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Judgment
Ramaprasada Rao, J.—These appeals u/s 51 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Act XXVI of
1948), hereinafter referred to as the Act, are directed against the order of the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Tirunelveli, negativing the claim of the
creditors of a sharer and other maintenance-holders in the erstwhile impartible estate known as the Sivagiri Zamin. This estate was notified and
taken over by the Government under the Act on January 3, 1961. In three of these appeals, S.T.A Nos. 27, 28 and 29 of 1963, the Appellants
are the creditors and the Respondents are the maintenance-holders entitled to receive their reckoned share in the compensation which was to be
deposited by the Government from time in consideration of the impartible estate having been taken over by them and in accordance with the
provisions of the Act. In S.T.A. No. 25 of 1963 the first Respondent is a maintenance-holder and the second Respondent a money decree-holder
against the maintenance-holder. In S.T.A. No. 26 of 1963 the Respondent is a sharer in the erstwhile Sivagiri Zamin as recognised under the
provisions of the Act.
The Appellants in S.T.A. No. 25 of 1963 are the heirs and legal representatives of one V.S. Subramania Iyer. The first Respondent is a
maintenance-holder whose claims to share in the compensation to be deposited by the Government was recognised in O.P. No. 170 of 1951 on
the file of the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Madurai. His claim was admitted to 1/35th share in the amount that was by then deposited and thereafter
to be deposited either as compensation or as interim payments Periya Raja and maintenanoe-holder, first Respondent, owed considerable sums of
money to late V.S. Subramania Iyer. By a registered document, dated April 29, 1955, the first Respondent assigned his rights in the moneys by
then deposited and thereafter to be deposited in the Court of the Estates Abolition Tribunal either as compensation or as interim payments, and
constituted the late V.S. Subramania Iyer as a power of attorney agent coupled with an interest to draw such moneys in his own name and as a
person entitled to the same. We shall presently consider in detail the material recitals in this document. The said V.S. Subramania Iyer died on
December 8, 1961, leaving the Appellants as his heirs and legal representatives He died intestate and the Appellants therefore claim that by virtue
of the recitals in the deed of assignment, dated April 29, 1955, which provided a power and a right on their father and after his death on the
Appellants to realise from and out of the compensation and interim payments the debts due and payable by the first Respondent, their claim is well
founded. The Appellants also refer to prior payments obtained by their late father on the foot of the deed of assignment as well as the order of this
Court wherein a similar claim of the Appellants was recognised, and urge that they are entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,457.36 being the 2/75th share of
the 1st Respondent in the deficiency of interim payments by then deposited by the Government This was opposed by the maintenance-holder, the
first Respondent himself and one Balakrishna Thevar the 2nd Respondent. The 2nd Respondent claims that he is a creditor of the maintenance-
holder and by virtue of a power of attorney, dated September 26, 1962, he is entitled to payment of the said sum in preference to the Appellants.
He opposes the application and urges that it is unsustainable in law. He attacks the deed of assignment, dated April 29, 1955, and states that even
in accordance with the said deed, the amounts deposited do not vest in the assignee under that document and therefore the Appellants are not
entitled to claim payment out of any sum as prayed for. His main objection is that this assignment being a post-notification transaction, cannot
create any charge over the compensation amount or interim payments in deposit, in favour of the assignee or his heirs. It is necessary, according to
the objector that the assignee should file a regular suit and apply for rate able distribution along with the other creditors of the maintenance-holder.
In S.T.A. No. 27 of 1963, excepting for the fact that the Respondent is another maintenance-holder, the Appellant''s claim is based on facts
similar to that stated in S.T.A. No. 25 of 1963. The Appellants by virtue of the deed of assignment and in pursuance to certain civil proceedings
which followed thereafter as between the creditors of the maintenance-holder, the right, title and interest of the Appellants to the compensation
amount and the interim payments then available and thereafter to be deposited by the Government was recognised and the Appellants withdrew
several sums allotted to the share of Seemai Raja (maintenance-holder). The Appellants, in order to further satisfy their claim against the
maintenance-holder and as further amounts were by then available for payment to their debtor, filed an application before the Estates Abolition
Tribunal, Tirunelveli, for payment to them of the sum of Rs. 3,027-34 in the proportion mentioned by them in the application. The Respondent was
not present at the enquiry.
