V.S. Remadevi vs State Of Kerala And Ors

The petitioner, who is stated to have retired from the services of P.G.M. Boys High School as a Headmistress, has approached this Court

impugning Ext.P3 order issued by the District Educational Officer, Pathanamthitta, as per which, she has been found guilty of making bogus

admissions in the School with a direction that the loss sustained by the Government on account of payment of salary to the Teachers and Non

Teaching Staff who worked against irregular posts be recovered from her.

The petitioner specifically says that she was suspended by the DEO, Pathanamthitta on 28.05.2010 and ordered to hand over charge to a certain

Smt.A.Jayalakshmi and that the latter was authorized to discharge normal duties of Headmistress and to draw and disburse salary of teaching and non

teaching staff till an alternative arrangement had been made. She adds that she was on commuted leave from 01.04.2010 to 24.05.2010, followed by

an accident and that the aforementioned leave was sanctioned by the DEO, Pathanamthitta; but that she was placed under suspension on the day

when the period of leave expired, which was revoked only on 24.03.2011, subsequent to which, she retired from the service, on attaining the age of

superannuation, on 31.03.2011.

The petitioner thus asserts that she had not played any role in the School admissions or the maintenance of records relating to staff fixation for the

academic year 2010-2011 and therefore, that she cannot held responsible for any salary paid to the staff or the teachers from the Government

exchequer for that year. She, therefore, prays that Ext.P3 be set aside and the respondents be directed to release her gratuity, which has now been

withheld, without any further delay.

The learned Senior Government Pleader, Sri.P.M.Manoj, submitted that a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the 2nd respondent, wherein,

it has been explained that the Supercheck cell of the Director of Public Instructions (now called the Director of General Education) verified the

physical strength of the School on 28.09.2010 and detected more than hundred absentees. He added that such an extraordinary absence necessitated

a revisit on 06.01.2011 by the same team and that these absentees were found to be absent on that day also. He says, it is, therefore, that action

against the petitioner was initiated, since she was working as a Headmistress of the School since 01.04.2008, till she was suspended from service on

28.05.2010. He contends that the bogus admissions detected by the Team on 28.09.2010 were actually made by the petitioner and her predecessors

and therefore, that she cannot shirk away her responsibility.

When I hear the learned Government Pleader on the afore lines, it is obvious that even the Educational Authorities have gone on certain surmises

and conjunctures to presume that the admissions detected by the Supercheck cell on 28.09.2010 “must have been made by the petitioner and her

predecessorsâ€​(Sic)

Obviously, there is no specific finding that the petitioner was responsible for these bogus admissions, particularly when it is admitted that she was

under suspension from 28.05.2010 and that prior to the said date, she was on commuted leave from 01.04.2010. Pertinently, she continued under

suspension till 24.03.2011 and retired from service on 31.03.2011. It is, therefore, factually indubitable that the petitioner was not in charge of affairs

of the school from 01.04.2010 until 24.03.2011, and that the charge of the Headmistress was held by some other teacher.

Ineluctably, therefore, the petitioner could not have been held responsible for the bogus admissions for that academic year and I therefore, find

force in her contentions, as voiced by her learned counsel, Sri.Vinod Madhavan.

In the afore circumstances and for the reasons above, I allow this writ petition and set aside Ext.P3 to the extent to which it relates to the petitioner;

with a consequential direction to the respondents to release to her the withheld gratuity, after issuing a non liability certificate in terms of the provisions

of the KER, as expeditiously as is possible but not later than four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.

I make it clear that the afore directions shall apply only to the question of payment of gratuity to the petitioner and that any other action that has

already been initiated against her will remain unaffected by my observations above.

At this time, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the disciplinary action against her client has ended up only in a censure and that no

further action had been taken. This is recorded.