 on 27-8-1979. The last date for filing the application for registration of occupancy as per the amended S. 48A was 30-6-1979. The legislature, while amending S. 48A of the Act by the Amendment Act, did not employ any words in S. 48A so as to give a discretion to the Land Tribunal to admit an application filed beyond 30-6-1979 unlike S. 48A as it stood prior to the amendment. It was provided under S. 48A of the Act as it stood prior to the amendment that the tribunal was empowered to admit an application made beyond 31-12-1974 but on or before 30-6-1977 (which was the last date then provided for making an application in Form-7) for sufficient cause being shown to the tribunal. The words "provided that the tribunal may, for sufficient cause shown admit an amplication made beyond that date but on or before 30th June 1977" were significantly omitted by the amendment Act and the words used in their place are "before the expiry of a period of six months from the date of the commencement of section 1 of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1978". These words clearly explain and give the intension of the legislature that the tribunal has no power to entertain an application made beyond 30-6-1979. It is submitted by Shri B.V. Krishnaswamy Rao, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, that the petitioner had made an application for condonation of the delay and the tribunal should have considered that application on its merits. In view of the clear and unambiguous language employed in S. 48A(1) of the Act as it now stands, no claimant, in my. view, is entitled to file an application for condonation of the delay and ask the tribunal to admit his claim application made beyond 30-6-1979 when the statute itself did not provide for extension of time.

In the result, for the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed-[1980](2)KAR.L.J. 432

Constitution of India Arts 133(1)(a) & (b) & 134A - Certificate for appeal - When to be made - Karnataka High Court Rules, Chap XIX, R. 3.

A party, who has failed to make an oral application immediately after the passing or making of a judgment decree, final order or sentence, cannot file a written application for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court at a subsequent stage.

If the oral application for grant of certificate is made then and there after the passing or making of a judgment, decree, final order or sentence such an application has to be regarded as having been made immediately. If the are application is not made then and there, then the Court has to examine the circumstances of each case as to whether the application can be regarded as having been made immediately.

The determination by the Court has to be made within the shortest possible time. The best way to do it is by concluding the determination immediately after the oral application is made. Similarly as regards suo motu power, if the aggrieved party does not make an application immediately, it is better if the Court applies its mind then and there to the question and make an appropriate order within the shortest possible time.