In S.T.A. No. 28 of 1963 a similar claim by the creditors against another maintenance-holder Dorairaja for payment of a sum of Rs. 3,027.34
was made. The Appellants here are the Appellants in S.T.A. No. 25 of 1963. They rest their claim on the registered deed, dated April 15,1955,
which, according to them, entitled their late father V.S. Subramania Iyer and after his death on December 8, 1961, the Appellants herein to claim
the compensation or interim payments deposited or to be deposited by the Government consequent upon the abolition of the Sivagiri Zamin. It is to
be noted that the recitals in the registered deed, dated April 15, 1955, are in pari materia with the earlier deeds of assignment made by the
maintenance-holders in favour of their creditors. Here again the maintenance-holder was ex parte.
In S.T.A. No. 29 of 1963 the Appellants being the sons of late V.S. Subramania Iyer rest their claim on the deed of assignment, dated April 29,
1955, which is similar in all respects to the assignment deeds which are the subject-matter of the other Special Tribunal Appeals referred to above.
As heirs and legal representatives of late V.S. Subramania Iyer, they claim that they are entitled to payment of the sum of Rs. 3,027.84 being the
amount by then due and payable to Chinna Varagunarama Pandian, the Respondent maintenance-holder, in the first instalment of the final
compensation deposited with the Tribunal. Here again the maintenance-holder remained ex-partte.
In S.T.A. No. 26 of 1963 the Respondent is a sharer in the estate of Sivagiri Zamin and he is entitled to 1/5th share of the compensation and
interim payments that is deposited and would be deposited before the Tribunal consequent upon the abolition of the Sivagiri Zamin. On June 25,
1954, the sharer Ayilya Raja in consideration of large amounts of borrowing effected by him from late V.S. Subramania Iyer, executed a deed of
assignment conferring and vesting on the assignee an absolute right to claim the moneys due and payable to him consequent upon the abolition of
the estate in lieu of the debts admittedly due by the sharer to the assignee. The recitals in this assignment deed are very much similar to the other
assignment deeds earlier referred to based on the deed of assignment the Appellants as the heirs and legal representatives of late V.S. Subramania
Iyer, claim for the payment out of the sum of Rs. 22,705 06 being the 1/5th share of Ayilya Raja in first instalment of the final compensation
admittedly deposited with the Tribunal by the Government.
The Estates Abolition Tribunal dismissed O.P. No. 156 of 1962 which is the subject-matter of S.T.A. No. 25 of 1963, on the ground that the
deed of assignment, on which the claim rests, is posterior to the notified date. The Tribunal rested its conclusions on the ratio in Chidambaram v.
Venkatesa ILR (1958) Mad. 135 but thought that the decision of Basheer Ahmed Sayeed J. in C.R.P. Nos. 1454 and 1465 of 1956 does not
apply to the facts of this case. The Tribunal also was of the view that the earlier decisions secured by the Appellants enabling them to obtain
payment out of similar amounts deposited by the Government cannot operate as res judicata. Incidentally it considered the claim of the objector
(2nd Respondent) and held that as the claim projected also rests upon the deed of assignment, dated September 26, 1962, he cannot also base his
right to obtain payment on such a deed which is later than the notified date. He therefore did not entertain the objection of the 2nd Respondent. It
may also be mentioned that the 2nd Respondent filed independently O.P. No. 4 of 1963 before the Estates Abolition Tribunal for payment of
moneys due to him on the foot of the assignment deed in his favour, dated September 26, 1962, and this petition also was rejected by the Tribunal.
There is however no appeal against this order of dismissal.
S.T.A. Nos. 26, 27 and 29 of 1963 are against the orders of the Estates Abolition Tribunal which rejected the claim of the respective
Appellants on the only ground that the assignments in their favour or in favour of their predecessors-in-interest, on which alone the claims are
rested, were after the notified date. AB against the orders of the Estates Abolition Tribunal rejecting their claims for payment out, the aggrieved
parties have come up in appeal u/s 51 of the Act.
