Vithal & Ors vs High Court of Karnataka & ors

The present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking following reliefs:

"(a) issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to prepare a revised seniority list in accordance with Rule 5 of the Karnataka Government Seniority Rules, 1957 granting all consequential benefits including seniority deeming their date of appointment as on 02.06.1999."

We need not go into the factual details leading to the filing of the present writ petition but suffice it to say that on an earlier occasion, Writ Petition (Civil) No.386 of 2014 and other connected matters under Article 32 of the Constitution of India were filed by similarly situated persons praying for following reliefs:

"WHEREFORE, the petitioners respectfully pray that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction:

a) allowing this writ petition;

b) calling for the entire records of the Special Committee and the Administrative Committee No.III, constituted by the respondent, relating to the fixing of the seniority of those appointed as Civil Judges (Jr. Divn.) pursuant to the Notification No.CJRG 1/98 dated 29.5.1998 (ANNEXURE P1).

c) in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent to announce the revised merit list prepared after deducting rural weightage marks, wherever it had been awarded in connection with the recruitment of Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.) pursuant to the Notification No.CJRG 1/98, dated 29.5.1998 (ANNEXURE P1).

d) in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent to fix the seniority of the petitioners retrospectively from 2.6.1999 based on their rank in the revised merit list referred to in the prayer at (c) above and to announce the seniority list prepared thereof.

e) pass any such other order/s as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case."

The matter was considered by this Court in its judgment and order dated 20.11.2015 as under:

"We have heard learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties at some length and perused the orders passed by the High Court as also those passed by this Court from time to time. The controversy as to what should be an effective date of appointment of the petitioners is, in our opinion, squarely covered by the direction already issued by this Court in the paragraph extracted above. That is because the appointment of the petitioners have come to be made pursuant to the order passed by this Court which in no uncertain terms stipulates that the same will take effect from the date of the issuance of the orders of appointment. The expression "will be taken from the date of issuance of the order of appointment" is much too clear to admit of any equivocation. The spirit and the purport of the said direction is that the appointments will not be given retrospective effect nor will such appointments count for seniority over candidates who had already been appointed to the cadre. There is, in our opinion, considerable good sense in the said direction inasmuch as it is not in dispute that between 1999 when the competitive examination in which the petitioners herein qualified and 2003 when they were eventually appointed there were two competitive examinations held in which a very large number of candidates qualified and were appointed against vacancies then available. These appointments were not questioned at any point of time nor is there any dispute that the candidates selected and appointed were working for a considerable period before the issue of the appointment orders in favour of the petitioners. The reason why this Court directed the appointment of the writ petitioners to take effect from the date the appointments orders were issued in their favour obviously was to prevent any confusion about the inter se seniority of those appointed in the year 2003 vis-a-vis those who had been appointed on account of the earlier selection process. Inasmuch as the High Court understood the direction issued by this Court in the above spirit, it committed no mistake to warrant interference from this Court. There is no merit in the writ petition, which fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

The submissions of the learned counsel raised in the present matter, on behalf of the petitioners, are thus completely covered by the discussion in said Writ Petition (C) No.386 of 2014 etc.

In the circumstances, we see no reason to entertain this writ petition.

The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.