Vishnuprasad Kalidas vs Inspector General of Police and Another

Baxi, J.—The petition prays by this application for u writ of certiorari for quashing the order of the Inspector General of Police, Saurashtra,

dated 25-10-1951 and a writ of mandamus against the Government for directing his reinstatement to his -appointment us a Sub-Inspector of

Police.

The Petitioner was appointed by the Inspector General of Police, Saurashtra, as a probationary Sub-Inspector by his order No. S/IGP/ ''28 of

1950 dated 3-1-1950. The appointment was on probation for a period of 18 months and though no formal order of confirmation was passed the

Petitioner''s contention is that ho was impliedly confirmed in his appointment as the Government had not taken any action contemplated by Rule 81

(4)(v), Bombay Police Manual.

The Petitioner alleges that while he was acting'' as the Sub-Inspector of Police of the Talaja Police Station he was charged with the offence of

cowardice and negligence in duty and without holding an inquiry the Inspector General of Police discharged him from service by the impugned

order.

His contention is that he was wrongfully and unjustly discharged from service without an inquiry and without giving him an opportunity of showing

cause and in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. A preliminary objection that the petition has been made very late

and. therefore, deserves to be dismissed in limine has been taken on behalf of the State.

The order of discharge is dated 25-10-1951. The Petitioner preferred an appeal to the Government against the order on 24-12-1951 but he

was informed1 by the Inspector General''s letter dated 7-7-1952 that as he was not confirmed as Sub-Inspector before the order of discharge, he

was net entitled to prefer an appeal to Government u/s 536, Bombay District Police Manual.

The Petitioner next applied to the Inspector General of Police for revision of the order of disease but he was informed by memorandum dated 6-

10-1952 that under R. 558(3), Bombay District Police Manual no further appeal or revision was permissible against the order passed by the

Inspector General of Police.

The Petitioner thereafter made a representation to His Highness the Raj pramukh on 1-11-1953 but he was informed by the Government by its

titter dated'' 22-12-1953 that as- his petition was not made within, six months from the date of the order his petition was withheld under Rules 7

and 9 of the Rules for transmission of petitions to the Raj Pramukh notified under the Home Department Notification No. HS/13-5(2) dated 2-1-

1951. The Petitioner, therefore, filed this petition on 22- 6-1954.

It will be seen from the above narrative that the present petition is made about 36 months after the date of the service of the impugned order.

The explanation for this delay by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner was that the Petitioner was pursuing other remedies. This explanation

cannot bear a moment''s examination.

There was no formal order of his confirmation in-his appointment and he had no reason to assume that he was confirmed merely because no formal

intimation was given to him of the extension of his probationary period. He should, therefore, have known that he had no right of appeal against the

Impugned1 order of discharge and, was his duty of have moved this Court without any delay. Assuming, however, that his assumption that, he had

been confirmed in his appointment was well founded, he was finally informed by the Government on 1-7-1952 that as he was not a confirmed

Sub-Inspector he had no remedy by way of appeal to the Government. After this order the Petitioner knew definitely that the order of his

discharge was final and there was no remedy open to him which ho could pursue under the rules.

But ho waited for about 24 months alter that order before approaching this Court. Further representations by him viz, his revision application to the

Inspector General of Police and a memorial to His Highness the Raj Pramukh were ultra legal remedies and cannot afford any excuse for not

moving this Court immediately after the Government''s order dated 6-10-1952.

Even after the rejection by the Inspector General of Police of his revision he slept over the matter for one year before approaching the Raj

Pramukh end even after he was informed that his petition to the Raj Pranukh was withheld ) waited for seven months before .approaching this

Court. There is no excuse whatever for this long delay. The petition, therefore, deserves to be '' dismissed in limine.

In Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society Vs. State of Bombay, the Petitioner continued to pursue after the impugned order extra legal or extra

judicial remedies in the shape of revision to the Government and to the Minister concerned and lost five months in these proceedings and the delay

was not condoned1.

In ''Krishna Rajeshwar v. Chief Secretary to the M.P. Government Police Department, Nagpur AIR 1954 Nag 151 (FB) (B), it was held that the

relief under Article 226 was discretionary and must be sought as soon as an injury is caused or threatened. But it was also held that the Court

owed a duty to the Petitioner and wide and untrammeled as were its powers, it could be precluded from rectifying a grave injustice simply because

the Petitioner could not move in the matter earlier and unless, by undue delay or latches inconsistent: legal or equitable considerations have arisen

which cannot be ignored, justice should not be denied simply because the Court was not moved soon after the injury was caused or threatened

and the delay has not been explained.

As a statement of a general proposition the decision is, if we may say so with respect, correct; but if it is intended to lay clown the rule that the

Petitioner can approach the High Court for a writ at any time he likes without having to justify inexcusable delay in approaching the High Court we

respectfully differ from it.

The proposition laid down in the decision that'' the remedy under Article 226 must be sought as snootily as an injury is caused or there is may

application of the equitable doctrine that was defeats equity and the longer the injured person sleeps over his rights without any reasonable excuse

his chances of success in a writ petition he-come more slender, and in a proper case the Court may throw off a writ petition on the ground of even

a short unexplained delay.

We, therefore, accept the State''s preliminary objection and dismiss the petition. In the peculiar circumstances of the case we make no order as to

costs.

Shah, C.J.

I agree.