At this stage it is necessary to note the relevant recitals in the deed of assignment and find the scope and effect of the same. It is sufficient if the
recitals in one assignment deed is considerable as the text, content and literature of the assignment deeds under scrutiny are admittedly reported to
be similar. It is not in dispute that the deeds of assignment in each of the eases in question were after the notified date. Whether this by itself would
make any difference would be considered by us later. The deed of assignment is registered document. It sets out that the maintenance-holder or
the sharer as the case may be was obliged to the assignee in that he is admittedly a debtor to the assignee. In order to meet certain urgent demands
of the maintenance-holder or the assignee, hereinafter compendiously referred to as borrower, the deed was executed so that the borrower could
secure from the assignee the sums noted in each of those deeds of assignment to enable him to meet his personal requirements. It is this that forms
part of the consideration for the document. In order to enable the assignee to obtain repayment of the amount lent from the compensation and
interim payments already in deposit and that may be deposited thereafter with the Estates Abolition Tribunal in respect of the Sivagiri Zamin, the
borrower executed this deed of assignment by vesting in the assignee an irrevocable authority to call for, collect and recover from time to time from
the appropriate authority in whose hands the compensation and the interim payment amounts payable to the borrower may remain and appropriate
and adjust the same against the debt due by the borrower. For this purpose, the assignee was appointed as the sole lawful and authorized
representative of the borrower so as to enable the assignee for himself and on his behalf to receive and collect from time to time the share amount
in the compensation and interim payments that may be deposited. One other stipulation in the deed of assignment is that the power and the right
conferred on the assignee shall enure in favour of his heirs and representatives and shall be irrevocable until the realization in full of the share of the
borrower in the amounts payable to him by way of compensation and interim payments.
Before adverting to the contentions of parties it is necessary to refer to the relevant sections of the Act which reflect on the issue and consider
their scope and content. Section 3 of the Act dealing with consequences of notification provides that with effect on and from the notified date and
save has otherwise expressly provided, all rights created in and over the estate before the notified date by the principal or any other landholder,
shall as against the Government cease and determine, and any such rights and privileges which may have accrued in the estate, to any person
before the notified date, against the principal or any other land-holder, shall cease and shall not be enforceable against the Government or such
land-holders, and every such person shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges as are recognised or conferred on him by the Act. Section
24 et sq are general provisions relating to the determination, apportionment and payment of compensation in respect of a notified estate. The
manner of payment of such reckoned compensation to persons entitled is dealt with in Section 40 of the Act. Section 41 provides for deposit and
apportionment of compensation. Section 42(1) can be usefully extracted:
Every person making a claim to, or enforceable against the compensation so deposited or any portion thereof, including the principal or any other
landholder members of his family claiming any portion of such compensation, whether by way of a share or by way of maintenance or otherwise,
and creditors, whether their debts are secured or not, shall apply to the Tribunal within six months from the date on which the amount was so
deposited or within such further time not exceeding six months as the Tribunal may, in its discretion, allow:
The Tribunal constituted u/s 8 of the Act and having jurisdiction over the subject-matter shall after hearing all parties interested inquire into the
validity of the claims received by it and determine he persons, who in its opinion, are entitled to the compensation deposited and the amount to
which each of them is entitled. This provision in Section 43 has to be read in conjunction with Section 46, which enables the Tribunal to take into
consideration the application of the creditors other than those dealt with in Section 45(3) and decide the amount to which each such creditor is
entitled to and the person or persons which might include maintenance-holders as well out of whose shares of compensation, such amount should
be paid. We are not concerned in these appeals with creditors whose debts have to be paid from and out of the asset of the impartible estate.
Section 48 dealing with devolution of interest in compensation reads:
Where it is alleged that the interest of any person entitled to receive payment of any portion of the compensation has devolved on any other person
or persons, whether by Act of parties or by operation of law, the Tribunal shall determine whether there has been any devolution of the interest,
and if so, on whom it has devolved. This section is peculiarly worded and has a specific import. The word devolution, according to the
Chambers''s Twentieth Century Dictionary, means a passing from one person to another, a handing over of powers. Thus understood, a person
entitled to the compensation under the Act can by an overt voluntary act of his pass on his power to secure such compensation. Any other person
who obtains such a right should be deemed to be a person, on whom the interest of the person entitled to receive any portion of the compensation
has devolved by an Act of that person. Devolution by operation of law is also envisaged in the section. It is noteworthy that if such a question
arises for determination, the Tribunal shall decide and determine whether there has been a devolution of the interest as claimed and if so on whom it
has devolved. In the above fascicle of the relevant sections, the important points that merge are:
(1) The Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain claims of normal creditors secured or not other than those classified in Section 46(3).
