High CourtsSingle Bench

Vivek Sharma vs Early Times and Others

Jammu And Kashmir High Court · Decided on 2 June 2006 · Citation: (2007) CriLJ 443

HON’BLE JUDGES
Y.P. Nargotra, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 203 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 499, 500
RESULT
Dismissed
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Judgment

68 paragraphs · 1,442 words

Y.P. Nargotra, J.—The petitioner is an accredited journalist with Directorate of Information J. & K. He happened to come across an

editorial in 'Early Times Newspaper' of its issue dated 17th of July 2005 containing the following statement:

There is no dearth of newspapers in the State and journalists are available dime a dozen. So how do we differ vis-a-vis our new. 'Avtaar'.

2.

The respondent is claimed to be au. thor of the editorial. Feeling deeply pained and injured the petitioner filed a criminal complaint against the

respondent, alleging the statement to be defamatory seeking his trial for commission of the offences under Sections 500, 501 and 502, RPC.

Learned Special Excise Mobile Magistrate has without issuing process to the accused dismissed, the complaint u/s 203, Cr.P.C. by his order-

dated 15-9-2005. Hence the complainant has filed this petition for Invoking revisional jurisdiction.

3.

I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.

4.

The contention of Mr. Sakal Bhushan, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the above quoted statement is defamatory in regard to the whole

of the journalistic community, therefore, against the respondent process should have been issued for commission of the offence u/s 500, RPC

which is defined in Section 499, RPC. Section 499, RPC reads:

Defamation. Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation

concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person, is

said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.

Explanation 1. It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the Imputation would harm the reputation of that person, if

living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives.

Explanation 2. It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such.

Explanation 3. An imputation In the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to defamation.

Explanation 4. No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers

the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit

of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person Is in a loathsorrje state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.

5.

From the bare reading of Section 499, it Is manifest that for attracting the section two Ingredients must be satisfied which are, one that the

imputation made by the ac cused is defamatory In character and two, that such imputation relates to the com plainant directly or if it is not direct

then such person falls In any category of the per sons referred to in Explanation 2.

6.

In the present case in the alleged state ment the expression ""dime a dozen"" accord ingly to complainant is defamatory. The im putation does not

relate to the complainant directly but to the journalist class of people, therefore, according to the complainant he being a journalist is covered by

the said statement and therefore, section is attracted.

7.

Learned Trial Court has held the ex pression to be not defamatory. It also held that petitioner/complainant is not covered by Explanation 2 being

not of the determi nate or identifiable section of journalist's community and, therefore, cannot maintain the complaint.

8.

In order to see whether the alleged offending expression is defamatory, its meaning is required to be understood. The said expression is an

adjective of English language therefore, it can be better under stood by reference to a standard Dictionary. The New Shorter Oxford English

Dictionaiy in its edition of 1993 defines the same as follows:

2a. Dime a dozen. Commonplace.

9.

The expression thus can mean com monplace. The word commonplace is de scribed in the same dictionary to mean:

Commonplace. A passage of general application, a leading text. A notable passage or quotation entered in a book for future use. A commonplace-

book. An ordinary topic, an opinion or statement generally accepted, a platitude. A thesis or discourse on a set theme. Anything usual or trite,

ordinary or trite matter. Ordinariness, lack of distinction, the commonplace, that which is ordinary and without novelty.

10.

With the above meaning in view when the alleged editorial of the accused is read, it appears to be conveying that the other journalists are

ordinary and without novelty whereas the accused would be a better one for espousing the public cause. Sudh a statement cannot in my opinion

per se be defamatory in character for the journalist community including the complainant.

11.

Assuming for the sake of argument the offending statement is per se defamatory then the question would arise whether it refers to such a class

of people, which Is contemplated by Explanation 2 of Section 499.

12.

In Sahib Singh Mehra Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, , their Lordships of the Supreme Court in regard to the expression 'collection of persons'

used in Expln. 2 of Section 499 observed:

The next question to determine is whether it is essential for the purpose of an offence u/s 500, I.P.C., that the person defamed must be an

individual and that the prosecuting staff at Aligarh or of the State of Uttar Pradesh could not be said to be a 'person' which could be defamed.

Section 499, I.P.C., defines 'defamation' and provides inter alia that whoever makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending

to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of such person, is said, except in cases covered by

the exceptions to the section, to defame that person, Explanation 2 provides that it may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a

company or an association or collection of persons as such. It is clear therefore, that there could be defamation of an individual person and also of

a collection of persons as such. The contention for the appellant then reduces itself to the question whether the prosecuting staff at Aligarh can be

considered to be such a collection of persons as is contemplated by Explanation 2. The language of Explanation 2 is general and any collection of

persons would be covered by it. Of course, that collection of persons must be identifiable in the sense that one could, with certainty say that this

group of particular people has been defamed, as distinguished from the rest of the community. The prosecuting staff of Aligarh or, as a matter of

fact, the prosecuting staff in the State of Uttar Pradesh, is certainly such an identifiable group or collection of persons. There is nothing indefinite

about it. This group consists of all members of the prosecuting staff in the service of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Within this general group of

Public Prosecutors of U.P. there is again an identifiable group of prosecuting staff, consisting of Public prosecutors and Assistant Public

prosecutors, at Aligarh. This group of persons would be covered by Explanation 2 and could, therefore, be the subject of defamation.

13.

Thus only that collection of persons which is identifiable in the sense that one can with certainty say that this group of particular people has

been defamed as distinguished from the rest of the community, can fall within the ambit of Explanation 2. Applying the aforesaid test to the present

case it cannot be said that which class of journalists out of the whole journalistic community of the World has been defamed. Therefore, any

journalist of any part of the world cannot complain defamation on the basis of the alleged statement of the accused.

14.

The contention of Mr. SakalBhushan learned Counsel for the petitioner is that journalist community being distinguishable from the general

public would be a group of particular people within the meaning of Explanation 2 is without any merit. For draw ing the distinction of the group of

people complaining defamation from the rest of the community only that community to which such group belongs is to be seen. For at tracting

Section 499, RPC Explanation 2 such group of people must be particularly identifiable out of general class of journal ists.

15.

In view of the above, I do not find any reason to differ with the view of learned Trial Court. The revision petition of the pe titioner, therefore,

has no merit. Dismissed.