Vishwamitra vs The Prescribed Authority (under the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972) and Another

M.P. Mehrotra, J.—This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of the proceedings u/s 2-A. The Petitioner contended that the Respondent No. 2 Had Shanker was inducted by him in the accommodation in dispute as a licensee with effect from 1-1-1980 u/s 2-A of the Act. The Respondent No. 2, however, contested the said claim of the Petitioner and contended that he was a tenant and not a licensee. By the, impugned order the Prescribed Authority rejected the claim of the Petitioner and upheld the contention of the Respondent No. 2.

Feeling aggrieved, the Petitioner has come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Dr. Gyan Prakash, learned Counsel for the Petitioner.

In my view, the impugned order does not suffer from any error of law much less an apparent error and there is no question of any lack of jurisdiction. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner expressed a fear that the findings recorded in the impugned order may operate as res-judicata in a regular title suit. In my view, this fear is not tenable. The findings recorded by the District Magistrate or his delegate authority in the summary proceedings u/s 2-A will never operate as res-judicata in a regular title suit in the civil court. This position does not admit of any doubt.

Further, I should like to observe that in the instant case there was no compliance with the proviso to Section 2-A. Admittedly, no joint intimation was given by the alleged licensor and the alleged licensee to the District Magistrate within one month from the alleged date of occupation of the accommodation in question by the alleged licensee. In my view taking into consideration the complete scheme of the Act and in as much as Section 2-A is admittedly a special provision which stands apart from the main draft and the scheme of the Act, and which enables the landlords to allow third party occupation without any allotment order, it is vital that the terms and conditions laid down in the said provision should be strictly construed. In the facts of the instant case, admittedly, no such joint letter was ever sent by the alleged licensor and the alleged licensee to the District Magistrate. In this view of the matter, I hold that the Petitioner was not entitled to take recourse to Section 2-A (5) of the Act.

This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed in limine.