(2) Such claims may relate to and enforceable against the compensation or any portion thereat.
(3) The creditor may be of the principal or any other land-holder including a maintenance-holder.
(4) Such claims filed in time as prescribed shall not only be entertained by the Tribunal but shall also be inquired into and it shall determine which of
the persons, when there are conflicting claims, are entitled to be paid out such compensation and what is the amount.
(5) The Tribunal has also the power to determine whether by any act of parties, the right to receive payment of any portion of the compensation
has devolved on any other person, be it a creditor or any other person.
Having thus noted the relevant provisions of the Act and their scope the legal import, effect and consequence of the deeds of assignment
referred to above may be immediately considered. The deed of assignment is a compendium of a power of attorney coupled with interest and
constitutes a contemporaneous transfer of the right of the maintenance-holder or the sharer as the case may be to receive payment of any portion
of the compensation. It is not, as contended by Sri M.S. Venkatarama Ayyar, a transfer of property simplkiter. The argument is that when the
subject-matter of the transfer is not available in present no transfer of such property is possible. Reliance is placed upon Chief Controlling Revenue
Authority v. Sudarsanam Pictures ILR (1968) Mad. 660 (F.B.). That was a case which arose under the Indian Stamp Act. The learned Judges
observed at page 669.
...It it settled law that while a transfer of property may take place, not only in the present, but also in the future, the property must be in existence at
the time of the transfer, for an instrument to be a deed of transfer.
...A purported transfer of property, not in existence at the time of the contract, can only operate as a contract to be performed in future.
The last sentence in the excerpt is apposite. The principle was so broadly laid down for purposes of adjudication of an instrument for stamp duty.
In the instant case, the borrower in consideration of hi� admitted obligations, gave an unqualified right to the creditor to take steps in his name
and recover such compensation payable to the borrower and pay himself the said money in discharge of the debt. This agency coupled with an
interest is a contract which can be worked out fully in equity in future, notwithstanding the non-availability of the compensation money on the date
of the deed in question. As observed by the Supreme Court in Jougalkishore v. Raw Cotton Mills AIR 1955 S.C. 276.
Where there is a contract for the transfer of property which is not in existence at the date of the contract, the intending transferee may, when the
property comes into existence, enforce the contract by specific performance, provided the contract is of the kind which is specifically enforceable
in equity.
Under the deed an equitable right is created, It is not disputed that such a right to collect and appropriate is contained in each of the deeds of
assignment under review. It is equally indisputable that the right created is an enforceable right. Section 202 of the Contract Act envisages such a
right Equitable assignments of rights of debtors in an ascertained and ascertainable fund is valid in law. In the words of Abdur Rahim O.C.J. in
Rama Aiyar v. Parthasarathy AIR 1918 Mad. 172 (F.B.) (head note).
An agreement between an assignor and an assignee that a debt shall be paid out of a specific fund or an undertaking to pay over to another,
moneys to be received from a particular source amounts to an equitable assignment.
We are not, however, concerned with the exquisite refinements in law dealing with legal and equitable assignments. If on the facts it is established
that contract to assign property not in existence is made, then when the property Comes into existence.
equity, treating as done what ought to be done, fastens upon that property and the contract to assign, thus becomes a complete assignment.
Such an assignment, if intended to be so by the parties, can create a charge as well on future property. To Quote Lord Truro in Rodick v. Candell
(1851) I. Deg. H. & G. 763 referred to in Lagdir Nauji Vs. Surendra Mohun Nag and Another, :
The extent of the principle to be deduced is that an agreement between a debtor and a creditor, that the debt owing shall be paid out of a specific
fund coming to the debtor, or an order given by a debtor to his creditor upon a person owing money or holding funds belonging to the giver of the
order directing such person to pay such funds to the creditor, will create a valid equitable charge upon the fond, in other words will operate as an
equitable assignment of the debts or fund to which the order refers.
