V.S. Kumaraswamy Mudaliar and Others vs The State of Madras and Another

K. Veeraswami, C.J.—There is little substance in these appeals. In each one of them, a piece of land has been requisitioned in exercise of

the powers u/s 3 of the Madras Requisitioning and Acquisition of immovable Property Act (Madras Act XLII of 1956). The requisitioning was for

the purpose of providing a seed farm, a public purpose. The validity of the requisitioning was unsuccessfully canvassed before Venkatadri J. It is

said that Section 8(3)(6), as held by the Bombay High Court in Kamalabai Harjivandas Pareka Vs. T.B. Desaid and Another, is illegal. But that

provision applies only to acquisition and not requisition. We are told, next, that Section 8(1)(e) read with Sub-section (2) Clause (c) is bad

inasmuch as principles for determination of compensation have not been laid down. This contention, again, has no substance. Section 8 itself is

headed as Principles and method of determining compensation. Sub-section (1) directs that, in a case of requisitioning of property, compensation

should be paid. The amount of compensation should be determined in the manner and in accordance with the principles is thereinafter laid down in

the section. If compensation is agreed to, it shall be paid accordingly. But where there is no agreement, the Government shall appoint an arbitrator

who is or has been or is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court. The arbitrator will be assisted in his task by an expert a who has

special knowledge as to the nature of the property requisitioned. In such a case, the person to be compensated may nominate an assessor for the

same purpose. After hearing the dispute, the arbitrator shall make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to him to be

just. The amount compensable for the requisitioning shall consist of a recurring payment, in respect of the period of requisition, of a sum equal to

the rent which would have been payable for the use and occupation of the property, if it has been taken on lease for that period, pecuniary loss due

to requisitioning, expenses on account of vacating the requisitioned premises, expenses on account of reoccupying the premises upon release from

requisition and damages caused to the property during the period of requisition including the expenses that may have to be incurred for restoring

the property to the condition in which it was at the time of requisition. We, therefore fail to understand the criticism that no principles determining

compensation have been laid down. The overall condition indicated by the statutory provision is that compensation, after applying there principles,

should be just. In our opinion, Section 8 is not shown to be arbitrary or invalid for any reason.

The next contention is that, where there are two procedures laid down by similar enactments one more drastic than the other and the choice of

the procedure is left to the sweet will and pleasure of the authority concerned, the act of requisitioning is liable to be struck down on the ground of

discrimination or arbitrariness. Reference is made to Sections 35 to 37 of the Land Acquisition Act which provide for temporary occupation of

land. Section 35(1) authorizes requisitioning for a limited period of three years, if the land is required for a public purpose and the Collector is

empowered to determine the compensation by agreement with the person concerned. In the absence of an agreement, the Collector shall refer the

difference to the decision of the Court. We do not see how Section 8 of Madras Act XLII of 1956 is more drastic than Section 35 of the Land

Acquisition Act. If at all, it seems to us that the procedure provided by Section 8 of Madras Act XLII of 1956 is more advantageous to the

Appellant. Section 35 of the Land Acquisition Act leaves the matter to the Court eventually to determine the compensation without even indicating

the principles which we stated in Section 8 of Madras Act XLII of 1956. Also we do not think that any arbitrary choice of the procedure is

involved, because Section 35(1) can be invoked only when the requisitioning is not for more than three years. In the instant case, the requisitioning

was not for a limited period. In fact, no period was stated in the notification. It is true that Madras Act XLII of 1956 was a temporary Act meant

to operate in the first instance for a Period of ten years. But Madras Act XXIV of 1966 has extended the life of the Act for a further period of ten

years. We do not think that there is any force in the contention, that because the requisition was made in this case for a period just less than three

years before the expiry of the Act as it originally stood, the requisitioning could well have been made u/s 35 of the Land Acquisition Act. The point

is that where no period was in contemplation for requisitioning, the proper Act to be invoked was Madras Act XLII of 1956 and that was what

was done in this case.

The appeals are dismissed with costs in each one of them.