It is convenient also to refer to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Seth Loon Karan v. I.E. John AIR 1969 S.C. 72 delivered on April 25,
1968. That was a case in which the borrower executing a power of attorney in favour of the Bank of Jaipur Limited, Agra. The Bank was enabled
to execute a decree which the borrower may obtain in a Civil Court, in the name of the Bank and on his behalf and to credit the realizations in
execution of the said decree towards his account. The Bank was irrevocably constituted as the agent and in substance the power was coupled with
interest. On the date when the power of attorney was executed, the decree in favour of the borrower was under appeal. Subsequently in appeal
the same was confirmed. The bank levied execution thereafter in the name of the borrower, but signed by the Manager of the Bank. In such
circumstances, the Court held that the power of attorney conferred a power coupled with an interest and the transaction amounted to an equitable
assignment of the decree in favour of the Bank to the extent necessary to discharge the borrower''s debts to the Bank. Their Lordships were of the
view that the power of attorney is an engagement to pay out of the particular fund the debt due to the Bank and hence the same constituted an
equitable assignment of the amount due under the decree or so much of that amount as is necessary for discharging the debts due to it. A
controversy whether the Bank could execute the decree under Order XXI, Rule 16, CPC without the decree having been assigned in a manner
known to law to the Bank was also set at rest by the Supreme Court in the above decision. The Court accepted in principle that an equitable
assignee of a decree who cannot have the benefit of Order XXI, Rule 16, can still execute the decree u/s 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Suffice it to say that the power of attorney or the deed of assignment in each of these appeals, is a clear pointer to the effect that the assignee
therein secured an irrevocable right by way of an equitable assignment to claim the compensation or any portion thereof payable then or thereafter,
the date of execution to the assignor, be he a sharer or a maintenance-holder.
It was vehemently argued before us by Mr. M.S. Venkatarama Ayyer that as there was no assignment in law of the right to receive the
compensation and as it was somewhat inchoate on the date when the deed of assignment in question was executed, it is in the nature of an
unassigned decree within the meaning of Order XXI, Rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure, and cannot, therefore, be availed of by the Appellants.
This overlooks the principal argument in this case that the deed of assignment creates and vests in the assignee a right to collect the compensation
and appropriate it towards the debt admittedly due by the sharer or the maintenance-holder as the case may be. Such equitable assignment, as
already stated by us is envisaged by Courts in India which administer not only law, but also equity. In this view we unhesitatingly hold that the
Appellants in each of these appeals have secured an irrevocable right in themselves to apply for and obtain the compensation or other payments
payable to the sharer or the maintenance-holder or the foot of the deeds of assignment.
One other argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondents in these appeals is that there being no devolution as is ordinarily understood,
the Tribunal as such has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim and adjudicate upon it. This argument runs contra to the very letter of Section 49 of
the Act, the scope of which has been considered already by us. We are unable to be persuaded that the ratio in Chidambaram v. Venkatesa ILR
(1958) Mad. 135 any way militates against the conclusion which we intend to draw to the effect that the Tribunal has jurisdiction in the instant
cases to enquire and deal with the claims of the creditors. The Division Benoh in Chidambaram v. Venkatesa ILR (1958) Mad. 135 expressed in
so many words that there is no doubt that the language of Section 42 of the Act is wide and it does not expressly exclude consideration of fresh
rights accruing after the date of notification of an estate; but the Court however, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case which dealt
with a secured creditor, was of the view that only a creditor whose security extended over the estate when it was taken over and not one who
obtains a charge against the compensation amount without having had any charge or encumbrance against the estate taken over is within the
purview of that section. We are here concerned with a case of an equitable assignment of a debt of the sharer or the maintenance-holder. It
essentially relates to a transfer of a right to collect the compensation, which right has crystallized even on the date when the estate was notified.
Such an equitable assignment which creates a legal right relates back to the date of the notification and what has to be done is to implement the
same in accordance with the letter and tenor of the deed of assignment. As pointed out by Basheer Ahmed Sayeed J., in Civil Revision Petition
Nos. 1454 and 1455 of 1956:
The assignment is no doubt after the abolition took effect. In the present ease the claim for the compensation is not made by the Petitioner in his
capacity as a secured creditor of the estate of the Zamindar. The claim is only against the compensation deposited with the Estates Abolition
Tribunal under the deed of assignment. In my opinion the decision reported in Chidambaram v. Venkatesa ILR (1958) Mad. 135 cannot have any
application to the facts of the present case.
We respectfully adopt this reason as well to find that Respondents cannot rely upon the ratio, in Chidambaram v. Venkatesa ILR 1958 Mad. 135
to no suit the Appellants, A similar argument was repelled by a division Bench of this Court in Navaneetha-krishnaswami Devasthanam v. R. &
Co. (1954) 68 L.W. 588. The contention there was that the compromise degree which was passed prior to the date of notification between the
land-holder and the creditor and the arrangement envisaged therein was on the footing that the estate of Uthumalai will continue and that as the
estate has been taken over by the Government, the creditors will not be entitled to proceed against the compensation deposited by reason of the
application of the doctrine of frustration of contract to the compromise and the agreements which have become impossible of performance.
Considering and rejecting this argument, the learned Judge observed as follows:
The estate is now represented by the compensation money against which a statutory right is conferred upon creditors, who could establish that
their debts were liable to be paid out of the assets of the Zamindari. It is therefore, difficult to hold that the contract became impossible of
performance within the meaning to Section 56 of the Contract Act. To the extent of which the compensation amount is available the statute gives
an undoubted right to the creditor to be paid from the compensation amount, provided his debt was such that it could be paid out of the assets of
the Zamindar. Therefore he would be entitled to proceed against the compensation.
It is unnecessary to multiply authorities. We are therefore unable to agree with Mr. Mani appearing for one of the contesting creditors that no
charge has been created and the right if any acquired under the deed of assignment cannot be projected against the compensation without the
creditor obtaining a decree in the ordinary Civil Courts.
We have indicated that the position as between a sharer and a maintenance-holder in so far as the matter in issue is concerned, cannot be said
to be much in variance. The result is that the deed of assignment is a valid document; it created a right in each of the Appellants in these appeals to
proceed against the compensation and that there applications for the purpose filed before the Tribunal are well within the scheme and express
provisions of the Act and the Tribunal therefore has jurisdiction to entertain the same and adjudicate upon them.
The Appellants in S.T.A. Nos. 25, 26, 28 and 29 of 1963 are the legal representatives of the assignee in the documents of assignment
relatively concerned. The rights of the legal representatives to enforce all such privileges of their predecessors-in-interest under the deed of
assignment is specifically provided for in Section 49 which speaks of devolution of interest by act of parties. The right to collect compensation and
other amounts devolved on the assignee in the first instance and on his death it is transmitted by operation of law to his heirs who are the
Appellants, in the appeals. There is, therefore, no force in the contention that the Appellants in the above appeals have no locus standi to file
petitions before the Tribunal The Appellants in S.T.A. No. 27 of 1963 are again persons who are claiming rights under an assignment deed and on
the foot of several incidents referred to in the petition. The position of the Appellants in this appeal is much the same as that of the Appellants in the
other appeals.
The view of the Estates Abolition Tribunal, which summarily rejected these petitions on the only ground that the decision in Chidambaram v.
Venkatesa ILR (1958) Mad. 135 applies to this case appears to us to be a perfuntory disposal of the appeal. The Tribunal has not adverted to the
main contentions of the parties and the legal rights that flowed from the deeds of assignment in question. Its order has to be therefore set aside. It is
accordingly set aside.
The only person who objected to the entertainment of the petition and the adjudication thereof before the Tribunal is the 2nd Respondent in
S.T.A. No. 25 of 1963. This Respondent filed an independent claim by himself resting his case on a deed of assignment, dated December 8,
1961. His claim was dismissed and no appeal was preferred therefrom.
In S.T.A. No. 27 of 1963 the sharer was th� Respondent, but it is not clear from the record that he contested the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
to adjudicated and determine the rights of parties. But the Tribunal however dismissed his claim on the ground that the assignment is after the
notified date and the Petitioners therein cannot ask for payment u/s 42 of the Act. We find that in this Court excepting for the legal objection raised
as regards the maintainability and as regards the competency of the Tribunal to entertain and deal with the claims, no argument was addressed
before us on the merits. In fact, there is no dispute that under the deed of assignment the Appellants in each of the appeals are entitled to the
amounts as prayed for by them. We therefore feel it unnecessary to remit the matter for a re-enquiry by the Tribunal. We order the respective
petitions filed by the Appellants before the Estates Abolition Tribunal against which these appeals have been filed which would in consequence
enable the Appellants to receive the amounts claimed by them in such petitions. These appeals are allowed with costs. In appeal S.T.A. No. 25 of
1963, the Appellents shall recover the costs from the first Respondent only.